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—By Omari H. Kokole

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—By Shivaji Ganguly

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AFRICAN-ARAB RELATIONS : A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

By OMARI H. KOKOLE*

In 1981, the largest contingent of Muslims from any one country making the annual pilgrimage to Mecca consisted of over 100,000 Nigerian Muslims.[1] *Six centuries previously, a fellow West African had undertaken perhaps one of the most memorable pilgrimages in Muslim history.* Mansa (*title of ruler*) *Musa, ruler of the West African empire of Mali ascended the throne in 1307 and in 1324 set out on his flamboyant pilgrimage, which was to awaken the world to the great wealth of Mali and to stimulate a desire among other nations to reach the source of this wealth. Cairo and Mecca received Mansa Musa, whose glittering procession helped to put Africa on the world map. Mansa Musa was accompanied by an impressive caravan consisting of 60,000 men including a personal retinue of 12,000 personal assistants, all clad in brocade and Persian silk. The Emperor himself rode on horseback and was directly preceded by 500 slaves, each carrying a gold-adorned staff weighing approximately six pounds. In addition, Mansa Musa had a baggage train of 80 camels, each carrying 300 pounds of gold. The historian al-Umari who visited Cairo over a decade after the Emperor's visit, found the Caireans (then a population of approximately one million) still singing the praises of Mansa Musa. So extravagant was the Emperor in his expenditure that he flooded the Cairo market with gold causing such a decline in the value of gold that one dozen years later the market had not yet fully recovered. Mansa Musa was of course, not the first Muslim ruler from West Africa to make the pilgrimage to Mecca,*[2] *but one of the consequences of his flamboyance was the advertisement of both Mali and its leader well beyond the African continent stimulating a desire not only among the Muslim kingdoms of North Africa but also some European nations to reach the source of his unbelievable wealth.*

Mansa Musa was domestically an able administrator who encouraged trade and commerce and patronized education and architecture. In the words of the Encyclopaedia Britannica :

> Under Mansa Musa, Timbuktu grew to be a very important commercial city having caravan connections with Egypt and with other important trade centres in North Africa. Side by side with the encouragement of trade and commerce, learning and the arts received royal patronage. Scholars who were mainly interested in history, Qur'ānic theology and law were to make the mosque of Sankore in Timbuktu a teaching centre and to lay the foundations of the University of Sankore.[3]

*Mr. Kokole is at the Centre for Afro-american and African Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA.

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Linking Mansa Musa and his fellow African Muslims and other Muslims worldwide is the pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca which every Muslim is obliged, circumstances permitting, to perform at least once in a lifetime. When this is accomplished the individual Muslim may assume the title Hajji. Today over one million pilgrims go to Mecca each year and many of these are increasingly from Black Africa.[4]

The cultural bond is Islam, clearly one of the most important political and social forces in many parts of Africa, both south as well as north of the Sahara. In terms of distribution, Islam is an Afro-Asian religion in the sense that the majority of Muslim nations and peoples are to be found either in Africa or Asia, although there are, indeed, some Muslim communities in Europe (especially Eastern Europe) and elsewhere as well. Islam is not only a highly developed religious system but also an established, distinctive and comprehensive culture embracing every aspect of human activity from theology to philosophy, from literature to architecture and the visual arts down to man's daily routine conduct. In this article we seek to explore the role of the Islamic factor in relations between Black Africa and the Arab world. Has Islam been a facilitator of, or an impediment to, collaborative efforts between Africans and Arabs ? Or has its role been more ambiguous and more complex than one would, at first glance, be inclined to assume ? What contibution has Islam made, what contribution is it capable of making to African development ? It is to an investigation of these questions that we propose to focus.

By professing Islam, Black African Muslims and their religious compatriots in the Arab world are united in one Muslim community or *Ummah*. Conceptually, Islam divided the world into *Dar el Islam* (the Abode of Islam) and *Dar el Harb* (the Abode of War). The Abode of Islam was by definition governed by shared values and principles and by shared allegiance to that ultimate of sovereigns *Allah* (God). Within the world of Islam the rules of inter-societal relations assumed the bonds of community. Muslims all over the world were supposed to constitute an *Ummah* (derived from the Arabic word for mother) i.e. a community and a people, with the culture of Islam serving as the binding factor necessary for social cohesion. The Abode of War, on the other hand, assumed that lands not governed by shared principles and not recognizing shared allegiance to the one God were potential theatres of war.

In African-Arab relations the cultural dimension of Islam has been nourished partly through the pilgrimage already mentioned, and partly through Black African presence at centres of Islamic learning in North Africa and the Arab Middle East. Islamic political culture and state-craft have also had considerable influence in Black Africa ranging from their impact on the political vocabulary of Ki-swahili to some of the earlier instances of state-formation on the continent. Some forms of resistance to European colonial intrusion into the continent were sometimes inspired by Islam. A substantial portion of western Africa's primary resistance to

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European colonization was indeed Muslim-inspired. In the words of Kanya-Forstner :

> Militant Islam presented the greatest challenge and mobilized the sternest resistance to the European occupation of Africa in the nineteenth century. Muslim polities with their written languages, their heritage of state-making, and the cohesive force of a universal religion preaching the brotherhood of all believers, could generally organize resistance on a wider scale than political units whose extent was limited by the tide of common ancestry. Muslims also had a strong incentive to oppose the advance of Christian power.[5]

In Northern Nigeria, when European pressures were getting too heavy for the leadership of the Sokoto-Caliphate in the nineteenth century, the latter thought of the *Hijra*, "obligatory flight from the infidels." Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu led a *Hijra* after the conquest of Sokoto, moving eastwards (as if moving, interestingly enough, in the general direction of Mecca and Arabia). As Michael Crowder put it :

> The British finally overtook him at Burmi and killed him. However, many of his followers continued to the Sudan where their descendants still live today under the chieftaincy of his grandson, Mohammadu Dan Mai Wurno.[6]

In the post-colonial period, Islam has become part of those movements advocating a process of de-westernization and a return to indigenous cultures. The Muslim disturbances in Kano and Yola in northern Nigeria in the 1980's are part of this phenomenon.[7] In this role Islam has had a radicalizing effect since it was mobilized as an ideology against the "*status quo*," both when the latter manifested itself in the form of colonial domination and as domination by traditional elements who were in collaboration with the forces of colonialism.

Islam has also been an important factor in the foreign policies of Egypt, Algeria and Libya, especially as a moral force behind their anti-imperialist campaigns. This has been particularly true in the case of Libya's diplomacy following the 1969 *coup* which brought Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi to power. Following the 1973 October War the Islamic factor in African-Arab relations was strengthened further with Arab funds flowing into Africa from the oil-rich Arab states. Countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates introduced a new vitality into African-Arab relations with more financial aid and a greater sense of missionary zeal. There has been considerable expansion in bilateral agreements between these countries and various African states, sometimes with the express ambition of creating or strengthening Islamic institutions of learning, in addition to the building of mosques as well as the granting of scholarships to Muslim African students.

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HISTORICAL ROLE OF ISLAM IN AFRICA-ARAB TIES

Historically, Islam has been an important factor in African-Arab relations, part of its importance stemming from the sheer length of its duration on the African continent (as long as in the Arab Middle East). Some scholars, therefore, have argued that it is as equally "native" to Africans as it is to the Arabs. It was very early in Muhammad's prophethood that African-Arab contacts, which had been ongoing for centuries across the Red Sea, began to acquire an Islamic dimension. To quote Muhammad Omer Beshir of the University of Khartoum :

> Islam's first contact with Africa was with Ethiopia. The Prophet, in the very early days of Islam, had advised his early followers to immigrate (*sic*) to Ethiopia to avoid persecution in Mecca. There they were well received and protected by the Emperor, despite strong representation by their adversaries. Tradition has it that the Prophet called for a special prayer—the first and only one of its kind in Islam— when the Emperor died.

Other emissaries seem to have been sent to the Ethiopian monarch by Prophet Muhammad ; some stayed, never to return to Arabia.[9] Present day Africa's triple heritage of indigenous, Islamic and Western legacies, argues Ali Mazrui in a fresh and exciting thesis, is just the modern culmination of a much older triple heritage—the heritage of indigenous, Semitic and Greco-Roman influences on Africa. The ancient Semitic strand, Mazrui goes on, has now narrowed and focussed more firmly on Arabic and Islamic influences while the ancient Greco-Roman strand has since expanded to include wider European and American intrusions. To use Mazrui's own words :

> The best embodiment of the ancient triple heritage (indigenous, Semitic and Greco-Roman) is Ethiopia.
> The best embodiment of the modern triple heritage (indigenous, Islamic and Western) is Nigeria.
> The whole cultural history of Africa is captured in the transition from the triple ancient personality of Ethiopia to the triple modern personality of Nigeria.[10]

Islam entered Egypt also in the seventh century of the Christian Calendar (albeit after the death of Muhammad) with the Muslim conquest of Egypt, and by the end of the century had reached the Atlantic. Islamization in Egypt was (unlike the case in Black Africa and the Persian Empire) paralleled by Arabization. By Islamization is meant the process by which Egyptians and later other North Atricans, were converted to Islam and became Muslims by faith. The process of Arabization, on the other hand, refers to the acculturation process by which Egyptians became, among

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other things, speakers of the Arabic language as well as being absorbed into other aspects of Arab culture. With time, Islamized Egyptians, and subsequently fellow North African Muslims, began to see themselves as "Arabs."[11] It took Islam centuries to consolidate its gains in North Africa and then gradually turn to the south.

In East Africa, Arabs and Africans mixed, as contacts continued, and a new coastal civilization emerged.[12] Swahili culture and the Ki-swahili language spread along the coastal areas of Eastern Africa until its influence over the Indian Ocean was briefly interrupted in the sixteenth century by the Portuguese. Today, contacts with the Arab world continue, stronger since the end of the colonial era and partly manifested in the growing numbers of African students seeking an Islamic education in the Middle East. In the case of Zanzibar, many Wazanzibari (especially Swahilized Arabs) invoked the "law of return" to the Gulf states following the bloody 1964 Zanzibari Revolution.[13] Later, with the help of various organized Muslim groups, including the Kenya African Muslim Political Union, the Afro-Arab Club in Nairobi and the East African Islamic Conference, further contacts occurred.[14]

In West Africa, Islam consolidated itself as a major presence in the Sudanic kingdoms, from the eleventh century onwards. Important urban centres, including institutions of Islamic learning, were developed at such places as Timbuktu and Jenne. At Timbuktu was established the first African University, itself another part of the Islamic progeny. The Italian traveller, Leo Africanus, is reported to have recorded the following observations upon visiting Timbuktu in 1550 :

> There you may find many judges, professors and devout men, all handsomely maintained by the King, who holds scholars in much honour. There too, they sell many handwritten North African books and more profit is made there from the sale of books than from any other branch of trade.[15]

Under the Almoravids (al-Murabitūn) West Africa witnessed the emergence of powerful Muslim reformers who were able to extend their influence to North Africa and even to Muslim Spain. Later, Islam grew in importance in the area with the rise of Mali under the *Mansas* in the fourteenth century and of Songhai under the *Askias* in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, another important phase in Islamic history in West Africa was underway and this lasted well after the coming of the Europeans. This period witnessed the establishment of Fulani and Tukulor rule over large parts of West Africa, extending from Senegal to Northern Nigeria. The colonizing armies of the French and the British, therefore, had to confront Muslim resistance under the leadership of what Abu Lughod once called "established political-mystic elites."[16]

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The Muslims of West Africa have maintained fairly uninterrupted contacts with the Arab world and this is partly reflected by the fact that during the nineteenth century two of the region's most important rulers had been educated at al-Azhar University in Cairo. The two leaders were al-Hajj Umar Tall and Muhammad al-Kānimī.[17] Umar Tall lived to build a large empire in what is today Mali while al-Kānimī lived to become the ruler of Bornu. The ancient ties of scholarship, and especially of trade between West Africa and the Arab North, have inspired a desire to renew them "giving a new meaning to an old relationship."[18]

With the end of the colonial era, Islam reasserted itself in some parts as a basis of community among Africans and as an expanding factor not only in the growing relations among the newly independent states of Africa but also in the wider African-Arab equation.

NATIONALISM AND ISLAM

Islam helped to convert the Sahara Desert into a cultural bridge that defied any attempt to sharply divide the continent into two segments ; one Arab and the other African.[19] Islam blurred the possibility of such a division of the continent partly by establishing a cultural and racial continum (as opposed to a dichotomy) that followed the routes of the trans-Saharan camel caravans over the centuries. With the advent of European colonialism, both the quantity and quality of goods and ideas across the Sahara probably declined but never entirely stopped. This trans-Saharan exchange was later ressurected partly by African independence and partly by the new efforts to reinforce Islamic culture within the Muslim communities north and south of the Sahara. The potentialities of the Muslim *Ummah* as a political force are partly premised on the fact that the over 150 million African Muslims who constitute a significant proportion of the inhabitants of the continent as a whole could be mobilized into a powerful resource. The late President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt grasped the broader implications of the Muslim constituency as a political resource some thirty years ago :

> As I ponder over these hundreds of millions of Muslims, all welded into a homogeneous whole by the same faith, I come out increasingly conscious of the potential achievements, cooperation among all these millions can accomplish—cooperation naturally not going beyond their loyalty to their original countries, but which will ensure for them and their brethren in Islam unlimited power.[20]

Yet the same Nasser came to exhibit a profound ambivalence concerning Pan-Islamism; he rejected a Pan-Islamic Federation and despite all the rivalry between Nkrumah and himself, he allied with Nkrumah because of a shared radicalism rather than with other Muslim heads of state.

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In practise, for Nasser, Pan-Islam came to be important as a cultural movement and not a s a politicel force. As Mazrui has observed :

> .. even in his Islamic activities, Nasser chose allies partly by reference to his other criteria of solidarity. If fellow non-aligned countries were also Muslim, this was an advantage. If fellow African countries were also Muslim, this was a special consideration, within certain limits. In other words, to be fully respected as a fellow Muslim in the eyes of Nasser you had to be something else as well. You had to be either a socialist, or an African, or an Arab, or a non-aligned radical. If you were none of those others, and had only the bond of Islam between you and Nasser you had in fact no bond at all. His links with Pakistan, Malaya, Turkey and Persia (Iran) were, on the whole, peripheral.[21]

Although African Muslims do not constitute the kind of homogeneous entity that Nasser was referring to in 1954, they none the lcss share an Islamic mystique that stems from a centuries-old Muslim culture and civilization that has influenced their sense of identity, making them at one and the same time both African and Muslim. Although this mystique has sometimes carried centrifugal tendencies within multi-religious societies in Africa, it has also been an important resource for social cohesion within those societies that are predominantly Muslim.[22] Clearly an Islamic consciousness did therefore exist in various Muslim societies in Africa and regardless of whether this awareness was mobilized to strengthen traditional structures of authority (and in this sense tended to be conservative in effect) or whether it was used as a radicalizing force against traditionalism, three broad consequences from it seem to have emerged.

First, a number of political parties and organizations that were based on Islamic solidarity and symbolism, if only partly so, were formed. Secondly, the popularity of some political leaders was partially influenced by religious sentiment.[23] Finally, Islam began to re-assert itself as an important and expanding variable in relations between Black Africans and the Arab world. During the period of nationalist upsurge and agitation on the African continent, Islam sometimes served as a special link between Africa and other Muslim societies. Islam was also a source of various ideas on how to combat colonialism and racism as well as the question of freedom from political association with imperial Europe. These ideas were to some extent transmitted during occasions of the pilgrimage to the holy sites of Islam. These ideas played their own role in raising national consciousness at home and in strengthening ties with the Muslim community (*Ummah*) worldwide.[24] Nasser was also quite aware of the political potentialities of the pilgrimage quite early in his leadership career :

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> I said we should change our attitude toward pilgrimage, that pilgrimage should become a great political power, and that pilgrimage should become a political conference. I called for regular meetings among leaders of Islamic countries during pilgrimage. I called for such leaders to meet, weak before almighty God but strong before their problems and enemies, dreaming of another life, and with strong faith in their particular place under the sun which they should occupy.[25]

Some of Nasser's radical compatriots in West Africa also seem to have perceived the possibilites that Islam presented. Modibo Keita of Mali and the late Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea Conakry are both good illustrations in this regard. In Lewis' words :

> Particularly in West Africa, as the heirs of a commercial and partly urban tradition concerned with long-distance trade and the pilgrimage, with at the same time a fund of Muslim knowledge and some command of a written language and administrative experience in both the pre-colonial and colonial regimes...local Muslims clearly possessed a unique heritage which could be applied to the development of modern nationalism.[26]

In Islam, both the Arabs and their religious compatriots south of the Sahara discovered a non-Western universalism that came to constitute, at least in part, the basis for an anti-colonial ideology that was sometimes manifested in a desire to return to indigenous cultures, or in a yearning for retraditionalization. To put it somewhat differently, Islam promised in varying degrees to both Arabs and Africans, the foundations for cultural nationalism. Lansine Kaba, a Guinean scholar, put it in the following terms :

> Islam in the 1950's was to mobilize and rally the African Muslims for liberation from colonialism....Given the importance of cultural issues in nationalism, one could see how Islam, the religion of the majority in Guinea and Sudan (now Mali) could be used for cultural nationalism and political mobilization.[27]

Young Muslim reformers were to struggle for Islamic reform against received Muslim traditional authority and the collaboration between these Muslim traditionalists and colonial authority. The *Wahhabiyya* reform movement in both Guinea and Mali as well as the older *Hammaliyah* movement in Senegal became the instrumentalities used against colonialism and its indigenous Muslim collaborators; they also "helped to prepare the ground for the emergence of the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain*" (RDA) and "played a determinant role in shaping the ideology and posture of the local branches."[28]

If the pilgrimage was one major transmission belt of political and

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cultural ideas from the Muslim world to Africa, al-Azhar University in Cairo was another. Under Gamal Abdel Nasser this ancient and widely respected institution of Muslim learning was both modernized and strengthened in order to continue to serve, or better still perform more effectively, in its old role as an important centre of Islamic scholarship.[29] Some of the al-Azhar alumni were at the forefront of the Islamic revival that occurred in West Africa and were also important participants in the development of a modern Muslim educational system designed to counter the French system of education. This Muslim education focused on learing the Arabic language and the *Qur'an*. The orientation of these Muslim youth then began to shift towards the Arab world,[30] a case one is tempted to say of, "Look east (towards Mecca) young man, look east," instead of "look north (towards Paris) young man," to paraphrase an old American saying—(Go west, young man, go west).

North Africa provided other educational opportunities for many West African students seeking an Islamic education. The nationalist movement in North Africa itself was also partly based on the ressurection of Islamic culture as a weapon for liberation from colonialism says Ibrahim Abu Lughod of the Northwestern University :

> .. the young Tunisians, the Moroccan refrom movement and later on, the Algerian movement of the early thirties and fifties, all worked directly within the framework of Islamic reform.[31]

Lughod goes on to observe that the *Salafiyah* reform movement was the cornerstone of North African Islamic reform.[32] The relatively young members of the movement challenged the authority and even the leadership credentials of the older, established brotherhoods. These brotherhoods, then under siege, had been dependent on French subsidies which the colonial system provided. Another writer, William Lewis notes that the brotherhoods "opposed emerging nationalist movements such as the *Istiqlal* and the *Neo-Destour* : the Moroccan and Tunisian movements respectively."[33]

The new nationalist leadership aspired to the credentials of "defenders of those religious values which continued to be cherished by broad segments of the population" and also "played major parts in leading their countries to independence."[34]

After regaining independence, the North African authorities undertook the modernization of *al-Qarawiyyin* in Fez (Morocco) and *al-Zaytunah* in Tunisia to make available a modern Islamic education in their role as the protectors and disseminators of Islamic civilization. To quote Lughod again :

> ...the higher institutions of learning, which monopolized theological education and which over the years had become outmoded and

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irrelevant, were (also) subjected to the reform policies of the new regimes.[35]

West African students who found their way to these institutions were initiated to the wave of Islamic reforms then sweeping across North Africa, and this in turn had an impact on their own intellectual evolution and emerging world-view. Upon returning to their respective societies, these students collaborated with those compatriots who had been to al-Azhar in Egypt in forming important Muslim organizations that included the *Subbanu al-Muslimin* (Muslim Youth) and later the *Union Culturelle Musulmane* (Muslim Cultural Union). These *beentos*, or returning students, became strong activists politically and through these newly formed organizations, became important actors in the RDA and US-RDA, transforming nationalism and giving it a "Muslim face" while also mobilizing Muslim symbolism that transcended colonial and territorial frontiers. Again, it is Lansine Kaba who provides one of the best characterizations of this process :

> (Islam) .. immediately appeared as the single most powerful ideology at the disposal of the nationalists to which the non-educated supporters could relate. Islamic symbols were not the only elements in nationalism, but they had decisive effects. The more Islamic was the orientation of the propaganda, the more it penetrated the masses. Thus, reform and nationalism became complementary, each contributing to the success of the other.[36]

Two inferences can be made from Kaba's observations. First, for West African Muslims, North Africa was beginning to be re-Africanized. To use Sulayman Nyang's (himself a West African Muslim) words, Islam provided for the "breaking down of the psycho-political barriers that separated for several years, the Black African from his Arab co-inhabitant (read Arabized compatriot) of the African continent."[37] It was partly through this burgeoning sense of Islamic solidarity that the Arabized African north of the Sahara could begin to feel that he was not only geographically residing in Africa but that spiritually and culturally he was also part of the continent. The Arab Africans began to feel that together with the Black African Muslims they were an indivisible part of the same great universal Muslim *Ummah*. Nasser in stating his well known thesis that Egypt had the credentials to be at the centre of three concentric circles (the Arab circle, the African circle, and the Muslim one) was in essence putting his finger on this phenomenon,. Thirty years ago he had stated :

> We cannot, in any way, stand aside, even if we wish to, from the sanguinary and dreadful struggle now raging in the heart of the continent between five million whites and two hundred million

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> Africans. We cannot do so for one principle and clear reason—we ourselves are in Africa.[38]

While he was still influential in his country, ex-President Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria made approximately the same point when he characterized the Algerian revolution in neo-Islamic terms, and after independence called on his partymen to highlight the Islamic strand in Algeria's personality when dealing with Black Africans.[39]

The second possible inference concerns the rise of Islam as an important factor in the politics of Pan-Africanism. This was partly the effect of the role that Islam had played in the nationalist struggles of both Black Africans and the Arabs. Partly because of its universalistic nature Islam managed to provide important connections : both horizontally as berween one West African Muslim and another and also vertically as between the West African Muslims as a collectivity and their Muslim brothers to the north.

Islam also provided a weapon, however ineffectual, against the West's technologieal superiority and cultural arrogance *vis-a-vis* Africans. Through a combination of nationalism, Pan Africanism and Islam, the beginnings of a process dedicated to end Africa's cultural dependency on the West could at last be initiated in some of these countries, even if sometimes inconsistently.

It was, of course, the westernized elites who replaced the imperial master in most of independent Africa. These relatively secular and westernized elites were sometimes challenged by their more religious compatriots. Instances of this conflict occurred both in Guinea and Mali. In both countries the secular westernized elites emerged triumphant. And yet the political elites still thought it prudent to cultivate and retain the goodwill of the Muslims, especially the *marabouts* (leaders).

A pragmatic *rapport* between Muslim groups and the governments was nurtured, the increasing secularization of the polity notwithstanding. Governments continued to sponsor a variety of Islamic cultural and social festivities and even helped in the building of mosques.[40] It would therefore seem that regardless of the strong tendency toward secularization among Africa's elites, Islam continues "to be an important force in Africa and its influence may be more substantial than would appear at first glance."[41] This is partly due to the omnipresence of Islam in "man's routine daily conduct" *á la* R.B. Serjeant,[42] which makes it even more difficult to separate religion from politics behaviourally even if the "church" (or mosque) was separate from the state institutionally. Even in the liberal democracies of the West, including the United States itself, as Ali Mazrui once argued quite persuasively, the institutional (or constitutional) separation of church from state has not resulted in a behavioural distinction between religion and politics.[43]

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Part of the strength of Islam in this regard derives from the fact that Islam is a religion-cum-culture that has very little organization, and is based on the Muslim's direct relationship with his creator, *Allah*, devoid of priestly intercession. In fact, the word "Islam" itself means the act of submitting or resigning oneself of God, and a Muslim is one who resigns or submits himself/herself to God. However, Islam also has a highly developed sense of social responsibility as witnessed for example by the fact that among the five obligatory practices of a believing Muslim is the payment of legal alms (*Zakat*). In early times this contribution was collected by officials of the Islamic state. Muhammad was founder of both a religious community and a political arrangement that developed into a huge empire after his death and devoted itself to the relief of the poor, debtors, aid to travellers, and other charitable and state purposes.[44] Nowadays the fulfilment of this religious obligation is left to the conscience of the individual believer.

The point to grasp is that the character of Islam has tended to tie Muslims to each other closely and to God intimately, and has provided them with a sense of cultural solidarity. It is partly this sense of religious solidarity that has helped or enabled African-Arab relations in the modern period to gather a new momentum.

Again according to some observers, Islam was a major contributory factor to Arab success in reducing Israel's influence in African countries. This was especially true in the case of those African countries with Muslim majorities that are "powerfully motivated by Islamic solidarity."[45] Another French writer, Henry Notat, is reported to have argued that Islamic solidarity had inspired many of the bilateral economic arrangements between the Africans and the Arabs.[46] For most of the 1970s, the consensus in the relevant literature has tended to be that Arabs seem to be more generous towards fellow Muslims in Black Africa in aid distribution and that bilateral ties between Africa and the Arab world (with a Muslim bias) seemed to be working out far better than the multilateral arrangements including the OAU and the Arab League which include non-Muslim African countries.[47]

ROLE OF ISLAM IN AFRICAN-ARAB COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Until fairly recently, the Islamic factor in the behaviour of Africans and in the orientation of African Muslims toward development (or modernization) has generally tended to be under-emphasized. The earlier negative attitude toward Islam originated party in the Weberian theorizing that tended to consider traditional belief systems as antithetical to development (or modernity) as we have come to understand it. For example, Ruth First once described Qaddafi's Islamic-based ideology as a groping "not to promote social and political change but to suffocate it." She also

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characterized the traditional origins of the ideology as basically "irrational" For her, Libya's irrational ideology was equally manifest in its foreign policy as well, for, after all, "Libya made her overtures to Amin on the strength of his attachment to the Moslem religion."[49] The "deviant" tendency to reject eurocentric cultures, especially in their capitalist and Marxist manifestations, and instead opt for an ideology based on traditionalism has further been interpreted as counter revolutionary and simply a "*petit-bourgeois* ideology" looking "for a third-way between capitalism and socialism" which in its search for more authentic roots finds "Islamic Socialism as an inevitable solution."[50] Three outstanding scholars of Islam (two of them Muslim, Abu Lughod and Ali A. Mazrui and I. Lewis), have all disputed this simplistic and ethnocentric interpretation of Islam and other "traditional" belief systems.[51]

The eurocentric Africanists' understanding of the new African leadership would seem to be seriously flawed These Africanists were perhaps more familiar with Africa's westernized elites who were leaders of the nationalist movement and agitation and who supervised the Africanization of political authority and control. Regardless of whether such a leadership was conservative or radical, capitalist or Marxist, that African leadership remained heavily intellectual and deeply westernized culturally. The ideas, mental processes, idioms and activities of these new elites betrayed a deep acculturation into western culture as well as an enduring intellectual dependency on the West. Says Ali Mazrui of the African intellectuals :

> ...the Christian impact on the first generation of modern African intellectuals, mainly through the efforts of Christian missionaries, ...the secularization of Africa's intellectual dependency from the *Bible* to *Das Kapital* . the penetration of western liberal ideas, the emergence of liberal-nationalist movements, the new fascination with socialist rhetoric and the triumph of Marxism as opium for Third World intellectuals, [was obvious.][52]

However the new leadership that came to power through military *coup d'etats* (through eurocentric *tanks* as opposed to its *ideas*) has tended to be basically rural in extraction and therefore more traditionalist in orientation as well as being distrustful of the westernized/urbanized elites. These "lumpen militariat"[53] have tended to lead African societies towards both cultural and economic liberation from western dependency. It has been suggested that this new leadership has done more for Africa's cultural and economic liberation "than the majority of the intellectuals."[54] Qaddafi, Amin (1971-1979), Mobutu, Thomas Sankara and Jerry Rawlings are all illustrations of this new generation of leadership.

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Libya's Role in Breaking Third World Dependency on the West

What role then is Islam likely to play in the new politics of the continent ? Only the future will reveal the full story. However, in the 1970s it was clear, with the emphasis placed on cultural authenticity in Libya (after Qaddafi's revolution in 1969) and in Algeria under the late (al-Azhar educated) Houari Boumedienne, that Islam was becoming the centre-piece of a new ideology dedicated to breaking the Third World's dependency on the West. Islam provided a new radicalizing influence independent of both western-derived Marxism and capitalism. Algeria initiated the raw materials debate at the United Nations in 1974 in an attempt to restructure the world economic order. This was followed by a special session of the General Assembly in 1975. Algeria's leadership also attempted to unite not just Africans and Arabs but the whole Third World in the struggle for a new international economic order devoid of economic dependency and exploitation of the Third World by the industrial North.

Qaddafi also emerged as a leader prepared to mobilize both Islam and oil to modernize his own country as well as encourage others to follow suit. In 1970 his economic radicalism was partly reflected by his attempts to control the wealth of his country by successfully demanding from the oil companies a 120 per cent increase in royalties within a brief two year period. By 1973, Libya's foreign reserves had risen to 2.9 billion and Qaddafi seemed determined to put this new wealth to good use both domestically, through extensive development plans, and externally, to strengthen Islamic ties with other Muslim communities, especially those in Africa.[55] However, Libya's diplomatic efforts were not limited to those African countries where Muslims constituted a majority nor indeed were these endeavours purely afro-centric or pan-Islamic for that matter. In a class by itself Libya has :

> ....Illicitly participated in the affairs of countries which range from the United States to Ethiopia, from Northern Ireland to Uganda, from Malta to Mali, quite apart from Libya's role in fellow Arab countries.. .It looks as if Libya has decided that if a superpower can declare itself unilaterally as the policeman of the world, so can a small country if the economic resources permit.[56]

Clearly, Libya was beginning to reverse the Northern Brobdingnags' monopoly of intervening in the affairs of others, especially the international Lilliputians of the South.

Several African government officials visted Libya during the course of 1974, including the Presidents of Niger and Chad.[57] During the same year Qaddafi visited Guinea Conakry and a mutual defense treaty was then signed. In the joint communique issued at the end of Qaddafi's visit, both leaders reaffirmed their faith in Islam and also expressed the conviction that for the two countries Islam constituted an ongoing (permanent)

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revolution in addition to being the basis for the unity of all Muslims.

Furthermore, Libya established an Islamic Legion, patterned after the French Legion, recruited from different parts of the world and available for speedy combat assignments. For most of the early 1980s Libya has been accused of having let the Islamic Legion loose on neighbouring Chad—occupying the northern parts of the country on behalf of one of the factions in the Chad Civil War, the faction of former President Goukhouni Oueddei who is now fighting his former Defence Minister and current President, Hissene Habre.[58] At one stage, Libya had proposed to swallow the whole of Chad. This was an extremely controversial declaration which alarmed many of Libya's black neighbours and seemed to introduce some stress into African-Arab relations. Both Oueddei and Habre are themselves Muslims from the northern part of Chad and one time colleagues in opposition and later in government. Clearly the problems of Chad is not religious as was widely (but erroneously) thought for a long time.[59]

At a cultural level, Libya has created an Islamic society for the purposes of protecting Islamic culture and also propagating Islam throughout the globe. One important consequence of Libya's African policy is the increasing Libyan enlightenment about Black African affairs especially through the mass media. African events have been featured on a regular basis in Libyan papers especially *al-Fajr al-Jadid* and its weekly special series *al-Usbu-cal-Thaqafi*. In 1974 Libya reorganized its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the process created a new department of Islamic Affairs under the political division of that Ministry.[60]

Libya's energetic/effervescent diplomatic efforts are partly reflected by the multiplicity of delegations that have visited the country since the 1969 revolution. These visitors have included heads of states as well as cabinet ministers from a variety of Black African countries and elsewhere. Ex-President Hamani Diori of Niger visited Libya twice during 1971, first in February and later in September. In the course of his second visit Diori attempted to mediate in the conflict between Libya and Chad. Ex-President Mokhtar Ould Daddah of Mauritania visited Libya in February 1973 and held economic and political discussions with the Libyans. Ex-President Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroun attended the second anniversary celebrations of Libya's revolution. Somalia's President Siad Barre, paid a visit to Libya during January 1972. Deposed President Idi Amin Dada of Uganda first came to Libya on 13 February 1972, and then once again during June of that year.[61] During the second visit by Amin, the Libyan Government appealed to all its citizens to make financial contributions to be sent to the Muslim minority in Uganda (Idi Amin was Uganda's first Muslim president in a predominantly non-Muslim society). President Amin's third visit to Libya occurred in June 1973. There were many visits after that which sometimes included stop-overs en route to other destinations. Amin's first home in exile was of course Libya although his first stop after flying from Uganda following his violent overthrow in April 1979 was

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Baghdad, Iraq. This seems to have been an indirect route to Libya calculated to confuse those who may have attempted to follow Amin on his final flight out of Uganda. Idi Amin has now of course moved to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to enjoy Saudi hospitality in return for his unusually consistent (by his standards) and extremely militant pro-Arab stand exhibited after he had broken ties with the Israelis in April 1972.[62]

The late Chadian President, Tombalbaye, first visited Libya in December 1972 ; during his visit talks were initiated to resume diplomatic relations between the two countries. For a while it seemed that the Chadian problem had been resolved ; however, events since then and more recently suggest otherwise. The President of Mali, Colonel Musa Traore first came to Libya at Qaddafi's behest in April 1973, after Mali, then like a handful of other African countries, had severed ties with Israel on 5 January of that year. A visit by the Vice President of Congo Brazzaville, intended to create closer ties between the two countries, took place in February 1970. During 1972 and 1973 other Black African dignitaries visited Libya for both political and economic reasons and these included visits by Niger's Army Chief of Staff, the Foreign Minister of Mali and the Foreign Minister of Burundi. After his first presidency, Ghana's young and charismatic leader, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, was reported to have made an unofficial, if controversial, visit to Libya. He seems to have been placed under arrest soon after his return to Ghana only to maneouvre a second military *coup* that brought him back to power in December 1931. Both Jerry Rawlings and his Upper Voltan colleague and friend, Colonel Thomas Sankara, seem to be in the good books of Tripoli and this has occasioned some alarm and unease among their more conservative neighbours.

From the Libyan side, Qaddafi himself, as well as a large section of his top officials, have paid a number of official visits to Black Africa (King Idris never did this). Qaddafi visited Mauritania in February 1972. A high-powered Libyan delegation visited Somalia in October 1971 and yet another Libyan delegation visited Cameroun during the same month. The Libyan Islamic Council was part of the Government delegation that visited Cameroun partly in order to acquaint themselves with the Muslim community in that country. A personal representative of President Qaddafi visited Zambia in order to express Libya's support to Zambia in the face of white-ruled Rhodesia's (now Zimbabwe) intransigence and belligerent posture well before the black-majority rule was finally introduced in April 1980.

As part of the growing cultural wing to its relations with Black Africa, Libya signed an agreement with Niger in connection with the establishment of an Islamic Institue in Niamey, the capital city of that country. Another agreement created the Libyan-Nigerian Friendship Society. A separate cultural agreement was signed with Upper Volta on 28 February 1972, for purposes of developing cultural relations, partly through the

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exchange of teachers and lecturers ; provision of scholarships for exchange student programmes ; and encouragement of the dissemination of scientific, cultural and artistic publications and materials between the two countries. Finally, Libya was to participate in the building of an Islamic institute in Dakar, capital city of Senegal.[63]

From the early 1970's to the present, Libya's activities, designed to strengthen its relations with its neighbours, have been received with both apprehension and suspicion in that these activities are perceived to be novel. In reality, Libya's relations with Black Africans are much older and consist of continuities of African-Arab history as well as contiguities of geography that are seldom discussed or even well known. Tripoli used to be the terminal of an important long distance trans-Saharan trade route that extended southwards upto Kano (the centre of the Islamic states) and to Bornu. This was the case until the first half of the 19th century. The trade routes passed through Ghadames and Ghat. By the time of al-Bakri's reign in the 11th century, trade on this route was both highly regularized and flourishing.[64] There were at least two other trade routes that terminated in Tripoli. One such trade route was from the east of Tripoli through the Fezzan area to Lake Chad and the second one, even further east, from Cyrenaica *via* Kufra to Wadai. Says Thomas Hodgkin of these routes :

> These trans-Saharan connections—commercial, diplomatic and religious—remained close, of course, well on into the 19th Century... by this time it was the Tripoli-Kano axis that was of the first importance.[65]

And despite the latter-day shrinking in volume of the trans-Saharan trade some forms of contact still remain, especially between the Libyan coast across the Sahara, partly through the instrumentality of the nomadic Tuaregs and others :

> ...through the Senussi confraternity through the use of the Hausa language ; through family ties [the] Tarabulsis and Ghadamsia resident in the Western Sudan, West Africans, or Fezzana who have not forgotten their West African origin [while] settled in Tripolitania and Tunisia.[66]

Nasser Initiates Islamic Politico-Cultural Cooperation

Qaddafi was of course deeply influenced by the philosophy and the thoughts of the late General Nasser.[67] So deep was this influence that Qaddafi even came to see himself as a successor to the former Egyptian President as far as leadership of the Arab world was concerned. Nasser had tried to forge an Islamic identity for the new political culture that the Egyptian revolution (which he helped to initiate) hoped to consolidate. A reformed and radicalized version of Islam was to become an important

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force behind Nasser's anti-imperialist policies and rhetoric, and this would hopefully liberate the entire Muslim world. In his speech to an Islamic Conference in Cairo in 1953, Nasser had the opportunity to say :

> We should know that the Arab world and the Islamic world are facing today one enemy and are cooperating against one disease— the enemy is imperialism and the disease is disunity and abandonment of the fight for the cause of God.[68]

Subsequently al-Azhar was reorganized as a sequel to the declaration of the National Charter (July 1961) and henceforth it was given a new role of communicating to all Muslims, wherever they may be, Egypt's new revolutionary message. The National Charter would therefore seem to have returned (or re-ancientized) al-Azhar to its old role of propagating the message of Allah and the building of a new society based on, if only partially, that message.[69] This new society was to be based on Arab Socialism derived from socialistic tendencies in Islam as understood and interpreted by Egypt's modernized and radicalized religious authorities. The fusion between Islam and socialism seemed easy enough. Says Mazrui :

> Islam can...be allied quite credibly with socialist thought and ideas. In the Arab world this trend to marry Islam to Socialism entered a new phase under Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Egypt and under the Baath parties in Syria and Iraq. M.I. Hazma's short study, *Muslim Socialism and the Western Theories of Socialism*, published during the Nasser years, was a good illustration of the effort to identify socialist principles in Muslim theology and Islamic law.[70]

The anti-imperialist orientation of Nasser's Egypt also included an Islamic ideological factor and the strategy here was to create a progressive Islamic force that would ensure the realization of the political objectives of this policy. In order to stress the importance of al-Azhar's new role as a modernized institution of Islamic learning, indoctrination and propagation, it was placed under the direct supervision of the office of the President of Egypt.[71] Missions from al-Azhar to various Black African countries with Muslim population, prior to their departure for their destinations south of the Sahara, underwent intensive programmes designed to educate them about the culture, surroundings and social organization of the Africans they were about to meet. An African institute designed for this special kind of training was established by the Egyptian Cabinet and the Institute continues to operate in Cairo to this day.[72]

Nasser saw in Islam a potential for political radicalism that could be mobilized in Africa and he proceeded to exploit this potential accordingly with a view to win over allies for the revolutionary cause he was waging against imperialism. In order to achieve his objectives he employed the following modalities :

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(i) Scholarships were provided to Black African students to attend al-Azhar University as well as other institutions of higher learning in Egypt.
(ii) The position of a special religious (Islamic) attache ; to be part of Egypt's diplomatic missions in a variety of Black African countries, was created.
(iii) Various Islamic congresses and conferences were organized and the pilgrimage came to be recognized as the single most important Muslim gathering.
(iv) A broadcasting service called 'Voice of Islam' was established for the purpose of broadcasting special Islamic programmes to the *Ummah* world-wide.
(v) Publications specializing in Islamic affairs and studies were sponsored.[73]

After al-Azhar had been reorganized and put directly under the office of the President it proceeded to, among other things, establish centres for Islamic cultural activities in Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Zanzibar, Tanzania, Somalia, Mauritania and Sierra Leone. Scholarships (monthly allowances and free accommodation) for the study of various Islamic subjects were awarded to students from a number of Black African countries. These students mainly from Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Upper Volta, went to all branches of al-Azhar, its elementary schools, high schools and the university proper.[74]

The reorganization of al-Azhar was paralleled with the establishment of a Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs designed to supervise Egypt's activities in and relations with other Muslim communities world-wide. The council was also responsible for the development of an Islamic-oriented mass media. It accordingly supported the publication of a number of Islamic-related documents in a variety of languages as well as running the "Voice of Islam" at Radio Cairo, the latter being dedicated to beaming to Africa Islamic programme broadcasts. The programmes were usually in Arabic though some indigenous African languages were also used (Hausa and Ki-Swahili pre-eminently among them). The "Voice of Islam" began its operations in 1964.[75]

The late Anwar Sadat, before he became the President of Egypt, was also actively involved in the country's Islamic activities. As Secretary General of the Islamic Congress, Sadat was responsible for the coordination of Egypt's Islamic policies albeit under the direct supervision of President Nasser himself. The Congress was converted into an agency of the office of the President of Egypt, This itself demonstrated the importance attached to Islam by the new leadership as a useful link between Egypt and Muslims everywhere, including those in Black Africa.[76]

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The Islamic Congress was instrumental in organizing Islamic conferences and even participated in conferences held outside Egypt. The political ambitions of the Congress included the desire to ensure that these conferences would reaffirm and strengthen the solidarity of Muslims in their anti-imperialist struggle in the Afro-Asian worlds where they were in a majority. Nasser attempted to develop the Congress into an additional instrument for Egypt's policies dedicated to reducing Third World dependency as well. This orientation was partly reflected in the role Egypt played at the 1954 Islamic Conference held in Nairobi, Kenya. The conference, thanks to Egypt's inspiration, called for the establishment of an Islamic Bank, Islamic Chambers of Commerce, cooperation in the exchange of technical and educational experts and development of Islamic education within the African continent.[77]

Clearly, then, during the colonial period, Egypt did open its educational doors to African students, providing scholarships in subjects ranging from engineering to Islamic theology. Some scholarships were for children to complete secondary school in Egypt, Others were for militant insurrectionists from places such as Cameroun, Kenya and South Africa.[78] After 1960 (16 African countries became independent during that single year) cultural agreements were signed between Egypt and several newly independent states in Africa such as Burundi, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey (renamed Benin in 1975), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania and Togo. The agreements provided for exchange of teachers, educational curriculums, scholarship students, the translation of written materials, certificate equivalencies, scientific and educational materials, special broadcasts and athletic teams.

Between 1970 and 1971, Egypt despite its weak economic base and the heavy military expenditure for defense against Israel, still lent Black Africa a total of 1,100 specialists. Four hundred and seventy-eight of these specialists received remuneration directly from Egypt. Also, the number of scholarships Egypt awarded African st dents soared to an impressive 1,640.[79]

These Nasserite policies resulted in some degree of consolidation in cultural bonds between Africa and the Arab world. However what is debatable is whether the immediate political objectives that Nasser had hoped to achieve were ever realized. What is clear however is that Nasser had resurrected and reinvigorated ancient historical ties that were over ten centuries old. These ties, as will be illustrated, have been consolidated but at the same they have become more complex.

Saudi Arabia Extends Diplomatic Cooperation

Since 1967 onwards, the Asian-Arab states have also become active participants in African affairs. From a strictly religious point of view

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Saudi Arabia has had a fairly uninterrupted relationship with Africans, mainly through the annual pilgrimage (undertaken by thousands of Africans) and partly through the influences of the *Wahhabiyah*. In addition Saudi Arabia has exchanged various missions with many African countries. Saudi petro-dollars have also found their way to Black Africa. The late King Faisal visited five African countries in 1972 as part of the increasingly important cooperation between Africa and the Muslim world. According to some Saudi official sources the aim of the visit was the "strengthening of relations between Muslim Africa and the Arab world."[80]

Of the five countries that King Faisal visited (Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Uganda) only Uganda had a Muslim minority, although its head of state at the time (Amin) was Muslim. Chad and Senegal, their Muslim majorities notwithstanding, had Christian presidents at that time. But with Abdou Diouf's succession to Leopold Senghor as President of Senegal and the presidencies of Hissene Habre and Goukhouni Oueddei in Chad the situation has since changed.[81] Officially, Saudi Arabia's policies in Africa were aimed at "cooperation, coordination and mutual help."[82] King Faisal had hoped that his visit would facilitate closer cooperation for African liberation, liberation of Arab territories from Zionist occupation, consolidation of Islamic ties, as well as enhancing the welfare of Muslims generally.

King Faisal's African hosts expressed strong Islamic sentiments for him and also drew his attention to the Islamic bond in African-Arab relations. The Niger National Assembly President, Boubou Hama, in a welcome address remarked : "The Islamic faith was brightening up the world at a time when countries were being torn apart by violence and bloodshed... and that Islam could correct an increasing tendency among men to worship materialism which is smothering the spirit of humanity." Hama then went on to call for the unity of all Muslims in the spirit of Islam "to act together to activate authentic values, the power of the spirit in the service of the faith, for the profit of man."[83] As for the joint communique from Kampala, it stated *inter-alia* that, "the two leaders (Idi Amin and Faisal) pledged to strengthen the Islamic faith as a contribution to international brotherhood among peoples of various races throughout the world."[84]

In March 1972, a conference of 31 Foreign Ministers from Muslim countries was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This conference decided upon the formation of an Islamic Bank. The conference also denounced the Israeli occupation of Arab lands.[85]

Since the October 1973 War, Saudi Arabia has expanded its diplomatic efforts in the African continent and has made important contributions to the various financial arrangements under the aegis of the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity. This is quite apart from the various bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and individual countries in Black Africa. In March 1977, during the first Afro-Arab Summit

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Conference held in Cairo, Saudi Arabia pledged the single largest aid package to Black Africa ($ 1,000m).[86] Besides Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have all been involved in various degrees of financial cooperation with Black Africa.

The Saudi Arabian Government has also awarded numerous scholarships to African students to study at the Islamic University of Medina ever since the institution was created in 1961. (See Table II) The relevant figures are relatively modest especially when compared to the volume of scholarships African students received from the developed countries. Yet it has to be remembered that Saudi Arabia itself is a Third World country, the subsequent oil wealth notwithstanding, and in a period of less than a decade after the creation of the University of Medina it opened its educational doors to others even before the momentous quadrupling of oil prices in the early 1970s. In the 1980s, upwards of two thousand young Muslims from 90 countries (mostly from the Third World) have been studying in Saudi Arabia. The phenomenon of young Muslims flocking to Saudi embassies has been increasing and is likely to continue to do so especially as more and more Muslims receive elementary and secondary education in their own countries and then desire to complement this with education of an Islamic college or university in the Muslim world.

However, Saudi scholarships have not always been received ungrudgingly in Black Africa. A 1978 article in *The Daily Times* of Nigeria is reported to have discussed the reasons why Nigerian students from the Rivers' States refused to accept scholarships from Saudi Arabia. It would seem that the Saudi stipulation that all eligible students first study Islamic law during their inaugural three years undermined the enthusiasm of the prospective students from Nigeria.[87] Another factor that discouraged Nigerian students, especially non-Muslims, was the austere, restrictive and constraining Islamic law and life style in force in that country. As a people leading a, by and large, secular lifestyle in the cities of Lagos, Ibadan and Port Harcourt, it is not difficult to see how many Nigerian non-Muslims or even non-practicing Muslim youth would find it difficult to operate in Saudi society.

Saudi interest in the welfare of Muslim minorities in Africa has also been considerable. The Saudis have organized conferences to ponder the plight and welfare of Muslim minorities who find themselves in otherwise predominantly non-Muslim societies. The range of such minorities is from the Muslims of Uganda to those of the Phillipines, from Soviet Muslims to Chinese Muslims.[88] There is even an Institute for Muslim Minority Affairs headquartered in Jeddah, complete with a sophisticated and well managed bi-annual journal of its own entitled, *Journal : Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*. The Institute initially affiliated to the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah had by 1982 started a more antonomous existence of its own. Part of the seriousness with which Saudi Arabia

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handles the issue of Muslim minorities can be gauged from the scholarships-related table. (Table II)

The rivalry and competition for influence in the Arab world between the Saudi monarchy on the one hand and Nasser's Egypt, as well as other radical forces in the Middle East on the other, also seems to have pushed Saudi Arabia toward cultivating friends abroad, including the Black Africans. Israel's relatively successful diplomatic penetration of Africa roughly from 1957 to 1967 also motivated Saudi Arabia to befriend Black Africa partly in a bid to isolate Israel. Saudi Arabia capitalized on its credentials as the ancestral land of Islam and custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina (the Holy Kobaah is in Mecca and in Medina Prophet Muhammed is buried) and mobilized Islamic sentiments in Africa and beyond, winning friends and influencing believers in the process.

One cultural institution at the disposal of Saudi policy in Africa was the *Rabetah al-Alam al-Islami* (the Muslim World League). This is a body of learned Muslim scholars from various parts of the Muslim world who provided a good deal of support and legitimacy to royal functionaries in Mecca, Jeddah and Riyadh. Although theoretically autonomous, the *Rabetah* is financially dependent on the Saudi Government. The fact that the *Rabetah* has repeatedly affirmed that the Saudi authorities were governed by Islamic ideology and precepts has converted it into a political instrument capable of being used in Saudi policy in Africa.

Saudi Arabia had already begun to outstrip Egypt in influence in Africa following the latter's defeat and humiliation in the June War of 1967 and in the wake of the rapid growth and development of the Saudi economy in the 1970s through the quadrupling of oil prices. The first major achievement of Saudi leadership was in 1969 when, largely as a result of King Faisal's efforts, most of the Mustim nations world-wide gathered in Rabat, Morocco, to attend the first Summit Conference of Muslim leaders in modern history. This was a diplomatic triumph on the part of the Saudi monarchy over the radical Arab nationalists, then led by Nasser, and was probably a brain wave of King Faisal himself, albeit under the inspiration of the *Rabetah*. The leaders of the *Rabetah* had themselves done the preparatory groundwork partly through a number of trips to Muslim countries and partly through the convening of a prior Islamic conference in Mecca. The creation of this conference organization plus the consolidation of the *Rabetah* afforded Saudi Arabia greater attention and viability in the Muslim world. Both organizations are of course headquartered in Saudi Arabia and this, in many Muslim minds, has enhanced the prestige and legitimacy of the kingdom abroad. Saudi diplomatic and consular missions have since the mid-1960's distributed thousands of copies of the *Qur'an* and other Islamic literature to Africans. The Saudis have also undertaken to translate Islamic literature into such African languages as Hausa, Ki-Swahili and Yoruba. Finally, there has been the use of African languages on radio broadcasts by "Radio Islam" (Sawt al-Islam)

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based in Mecca. In 1975, the government instructed "Radio Islam" to broadcast in at least seven languages.

There are currently over 2000 African students in Muslim institutions in Saudi Arabia.[89] There are also three Saudi-based organizations that are busy assisting these Muslims who are interested in propagating and consolidating Islam in their countries. The first is the *Dar Ul Ifta*, the Islamic guidance unit affiliated to the Saudi Ministry of Education. Although originally intended to foster and consolidate the faith inside Arabia itself, *Dar Ul Ifta* has begun to spread its wings to the outside world. This institution has sent out Muslim teachers to teach both Arabic and Islam to many African countries, Complementary and of great assistance to *Dar Ul Ifta* is *Rabetah al-Alam al-Islam* (The Muslim World League). This organization, as indicated, has been directly involved in African Muslim cultural affairs for many years.

The *Rabetah* has been astute enough to cultivate important African Muslims, including the late Sardauna of Sokoto and the late Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse of Senegal. Today, it is an influential organization in the Muslim world, with regional branches in Asia, Europe, Africa and America.[90] Clearly, Saudi affluence has facilitated its expansion.

The Saudis have also tried to purify Islam. With regard to Africa, both the Saudi Government and the *Rabetah* have attempted to frustrate the *Ahmadiyyah Movement*. Orthodox Muslims are opposed to this Islamic sect that was founded by "Prophetic Pretender" Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in British India. Ahmad claimed to be a prophet. The Ahmadis have been expelled from the mainstream Muslim community of Pakistan since 1974, mainly in response to Saudi royal pressures (and encouragement !). Since then, the Saudi royalty has encouraged African Muslims to follow the Pakistani model by expelling their own Ahmadis. Efforts have also been made to improve the African understanding of Islam ; towards this purpose, scholarships have been awarded by the Saudi authorities. The Saudis have firmly supported the Islamic News Agency, an affiliate of the OIC—an agency dedicated to keeping the Muslim world informed about global events.

Following instructions from King Faisal, the Islamic University of Medina sent a special mission to Africa in 1966 to collect information concerning Muslims in the countries it was to visit partly in order to facilitate the allocation of scholarships in proportion to needs. The mission was also instructed to provide funds to various Islamic institutions of learning in those countries. The mission visited Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rhodesia, Sudan, Zaire and Zambia. Since those early days, Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing Arab states have, as we have attempted to show, used a combination of Islam and oil wealth to consolidate ties and strengthen cooperation between the Arab world and Black Africa.

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Algeria Strengthens Ties with Black Africa

The Maghreb states (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) have also had na important, though somewhat different, relationship with the African states south of the Sahara. Algeria, partly because of its oil wealth and partly because of its heroic struggle against French imperialism, has demonstrated a unique leadership role in African-Arab relations.

> Algeria, among the Arab oil producers, is perhaps more pan-African than pan-Islamic. Its relatively radical orientation has made it more responsive than other oil-producing states to Third World solidarity regardless of religion. In terms of material support for Southern African liberation movements, Algeria is more pan-African than the majority of African states, both black and Arab.[91]

Yet, the late Houari Boumedienne's own background and his devotion to the puritanical and ascetic values in Islam also contributed to his success in forging Algerian unity and economic growth domestically. A combination of internal stability and a sense of revolutionary mission, moderated by pragmatism, pushed Algeria to the frontlines of efforts at African-Arab cooperation. Algeria's role in initiating the struggle for a new international economic order and for reducing Third World dependency through the use of economic resources and political stability has earned for it the admiration of many Africans as well as others in the Third World.

Colin Legum once asserted that the late Houari Boumedienne was one of the "most respected members of the African family."[92] Boumedienne's popularity among African leaders began to rise to some extent after he dispelled the suspicions that accompanied his *coup d'etat* against Ben Bella in June 1965. Boumedienne was particularly successful in cultivating some of the African radical leaders who had previously been close to deposed Ben Bella, including the late Sékou Touré and Julius K. Nyerere.

Boumedienne's pan-Africanism was to some extent reflected through the successful Pan-African Cultural Festival held in Algiers in 1969. Through the festival (which was probably the first most important cultural and artistic event for continental Africans ; later followed by the FESTAC held in Nigeria in 1977) Algeria provided an opportunity by which existing differences could be reconciled. In the words of Samir M. Zoghby :

> The 1969 Algiers Cultural Festival, with all its shortcomings, with all the criticism it generated, attempted and succeeded in getting Africans—black and brown—Muslim, Christian and Animists, western-oriented and eastern-oriented, French speaking and English-speaking—to think and feel on a continental basis, thus transcending the various tendencies and orientations of the two shores of the Sahara, often considered a barier, but, in fact, an avenue of contact and interaction.[93]

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In his opening speech at the festival, President Boumedienne reaffirmed the basic oneness of all Africans :

> We succeeded in triumphing over the forces of oppression. That alone is a sufficient reason for us to give African culture, and therefore to universal culture, the time, place and care we are now devoting to it. This is why we wanted this festival to be the meeting of hope and rebirth, as well as an enthusiastic and lucid understanding to recover and assert our *basic oneness* (emphasis added).[94]

The emphasis that the late Boumedienne was placing on the liberation of one's culture from the hegemony of the North was partly rooted in this particular leader's conviction that :

> ...freedom, nationhood, personality...were but the product and origin of culture....We quite naturally recognized the vast role of culture long before the social sciences made of culture the pernicious instrument of domination or a materialistic form of entertainment, that it was the basic cement of all social groups, its prime means of intercommunication and understanding of the outside world, its reflection and transendency, its soul and its essence, its expression and its ability to change.[95]

Algeria, under Boumedienne, was to embark on a cultural revolution whose ambition it was to eliminate cultural dependency partly by invoking a "law of return" to Islamic authenticity. This was a monumental task especially in view of the lengthy period of French imperialism and the devastating consequences of France's aggressive cultural policy during the colonial era. For this purpose, President Boumedienne initiated a policy of re-Islamization which began, much to the chagrin of Algeria's Berber population, by establishing some Islamic symbols for Algeria. The heroes who were chosen to inspire this cultural revolution included those Algerians who had struggled against the French imperial policy of assimilation and who wanted to reform Islamic practices that were taught by self-imposed semi-literate *marabouts*, who in any case were collaborators with the colonial authorities.

The cultural nationalists belonged to an Islamic association that included al-Sheikh Ben Badis. Like other modern Muslim reformists, these nationalists were committed to Islamic revival and they rejected *in toto* French assimilation policies.[96] Both al-Amir Abdul Qadir al-Jaza'iri (the man who led the Algerian resistance to French occupation) and al-Shaikh Ben Badis became celebrated heroes and symbols of the revolution.

Under Boumedienne's leadership, the Algerian Government encouraged the building of mosques, particularly at Constantine (Algeria's Islamic cultural "capital") where President Boumedienne himself had been a student prior to his departure for al-Azhar in Egypt. It was also at

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Constantine that al-Shaikh Ben Badis defiantly asserted against the French myth of "*Algerie Francaise*" (Algeria is French) by proudly declaring, "Algeria is my homeland, Islam my religion and Arabic my language."[97] Through the Ministry of Traditional Education and Religious Affairs, the Algerian Government popularised the teaching of classical Arabic as an ideal mechanism to gain a better Islamic education. This was expected to reverse the supremacy of French as the medium of instruction. In order to accomplish this, mosques were re-converted to their traditional roles as centres of learning for the community. The *imams* of these mosques were to be the new teachers. In addition, the Algerian authorities undertook the building of more schools and hired teachers from other parts of the Arab world with a view to accelerating the pace of change in the direction it had in mind. This educational programme was not limited to school age children alone ; it soon encompassed civil servants who were supposed to attain a particular level of competence in reading and writing Arabic before they could be promoted.[98] Algeria's ambition was, in the tradition of Nasser and the Baa'th parties in Syria and Iraq, as already mentioned, to marry socialist ideology to an Islamic *Weltanschauung* (comprehensive world view), the same world view that had inspired the heroic struggle against French imperialism, a process in which probably over a million Algerian lost their lives.

During the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the 1954 revolu tion held in November 1974, Algeria stressed the points of contact (or linkages) between revolution, politics and symbols in the minds of contemporary revolutionaries. This was done in a way which confirmed the continuities of the Algerian revolution, *viz*. Algeria's moral and educational support for the Arab and African struggle against settler regimes and imperialism in Palestine and Southern Africa, and its leadership role in a developmental model that hoped to combine traditionalism with aspects of modernity within the framework of socialistic justice.[99]

The continuities of the Algerian revolution were stressed partly by linking 1954 to 1830 ; this would demonstrate the resilience of the tradition of resistance through armed struggle by the various Algerian insurrectionists. In the modern period these continuities are nourished partly by the role of the Algerian Army as it also participates in the creation of a modern revolutionary state with the army helping to protect, consolidate and further enhance the gains of the revolution. The army in Algeria has been involved in developmental ventures, especially rural development.[100] The late Boumedienne himself referred to these continuities in his festive speech during the 20th anniversary celebrations :

> November was not the dawn of one of the greatest National Wars of Liberation in the world alone, it was the explosion of a time revolution that destroyed with the arms it carried the tyranny

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> (of imperialism), then it put aside those arms and replaced them with the tools of construction—though they are always available when they are needed—so it can give to independence its full significance and establish the foundation for a society based on freedom, justice and peace.[101]

The Algerian revolution was also to extend itself southwards, partly by participating in the construction of the Saharan Highway of African Unity as part of the process of stengthening Algeria's ties with Black Africa. The highway is supposed to be 1,800 miles long and would facilitate and expand economic interaction between north Africa and the Black African countries. It is hoped that it would revolutionize trade patterns and return this trade to its pre-colonial orientation. The highway is to go through Algeria, Mali and Niger.

> By the time the entire route is finished to Agadez, unofficially estimated for the late 1980s, a person will be able to drive on covered road from Algiers on the Mediterranean coast to Lagos, Port Harcourt, or Guinea. All land-locked nations of the Western Sahel, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger and western Chad will be open to this traffic.[102]

It was also hoped that the highway would bring about closer cooperation between the Black African countries (especially Muslim) countries of the Sahel and north Africa. A large portion of the highway is being built with the help of youth labour of Algeria; they are participating in this project as part of their compulsory military training.[103]

The Islamic component in both Algeria's internal and external policies is a continuation of the ideological framework within which the 1954 revolution was initiated with its supreme ambition being the establishment of a "democratic Algeria with Islamic principles." As for its external dimension, this involved the internationalization of the Algerian revolution and the realization of African unity within its Arab and Islamic components.

The Islamic factor in Algeria's relations with the rest of the African continent has clearly been integrated within the broader identity of the country. Algeria's triple heritage consists of the African, the Arab and the Islamic components. The strands together have afforded the country a high degree of respectability as a progressive and revolutionary state in Africa, the Arab world as well as the entire Third World.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion one may say that, by professing Islam, African Muslims in Black Africa and the Arabs belong to the same Muslim community (*Ummah*). For centuries the cultural dimension of Islam has been maintained partly through the pilgrimage "Hajj" and partly through Black African

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attendance of institutions of Islamic education in both Africa and the Arab Middle East.

Doctrines of Islamic reforms did have political ramifications in both Africa and the Arab world. These sometimes took the forms of nationalist agitation against colonial rule and later became part of the longing (nostalgia) advocating cultural de-westernization and a return to indigenous cultures. Islam has in this particular sense been a radicalizing force.

Islam also became an important instrument for Arab policies in Africa, especially for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria and Libya. For some of these Arab states Islam had earlier been an important resource during their own anti-imperialist campaigns at home. This is particularly true of Libya's diplomacy under Qaddafi although in his case he has sometimes over-played the Islamic card, creating stress and strain in some African-Arab relations. The proposed merger between Libya and Chad in the early 1980s provides one illustration in this regard.

Following the 1973 October War, the Islamic factor in African-Arab relations has been strengthened further especially with the help of Arab petro-dollars flowing into Black Africa. Oil rich countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates did introduce into African-Arab relations a new dimension with more aid and a greater sense of Islamic missionary zeal. Bilateral agreements between individual Arab countries and various Black African countries have steadily increased. Quite often some of these agreements have placed particular emphasis on strengthening institutions of Islamic learning, building mosques as well as awarding scholarships to Muslim African students.

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TABLE I

The Muslim Population

COUNTRY	TOTAL (m)	%
Arab Countries in West Asia		
Iraq	10.6	95
Syria	6.4	87
Jordan	2.6	95
S. Yemen	1.7	98
Kuwait	.9	99
Qatar	.2	99
S. Arabia	7.2	100
Yemen	5.2	99.5
Oman	1.5	99
Lebanon	1.3	40
UAE	.6	90
Bahrain	.3	98
Palestine	2.6	—
Total	41.1	
African-Arab Countries		
Egypt	34.5	92
Algeria	16.6	98
Sudan	14.5	70
Somalia	3.5	99
Djibouti	.9	98
Libya	2.5	98
Morocco	16.5	95
Tunisia	5.5	95
Mauritania	1.5	100
Total	96.0	
African Countries		
Angola	?	?
Botswana	?	?
Burundi	0.7	20
Cameroun	3.4	55
Central African Republic	0.9	5
Chad	3.4	57
Comoro Islands	0.5	90
Congo-Brazzaville	0.2	15
Dahomey (Benin)	1.0	15
Ethiopia	18.3	65
Equatorial Guinea	?	?
Gabon	.2	3
Gambia	.3	85

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Guinea	4.0	95
Guinea Bissau	0.5	?
Ghana	2.8	30
Ivory Coast	1.7	24
Kenya	3.9	30
Lesotho	10.1	10
Liberia	0.5	30
Madagascar	1.4	20
Malawi	1.7	35
Mali	4.9	90
Mauritius	0.1	19
Mozambique	2.2	29
Namibia	0.3	5
Nigeria	59.8	66
Rwanda	?	?
Senegal	3.8	95
Sierra Leone	1.8	33
Swaziland	.4	10
Togo	1.1	55
Tanzania	5.0	30
Uganda	3.9	12
Upper Volta	3.9	56
Zaire	2.4	10
Zambia	0.7	15
Zimbabwe	?	?
Total	140.3	

Muslims in Asia (other than the Arab countries) 500m

Muslims in other parts of the world 4.6m

Total 782m

Source : Mohamed Omer Beshir, *Terramedia* : *Themes in Afro-Arab Relations* (London, 1982) p. 35-36.

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TABLE II

Medina University Scholarships to Muslim Students from Africa and Elsewhere (1967)

	COUNTRY	NO. OF STUDENTS
1	South Vietnam	2
2	Jordan	10
3	Palestine	6
4	Ghana	2
5	India	3
6	Kuwait	2
7	Bahrain	1
8	Maldive Islands	2
9	Pakistan	2
10	Syria	5
11	Eritrea	6
12	Somalia	2
13	South Africa	2
14	Comoro Islands	1
15	South Korea	2
16	Japan	1
17	Liberia	2
18	Nigeria	3
19	Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	6
20	Turkey	1
21	Cameroun	3
22	Phillipines	4
23	Tanzania	3
24	Ivory Coast	6
25	Guyana	2
26	Mali	2
27	Indonesia	3
28	Madagascar	1
29	Thailand	3
30	Mauritius	1
31	Yugoslavia	1
32	Togo	3
33	Upper Volta	1
34	Niger	4
35	Sierra Leone	I
36	Uganda	5
37	Kenya	4
38	Greece	1
39	Morocco	1
40	New Zealand	1

Source : *News from Saudi Arabia*, 29, August 1967.

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INDIA AND ASIA : CHANGING PERSPECTIVES

By PUSHPESH PANT*

Inaugurating the Asian Relations Conference some thirty-five years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru had mused that both India and Asia were poised on the threshold of a new period of history – a watershed dividing two epochs of endeavour. The colonial world was crumbling and old empires were being transformed into young nations. The dynamic continent of Asia was slowly finding itself again and stirring to take its place.

In the years immediately after India's independence its foreign policy was informed and marked by a strong Asian consciousness. The transition from this Asian phase to global concerns has disturbed many Indians as it is felt that it was only due to its Asian orientation that newly independent India was able to carve out for itself a prominent role in world affairs. However, it is useful to remember that when imperialism was establishing itself India was the hub of its power. Colonial control of China or Iran hinged on it. It is difficult to escape the conclusion then, that Nehru's consciousness was shaped more by anti-imperialist fervour and not merely conditioned by a vague awareness of an Asian identity.

To many persons Asia today is just a geographical expression—a continent which unlike Europe or Latin America is not dominated by a single culture. The term Asia is used by most non-Asians to mean diverse things; "Asia" is usually distinguished from the Islamic World, and China and Japan are excluded.

It is easy to exaggerate the strength of cultural bonds that unite the Asians. The vast Asiatic continent has seen the flourishing of at least three major civilizations—Indian, Sinic and Islamic. These divisions are further complicated by ethnic and racial differences and not much useful purpose can be served by trying to base programmes for peace and stability in Asia on this elusive shared heritage and kindred identity.

In the aftermath of the Second World War there was a keen desire on the part of the Asian countries to work together, to confer together and to look to one another to accelerate the process of decolonisation and to consolidate their newly won independence. This was undoubtedly due to a feeling that the Asian countries might still be exploited or dominated by Europe or countries elsewhere. Against such a backdrop, India could not be ignored.

Nehru strove throughout his life to build and reinforce an Asian personality inspite of many obstacles so that the Asian nations may be better equipped to grapple with complex challenges they were confronted with. He was

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not entirely successful in this heroic endeavour. There is no point in lamenting over the failure. That phase is over.

What should be remembered and emphasised is that the Indo-centric Asian policy was not born of some idle fancy of a whimsical leader but had emerged from the material facts of life. The international scene has altered considerably with the passage of time and Indlan perspectives on Asia have changed correspondingly. To many of us it seems, at times at least, that todays problems are quite different from the challenges of yesteryears. We cannot solve out individual or regional problems unless we look at them in a global perspective. What then remains of the concept of Asia ?

NEED FOR A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF ASIAN PERSONALITY CONCEPT

The euphoria of earlier years has passed and many concerned persons have begun to ask themselves whether at this historical point in time the kind of problems the Third World is facing can be solved at all within an "Asian framework." The days of romantic nostalgia are over and a more hard-headed business-like reassessment of the concept of Asia and the "Asian Personality" is underway.

It is true that during the first half of this century - particularly in the second quarter—various people in Asia had experienced a swell of fraternal feeling and were bestirred by a strong sentiment of solidarity in their struggle against colonial exploitation and oppression. It is worth remembering that even during this phase it was politics not culture that proved to be the unifying impulse. It was this aspiration to assert their political independence that provided the inspiration for the Brussells Conference of of the Oppressed People in 1927 and imparted a strong momentum till the Convention of the Asian Relations Conference in 1947. This unity of purpose—dramatically successful—was, however, transient in nature and should in no way be confused with a manifestation of cultural homogenity or derived from an awareness of an Asian identity. It would be naive to expect that the nebulous Asian identity/personality can crystallize or emerge to project and promote collective (Asian) interest. Ironically two major Asian actors—China and Japan—do not always or readily identify as constituents of "Asian Culture." It is obvious that the Chinese and Japanese hardly consider themselves sharing a cultural heritage with Saudi Arabia. It is time that we rid ourselves of these romantic delusions and come to terms with this problem in a realistic manner.

INDIA'S RESPONSES TO THE ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

When we shift our attention to security considerations, this difficulty persists. Security in India, or China, or Japan, or Indonesia cannot be meaningfully analysed within the framework of anything like Asian solidarity. From the point of view of promoting Asian security there are any

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number of focal points and these are not necessarily congruent. The security problem of Japan and their perception at any given time may be divergent from that of China. Similarly in threat perceptions and policy perceptions, to counter them India and Pakistan are almost diametrically opposed.

At the same time it is impossible to overlook the imperatives of Asian security. Security of India or for that matter any country, is an integral part of the overall security environment in the region. Be it the Indian Ocean power politics or the Kampuchean Conflict it has an important bearing on the security arrangements on the continent. While it is true that the category of an Asian personality may not be very relevant in the consideration of these problems—it may not be adequate to comprehend all the complexities – one cannot wish away the geostrategic constraints. It is in this context that the validity of Asia as a unified concept remains. War and peace on the continent of Asia are indivisible. One can easily speculate that in the next five years or so the various Asian countries which are at different levels of confrontation with one another shall discover that intra-regional disputes and conflicts may continue but there are possibilities of managing these without inviting external intervention. The commonality of regional security interests urgently needs to be identified.

Southeast Asia's strategic significance to Asia needs no elaborate explanation. Southeast Asia flanks two major nations of the world—India to the West and China to the North. The area was one of intense activity and competition among the colonial powers – the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British and the French. It is from their bases in Southeast Asia that the colonial powers pursued their policy of semi-colonial subjugation *vis-a-vis* China. Subsequently, for the Japanese Southeast Asia was to be the fulcrum of their coprosperity sphere. Many of these historical memories may no longer be valid but the human mind is more susceptible to pressures of the known past than the unknown future. Since both India and China have such memories, Southeast Asia is an area of competing concern for both. Presence of great powers and their operations directed against each other and the states in this region are matters of natural concern to the two big nations and particularly to India which unlike China has no nuclear deterrent.

The history of Vietnam has been one of millenia-old struggle to prevent China from its southward march. Some of the most fierce anti-colonial wars, prolonged insurgencies and genocidal violence took place in this area in the last thirty-five years and some of them are still continuing. Inspite of the much vaunted economic progress of the ASEAN this remains an area of intense turbulence.

While the ASEAN countries have a general pro-western orientation there is no agreement among them on the nature of threat they face. For Thailand and Singapore, the primary threat is posed by a unified Vietnam

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backed by the Soviet Union. It is necessary to keep in mind the role these countries played during the Vietnam War and hence the consequent apprehensions. Secondly, ever since the United States normalized its relations with China and began playing the China card and talking of China's legitimate interests in the area, Thailand, true to its tradition, started readjusting its diplomatic alignments. Singapore has a pronounced anti-Vietnam bias. This perception is not shared by Malaysia and Indonesia though to sustain the ASEAN solidarity they are prepared to go along upto a point with Thailand and Singapore. The Philippines is interested more in retaining the United States on the support for the Marcos Administration. For some of the countries it is easier to talk of the threat that is not there in the interest of solidarity than to talk of a threat that is actually there and divisions on perceptions which may split the ASEAN. Indonesia and Malaysia have a greater stake in the solidarity; for these two countries the basic threat to the region arises out of China and not from Vietnam. They see Vietnam as a dyke against the pressures of China in Southeast Asia. Given Vietnam's own population size, its economic potential and its reconstruction needs, they do not perceive Vietnam as expansionist beyond the Indo-Chinese perimeter.

It is this realisation that has shaped Indian responses to various strategic developments. In the Southeast Asian context, the independence, unity and strength of Vietnam is obviously in India's national interest. At the same time, close friendly relations with the ASEAN countries are also in India's interest. What is detrimental to Indian interests is the continuing quarrel between ASEAN and the Indo-Chinese states.

In South Asia, the principal external threat to peace and stability relates to Pakistan. Developments in Afghanistan are integrally related to this. India has given any number of indications that it is formally and firmly committed to the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Pakistan. India would like to work for a policy-frame so that the partition and consequent modifications, such as Bangla Desh can be convered into an internal political arrangement within the sub-continent which would render it immune to external forces—no longer a house divided against itself.

The pity is that the Pakistanis have no interest in exploring this area as the immediate interest of the rulers are better served by leaving these questions buried. Pakistan had been deprived of economic assistance to the extent that it had to borrow $ 100 million from a commercial bank. Things changed with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The developments in Afghanistan altered the strategic forces of the United States locating Pakistan in the eye of a storm. Quite a few Pakistani leaders perceive this as an opportunity to grab. Pakistan might not attain all the objectives it seeks in the current phase but it cannot be overlooked that certain role has been assigned to it by the Americans. There is no need to go into details but India's security interests have to be defined in this context.

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Regrettably the big powers persist in their attempts to implement misconceived strategic designs in Asia. Most of Asia's security problems can be traced to these external machinations.

India today is acutely conscious of the fact that it is in the midst of a prolonged period of uncertainty. Historical processes have unleashed powerful forces and the social ferment in the wake of decolonisation is not over yet. This is as much true of Pakistan as of the Philippines. India itself has not remained untouched. So, to build stable relationships and have an undistorted strategic perspective one cannot rely on only ground realities of today. India like others has to anticipate what might happen in ten years and provide for alternative courses of action.

India's perception of the Asian security environment is linked up with its overall view of the world. India realizes quite well that ultimately there is a single totally integrated security structure in the world which starts with the Super Powers and their manipulations in the rest of the world. If this as a fact of life is overlooked the quest for regional security would be like pursuing a mirage.

It is not necessary to go into details of individual cases like Kampuchea or Afghanistan. India's prime consideration in the current phase of what has been called the Second Cold War is to devise ways and means to shield its own area from turbulence and to safeguard its development from external intrusions. Naturally, emerging threats to peaee and stability in India's immediate environment take precedence over all else.

India has constantly striven to have normal relations with Pakistan. Yet successive governments of that country have chosen to base the survival of their country on the idea of confrontation with India. This has stood in the way of mutually beneficial regional cooperation. The Pakistani ruling elite continues to seek legitimacy in the medieval notion of seeking and reinforcing national identity in religion. This has complicated the settlement of disputes. Pakistan often enough has been set on a course of pointless and seemingly endless conflicts with India. Pakistan has been used by some external powers to offset India.

With the Indian Ocean region being caught in the web of great power rivalry in its strategic-nuclear as well as politico-economic dimensions there has been a corresponding deterioration in India's strategic environment. What makes the situation more serious is the conflictual relationship among the regional powers, which makes it easier for the great powers to exploit local animosities and gain a foothold in the region. This coupled with the interventionist strategy and coercive diplomacy of the great powers makes the threat of the destabilization of the whole region a very real one and naturally India cannot afford to watch it complacently. It is thus necessary for India to view its security environment from a new perspective and attempt to create a new strategic consensus in Asia.

India has two major powers to the north and the United States' Central

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Command enveloping the West and the Indian Ocean. India does not want any one of these three major powers to flank it in the east and southeast. Once Jawaharlal Nehru described CENTO and SEATO as encircling alliances. Therefore it is in India's interest to support the development of regional resilience in Southeast Asia which would help keep out the strong extraregional power presence of China, US and USSR. This is likely to come about only with a strong Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Not that India has anything against a strong Thailand provided the Thais would adopt an independent region-oriented foreign policy but their dependence in terms of capital, technology and emotional security appears to preclude that possibility for the present and foreseeable future. Some in this country, in the light of the memories of the Sukarno period, may have some reservations about a strong Indonesia. However in the light of the current military equation between India and Indonesia such fears will not be justifiable. India has to strengthen ties with both the Southeast Asian and Westasian countries. It has to emphasize that the security and stability of any one country in the region is of great importance to the others, for the area between the Mediterranean and the Pacific is an integral region. Without some degree of cooperation and understanding among the countries of the region it is virtually impossible to reduce great power interference.

The two Super Powers are continuing their navel deployments in the Indian Ocean. With the setting up of the United States' Central Command in the Indian Ocean area their naval activity is bound to increase still further. This in turn would have an impact on the Soviet naval activity in the area. The United States maintains its fleets in the South West Pacific (7th fleet at the Subic Bay) and in the Mediterranean (6th fleet). The Soviets too have their naval forces in the Pacific and the Mediterranean. Consequently the Indian Ocean deployments of both powers call for continuous transfer of ships from one fleet to another. In this respect the Southeast Asian waters become an important communication zone for both fleets.

The Andamans and Nicobar group of islands are strategically located at the entrance of the Malacca Straits. Apart from their having a million population there are good prospects of offshore oil in the area. The islands also constitute a good forward observation post to monitor the fleet movements in and out of the Indian Ocean. The possession of these islands are vital from the point of view of India's title to significant areas of sea-bed in the Bay of Bengal. All these factors would emphasize the need for a strong military presence in the islands and a capability based on the islands to monitor foreign naval activity in the area.

Almost a decade ago Srimavo Bandaranaike had emphasised that a peace zone in the Indian Ocean was imperative for the region "to develop trends towards integration and cooperation.. ," and recognizing and accepting this India has continued to lend firm support to the United Nations

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Resolution demanding that the Indian Ocean should remain a zone of peace and free of "any manifestation of great power military presence .. conceived in the context of great power rivalry." In seeking recognition for the peace zone concept India's approach has conformed to its primary objective of a eommon continental security perception assuring mutual survival, development and prosperity.

NEED FOR ACCOMMODATION/COORDINATION IN ASIA

India and China stand out in Asia—in the whole developing world—as between the two they have a range of human potential "who fire rockets in space, split atoms, or synthesize insulin." There is today a certain amount of justifiable pride in India when contemporary China seems to be adopting and adapting the Nehruvian strategy of development. This vindicates the Indian claim that India's self-reliant model of development is relevant for others.

Even today when China seems to have turned a full circle it is necessary to guard against naive optimism. It is difficult for most Indians to be reassured about the genuineness of Chinese declarations of friendship. It is difficult to forget that the Sino-Indian clash of arms in 1962 and the years of tension preceeding it were detrimental to the evolution of Asian solidarity. It was discord with China that shattered Nehru's dream of one Asia.

Nor can it be overlooked that despite professed commitment to normalization the Chinese seem to be in no hurry to accomplish this. Pinpricks like the episode during the Asian Games persist and continue to vitiate the atmosphere. Under these circumstances it becomes difficult to be certain of the Chinese response to any fresh overtures.

Yet there has been a remarkable transformation in the general Indian attitude towards China in recent years. With a receding perception of Chinese threat it has been possible to embark on the normalization of relations. At the same time there is an understanding that there can be no easy restoration of the euphoric warmth of the early fifties. India does not believe in permanent estrangements but much to India's disappointment the past three decades have failed to fulfil the initial hope that India and China would "constantly live in peace, learn from one another and cooperate constructively."

It is necessary to emphasize, that Indians today are no longer burdened with the trauma of '62. They realize that the border dispute was the outcome of a complex set of circumstances and that no useful purpose would be served by mutual recriminations. But there can be no question of making any concessions to China in quest of normalization. India has always taken considerable pains to convey to China that we are not in competition with them nor do we entertain any hostile intentions. But we

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cannot obviously remain indifferent to actions that seek to retard, obstruct or disrupt our orderly progress.

It is difficult to get over the impression that China is not going to make any concession on the border issue. May be they could do so in the recent past because of the volatile domestic balance of forces when factionalism was rampant. Keeping this in mind India has to continue pursuing the border settlement and accord it greatest priority. It should at the same time realistically strive for a controlled measure of development of relations so that tensions between India and China do not become explosive. China too seems to have realized that it stands to gain nothing from sustaining a stance of hostility towards India.

Ever since the first moves were made in 1978 to improve Sino-Indian relations, the Indian side has time and again made it amply clear that it regards the border question as central to any improvement in Sino-Indian relations. It has, however, not allowed this issue to obstruct the process of normalization of bilateral relations. In June 1981, when the then Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited India, he conceded the need to tackle this longstanding dispute. At the first three rounds of official level talks – two in Beijing and one in New Delhi—the two sides catalogued the points of dispute and stated the principles which each felt should be followed in settling it. In the New Delhi talks each side expressed its willingness to reconsider the proposals made at the earlier round of talks. These included the Chinese suggestion for a package plan which India had rejected as well as the Indian proposal for a sector by sector approach which had not found favour with China. The two sides also intended to come up with an agreed set of common principles that "should govern the settlement."

The points that emerged at Delhi are no less significant. Firstly, it was agreed that any settlement would not ignore historical evidence, custom and tradition. Admittedly this is going to be no easy exercise. However, more important was that the two sides concurred on the undesirability of the use of force in acquiring territory. Obviously for India the second point has a dual significance in respect of both the past and the future. A permanent solution to the vexatious border dispute would not only pave the way for greater interaction between the two countries, but in the long run it would be in China's interests in as much as in India's. On the whole, the two sides now seem to display a greater appreciation of each other's difficulties.

There has also been a good measure of progress on the question of cultural and educational exchange programmes as well as in respect of science and technology.

Japan merits India's attention today because of the global importance it has assumed. India and Japan have no clash of interest in Asia or elsewhere. There is no irritant to cordial ties. India is beginning to note that

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contrary to popular notions Japan's foreign policy is independent of the United States. The security perception of Japan is also different.

At the same time, difficulties in the way of accommodation coordination of interest with Japan cannot be wished away. For some incomprehensible reason, for the Japanese "Asia" ends with Burma; they tend to regard India as outside their concept of Asia. The recent changes in Japanese leadership are being watched with great interest by India; maybe this perception will now change.

Japan's impressive technological and economic progress has made the United States apprehensive and if this continues the US-Japan ties cannot remain unaffected. In due course Japan might be constrained to search for closer ties and more substantial relationships with its Asian neighbours.

While the Japanese model of industrialization has prompted many peopie to attempt an emulation, the memories of the wartime intrusion in Southeast Asia continue to linger on. The Japanese alliance with the United States in the post-war years also complicated Japan's relationship with its other Asian neighbours. While others are apprehensive of Japanese designs, it can also be noted that the Japanese on their part too are rather suspicious of potential competitors. Viewed against the above perspective, it has to be conceded that Japan's interest in India at present is at best peripheral and that in the prevailing environment there are little, if any, prospects of dramatic or substantial improvement in Indo-Japanese relations.

What is clear is that there are no simple solutions to these complex problems but that India must give more attention to Asia. The countries in Asia have been politically free for quite some time but the continuing interplay of international forces still impedes their struggles against economic backwardness.

We should realize and readily concede that each country in Asia has its own heritage and distinct personality which it naturally wishes to develop in its own way. But at the same time one cannot lose sight of the fact that there is a vital community of interests. To protect and promote this community of "Asian" interest it is useful to recall that—"when we look after our own home first only than can we be effective in a larger circle." What is really important is to look at our problems in the global context, relate the two and build a dialectical relationship between them.

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WORLD FOOD SECURITY AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES*

By B.M. BHATIA**

An important factor of international economic relations today is that the developed market economy countries produce much more food than they need for their own consumption while the developing nations have to import food-grains at heavy cost from the former to feed their growing population. The cereal imports of all developing countries in 1978/79—1979/80 amounted to 86.2 million tonnes. Of this only 9.2 million tonnes was received in food aid from the developed countries ;[1] *the rest had to be paid for. Food imports thus imposed a big strain on the external payments account of the developing countries.*

That, however, is not the only or even the major problem in the distribution of world food supplies between the developed North and the poor South. Because of their poverty, the average daily energy in-take per person in the latter group of countries in 1974-76 was 2180 Kcal compared to 3315 Kcal in the former. Out of the total population of 2259 million (excluding China) in developing countries, 435 million or over 19 per cent were under-nourished.[2] *At the root of the low levels of food consumption and under-nourishment in these countries, lay the poor performance of agriculture. As against 5.4 tonnes per hectare in the developed countries, the average yield of paddy in the developing countries in 1974-76 was 1.9 tonnes and that of wheat 1.9 and 1.3 tonnes respectively.*[3] *The close association between under development, backward agriculture and under-nourishment of a large section of the population needs to be noted.*

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The reason why the developing countries are unable to produce sufficient food to feed themselves, and their agriculture suffers from low productivity, lies in the historical past. Even before the turn of the present century, the balance of advantage in agricultural production had begun to shift in favour of the New World countries, namely, USA, Canada and Australia against the old agricultural countries of Asia and Africa. With vast tracts of virgin land available for cultivation, and sparse population on the one hand and use of farm machinery and highly productive inputs like chemical fertilizers on the other, these new countries achieved high growth rates of agriculture.

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At the same time the older countries began to suffer from over-crowding of agricultural land because of growth of the population and decline in the land-man ratio. With the feudal agrarian system, which inhibited both capital investment in permanent improvement of land by the land owner and harder work by the farm r in the cultivation of that land, crop yields of these countries first fell and then became stagnant at dismally low levels. The net result of all these factors was that by the early decades of the present century, many of these countries that had earlier been food exporters were turned into net importers of foodgrains. A glaring example of this change is the Indian sub-contiment, comprising the three South Asian countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The sub-continent was an annual exporter of wheat and rice in the nineteenth and the first two decades of the present century. By the turn of the fourth decade, it had become a net importer. By the end of the decade the net annual imports averaged 1.38 million tonnes (imports 2.07 million tonnes minus exports 0.69 million tonnes).

Yet another feature of the food situation in the developing countries is the high degree of instability that characterises their agricultural production. This is due to the vagaries of nature. Taking all these countries together, the variations from the trendline may not be large; the estimated variation for Asian countries is 6 per cent. But in individual instances, the variation can be as large as 20 per cent. In India, for example, the output of food-grains which stood at 131.8 million tonnes in 1978-79 fell to 108.4 million tonnes the next year, which means a decline of about 18 per cent. Because there exists such a precarious balance between demand and supply in most of the developing countries even in normal years, any failure of crops sends them scrambiing for supplies of food from the developed exporting countries. At the same time if there is a failure of crops in a developed country and it enters the international grain market in a big way, prices of foodgrains could rise inordinately making it all the more difficult for the poor countries to get their required supplies of grain from the food surplus countries.

This is precisely what happened in 1973 to cause the world food crisis.[4] As a result of the failure of its crops in 1973, the Soviet Union made a purchase of over 15 million tonnes that year from the United States. This sent the wheat prices soaring up to an unprecendented peak at home. The New Orleans export price of US wheat rose from $63.80 per tonne in August 1972, to $ 103.60 per tonne in December 1972 and to $ 221.60 per tonne in February 1973. It has been reckoned that 60 to 80 per cent of this price rise was attributable to the Soviet Union's heavy purchases in the Americon market, devaluation of the US dollar, the exhaustion of US agricultural surpluses given away earlier in food aid in the 1950s and 1960s and decline in the world food output in 1972-73.[5] The rest of the rise was due to the desire for liquidity in staples on the part of many governments that

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control their grain trade. The knowledge that North America (USA and Canada) could no longer be relied upon to serve as the world's residual grain suppliers and for holding the price line in the world grain trade, had an unsettling effect on food-importing countries which began indulging in panic buying. Even though 1973-74 was a world record crop year, it failed to remove thefear that another crisis of the type and magnitude of 1973 could overtake the world at any time in the future. It was in this background of anxiety over the emerging imbalance between world demand and supply of foodgrains and rising trend of food prices that the World Food Conference was convened in November 1974.

GLOBAL FOOD REGIME CONCEPT MOOTED

The discussions at the Conference centred principally around "food aid," "emergency relief" and "price stabilization" measures through creation of food reserves. According to a resolution adopted, the Conference felt that a reserve aid combination should,

> .. assure the availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic foodstuffs, primarily cereals, so as to avoid acute food shortage in the event of widespread crop failures, or natural disasters; sustain a steady expansion of production and reduce fluctuations in production and prices.[6]

The Conference thus envisaged a new global food regime which would have at its centre a world food security agency that could at the very least transfer supplies so that every one would "have enough," assure that unanticipated local shortfalls would be made good and stabilize prices and production.

The Conference unanimously adopted the International Undertaking on Food Security that had been drawn up by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 1973, to serve as the basis of its discussion for creating a global food security system and taking collective action in the matter. International collective action in this context really meant action on the part of the rich nations. The Undertaking, among other things, called for an agreement on international trade and grain prices, building up of an international reserve for meeting shortfall in food production in any part of the world caused by the vagaries of nature, strengthening the food production base in developing countries and affording special assistance to these countries for their stocking programmes. Obviously the implementation of these measures required close cooperation and the willing support of developed countries. There were, of course, some innocuous provisions like the establishment of an effective international food information and early warning system which did not involve any cost or any material contribution from the rich countries.[7]

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While the Undertaking drew universal acceptance and commitment to its provisions at the Food Conference, the "follow up action" on implementation was tardy and, in large measure, disappointing. The Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture was set up in 1975 and it became operational in 1976. For accelerating growth rates of agriculture in developing countries, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was established in 1977 and became operative in 1978 with a capital of US $ 1000 million. But since the Conference, the flow of resources that has taken place on the whole from the rich to the poor nations for agricultural development or even for building an effective food security system falls far below the requirements of the case.[8]

The kingpin of the whole scheme of world food security embodied in the International Undertaking was, however, the proposed "International Grains Arrangement." It was generally envisaged at the time of the Conference that the main elements of the International Undertaking would be translated into a legally binding instrument through the conclusion of an international grains arrangement agreement which would clearly define the rights and obligations regarding reserves, prices, special assistance of developing countries and other provisions essential for world food security. Likewise, it was thought that a minimum food aid target of 10 million tonnes in cereals adopted by the World Food Conference would be achieved through legal commitments under a new food aid convention.

After almost four years of discussions and negotiations, the United Nations negotiating conference on a new "international grains arrangement" agreed on the achievement of this target but was unable to reach agreement on a number of essential elements of a new Wheat Trade Convention, including the size of the reserves, prices and special assistance to developing countries. It was adjourned *sine die* on 14 February 1979.

It was in view of this adjournment that the Director General of FAO drew up a voluntary Plan of Action[9] envisaging a return to the concepts and pledges of the International Undertaking and focusing on some of the most immediate food security problems especially of the low income food deficit countries. For the purpose of our discussion here, the most important feature of the Plan of Action was that it emphasized the need for national and collective regional action on the part of the developing countries themselves to secure their food needs by mutual cooperation and collective action on a regional basis without waiting for the successful culmination of the international grains agreement envisaged in the International Undertaking. *Interalia* the Action Plan called for :

1 Adoption of foodgrain stocking policies;
2 Formulation of criteria for management of release of national stocks held in pursuance of the Undertaking;
3. All donor countries taking special measures to assist low income

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food deficit countries to meet the latter's current import requirements and their emergency needs;

4 Making special arrangements for food security assistance ; and

5 Action on the part of developing countries for collective self-reliance.

On this last point, calling upon the developing countries to organise themselves for collective self-help in the matter, the Action Plan required :

(i) The international community should recognize the urgent need for fostering the collective self-reliance of developing countries in the vital sector of food security;

(ii) To this end, developing countries should intensify their efforts to establish cooperative arrangements, including the setting up of regional reserves to strengthen their food security and collective capacity to meet emergency food requirements; and

(iii) In particular, the government concerned should consider joint action on reserve stocks held nationally or regionally; mutual assistance in time of crop shortfalls, special trading arrangements among developing food importing and food exporting countries, and joint investment ventures in food production as well as exchange of technology.[10]

ACTION OF THE NON-ALIGNED

It was in this background of gloom over the prospects of reaching the international grains agreement envisaged in the International Undertaking, due to the intransigence of the developed food exporting countries, that the consequent call given by the FAO led to action on this issue by the non-aligned countries. The Sixth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations held on 3-9 September 1979, in Havana, viewed with deep concern the continued deterioration in the food and agricultural situation faced by the food deficit developing countries and regretted "the almost total lack of implementation of the recommendations of the World Food Conference, particularly the target for food aid and its forward planning institutions of the system of international food seeurity." It therefore decided that :

> The non-aligned and developing countries should expeditiously set up a food security system of their own.. and that the experts of coordinating countries should undertake a comprehensive study including institutional arrangements of the possibility of establishing a food security system.[11]

Bearing in mind point (5) of the FAO Plan of Action, the Conference thought that a food security system for the non-aligned would consist of

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four main elements : mutual assistance, joint ventures, emergency arrangements and trade relations. It proceeded to lay down for consideration of the proposed Expert Group, in broad outlines, the possible avenues and lines of cooperation among the regional groups of non-aligned countries.[12]

1 *Cooperative Action in Accelerating Food Production*

(i) Cooperation in exploitation of common resources and tackling problems of common concern;
(ii) Establishment of joint ventures and cooperative action for production and trade in agricultural inputs; and
(iii) Transfer of technology.

2 *Cooperative Action in Establishing Food Security Infrastructure*

(iv) Assistance Programme for food security infrastructure, and
(v) Grain Aid Programme for national food reserves.

3 *Food Security Through Trade and Emergency Arrangements*

(vi) An emergency food sharing scheme;
(vii) Regional food security reserve;
(viii) Multilateral food trading contract scheme;
(ix) International food trade and cooperation and
(x) A food import financing fund.

4 *Political Commitment on Food Security*

(xi) A food solidarity pact.

1 *Accelerating Food Production Growth Rate*

The first and foremost need of the developing countries was for an acceleration of the rate of growth of food production. Three types of cooperative action were suggested here :

(i) In regard to cooperative action on "exploitation of common resources such as common rivers or lakes for increasing agricultural production" and alleviation of "common problems affecting food production," the coordinators suggested :

> Where neighbouring countries have common resources (e.g. common rivers or lakes) these would be exploited for irrigation or through other purposes through unified development programmes. Marine fishery resources in the extended economic zones resulting from the newly emerging regime of the sea, could also be exploited through sub-regional cooperation. Cooperative measures could also be undertaken to control pests and diseases and desert locusts which

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spread over long distances from country to country, and arrest the desertification over countries.[13]

The coordinators cited the cases of the development of the Mano River Basin, the Senegal River Basin, the use of Nile water, Lake Chad Basin, and the organization of the Locust Control Programme established with the assistance of FAO, as examples of this type of action already underway in different parts of the world. For implementation of schemes of this nature the coordinators suggested pooling of resources—financial, material and technical—by participating in joint agricultural production programmes.

(ii) On the second point, relating to establishment of joint ventures and cooperative action for production and trade in agricultural inputs, the coordinators suggested undertaking of "joint ventures taking advantage of the variety of resource endowments within different countries (of a region or sub-region), to fully utilize the production capacity of fertilizer or other agricultural inputs manufacturing industries, to encourage cooperative trade arrangements among importers and exporters of agricultural inputs by assuring stable markets." The underlying idea was "securing economies in cost of production, keeping prices at reasonable levels and assuring supplies to consumers."[14] Governments and private corporate sector enterprises of developing countries having abundant raw materials and/or financial resources might agree to set up joint ventures with government or private enterprises of other countries, for the production of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural implements in order to meet the fast increasing demand of both producing and consuming countries.

The producing and consuming countries might also enter into agreements on quantities of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural implements to be produced annually and possibly on other prices as well.

(iii) Under the third point, the coordinators suggested arrangements to be made for dissemination of technical and scientific knowledge and skills among developing countries. Measures to promote transfer of farm technology would include continuous dissemination of research findings, collaborative research undertaken by two or more countries at national or regional institutions and collaborative training facilities, including workshops, seminars and study by farmers. Recipient countries would also need to undertake applied and adaptive research so that indigenous technology becomes attuned to their conditions.

All these proposals received the endorsement of the Committee of Experts.[15] The Committee generally agreed with the coordinators' proposals—1, 2 and 3. In some cases they elaborated upon those proposals and went into greater details in defining a particular line of action together with its limitations. In the matter of establishing food security infrastructure, for instance, it was pointed out that while expansion of storage, marketing, transportation and port facilities was not only desirable but

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absolutely essential for building up an effective food security system in low-income countries, the cost involved could prove an important constraint. An estimate made by the World Bank indicated that between 1980 and 1985, an investment programme to improve the infrastructure associated with storage and distribution of foodgrains in the low income countries would cost $ 500-800 million in improving storage, marketing and distribution systems for locally produced foodgrains and $ 270-540 million to strengthen the infrastructure to support the growing volume of imports. Low-income countries could not find the required funds within their own limited resources Aid from international financial institutions, like the World Bank, would be necessary if the recommendation was to be implemented. The question of raising at least a part of tne resources on a regional basis through regional cooperation among the developing countries was considered. But the committee came to the conclusion that "the level of resources presently available for this purpose was grossly inadequate to meet the minimum requirements."[16]

The experts also expressed themselves strongly in favour of various proposals made under the head, "Food Security Reserve System including Trade and Emergency Arrangements." These included : (i) An emergency foodsharing scheme (EFSS); (ii) regional food security reserve; (iii) multilateral food trading contract scheme; (iv) an international food trading corporation (FTC); and (v) a food import financing fund. (IFF) The experts recommended strongly that "every effort should be made by the countries concerned towards the establishment of such reserves and that they should be expected to provide a level of reserves compatible with their capabilities."[17] They generally endorsed the proposals on establishment of EFSS and Food Trade Arrangements but at the same time cautioned that these proposals required closer study and examination before further action on these is taken.[18]

It was, however, on the question of the political commitment of each country to the ideal of close cooperation among the non-aligned nations that the experts laid the greatest emphasis. The proposal regarding a solidarity pact among the non-aligned and other developing countries to stand by each other in the matter of food supply in the event of emergency in any member country, was strongly commended. The experts felt that little progress could be made towards the goal of establishing effective food security on a regional basis unless there was a total commitment on the part of governments of the countries concerned, to close cooperation among them for the purpose. In their own words :

> ...while the primary responsibility for increased food production and equitable distribution rested with individual governments, a sustained and global programme would demand strong political commitment, active cooperation within the international community and

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effective use of financial, technical and human resources in a sound, systematic and coordinated manner.

This could be achieved only if the non-aligned and other developing nations outside the non-aligned movement "proceed forthwith to have a general political document embodying principles of collective self-reliance and solidarity" which would promote concerted action to strengthen food security among non-aligned and other developing countries.[19] The document should set out clearly the rights and obligations of the participating nations in this regard. It should also commit all signatory non-aligned and other developing countries to concentration of efforts by each towards ensuring "the availability at all times of an adequate level of reserves of basic food-stuffs so as to avoid acute food shortage and undue dependence on world markets."[20]

These studies provide a good starting point for action by the non-aligned countries. Some progress towards regional cooperation among the developing countries in the matter of food security has already been made. ASEAN countries have set up a small regional rice reserve as a first step towards an integrated approach to the food security probiem of that group of countries.[21] On the same model, the creation of a collective food reserve for South Asia has been recommended by an ESCAP study presented in 1982.[22] In the Caribbean, a disaster relief fund has been established by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to assist the least developed countries in that sub-region while further measures to promote food security are being taken by the Economic Committee of the Caribbean. The Arab Organization for Agriculture for Agricultural Development is engaged in preparing a comprehensive study on a food security programme for the Arab countries. The Ministerial Council of the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in Sahel (CILIS) has approved an FAO Feasibility Study for the setting up of a coordinating system of national and regional food reserves of 4,50,000 tonnes at a total cost of US $ 217 million. The South African Heads of State have called for a regional food security plan and the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) accordingly is drawing up a scheme for a comprehensive regional programme for food seeurity. A high level meeting in Mexico was held in August 1981 under the auspices of *Sistema Economic Latino Americano* (SELA) to consider possibilities of regional cooperation on matters relating to food security in Latin America.

APPRAISAL

These are all no doubt encouraging developments and that too in the right direction. Most of the countries involved in these groupins are non-aligned, but the non-aligned movements or organization as such had no direct connection with these developments. These occurred autonomously.

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They were not part of any design by the non-aligned countries as a group to trigger them off nor in the framework of policy recommendations of the coordinators and experts committees of the non-aligned nation. After the Havana meet, where it was decided that "the non-aligned and developing countries should expeditiously set up a food security system of their own," precious little has been done by the body of the non-aligned to implement that resolution. The valuable reports of the committees of coordinators and experts should serve as the basis for formulating a Plan of Action for South-South Cooperation in the vital field of food security. The desire expressed at Havana has to be translated into action and for that some concrete steps have to be taken to implement the findings of the committees.

Even that would be only the first step by the non-aligned developing countries towards building a food security system of their own. A lot more would still remain to be done. The FAO document, *Agriculture : Towards 2000*, has indicated that if the present growth trends in agricultural production in the developing countries are allowed to continue till 2000 A.D. no fewer than 34 out of 90 studied countries (China not included) accounting for half of the population would still have per capita calorie supplies of under 100 per cent of national average requirements, while a substantial margin above 100 per cent is needed to ensure adequate supplies to every one.

> ...It is in this sense that a continuation of trends leads to alarming results even on assumptions, more favourable that strictly warranted by the past, that no further declines in per capita calorie supplies would occur and that all food deficits could be covered though imports.[23]

The number of seriously under-nourished people in the developing countries would grow from 435 millions in 1974-76 to 510 million by 1990 and then further to 590 millions by the year 2000.[24] The trend growth rate of agriculture in the developing countries if allowed to continue would result in these countries requiring cereal imports of 64 million tonnes in 2000 A.D. Such heavy imports by the developing countries may neither be technically nor financially feasible with the result they would remain condemned to a high incidence of under-nutrition which "in the developing countries as a whole would increase by 250 million persons to 68.5 millions rather than by the 155 millions indicated above."[25]

This is a grim prospect to contemplate. Something has to be done to prevent such a situation from arising. Technically it is possible to save that situation through acceleration of growth rates of agriculture in the developing countries. But that will require heavy financial outlay. It has been estimated that to secure an overall growth rate of 3.7 per cent per annum over the 20-year period 1980-2000, an investment of $ 1690 billion (at 1975 prices) would be needed. While developing countries should do their

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utmost to raise a large part of these resources from within, the major portion will have to come from the developed countries and international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. This is a challenge to the international community which it can afford to ignore only at its own peril. But before that aid is asked for, developing countries will have to be give evidence of doing their best by way of self-help. This has to be organized and the non-aligned forum seems to be, under the persent circumstances, the best suited organ to do that.

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COMMONWEALTH AND THE THIRD WORLD*

By RASHEEDUDDIN KHAN**

What is the Commonwealth ? Is it the continuation of the British Empire by other means ? Does it constitute a form of neo-colonialism ? Is it a trap laid by the old colonialists to lure the newly freed countries into newer forms of dependence ? The answer to questions like these used to be in the affirmative in 1948, by a wide variety of perceptive analysts of international politics. Thirty-five years later and wiser today in 1983, except the ignorant, the naive or the hardcore text-book dogmatist, indeed none with an understanding of the new and complex international situation and an awareness of the logic of an interdependent world, would be prone to give a straight-cut answer.

The international context in which the Commonwealth took its shape and form in the fifties of this century was basicaliy different in terms of political power-equation ; the situation of world finance, trade and commerce ; the far-reaching effects of the revolution in technology, electronics, communication, aeronautics, defence technology and in the many critical fields with an impact on human life and group relations. Together with this the phenomenal proliferation of human population and explosion of democratic human consciousness and the surging passion for national identity, freedom and equality, had brought into being a global situation that was qualitatively different from any epoch in human history. It was a new world, a radically different world, but an amazing world of contrasts and of opportunities.

On the collapse of the European imposed global order around 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged on the world scene (to borrow the current jargon) as Super-Powers. The global spread of the United States and the US dominated TNC's created a situation of new challenges even to the old world. The formution of the socialist commity of nations in eastern Europe and Asia, and the spread of socialist ideas and perceptions the world over, provided sustenance and support to the struggling people and established an alternative focus in the balance of power. The ferment in the colonies was such that with the breaking of the chains in India, one by one new states in Asia, Africa, Central America and Oceania appeared on the horizon of the expanding international community. Since the Commonwealth was not born in an age of imperialism but in the age of the winding-up of imperialism, its roots can be traced not in British constitutional practices and institutions—

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part of it as the starting point are undoubtedly there—but in their "disruption," mutation and transformation by the triumphant liberation movements which congregated in the Commonwealth.

ORIGINS AND CHARACTER

The Commonwealth, about which we are concerned today, is not the gift of Disraeli and Gladstone, Palmerston and Shaftesbury, Cecil Rhodes and Jan Smuts, not even of Curzon and Churchill. They helped build, and took pride in the glory of the British Empire—the most widespread imperial system the World had ever known—most diverse and variegated in its ethnic, cultural and linguistic composition, covering the five continents and the seven seas. But the sun that was never to set on that Empire had set and in the dusk of that sunset the Commonwealth was born. During its long pregnancy in the womb of the Empire, eager midwives and expectant on-lookers had conjured-up many images of the child, some in the likeness of the mother, others of a still-born baby. But the Pandit ('the Light of Asia,' as Churchill in one of his rare moods of generosity once called him)[1] who became its god-father and supervised its birth was imbued in the ancient wisdom of the eternal East. He was heir to the folklore which taught: "Even the evil that enters our body remains imprisoned until by penance it is purified into a virtue." "Reject nothing—assimilate and change, for there is nothing that needs to be totally rejected." "Even poison can be transformed into its antidote, if not into an elixir of life." "Bondage can be a blessing, if it incites to deeper longing for, and commitment to, freedom ; and freedom can be a mirage if it leads to complacency."

For long the term Commonwealth was taken as an acceptable euphemism for British Empire in an age imbued in the ethos of democracy and attuned to the norms of a democratic political culture. There is always a lag in human history between the emergence of a phenomenon and its appropriate designation in human language. Terms and designations being always borrowed from the experiences and the heritage of the past, tend to be approximate, until modified by usage. The historical context lends a meaning different from the etymological root or the earlier implication. Nomenclatural inadequacy is nothing new. Old terms acquiring new meaning pass through a long transition of confusion.

Institutions and structures—social, political and economic even cultural and religious—acquire meaning and content in the context of the time and with reference to circumstances and situations. Democracy, for instance, in a slave-owning Greece in a B.C. setting, had nothing in common except a name with the British parliamentary democratic practices of the 19th century. Even within the same century American democracy has elements divergent from Indian democracy, and more so from the pattern of what are generically called people's democracies of eastern Europe and China.

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That each variant refutes the other as spurious, or less than authentic, only serves to underline the dilemma inherent in the problem. Even terms like Empire and Imperialism meant, at one level at least, different things in the context of say the Manchus in China and Moghuls in India on the one hand, and the Spanish conquistadors of Mexico and Peru or the Turkish Ottomans in the Balkans, on the other.

In the case of the Commonwealth, the confusion was both at the nomenclatural level as well as the substantive level. For the proponents of the British imperial ideal, that is the latter-day Kiplings, "the knights of the precious jewel set in a silver sea," the Commonwealth was envisaged as the continuator of the legacy of the Empire, with agreeable adjustments.[2] There was a design, a lingering hope to continue the imperial hegemony in less blatant forms. But the logic of the new world destroyed it. That the World had changed so drastically after the Second World War was a reality that took some time to percolate in the consciousness of the imperial faithfuls. But let us leave at that.

Regarding the name, even so profound a scholar like Professor W.I. Jennings, joint author of the *Constitutional Laws of the British Empire*, stated in a letter to *The Times* (6 June 1949) 'Empire' was associated with 'imperialism' which was the deadliest of the political sins. The use of 'Commonwealth' made political conditions slightly less difficult. Prime Minister Attlee speaking in the House of Commons on 2 May 1949, said regarding the three terms : the Commonwealth, the British Commonwealth and the British Empire, that "there has been no agreement to adopt or to exclude the use of any one of these terms," and that "opinions differ in different parts of the British Empire and Commonwealth on this matter, and I think it better to allow people to use the expression they like best."[3]

The term Commonwealth was first used by Oliver Cromwell, after establishing the short-lived stormy republican government in England in 1649. It signified refutation of the hereditary monarchical system. Therefore it was abandoned on the restoration of monarchy in 1660. Literally it implied common good or public good ; a body-politic in which power rests with the people. It came into disuse as a form of government for nearly three hundred years, till it was resurrected in the Statute of Westminster 1931, when with the creation of the Dominions, the British Empire was rechristened as the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The man who consistently used the term Commonwealth, without the prefix British, was Jawaharlal Nehru, the same man who fought for the liquidation of the British Empire. The Commonwealth, which he wanted the Republic of India to join, and urged other liberated British colonies also to join, was not the continuation of the Empire but its negation. Even as captive India was called the "brightest jewel in the British Crown," probably it was not fortuitous because of its size, political relevance and

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strategic importance, for an independent republican India to become the catalyst and pace setter of change in the mighty transformation of the Empire into Commonwealth. India's joining the Commonwealth made all the difference. The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Shridath Ramphal echoes the sentiments of many when he says :

> The Commonwealth could not have come into being without India, without the humanism and universality of its freedom movement, without the vision and far-sightedness of its leaders. Mahatma Gandhi always regarded his struggle as part of the larger human struggle to end suffering : his ambition was 'to wipe every tear form every eye.' Rabindranath Tagore, at a different level, articulated his own philosophy of the universal man and the widening of the human vision. Above all, Jawaharlal Nehru's dreams were not only for India but for the whole world. He shaped and articulated the suppressed aspirations of people far beyond the confines of his own vast country. In his thinking nationalism and internationalism complemented and enriched each other. An experiment in international pluralism, the modern Commonwealth was essentially his creation. Nehru, more than any other statesman of his time, and long before it became a fashionable concept, was sensitive to the realities of an interdependent world.[4]

It was this same acute awareness of interdependence and universalism that made Jawaharlal Nehru one of the pioneers and founders of the Non-Aligned Movement as well. It is not always realized that Jawaharlal Nehru was simultaneously the architect both of the Commonwealth and the Non-aligned Movement. In his personality converged the roots of these two of the bigger aggregations of the decolonized world : one sprouting out of the defunct British Empire and the other like a phoenix rising out of the ashes of the European colonial system.

As a brief diversion, it would be useful to keep in mind the main contours of the colonial system. Modern European colonial empires, which by 1970's reached a high watermark of world dominance that continued till the end of the Second World War in 1945, had origins and motivations different from the pre-industrial empire systems. They originated neither in the adventure and lure of conquest, nor in the pursuit of individual glory of a conqueror, a tribe or a horde. They were not the creation of a religious crusade either. Their rise and expansion can be located in factors basically of commercial aggrandisement that loomed large in the wake of the expanding capitalist system. In the pursuit of trade the flag appeared to defend and maintain the gains. Local conflicts provided the pretext for annexations. Collapse of the internal system and breakdown of native institutions facilitated expansion. Political control was the unintended by-product of the circumstance.

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Inherent in this process were elements of propulsion of the imperial ideal and calculations of political expansion and hegemony which were new, different and more complex than those of the pre-industrial imperial systems. "Trade, markets, investments were the fundamental interests."[5] They were also different from the main premises, for instance, of the all-European Austro-Hungarian Empire, and partly, though not wholly of the contiguous continental Czarist Russian Empire, linking Eastern Europe with Central Asia, and straddling over trans-Siberia till the waters of the Pacific.

The eight major European colonial powers with dominions outside Europe and in far flung parts of the world, were Great Britain, France, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Engaged in incessant competition and conflict with each other during three centuries of the rise and expansion of their empires, with short intervals of precarious peace and occasional attempts at pairing and groupings, they dominated the world scene so comprehensively and decisively (the like of which was neither attempted nor succeeded earlier), that the world in which we live today continues to feel the impact of that global phenomenon almost as the most determining aspect of our immediate past. In fact much of that colonial past, has permeated our "present" in several forms.

The post-colonial world is no doubt a refutation of the colonial past, but in this very process it cannot but take cognizance of those elements of the past which tend to encroach on the patterns of the present. In many countries, their own indigenous past, interrupted and in some cases uprooted by the European colonial intervention, has become an obsolete, bygone past. But not so the colonial past itself, which provides in many cases the context and the framework of the contemporary urges, aspirations and struggles of the people. In the length and breadth of the decolonized world it is not fortuitous therefore to perceive in various shapes and patterns, aspects of "Europeanism" or what is popularly called "Westenization" in the processes of change and institution-building. Europe and European experience of industrial change, nation-building, societal transition, trans-valuation of values etc., remain a valid parameter of reference and comparability, of innovation and model-building. It would be missing the point gravely if one were to dismiss or to define this phenomenon as servile nostalgia of the imperial past or as an attempt at sterile immitation of Europe or the West. On the contrary this reflects the recognition of the organic link between the "universal" and the "specific" in human experience and endeavour and the desire to borrow and adapt experiences in similar stages of growth of the developed countries.

Perhaps its germane to remember that European colonialism provided the shock, the trauma, the catalyst and the impetus for the socio-economic restructuring of more than hundred territorial units in West, South and East Asia, Africa, Oceania, Caribbean and Latin America. This variegated

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concourse of humanity covers areas which are big and small comprising continental chunks, ethnic formations, stray and sparsely populated islands, mature pre-industrial civilizations, comprador port towns and hinterlands, and tribal habitations. The awakening to new life and identity of the colonised world was that part of the consequence of the colonial domination and exploitation which Marx referred to as "the unconscious tool of history." The negation of colonialism was endemic as it were in its rampant spread and deeper penetrations into the life patterns of the colonial people. The history of mankind is not the history of the affirmation of negations, but the process, at least at one level, of what the dialecticions call negation of negation.

Reverting to the character of the Commonwealth one might maintain that the Commonwealth, in one sense, and in the manner in which it has now emerged, almost imperceptibly and contrary to earlier apprehensions, represents an institutional arrangement built in the wake of the dismantling of the British Empire. In its work and purposes today the Commonwealth does not represent the extension or continuation of the Empire or the imperial principle, but on the opposite the conversion of the colonies, dependencies, protectorates and empire-countries into the community of sovereign equals in law and politics, and of an interdependent group in terms of mutual transactions in the realm of trade, technology, education, culture and other functional activities. The Commonwealth is the British Empire in reverse. It is the flowering of independent entities out of the bondage of colonial dependency, "the transformation of an imperial hierarchy into a fellowship of equals," as Indira Gandhi put it in her address at Melbourne in 1981.

Of all the European colonial systems, it is interesting to recapitulate as an apostrophe for thought that it was given only to the continental Czarist Russian Empire and the transcontinental British Empire—both quite different in their imperial ambitions, style and tactics and representing divergent political ethos and patterns of indigenous governmental structures, practices and conventions—to have been transformed into two distinct patterns of decolonization, namely the multi-national centrally-planned federation of the Soviet Union and the multi-ethnic loose Commonwealth with membership spanning the globe. Both of them represent a political metamorphosis, whose relevance to the contemporary international situation is exhibited in many ways.

THE PROFILE

What is the profile of the Commonwealth today ? Till the middle of 1982, its fulfledged members numbered 47, (now with the inclusion of St. Christopher-Nevis it is 48). A group of 19 islands, mostly crown colonies and dependencies of Great Britain, are recognized as Associated states

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some of which would soon join the ranks of independent states. The 47 members in terms of their political system comprise three categories of states : 24 Republics, 5 National Monarchies and 17 Queen's realms, that is states that recognize Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain in their own right as Head of the State.

The original white dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand though constituted as autonomous communities in 1867, 1901 and 1907 respectively, but recognized as "free and equal" only by the Statute of Westminster 1931, established the legal format for the recognition of the British monarch, as their monarch, that is, without reference to Britain. This juristic innovation, of appropriating a foreign ruler as a native ruler, is one of the amusing consequences of the rejection of formal dependency but affirmation of the symbolic link that binds the colonial empire country with its erstwhile subject people but in a different political equation. This model had a "demonstration-effect" for the sparsely populated 13 island-colonies with a background mostly of indentured labour, settlement colonies and patriarchal tribal societies that joined the ranks in the 15 years between 1966 and 1981.

The pattern of National Monarchies, with local variations, was first set by Malaysia in 1957 with a novel form reconciling the principle of heredity with elections, by introducing the system of periodic election of a "paramount ruler" from among the Sultans of Malay archipelago, as the head of the federation. Lesotho in 1966, Swaziland in 1968, and Tonga in 1970, also opted for a form of indigeneous monarchy, and Western Samoa in 1962 followed a slightly different system of electing representatives of their royal lines as head of the state.

It was left to independent India to establish the first democratic Republic in the Commonwealth and set a precedent that marked a decisive change in the basic assumptions and conventions of the Commonwealth as envisaged in the Statute of Westminster 1931, and as was taken for granted till 1947 as the settled form of Commonwealth infrastructure. Perceived retrospectively, India's national "impudence" in 1947-48, so to say, became ironically the basis of the Commonwealth's political prudence in the succeeding years, by facilitating the admission of Republics into the Commonwealth as a matter of course. By asserting the obsolescence of the British Crown as the focus of allegiance, India dared not only to assert a modern principle but also to find an honourable and a practical way of building a new relationship overcoming the dismal and disquieting memories of the colonial past, by joining the members of the Commonwealth in a credible contemporary political arrangement, in fact and in appearance. "It is this," affirms, Shridath Ramphal,

> we call the Second Commonwealth of Nations....It is a new association of nations, independent in form as they are in status, each free

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to go its own way in regional and international affairs, but united by common ideals and common interests.[6]

India's lead was followed by 24 members from Africa, Asia, Mediterranean and the Caribbean region, mostly by large-sized states with big populations and a background of national struggle for independence and also by active littoral and island communities with creative leadership imbued with ideals of revolt, change and stability. Ten years after India's decision to join the Commonwealth as a Republic, and on new equations, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah gave the lead in Africa in 1957, followed by Cyprus and Nigeria in 1960 in extending the republican pattern for partnership.

In the two decades of the sixties and the seventies 20 states opted for the republican form including the populous states of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the politically advanced small littoral states like Guyana with its novel cooperative republic and island communities like Trinidad and Tobago, Domminica, Malta, Seychelles and Singapore.

Looking at the geographical, demographic and ethnic dimensions of the Commonwealth one is struck by certain glaring attributes. There is a wide variation in the areas and the population of the member states; 29 states cover small areas ranging from 21 (Nauru) and 28 (Tuvalu) sq. km., to 13 states covering areas between 100 and 1,000 sq. kms , 6 between 1,000 and 10,000 and 8 between 10,000 and 100,000 sq. km. Only 15 are in the middle range 100,000 to 1 million sq. km., and 3 in the category of big territory namely Canada (9.9m). Australia (7.6m) and India (3.2m). (See Table-I) Twenty-seven of the 47 members are island societies ranging from Great Britain itself, the old dominion of New Zealand and the new Republic of Sri Lanka at one extreme in size, resources and history to the Bahamas, Jamaica, Dominica, St. Lucia, St, Vincent and Antigua, in the Caribbean, over to Malta and Cyprus in the Mediterranean, then to Mauritius, Maldives and Seychelles in the Indian Ocean and the many tiny spots in South Pacific like Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa with small diverse ethnic populations, apart from the port townships like Singapore and Gibralter, on the other extreme. Thus the global chain of islands provide the Commonwealth a transhemispheric spread and a wide range of diversity of social mores, customs, habits, outlooks, ascriptive values and levels of development from the nomadic tribal to the sedentary, over to the developed pastoral, commercial and industrial civilization. Together with the sparsely populated tiny 19 islands, of various sizes which are still dependencies with the status of Associated States aspiring to independence, clustered in the Caribbean region and the Polynesia, Melanesian and Micronesian areas of the South Seas, the Commonwealth emerges predominantly as a community of island people. Yet the 20 land-based members, though numericaly smaller, cover some of the largest territorial areas

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the of world—these include states like Canada, India, Australia Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia.

The population figures of the Commonwealth countries (See Table-II) indicate that of the 100 million people that constitute its total population, living in all the continents of the world, accounting for over a quarter of the world's total, 26 members have a population of less than one million each; in fact of these 11 are in the range of 100,000 to 500,000; 5 in 10,000 to 100,000, and Nauru and Tuvalu have total inhabitants of just 8,000 each. In the middle range 6 have a tally of between1 to 5 million, 3 between 5 to 10 million and 8 between 10 to 25 million. Only 4 have a census of over 50 million, namely Bangladesh (90), Nigeria (84), Britain (55) and of course India, the second most populous country in the world, with the gigantic figure of 674 million—a figure incidentally accounting for approximately three fourths of the Commonwealth's grand total. Every 3 out of 4 Commonwealth citizens is an Indian.

In terms of regional population clusters (Table-XIV), South Asia (comprising India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives) account for 778.3 million, Africa 170.5 million, Caribbean 5.3 million, South East Asia 15.8 million, Australia and New Zealand 17.8 million, Oceania 4.3 million, Canada 23.9, million, Europe and Mediterranean 56.8 million. In ethnic-colour terms, the Commonwealth is predominantly brown and black and only marginally white. All the major ethnic variations are reflected in the social anthropology of the Commonwealth, and even within each major racial group, most of the sub-ethnic origins are traceable in Africa; the Nilotic, Hamites, Semites, Hottentots and Pygmies, covering the Negrotoid race inhabit the Commonwealth countries, with tribes ranging from the nomadic to the sedentary. In Asia, the Indo-Aryans, the Dravidians, the Mongoloid in various mixtures and permutations are found in Common-wealth countries. In Oceania, the Polynesians, the Nelanesians and the Micronesians, are interspersed in many ad-mixtures. The Caribbean, a multi-racial community, has negrotoid, mongoloid, mediterranean, with a a dash of Indo-Aryan elements, weaved into its human population. Of course, the Nordic, the Anglo-Saxons and Alpine ethnic origins are also found among the white members of the Commonwealth. Almost all of the world's major religions – Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikkhism, Taoism—and scores of belief-patterns are adhered to in the Commonwealth. Christianity with its many denominations is the main religion in 37 of the 47 Commonwealth countries and islands. Islam is either the dominant or an important religion in 14 countries, Hinduism in 9 and Buddhism in 5. (See Table-XI) The Commonwealth is a multi-cultural and a polyglot community joined in functional unity by the English language, spoken, composed and used in phonetic variations, accents and grammatical nuances which are delightfully different from region to region, country to country, and in India even state to state. It

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was said that England and United States are two countries divided by the same language. In the Commonwealth, the English language served the federal function of unity in diversity, by allowing itself to be mutilated according to the native genius and the thought-patterns, diction and local idiom. Like the American English, the Commonwealth English is a different language, though less fanciful than the American despite heroic Dravidian efforts and Bengali innovations to the contrary.

STYLE OF FUNCTIONING

How does the Commonwealth function? Is it a bloc? A common grouping? A well-knit power lobby in international affairs? An economic community like the EEC? Something analogous to OAU or OAS or the Arab League? Fortunately the Commonwealth is nothing of the sort—it is neither a bloc, nor a grouping or a lobby in terms of international politics, nor yet an economic community or a close-knit organisation. It was never intended to be so, nor at any time any serious attempts was made to give it a shape, form and structure more than what it already possesses. Indeed the hallmark of the Commonwealth is, and its inner vitality lies in the fact that it is, one of the few aggregation of states and countries which deliberately, and one might add not unwisely, avoids uniformity in a world of plurality, cohesion in the face of diversity, homogeneity in a congregation of the heterogeneous. Also there is no proximity of policy and diplomatic orientation among members of diverse and often opposing interests. It neither bothers its members by compelling their adherance to uniform structures and procedures, nor expect from them any identical response to a given international situation or a national challenge. Informality of approach, recognition of plurality, deference for dissent, abhorrence of confrontation, cheerful regard for co-existence and cooperation, attempts at consultation and assistance, toleration of varied conducts in matters of state – domestic and planetary, but above all an amusing political inertia marked by a reluctance to leave the Commonwealth despite its manifest amorphousness, makes the Commonwealth something unique and amazing but also resilient in a contemporary international setting. Adherance to a negative impulse and confrontationist posture finds no hospitality in the company of the comfortably informal Commonwealth Club. Therefore it was not fortuitious that the Irish feelings about the British, the racial animosity of South Africa and the Pakistani phobia about India prompted these three worthy disparate states to quit the Commonwealth at different stages of its growth. Burma kept away from the Commonwealth in 1948, as it kept away practically from the whole world—a withdrawal that is yet to prove the profoundity of insulation in a world of increasing interaction. Commonwealth has not become poorer by their absence, nor they, richer by their exclusion. In this connection it is edifying to note that the Commonwealth does not evoke any sentiments, neither of exhilaration

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nor of cuphoria, nor still of apologia or guilt. It is as non-sentimental and staid as the British.

At this point three, rather long but relevant and pithy, quotations are in order. *The Times*, London, wrote on 7 July 1964 on the occasion of the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers that, "Almost any adjective, good or bad, can – on the principle of Roget's (Thesaurus)—be applied to the Commonwealth as it has grown. It is shapeless, unorganized, unstructured, anomalous, illogical. Equally, it is flexible, adaptable, pragmatic, useful. It works. Because it works, it exists. It exists because the Commonwealth corresponds to international life as it really is, not as dreamers or doctrinarians say it ought to be."[7]

Reflecting on the nature of the Commonwealth, an Australian Prime Minister, speaking at Cambridge in 1960 said :

> We of the Commonwealth are no longer a single integrated structure with a common foundation and a powerful organic association. Our strength is that we meet as equals, without vote or lobby, we speak to each other with freedom and friendliness, we seek to understand each other but we do not sit in judgement on each other; we take an interest in each other but respect the fact that each member has achieved self-government; hence we seek to cooperate with each other but not to invade the sovereignity of each other. We seek agreement on purpose and principle, but leave to each other the decision how to achieve or apply them....We derive strength from the knowledge that we are not like other associations, that our rules may be unwritten but our relations are written into our hearts and consciousness.

Shridath Ramphal, speaking in London in 1976 on the Commonwealths role in its global setting, maintanied :

> "....the Commonwealth exists today not because of the past out of which it has emerged but because of the present which it serves and the future which it must help to create. It is not an evolution from empire sustained by memory and justified by sentiment. It is the very negation of empire—a community of free and equal members sustained by the practicalities of cooperation and justified by the needs of our global society for ever-widening areas of dialogue and understanding within mankind's variety . .President Nyerere came closest to capturing this reality of the modern Commonwealth when he described it, not in institutional terms, but as 'people meeting together, consulting, learning from each other trying to persuade each other and sometimes cooperating with each other, regardless of economics or geography or ideology, or religion, or race.' When it is recalled that these 'people' constitute, or at least represent, one-

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quarter of all the peoples of the world, it is self-evident how significant in global terms are these processes and habits of dialogue, understanding and cooperation. This facility for bridging the many gaps that divide a scattered and disparate humanity is what the Commonwealth truly is.[9]

In an interdependent world where the problems of our "inseperable humanity" are discussed and negotiated to a large extent in multilateral congregations and in multinational meets, and are mediated, monitored and resolved through the wide network of the United Nations systems with its ever expanding agencies, specialized and regional groups, commissions and related organisations, no sovereign country can pursue its legitimate national interests in isolation and in solitary splendour. Bilateralism if necessary, and multilateralism if desirable, are the given forms of any international transaction. It is in this milieu of the international setting that one has to comprehend and evaluate the role and activity of the Commonwealth.

The members of the Commonwealth mostly function on the international scene, and sometime even among themselves, not through the Commonwealth channels even if there be such, but through established UN agencies, commissions, and organisations and through other regional groupings and associations. Commonwealth ties neither hamper nor inhibit its members from active participation, and often in a manner more pronounced than their membership of the Commonwealth, in taking leading parts and even pioneering roles in other relevant organisations. And that too not always in concert. On the other hand, quite often in organisations which are counterposed to each other or organisations with restrictive regional relevance. For instance there are 39 Commonwealth countries in the Group of 77 (G-77) and 31 in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), while Australia and New Zealand are in the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) and Britain and Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 15 in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 8 in the Organisation of American States, 9 in the South Pacific Commission (SPC), 10 in the South Pacific Bureau Economic Cooperation (SPEC), 2 in the European Economic Community, 4 in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 3 in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 11 in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 23 in the Lome Convention, while 15 in the African Development Bank, 10 in the Asian Development Bank and 7 in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In the United Nations and its major agencies like FAO, GATT, ILO, ITU, UNESCO, WIPO, WHO the Commonwealth countries[10] are active members, even as they are in other concerned Commissions and groups of the United Nations system.[11]

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> Commonwealth relationships reinforce, not dilute, the internationalism of member states. It is no accident that . some of the world's major groupings criss-cross Commonwealth lines : that Sri Lanka leads the Non-Aligned Movement; that Mauritius presides over the Organization of African Unity; that Britain is Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European. Community; that Fiji has been leading the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States; that Canada has been the... Co-Chairman of the Conference of International Economic Cooperation. Such a Commonwealth must see itself in the service of a wider humanity.[12]

Since there is no orthodoxy within the Commonwealth, there is also no heterodoxy, and hence no inquisition and ex-communication (the exception of South Africa notwithstanding – a unique *sue generis* case of a global outlaw). The Commonwealth members subsume themselves in functional organisations and almost spontaneously recede their membership of the Commonwealth into the background while participating in other international organisations. This is neither an act of modesty or tactics nor of hypocrisy, but flows logically from the patent characteristic of the Commonwealth, as a non-binding, non-ideological, non-regional, and non-structural informal group of countries, coalesced only to help, consult and assist each other in their sovereign activity of socio-economic transformation.

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE COMMONWEATH

What are the critical elements in the global setting impinging on the interests and concerns of the Third World in which the Commonwealth in our own time exists and is expected to play a part ? What are the major challenges facing the world in its process of building an equitable, free and dignified human community ? What are the priorities of the contemporary human population, societies, countries and states ?

Let us borrow words, not from other sources however worthy and incisive they might be, but from the latest official documents of the Commonwealth Summit, viz., Melbourne Declaration adopted on 3 October 1981 and the Final Communique adopted at the Melbourne Meeting (30 September to 7 October 1981) in order to reflect on the questions raised above.

The quintessence of the perceptions of Commonwealth leaders in their statement in the last Summit of the Commonwealth[13] was that the *global setting* is marked by (i) *gross inequality of wealth* and opportunity; (ii) persistence of the unbroken circle of *poverty* in which the millions in developing countries live; (iii) that the *fundamental sources of tension and instability* is the existence of *inequality and poverty* between and among nations; (iv) that the choice before humanity is only *timely, adequate and*

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managed change and not no change; (v) that there is *essential interdependence of peoples and states;* (vi) that there is *marked deterioration in international relations* due to the *slide from detente to confrontation* resulting in mounting tensions between opposing powers, particularly super-powers, and in the *build-up of nuclear arms;* (vii) that *resources* available for economic cooperation and alleviation of poverty are inadequate while large resources are devoted to manufacture of weapons; (viii) that there is *weakening of the spirit of internationalism.* (Emphasis added to words culled from the Melbourne documents).

And in order to respond to these challenges the Commonwealth leaders asserted their conviction for : (i) *determined and dedicated* action to reduce inequality and poverty; (ii) to *activate the dialogue* between developed and developing countries; (iii) called attention to the need for *political commitment, vision and realism* ; (iv) recognised the *Commonwealth's unique situation* in defusing international tensions ; (v) endorsed and appreciated the *constructive role of the Non-Aligned Movement* in the highest interest of the international community. (Emphasis added).

It is refreshing to note that such is the impact of what may be called "globalisation" and the emergence of a universal "global consciousness" that a striking proximity of approaches and near identity of views is detectable in almost any international gathering, official or non-official, at the summit or the base, with pro-left or non-left leanings. If one were not informed of the auspices, the venue, the sponsors, the political labels, it would be difficult to guess the correct context and company in which things are said. This broad unanimity also reflects the universal triumph of dominant ideas about peace, progress, freedom, equality, human fraternity and one world, and convergence of perceptions based on objective facts and reality of national and international existence. Distortion of reality is only done by those to whom reality is inconvenient, or by those whose interests were served by misrepresentation, misperception, and what the Americans would call (and with considerable experience) "disinformation."

Let us concentrate in this paper on the major challenge of economic distress, and overlook for the moment the second major danger namely the arms race and its detrimental effect on the development process, except for a very brief reference at the end.

Since the Commonwealth is a microcosm of the world, the Commonwealth leaders need look no further than in their own ranks to see the phenomenon of gross inequality of wealth and development levels "the persistence of economic distress" and "the widening of the gap between the developed and the developing," "the increase in disparities between the technological haves and havenots," the fact that "most developing countries are still dependent for their earnings on the export of one or two primary commodities." These are words taken from Indira Gandhi's address at Melbourne, September, 1981.

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What is the scenario of economic life and social situation in the Commonwealth today ? Let us look at few indicators briefly.

Eleven Commonwealth countries, including India, are categorized among "poorest of the poor", that is, whose per capita is below $400 per annum,[14] another 17 as "poor" with a per capita between $400-$1,000, 14 are in the twilight zone of misery with per capita between $1,000-$6,000 per annum. Only the 4 white states have a per capita ranging from $7,090 in New Zealand to $10,130 in Canada. (See Table IV) Imagine the strains of coexistence for instance between Bangladesh (with a per capita of $120) and Malawi (with $230) and Britain ($7,920) and Australia ($9,820).

The nine most populous countries of the Commonwealth with a population of above 10 million, namely India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Uganda and Ghana have 5 in the "poorest of the poor" category and 2 among the "poor", and the other 2 in the penumbra of poverty and hope, namely, Nigeria and Malaysia. (See Table-V) According to the "classification of the world economies," in terms of developmental needs done by the United Nations, while Botswana and Malawi are indicated as LDCs (Least Developed Countries, i.e. with per capita GDP of less than $125 in 1975, manufacturing 10% or less of GDP and literacy 20% or less), Ghana, Guyana, India, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka are categorised as MSAs (Most Seriously Affected, i.e. countries with low per capita income adversely affected by increased oil-price and with low exports and low capitalisation). Bangladesh, Gambia, Lesotho, Uganda and Tanzania are listed as sandwiched between LDCs and MSAs.

The distribution of GDP percentage as between agriculture, industry, manufacturing industry and services (See Table-VI), together with the share of primary products in exports (See Table-VII) underlines the fact that many Commonwealth countries continue to be hewers of wood and drawers of water. Sixteen countries have a population with 30-50 per cent of its people in the agricultural sector. Looked at together with the other sectors it is apparent that in 39 countries less than 50 per cent of the people are in the industrial sector and in 23 countries less than 50 per cent in the manufacturing industry sector. In 29 countries the share of primary commodities in exports is more than 60 per cent including these 26 countries in which it is more than 80 per cent. This aspect is evident also by looking at the demographic proportion of the urban to the total population. See Table-III) In 35 countries, the urban population is below 50 per cent of the total—in 26 even below 30 per cent. Only in 10 countries the urban population is above 50 per cent, but interestingly these include island communities like Malta, Bahamas, Grenada, Nauru and Singapore—the latter two with 100 per cent urban population. Further, the rates of growth of GNP reveal that 12 island countries have a minus growth rate, ranging downward from zero for Guyana to 1.3 for Grenada, 1.9 for Zambia, 3.0

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for Ghana, 3.5 for Uganda, 3.7 for Jamaica and 4.7 for Bahamas. Above the zero level, 10 countries, including India, Bangladesh and Tanzania, have a growth rate below 2 per cent. Other 8 countries are in the range of 2 per cent to 3 per cent including Sri Lanka, Kenya, Barbados and Malawi. Only 12 have a growth rate above 4 per cent and this includes Malta, Singapore, Malaysia and Nigeria.[15]

Three major indicators of social development are the levels of literacy/education ; health/medical care and energy consumption per capita. Literacy rate has been steadily increasing in the Commonwealth countries, though not quite impressively, but the higher educational level is unequal and inadequate. The adult literacy rate (see Table-VIII) shows that while in 26 countries the rate is above 60 per cent in 16 countries it is below that line). But the medicare index is quite depressing and alarming. (see Table-IX) In 36 countries out of 47 the range of physicians per population stretches from the already high proportion of one per 1,600 persons to the disquieting figure of one per 9,000 and above ; in 15 countries it reaches to the scandalous extreme of one physician for 25,000 persons and above —in Uganda there is one physician for over 26,850 persons/and in Malawi one for over 41,000 persons ! In terms of per capita energy consumption (see Table-X), with the exception of 7 countries, including the 4 White ones, plus Bahamas. Trinidad and Singapore, all the rest are below the 2,000 kg. of coal equivalent level, and 30 even below 1,000 level, indicating the abject state of industrialization and urbanization in the Commonwealth community.

THE CHALLENGE OF POVERTY IN THE THIRD WORLD

What is the situation in the Third World, dominated by the non-Aligned community of nations ? The picture is no different in the non-Aligned World, in which 31 out of 47 Commonwealth countries actively participate. In a total of 111 members of the NAM in 1980, 77 with less than $1,000 per capita, made the NAM the movement of what Frantz Fanon called "the wretched of the earth." Responding to the question ; "What indeed is the primordial basis for the existing ground level unity between these non-aligned ?," the present writer has elsewhere[16] argued that "it is a shared experience of the colonial past and a shared desire for internal development and international peace. The Non-Aligned constitute the fraternity of the poor, the destitute, the illiterate, the diseased, in brief the scum of the ocean of mankind, thanks to systematic exploitation and neglect of the colonial outsiders, and the feudal and tribal propertied strata of the insiders." Seventy or eighty per cent of the world's people have the dubious distinction of being at the lowest level of each of the recognised indicators of socio-economic development, whether it be per-capita income, per capita protein consumption, per-capita energy consumption, per capita

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literacy, per-capita availability of physician, life-expectancy and access to clean drinking water, not to mention about availability of radio, daily, newspapers, etc., which are included in the tabulation of the index of what is called "the quality of life." It was reported in 1974 that, "the world is so divided economically as to have about 20 per cent of the population enjoying about 80 per cent of the world's income....That two-thirds of humanity living—if it can be called living at all—on less than 30 US cents a day that there are about 1,000 million illiterate people around the world, although the world has the means and technology to spread education...that (there are) 60 to 70 per cent of the children in the Third World suffering from malnutrition, although the world has enough resources to give adequate nutrition to all its population."[17] Referring to this situation, Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank said : "They are the absolute poor, living in situations so deprived as to be below any rational definition of poverty. Absolute poverty is a condition of life so limited by illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, high infant mortality and low life expectancy as to deny its victims the very potential of the genes with which they are born. In effect it is life at the margin of existence."[18] The UN Report, *What Now ?* in 1975 stated : "In Africa, one child in seven dies before the age of one year ; in Asia, one in ten ; in South America, one in fifteen ; but in Europe and North America, one in forty ..Half of the population of the Third World have never been to school, and two-thirds....have no school to go to ; and the hungry, the sick, the badly-housed and the illiterate are obviously the same."[19]

This tableau of rampant backwardness in two-thirds of the world and in more than three-fourths of the Commonwealth, appear all the more poignant in contrast to the disproportionate concentration and blocking of economic resources—capital, technology, management consultancy etc., —in the affluent ex-colonial and neo-colonial countries. There is a maldistribution of the world's resources. The rich countries consume per capita twenty times more of the resources—food, energy, goods, services, amenities etc.—than the poor countries. In the energy sector the disparity is appalling; with 71 per cent of the world's population, the Third World consumes only 61 per cent of its produced energy, while the advanced countries hog 86 per cent of the global energy. A caricature reminiscent of a few fattened pigs versus famished millions—islands of luxury in a sea of misery. And the irony is that this skewed-up situation is called world economic development ! The mindless consumerism in the industrially advanced countries, not infrequently exhibited with conspicuous extravagance, is a sight as vulgar and de-humanised, revealing pathetic insouciance towards fellow human-beings and an un-wisdom which can only come with obesity of body and mind. *Reshaping the International Order Report* (*RIO*) 1976, under the editorship of Professor Tinbergen and the auspices of the Club

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of Rome, called pointed attention to the fact that : "The inequalities in the international system are of tremendous significance. They have given rise essentially to two worlds and the disparities between them are growing. One is the world of the rich, the other the world of the poor....A poverty curtain divides the world's materially and philosophically... one industrial and urban, the other predominantly agrarian and rural : one consumption-oriented, the other striving for survival ...."[20] "It is estimated that 99 per cent of all the technologists and scientists who have ever lived are alive today and that of them over 90 per cent work in the industrialized world—their activities concentrated on research for the rich world, much of it evolving protected technical processes."[21]

What Professor Tinbergen calls "the inequalities in the international system," have originated due to the convergence of many factors indigenous and exogenous, geographical and historical, ethnic and colonial. Backwardness in each specific country in a particular region can be explained by examining the peculiar combination of all these factors.[22]

The neo-conservatives in the Western world, or the radical conservatives as they prefer to call themselves in the United States, dominated by the politics of what is popularly called Reagonomics maintain that backwardness and stagnation in the developing countries has been a result of their own lethargy and lack of initiative rooted in climatic, ethnic and cultural factors and internal history ; and above all due to the acceptance of wrong economic policies in the present time by the newly independent countries. They recommend free-enterprise, capitalist mode of production and co-operation with the TNCs and with capitalist countries as the dependable way of economic progress and social modernization.[23] President Reagan speaks of "the magic of the market place,"[24] the role of market economy in stimulating growth through trade and private investment. As examples they cite South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Brazil as "wonders of the old economic order." These countries are referred to by the defenders of the Bretten Woods-GATT system, like Milton Friedman among economists and Henry Kissinger among diplomat-publicists, and a host of others—as Advanced Developing Countries (ADCs) or Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). It is true that in three decades these countries have registered a high rate of economic growth but to call them "wonders" or more than that models for emulation, is putting the claim a little higher than credible. Indeed on closer scrutiny the category of NICs would appear neither a "wonder" nor prove the validity of the old economic order. If the criteria for inclusion in the NICs is the range of per capita between $1,100 and 3,500, coupled with a 20 per cent or higher share of manufacturing industry in GDP, then four socialist countries of Eastern Europe, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia[25] also find a place, with GDR close on the heels, and this is to put it mildly not the wonder of the old economic order but like the anti-hero in modern novels,

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is the "counter-wonder" of the centrally-planned socialist economies. Not the least significant is the fact that their growth was achieved despite non-availability of help from the advanced industrialized countries and inspite of attempts to isolate them. Remembering the fact that whatever else the socialist countries may not have done, they have provided the "basic human needs"—about which so much is talked today in the United Nations by the representatives of the US and Western Powers—to their people with a firm commitment to what democrats everywhere call "distributive justice." Apart from the much advertised ethnic factor, emphasized by the neo-conservatives, in the example of South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, while conceding the busy-bee character of the mongoloid ethnic groups so euphorically emphasised by their promoters, the crucial factors like the smallness of population, the availability of comprador base, but above all the dependent nature of their capitalism compelling them to provide cheap labour and location for "dirty" (pollution-prone and pollution-spreading) industries that the advanced capitalist world countries do not now like to have, should also be kept in mind. The dominance of the US and Europe-based TNCs in their economies is such that they have become peripheries in terms of inter-state production relations, appendages of the industrial North and their transnational companies, supplying in large measure components in a widely diffused manufacturing industry with headquarter locations in the metropolitan centre. These are the industrial variants and contemporary progeny in the age of finance-capitalism and transnational corporations of the hewers of wood and the drawers of water, in the earlier age of mercantile and industrial capitalism.

Global poverty and global inequality today is, irrespective of other inherent and indigeneous causes and factors which have certainly aggravated the situation, basically the result of the two to three hundred years of western commerce, exploitation, oppression and colonial rampage, and western control and manipulation of world politics, economy and technology. The pith and substance of the demands of G-77 and NAM, the two most representative world organisations of the developing world, including the Commonwealth countries, is that : (a) the present international institutions and structures—GATT, IMF,' World Bank, and "the political and economic processes governed by them—are deeply biased against the developing countries in their global distribution of income and influence ; and (b) the reality of the current international situations in which the developing countries have a majority in all international organisations including the UN should be reflected democratically in economic structures as well. The developed countries, particularly US, consider this as impudent, impractical and unacceptable. In brief they refuse to budge. It is therefore apparent that the unabashed advocacy of the ruling western circles of the dependency model of industrial growth and their refusal for a meaningful North-South dialogue to bring about a much over-due structural change in the

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Bretton Woods-GATT ordained economic order, is the basic impediment in moving towards a more humane, equitable and a just New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Those who claim the utility of the Bretten Woods-GATT system say that it is built on four central elements—"open and expanding trade; free movement of investment capital and technology; readily available supplies of raw materials and institutions and practices of international co-operation."[26] This contention is refuted by the critics by pointing out that : (i) the tariff system with low tariffs for raw materials and high for manufactured goods block the industrialization of poor developing countries ; (ii) the domination of the capital creation and credit system by the United States and Europe, and of late by the OPEC countries, choke the free flow of capital and investment ; (iii) the ownership of patents regulations, restrict the free movement of technology ; (iv) not only raw materials are not readily available, but there is the threat of scarcity ; (v) the collapse of the monetary and trading systems as exemplified in the introduction of new protectionist policies by the affluent countries. Ten years ago the Bergsten Report from the Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., stated that : "....the Bretton Woods and GATT systems provided the foundations for a generation of economic peace, but can hardly be expected to govern a world economy so radically different from the one from which they were structured. Any new system must be built of very new underlying circumstances."[27] And what would be the cumulative effect of forty-years of the Bretton Woods regime (1944-84). "The result by 1985 is likely, we know, to be an increase of $ 50 per capita in the annual incomes of the poorest group over 1965 incomes compared with an increase of $ 3,900 per capita for those of the richest—who were already in 1965, thirty-two times better off. By 1985 the poorest developing nations would have grown still poorer when comparred to the richest developed countries; they would, by then, be fairly five times worse off. The gap would have widened."[28]

The Commonwealth leaders pointed out the deterioration in international relations marked by the slide from *detente* to confrontation, mounting tension between the big powers and the build-up of nuclear arms, as a matter of grave concern which directly impedes and distorts the process of development. Given the precarious interdependence between countries in a shrunken planet of multiple transactions, and given also the competitive relationship between development and disarmament, Indira Gandhi had rightly emphasized in her address to the Seventh Summit of the NAM, that "Independence, Development, Disarmament and Peace are Indivisable". She added : "It has been pointed out that global military expenditure is twenty times the total official development assistance....A nuclear aircraft carrier costs $ 4 billion, which is more than the GNP of 53 countries." It is estimated that today the expenditure on armaments—

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nuclear and conventional—has reached the astronomical figure of $ 800 billion per annum from $ 500 billion in 1981 and $ 650 billion in 1982. In 1976, among the 95 importers of foreign arms, 75 were developing countries and 70% of the weapons were imported by the West Asian and Gulf countries. In 1978, the US arms supplies to foreign states reached a record sum of US $ 13,6000 million—an increase of 400 million over the 1977 spending which itself was higher than all the previous years. And this against the background that all the 146 wars that broke out between 1945 and 1982 were fought in and in 80% of the cases between the developing countries themselves. About 36 aggressive wars were launched by imperialist powers on the soil of the developing countries. Global expenditure on military R & D in 1980 was about $ 35,000 million which is approximately one quarter of all expenditures on R & D. About 20 per cent of the world's qualified scientists and engineers were engaged in military work during the seventies. Some 50 million people are engaged directly or indirectly in military activities throughout the world. "The incompatibility between the objectives of a new international economic order and the recent trends in the arms race (has) already (been) recognized by the (United Nations) General Assembly at its tenth special session (on Disarmament)," states the UN Report : *Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development*, 1981.[29]

RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF POVERTY

What efforts are being made to rectify the situation ? What is the response to the challenge of poverty by the world community ? It should bring sobering thought and an occasion to pause and ponder for any one who cares to realize that two development decades and six UNCTADS (Geneva 1949, New Delhi 1968, Santiago 1972, Nairobi 1976, Manila 1979 and Belgrade 1983) have yielded nothing; but to borrow Shridath Ramphal's words, "institutionalized frustration," and a "pattern of pervasive and constantly enlarging disparities in the human condition and between the world's people."[30] It would be remembered that both the proposal for the establishment of the UNCTAD and for the Declaration and Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 in the UN, have been feathers in the Non-Aligned cap. The creation of the Group of 77 in 1964 (with a current membership of 126) in the first meeting of the UNCTAD in Geneva, together with the adoption of the programme of the three Development Decades by the UN in the sixties, seventies and the eighties, and later the creation of the ECDC (Economic Cooperation between Developing Countries) as a service bureau are some of the major efforts by the poor of the world to give an organisational shape to their aspirations and demands. It is interesting to see the linkage and causality relation in these efforts.

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After the Second Summit of the NAM in Cairo, 1964, UNCTAD was set-up. And in the meeting of the first UNCTAD, the Group of 77 was established. The Group of 77 pressed the UN to adopt the Declaration of NIEO and also brought into being the ECDC. To take a synoptic view,three basic specific demands are inherent in the call for NIEO, namely, (i) the demand for massive resource transfer, automatic and multilateral, from the North to the South ; (ii) increased representation and power for the developing countries in major institutions that manage international transactions like IMF and World Bank in order to ensure the protection of their interests in decision-making processes ; and (iii) some special and preferential treatment in trade, availability of finance and investment and technology transfer to help the growth of equitable economics[31]

The developed countries of the West oppose structural change in the financial and monetary institutions of the World Bank and IMF on the premise that "present international structures and processes are as equitable as the realities that international politics allow."[32] The US and the advanced countries of Europe also reject the notion that the fundamental economic problems of developing countries are caused by the operation of the present international economic system. However it is clear that their opposition is because any change would mean dimunition in their predominant control and manoeuvrability. This is adding insult to injury because the existing arrangement in IMF, World Bank and GATT gives them the prerogative of "weighted voting" an advantage which is the keystone of the present Western hegemonistic and monopolist system. They believe that the postponement of change might avert change itself and that with few adjustments in functioning methods and procedures the old system can be refurbished and revitalized.

On the other important question of the Integrated Commodity Programme initiated in UNCTAD-IV at Nairobi, the most determined opposition also came from the United States and Western powers, on the ground that this would interfere with market forces. Thus it was a patent ideological capitalist opposition. Surprisingly these same countries, including the US and EEC, practise wide-ranging intervention in the field of commodities in their own domestic markets and at regional levels as well, in order to support prices and the incomes of their own commodity producers. For instance, in farm products and oil in the US. The Integrated Commodity Programme would have helped the developing countries immensely because most of them are primary producers. For example look at the situation in selected minerals supplied by them. (Table-XIII) Similarly of the "ten" core commodities included in the Integrated Commodity Programme, the Commonwealth supplies are as follows : tea and Jute-70% ; tin and rubber-60%, cocoa, copper and hard-fibre-34%, sugar and coffee in significant proportion, wool and bauxite-75%. groundnuts and palmoil 50%, meat, wheat and iron ore 30%.[33] "The World Bank has

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estimated that the developing countries can reasonably expect to earn an additional $ 30 billion (1975 prices) if the restrictions which the industrialized countries apply against their exports are lifted."[34] The developed countries quite shortsightedly are overlooking the fact that stabilization of commodity prices, as envisaged in ICP, is important for economic management in their own countries as well. The former British Prime Minister Sir Harold Wilson is reported to have pointed out that, "Over the past hundred years every recession in industrialized countries has coincided with collapse in commodity prices and earnings in the developing countries."[35] Obviously he was referring to both the phases of relations between the developed and the developing—the phase of direct colonial control till the Second World War and of the post-colonial phase.

Both the North and the South should squarely recognise the fact that the old economic order, the Bretton Woods GATT system, that sought to legitimise and perpetuate the dominant-dependent equation in international economic and commercial relations between the industrially-advanced and the developing agrarian-based countries, has not only not served to promote healthy and mutually beneficial interdependence, but has stifled the emergence of an equalised world. "The system promised order, stability and growth for the industrialized countries, for those who already wielded economic power, but it implied disorder, insecurity and deprivation for those who did not. Upholders of the system ignore the possibility that some countries may be rich because others are poor and that the price of sustained growth in the developed world may be sustained poverty in the developing."[36]

There is no escape from hard-headed negotiations. As Willy Brandt has put it : "The world cannot only explode as a result of nuclear proliferation –it could also explode as a result of international class warfare." The latest call for global negotiations was given by the Seventh Summit of the NAM from New Delhi in March 1983, as a continuation of the efforts of the Third World to bring the so-called North and South around a table for concrete talks on an international economic system in order to identify areas of revision and modification. The attempts by the developed countries to resolutely oppose structural reforms finds expression not only in the avoidance of a dialogue but also in the adoption of diversionary tactics like the proposal for "Basic Human Needs." They believe that "incremental reforms constitute the preferred means to strengthen the evolving post-Bretton Woods international institutional order and the economic and political relationships governed by that order."[37] This is objected to by the developing countries as an attempt to side-track the basic problem at the international level by emphasising problems that are to be tackled at the national level. What the developed countries in effect are saying is this : "Let an essentially inequitable system persist—in commodities, in manufactures, in credit and in international institutions—but let us do more

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in the areas of health, housing, clothing and nutrition for the world's poorest. Far from being the essential objective of the new order, 'basic needs', would become the way of avoiding it."[38] Apart from being an interference in the sovereignty of the developing country and their right to work out priorities according to their own perception, interests and needs, the "basic human needs" approach advocated by the US, shifts the emphasis from equality of opportunity (as for instance right to employment) to an emphasis on welfare (right to literacy and medicare), in a situation were production levels are low due to non-availability of resources and technology.

In this situation the urgency for what is called South-South consultation, cooperation and assistance becomes urgent and important. The Group of 77, now with 126 members, is the major economic forum of the developing worlds, even as the NAM with a membership of 102 plus 20 observers and guests, is the political and diplomatic organisation of the have-not states and movements. Both include the many groups, regional and functional, as well as most countries of the Commonwealth. India took the initiative recently in organising the meeting for consultations among the countries of the South as a step in the direction of cohering the resources of the developing countries for mutual help and benefit. There is a need for a greater organisation and closing of ranks.[39] The available forums – NAM, G-77 and UNCTAD – are loosely organised. The diversity and heterogeneity of the developing countries partly contribute to this, but if the "global negotiations" with the entrenched and organised industrialized countries have to be conducted on specific issues of common concern, then the need for greater coordination and congruence among the decolonized developing states is apparent. And this indeed acquires an aspect of necessity if "timely, adequate, managed change," to use the words of the Commonwealth Melbourne Declaration, is to be brought about before the situation becomes more complex and explosive.

AREAS OF DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH

Two Worlds co-exist in the Commonwealth. And they live parallel lives. There is a world of affluence and plenty, industrial development, high technology, efficient service sector, civic amenities and wide-spread education. There is another world, a larger world, of chronic poverty, disease, malnutrition, illiteracy, inherited and widening inequality, in brief a world of unremitting misery and receding hope. This is the world of frustration and anger, whose consciousness of deprivation has been accentuated by the release of democratic urges as a consequence of the political revolution and national independence. It is true that they were miserable earlier, and for long, and probably a little more miserable than what they are

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today, when they were part of the colonial system, as subjects of an imperial power. But then, in bondage and slavery, they had no hope for the future, no rights to defend and articulate. Some of them had resigned to their fate. Others had revolted and were banished, or died fighting like heroes. Some others were liquidated by the iron-hand of an oppressive system for which good natives were only those who collaborated with the "civilized" and "civilizing" colonialists who carried the heavy burden of the wretched brown and black on their shoulders.

But the situation today is different. With national freedom, with political decolonisation, hopes have been revived, the outlook has changed. Those who had no tongue to speak, speak today, for they may be hungry but they are given the right to speak. Today people demand their rights. They fight for justice. They fight for equality. They generate a sense of shame in their leaders, who could not promise, even if they could not deliver, a better tomorrow. They ask, and not only ask but fight for economic content to their national freedom. Their leaders having been exposed to the world of ideas, to rational enquiry and scientific temper, some to the experiences of struggle and revolution as well, and to communication and consultation with men and women of goodwill and compassion everywhere realize deeply the depth of deprivation in which their compatriots live. Since in an interdependent world, serviced by global organisations and jet-age communication, every head of government and state, as part of his duty and responsibility, participate in international confabulations, they cannot with clear conscience profess ignorance about the range of possibilities that our epoch has thrown up for solution of basic human needs. National isolation or insulation is not part of the world in which we live. On the contrary the operative principle of international life is interdependence. How can an interdependent Commonwealth, then remain divided between the "haves" and the "have-nots" within it, to an extent that it vitiates *espirit de corps* and generates animosity, mistrust and tension nmong its members.

With what degree of credibility the Commonwealth leaders can promote North-South dialogue and global negotiations, if they cannot hold purposeful talks for narrowing the gulf between the four rich and the forty-four poor within their own ranks ? What community outlook one can expect in a congregation of unequals, among those with a per capita income of $7,000 to £10,000 at the table of the feast of life, and others with a pathetic per capita of $100 to $500 ? And yet this is a living reality in the Commonwealth. Can the occasional clinking of the glasses of champagne at the Commonwealth summits drown the reality that clean drinking water is not available for millions for whose welfare toasts are proposed ? And yet this is also a reality, and not the sentimental outburst of a despondent soul, that not only adequate calorie intake is not available to people in 31 out of 48 Commonwealth countries, but that even within

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these backward countries between one-third to nearly half the population is below the poverty line.

Is it not a recognised fact that "nearly every other person among the world's poor lives within the Commonwealth. But the Commonwealth's involvement with poverty goes much deeper. Of the world's absolute poor, of the 950 million people with annual per capita incomes of less than $200,760 million live, if it can indeed be called living, in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth provides 80 per cent of the world's 'marginal men.' If we take another statistic, measuring those who are 'most seriously affected" by the current international crises, the Commonwealth accounts, for 71 per cent of the world's special 'sufferers'. Within the Commonwealth, 89 per cent of its people are from developing countries and, of them, as many as 78 per cent are from among the least developed."[40] And mind you these are not the words of an outsider, an antagonist, a detractor, but of the intellectually agile and clear minded Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal.

One of the biggest challenges facing the Commonwealth is the challenge of the eradication of poverty. Poverty syndrome dominates the agenda of concern, call it by any name. Economic disparities are not merely between the four rich (Canada, Australia, Britain and New Zealand) and the forty-four poor, but also between the many grades of the poor. A wide range of conflict of interests is identifiable between the island communities and large territorial nations, between littoral countries and landlocked states, between industry-based economies and economies dependent on primary products, between oil exporting members and others, between the scale of priorities in the Caribbean, Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Oceania. Leo Tolstoy begins *Anna Karennina* by asserting : "All happy families are alike, but all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way." In the life of the nations, however, while all poor nations are poor in their own way, the rich nations too, are not alike. The Commonwealth, being not wholly of the North or the South, neither of East nor West, is so placed by its trans-hemispheric spread and by direct experience of the world problems that it can, and should play, a more positive and an initiative role in breaking the deadlock in the so-called North-South relations. Indeed, at this point of time in international relations, no major organisation is better placed than the Commonwealth in building the bridges of understanding and facilitating negotiations for a gigantic peaceful transformation of the World.

International groupings have many functions—diplomatic, cooperative and consultative. But in each of the function, their *modus operandi* is to reconcile national interests of their members in a certain congruence and a pattern of mutual benefit. This process becomes easier if the degree of homogeneity among the members is higher. But in a congregation of the heterogeneous, which is the dominant mosaic of the Commonwealth, the

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process becomes so painfully difficult, that it is slowly abandoned, if only to maintain at least the public pretence of unity. Such has been the basic divergence of national interests within the Commonwealth in terms of its three vital elements, viz., national independence and integrity, national development and economic progress, national security and defence ; that no sooner the "new" Commonwealth was formed, around 1948, the baffling schism between the traditional members and the new members manifested in several areas of international diplomacy, in terms of their foreign policy perceptions, orientation and articulation.

As a product of decolonization, the Commonwealth or rather the "new" Commonwealth symbolized independence and equality, and a pragmatic adaptability for maximising basic national interests. At least this was so in the imagination of the founding-fathers like Jawaharlal Nehru and Kwame Nkrumah who acquired legitimacy in their countries and elsewhere basically as freedom-fighters opposed to colonialism and exploitation. Naturally therefore the Asian and African leaders of the Commonwealth took active interest in the liberation struggle of the unfree people, particularly in South and Southern Africa that have been parts of the British Empire. The abominable practice of *apartheid* and racial dlscrimination had made the struggle of the people there a joint struggle for national emancipation from colonial rule as well as from a de-humanised racial oppression. Leaders of the new Commonwealth sponsored the cause oft he struggling people in all relevant forums including the United Nations.

India, from the beginning, later joined by Ghana in 1957, Nigeria in 1960, Tanzania and Uganda in 1962 and other African countries as they became free, encountered opposition particularly from the UK, supported by the traditional Commonwealth members particularly Australia, together with South Africa on almost all major issues of colonialism and racism. The voting record in the General Assembly of the United Nations for the years 1945-65, for instance reveals that out of a total of 23 selected resolutions concerning South Africa, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination, while India voted in the affirmative for all of them, UK negatived 9 and abstained in 11 cases, while South Africa negatived 14 and remained absent for the rest. The record of the US and the USSR is given in a table to provide comparability on these issues. (Table-XIIA) And what were the issues ? The issues were concerning racial problems including the practice of apartheid and race conflicts in South Africa ; question of South West Africa ; question of the freedom of Angola and Namibia.

In the second list of resolutions in the UN concerning the issues of liberation struggles and the proces of decolonization within the Commonwealth and outside, the questions included were those of the freedom of Southern Rhodesia, Zanzibar, Kenya, Basutoland Bechuanaland and Swaziland, British Guiana, The Gambia, Malaysia, Gibraltar, Falkland Islands, Fiji, Aden, Trust Territories—South West Africa, Togoland, Cameroon,

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Tanganyika, Western Samoa, Nauru and New Guinea. (Table-XIIB) How divergent had been the policy of India from that of UK, the US and South Africa is revealed in the voting record which shows that out of the 41 resolutions, while India voted in the affirmative for 38, UK negatived 12 and abstained from 19, while South Africa negatived 15 and abstained from 15. The line-up of the other traditional Commonwealth members, as also the US, and USSR would reveal the pattern of support or opposition on this vital issue. There is no need for elaboration.

The dichotomy between the traditional members of the Commonwealth and the new members from Asia, Africa and the Carribbean has covered other areas of basic concern a well, especially in the broad field of security and defence, economy and development. Their perception of security environment and problems of defence have been different. Since Britain and Canada have been members of NATO, while Australia and New Zealand of ANZUS, naturally their outlook on military matters and on strategic priorities have been different, and on several issues even in conflict with those Commonwealth countries a majority of whom (31 out of 47) are members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

On problems of global economic concerns like structural changes in the Bretton Woods-GATT regime ; on the question of financial and monetary reform and the problem of protectionist policy and tariff rates in the developed countries as well as on the proposal for integrated Commondity Programme, in brief on the whole host of issues subsumed under the label New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the agenda for Global Negotiation, the black and brown members of the Commonwealth find themselves on the other side of the fence. Since much of present day diplomacy is concerned about development and disarmament, the in-built discord within the Commonwealth is too apparent to conceal. This is one reason why the Commonwealth could not promote greater cohesion. The question has alawys been asked : cohesion for what ?

The basic areas of discord and conflicts of vital interest are such that ordinarily this should have been enough to dismantle an association like the Commonwealth. But this has not been so. The Commodwealth, to be sure does not continue by an accident. Unlike the British Empire, which (some of its proponents given to under-statement had claimed) was built in a fit of absent-mindedness, the Commonwealth was neither formed nor substained by absentmindedness, much less mindlessness, but due to clear calculations of mutual benefits and advantages that, till the moment, outweighs limitations or hindrances. What sustains the Commonwealth are three considerations : the existing flexibility based on pragmatic, non-ideological considerations that preclude confrontation, bilateral or multilateral and allows members to play their parts according to the decisions of their own sovereign bodies ; secondly the well-established practice of

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mutual consultations at many levels and on major issues, and extension of help and assistance in agreed areas of cooperation ; and thirdly the availability of wide range of technical, educational and economic facilities among themselves.

Indeed this facility has been the most positive aspect of the Commonwealth community. The *Colombo Plan* for Cooperative, Economic and Social Development of Asia and the Pacific, came into operation in 1950 ; it includes 21 countries within the region (including 13 outside the Commonwealth) and 6 from outside the region namely the four traditional Commonwealth members plus US and Japan. The Colombo Plan gave a fillip to developmental activities and has served as a model for constructive cooperation. Then there are about 45 official organisations of the Commonwealth, central, regional and national, covering many branches of human interest and activity from agriculture, horticulture, dairy farming, animal husbandry and forestry, to soil and mineral sciences, various fields of medical and biological sciences, physical and social sciences, aeronautics, transport, telecommunication and defence, as well as education, culture, economic and social development. As an example of a central commonwealth organisation one might mention—the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) which has branched off its salutory activity in such varied fields like agriculture, education, export promotion and market research, tourism, handicrafts, environment protection. finance, accountancy, banking and taxation, industry, health, law, media, public works, transport, telecommunication and technical assistance. To augment the official organisation there are about a hundred unofficial organisations that keep alive the relevance of the Commonwealth. Being outside the parameter of politics and therefore of conflicts, most of them have become useful service organisation. It is no surprise therefore to find that the secret of Commonwealth's resilience and vitality is found in its functional role as a service organisation.

As an integral part of this service organisation is the English language. As a medium of communication and cooperation it has served the Commonwealth well—in intragovernmental transactions and negotiations. In one way, it represents a significant point of convergence in the multi-racial, multicultural, multi-regional Commonwealth. In terms of historical impact, the English language is probably the most useful legacy left-over by the British Empire, its good that the language of the rulers never dies with the rulers. It lives a new life in the life of the erstwhile ruled, by becoming part of their free existence. That has been true of Greek and Latin in the ancient West, Arabic and Persian in medieaval East, and now of English, Spanish and French in the modern world. Languages, like the oceans, air and sky remain the common heritage of mankind. The English language serves as a window on the world and opens up the vast realm of modern science and technology to the Commonwealth people. It has been a powerful vehicle

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of protest in the past and has become an important medium of communication, discourse and dialogue today. Its terminology, phrases and concepts are enriching the languages of the people in the many countries of the Commonwealth. As a link language and as a working language for the miliions whose mother-tongue it is not, it serves a great practical need.

An inarticulate major premise of the Commonwealth's survival is the fact that it keeps a low profile in international politics. Just as well. In fact it has no coherent orientation to project, or a unified posture to adopt in international affairs. Its members reveal greater sentiments and vigour and exihibit their predilections, and discord on vital issues of contemporary global concern in other organisations—the agencies and commissions of the United Nations system and the several regional and functional organisations. The Commonwealth itself remains more or less outside the din and bustle of world politics. Within itself it is a club of the polite, well-mannered people, soft spoken and suave, conciliatory and tolerant. The pent-up animosities among them or uncontrollable political bickerings, find expression elsewhere and in other less convivial circumstances. That is a great assurance for the success of the Commonwealth Summit and one might conclude a distinguished point of convergence.

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4 Shridath Ramphal, *One World to Share*, Selected Speeches of the Commonwealth Secretary General with an introduction by Barbara Ward (Delhi, 1980), p. 215.

5 Barbara Ward, *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

7 Cited in S.P. Aiyar, *The Commonwealth in South Asia* (Bombay, 1969), p. 4.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

9 Shridath Ramphal, n. 4, p. 224.

10 UN agencies and organisations in which the Commonwealth countries are members are the following :

FAO : Food and Agricultural Organisation
GATT : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IBRD : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICAO : International Civil Aviation Organisation
IDA : International Development Association

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IFC : International Finance Corporation
IFAD : International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO : International Labour Organisation
IMF : International Monetary Fund
IMO : International Maritime Organisation
ITU : International Telecommunication Union
UNESCO : United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UPU : Universal Postal Union
WIPO : World Intellectual Property Organisation
WHO : World Health Organisation
WMO : World Meterological Orgaeisation

11 Like :
ECA : UN Economic Commission for Africa
ECLA : UN Economic Commission for Latin America
FCE : UN Economic Commission for Europe
ESCAP : UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

12 Shridath Ramphal, n. 4, p, 247.

13 See Appendix I, excerpts from the Declaration and the Communique.

14 The World Bank has defined the "poorest of poor" as those with a per capita income below $370. There are 36 countries in this category. See aso, Leontief, *The Future of the World Economy* (New York, 1977).

15 See table on "Levels of Development" in *The Commonwealth Factbook* (London, 1982).

16 Rasheeduddin Khan, (Ed.) : *Perspectives on Non-Alignment* (New Delhi, 1981), p. 62. See also Tables 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

17 Mahbub ul Haq, quoted in Shridath Ramphal, n. 4, p. 13. See aso Michael Harrington, *The Vast Majority : A Journey to the World's Poor* (New York, 1977).

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20 *Development Dialogue, Ibid.*, p. 71

21 *Development Dialogue, Ibid.*, p. 51.

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23 See for instance Rachel McCulloch, "US Relations with Developing Countries : Conflict and Opportunity", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March 1982, pp. 119-26, and Robert D. Hansen, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980, pp. 1104-1127.

24 President Reagan's speech while opening the annual meeting of the World Bank and IMF in September 1981.

25 Bela Belassa, *The Newly Industrializing Countries in the World Economy* (London, 1981).

26 See the contention of Dr. Henry Kissinger and its refutation by J. den Uyl, Prime Minister of Netherlands, as reported by Ramphal, n. 4, pp. 6-8.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

29 UN General Assembly, *Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development*, Report of the Secretary-General, 36th Session, Agenda 51 (d) and 69,

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5 October, 1981, reprinted in *Strategic Digest* (New Delhi), Vol. XI, 12 December 1981. Most of the data has been taken from this study.

30 Shridath Ramphal, n. 4, pp. 28-30.
31 Rachel McCulloch, n. 23, p. 120.
32 Robert D. Hansen, n. 23, p. 1108.
33 Shridath Ramphal, n. 4, p. 33.
34 *Ibid.*, p. 97.
35 Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 111.
36 Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 13.
37 Robert D. Hansen, n. 23, p. 1109.
38 Shridath Ramphal, n. 4, p. 126.
39 See the powerfully argued case for greater cohesion and organisations by Ramphal, *Ibid.*, pp. 188-201.
40 *Ibid.*, p, 221.

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TABLE—1

Commonwealth

Area (In sq. Kms)

No. of countries	*Area*					
	Less than 100	0,100-1,000	01,000-10,000	010,000-100,000	0,100,000-1,000,000	More than one million
02	2a					
13		13				
16			6			
08						
15					15	
03						3b

a—Nauru (21), and Tuvalu (28).

b—Canada (9,097, 139), Australia (7,686,848) and India (3,287,590).

Note : Only the data for the Table 19 has been drawn from the following sources : *The Commonwealth Fact Book* (London, 1982) *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 1982*; *The Statesman's Year Book, 1981-82*; *The Whitaker's Almanac* 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

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TABLE—II

Commonwealth

Population (1980)

Less than 10,000	10,000-100,000	100,000-500,000	500,000-1 million	1 million-5 million	*Population* 5 miln.-40 miln.	10 miln.-25 miln.	25 miln.-50 miln.	50 miln-. 100 miln.	100 miln.- & above	Total
	2a									02
		5								05
			11							11
				8						08
					6					06
						3				03
							8			08
								Nil		—
									3	03
									1b	01
Total	2	5	11	8	6	3	8	Nil	3	1	47

a—Nauru and Tuvalu (8,000 each)
b—India 67,3000,000 (Absolute)

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TABLE—III

TABLE—III

Commonwealth

Proportion of Urban Population to Total Population (1980)

	15%	15—20%	20—30%	30—40%	40—50%	50—75%	75% & above	N.A.	Total
	7								07
		5							05
			14						14
				4					04
					5				05
						3			03
							7*		07
								2	02
Total	7	5	14	4	5	3	7	2	47

*Includes Nauru and Singapore with 100% urban population.

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources : *The Commonwealth Fact Book* (London, 1982) ; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82*; *Thc Statesman's Year Book, 1981-82*; *The Whitaker's Almanc*, 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have deen re-done.

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TABLE—IV

Commonwealth

G.N.P. Per Capita in $ (1980)

No.	100-200	200-300	300-400	400-500	500-1,000	1,000-3,000	3,000-6,000	06,000-10,000	10,000 & above	Not Available
01	1a									
08		8b								
02			2c							
03				3d						
14					14					
08						8				
06							6e			
03								3e		
01									1l	
01										1g
47	1	8	2	3	14	8	6	3	1	1

a=Bangladesh—120

b—Gambia—250; India—240; Malawi—230; Maldives—260; Seirra Leone—270; Sri Lanka—270; Tanzania—260; Uganda—280.

c—Lesotho—390; Western Samoa—350.

d—Ghana—420; Kenya—420; Solomon Islands—460.

e—Australia—9,820; Britain—7,920; New Zeland—7,090.

f—Canada—10,130.

g—Nauru.

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources : *The Commonwealth Fact Book*, London, 1982; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82*; *The Stateman's Year Book 1981-82*; *The Whitaker's Almanac*, 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

TABLE—V

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have been re-done.

TABLE—V

Commonwealth

Commonwealth Classified States : G.N.P. Per Capita in $ (1980)

Group of States	*G.N.P. Range*										
	100-200	200-300	300-400	400-500	0,500-1,000	1,000-3,000	3,000-6,000	06,000-10,000	10,000 & above	NA	Total
A	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	3	1	—	04
B	1	4	Nil	2	Nil	2	Nil	Nil	Nil	—	09
C	Nil	4	2	1	14	6	6	Nil	Nil	1	34
Total	1	8	2	3	14	8	6	3	1	1	47

Group A—(Four old Commonwealth White Members)—Australia, Canada, United Kingdom & New Zealand.

Group B—(Nine most populous new members with a population above 10 million—India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Uganda & Ghana).

Group C—Others.

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources : *Commonwealth Fact Book*, London, 1982; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82*; *The Statesman's Year Book, 1981-82*; *The Whitaker's Almanac*, 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

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TABLE—VI

Commonwealth

Distribution of G.D.P. Percentage (1980)

	Agricultre					Industry					Mfg. Industry					Services				
	1-15	15-30	30-50	50 & above	NA	1-15	15-30	30-50	50 & above	NA	1-15	15-30	30-50	50 & above	NA	1-15	15-30	30-50	50 & above	NA
	16					15					12					2				
		10					13					11					1			
			8					11					1					18		
				8					2					—					20	
					5					6					23					6
Total	16	10	8	8	5	15	13	11	2	6	12	11	1	—	23	2	1	18	20	6

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources: *The Commonwealth Fact Book*, London, 1982; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82*: *The Statesman's Year Book, 1981-82* ; *The Whitaker's Almanac*, 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

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TABLE—VII

TABLE—VII

Commonwealth

Share of Primary Commodities in Exports (% 1979)

No.	20-30	30-40	40-50	50-60	60-70	70-80	80-90	90 and above	NA
3	3*								
1		1							
5			5						
3				3					
1					1				
2						2			
9							9		
17								17	
6									6
Total 47	3*	1	5	3	1	2	9	17	6

*Britain 23, Malawi 16, Malta 8.

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources : *The Commonwealth Fact Book*, London, 1982; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82*; *The Statesman's Year Book, 1981-82*; *The Whitaker's* Almanac, 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

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TABLE—VIII

Commonwealth

Adult Literacy Rate (1978-80)

No.	Literacy Rate								
	10%	10-20%	20-30%	30-40%	40-50%	50-60%	60-80%	80% & above	NA
1	1*								
2		2							
4			4						
3				3					
3					3				
3						3			
5							5		
21								21	
5									5
Total									
47	1	2	4	3	3	3	5	21	5

*Solomon Island 9%.

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources: *The Commonwealth Faci Bank*, London, 1982; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82*; *The Statesman's Year Book, 1981-82*; *The Whitaker's Almanac* 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

TABLE—IX

Commonwealth

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TABLE—IX

Commonwealth

Medicore Population Per Physician (1978-80)

No. of States	Population Range													
	Blow 800	800-1,600	1,600-3,000	3,000-5,000	5,000-7,000	7,000-9,000	9,000-12,000	12,000-15,000	15,000-18,000	18,000-21,000	21,000-24,000	24,000-30,000	30,000- & above	NA
5	5													
5		5												
9			9											
7				7										
2					2									
3						3								
5							5							
3								3						
3									3					
2										2				
Nil											Nil			
1												1		
1													1	
1														1
Total 47	5	5	9	7	2	3	5	3	3	2	Nil	1	1	1

Malawi—above ; 41,000 **Uganda—above 26,800.

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources : *The Commonwealth Fact Book*, London, 1982; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82* ; *The Statesman's Year Book, 1981-82* ; *The Whitakar*, 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

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TABLE—X

Commonwealth

Per Capita Energy Consumption (*Kg of Coal Equivalent*), (1980).

No. of States	Consumption Range											
	Less than 50	50-100	100-200	200-300	300-500	500-700	700-1,000	1,000-2,000	2,000-6,000	6,000-10,000	10,000 & above	NA
2	2a											
4		4										
7			7									
7				7								
5					5							
2						2						
3							3					
7								7				
5b									5			
1										1b		
1											1c	
3												3
47	2	4	7	7	5	2	3	7	5	1	3	3

a - Barbados, Uganda ; b—Australia ; c—Canada

Note : Only the data for the Table has been drawn from the following sources : *The Commonwealth Fact Book*, London, 1982 ; *Commonwealth Year Book 1981 & 82* ; *The Statesman's Year Book; 1981-82* ; *The Whitaker's Almanac*, 1982, but the format, classification and calculations have been re-done.

TABLE—XI

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TABLE—XI

Commonwealth

Area, Population Per Capita Income

Sl. No.	Member Country	Political System	Date of Independence	Formulation of Republic, etc.	Main Religion
1	2	3	4	5	6
01	Antigua & Barbuda	Constitutional Monarchy	1981		Christianity
02	Australia	Constitutional Monarchy	1931*	1901**	Christianity
03	Bahamas	Constitutional Monarchy	1973		Christianity
04	Bangladesh	Republic	1971	1972	Islam
05	Barbados	Constitutional Monarchy	1966		Christianity
06	Belize	Constitutional Monarchy	1981		Christianity
07	Botswana	Republic	1966		Christianity
08	Britain	Constitutional Monarchy	—		Christianity & Judaism
09	Canada	Constitutional Monarchy	1931**	1867**	Christianity
10	Cpyrus	Republic	1960	1960 ; joined CW 1961	Christianity & Islam
11	Dominica	Republic	1978		Christianity
12	Fiji	Constitutional Monarchy	1970		Christianity & Hinduism
13	The Gambia	Republic	1965	1970	Islam, Christianity, African Religions
14	Ghana	Republic	1957	1960	Christianity & Islam
15	Grenada	Constitutional Monarchy	1974		Christianity
16	Guyana (formerly British Guinea)	Co-op. Republic	1966	1970	Christianity & Hinduism
17	India	Federal Republic	1947	1950	Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism
18	Jamaica	Constitutional Monarchy	1962		Christianity & Rastafarianism
19	Kenya	Republic	1963	1964	Christianity, Islam, Hinduism

1	2	3	4	5	6
20	Kiribati	Republic	1979		Christianity
21	Lesotho	National Constitutional Monarchy	1966		Christianity & African Religions
22	Malawi	Republic	1964	1966	Christianity & African Religions
23	Malaysia	National Elected Monarchy	1957	As Malaya in 1963, as Fed. Rep. of Malaysia	Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Christianity.
24	Maldives	Republic	1965		Islam
25	Malta	Republic	1964	1974	Christianity
26	Mauritius	Constitutional Monarchy	1968		Hinduism, Islam, Christianity
27	Nauru	Republic	1968		Christianity
28	New Zealand	Constitutional Monarchy	1931*	1907**	Christianity
29	Nigeria	Federal Republic	1960	1963	Islam, Christianity, African Religions
30	Papua New Guinea	Constitutional Monarchy	1975		Christianity & Traditional Religions
31	St. Lucia	Constitutional Monarchy	1979		Christianity
32	St. Vincent & the Grenadines	Constitutional Monarchy	1979		Christianity
33	Seychelles	Republic	1976		Christianity
34	Sierra Leone	Republic	1961	1971	Islam, Christianity, African Religions
35	Singapore	Republic	1965		Buddhism, Taoism
36	Solomon Islands	Constitutional Monarchy	1978	—	Christianity & Traditional Religions
37	Sri Lanka	Republic	1948	Republic as Ceylon 1970 ; as Sri Lanka 1972	Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam.
38	Swaziland	National Constitutional Monarchy	1968		Christianity & African Religions
39	Tanzania	Republic	1961	1962	Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, African Religions

(Tanganyika Republic 1962 ; Zanzibar independent and member in CW, 1963, united with Zanzibar and renamed Tanzania, 1964).

40	Tonga	National Constitutional Monarchy	1970		Christianity

1	2	3	4	5	6
	Trinidad & Tobago	Republic	1962	1976	Christianity & Hinduism

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(Tanganyika Republic 1962 ; Zanzibar independent and member in CW, 1963, united with Zanzibar and renamed Tanzania, 1964).

40	Tonga	National Constitutional Monarchy	1970		Christianity

1	2	3	4	5	6
41	*Trinidad & Tobago*	Republic	1962	1976	Christianity & Hinduism
42	*Tuvalu*	Constitutional Monarchy	1978		Christianity, Baha'i
43	*Uganda*	Republic	1962	1967 & 1971	Christianity, Islam
44	*Vanuatu*	Republic	1980		Christianity & Pacific Religions
45	Western Samoa	Republic with elected 'royal' head	1962	C.W. member 1970	Christianity
46	Zambia	Republic	1964		Christianity
47	Zimbabwe	Republic	1980		Christianity & African Religions

States that left the Commonwealth : Republic of Ireland 1949 ; Union of South Africa 1961 and Pakistan 1972. Búrma did not join in 1947.

• Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were formally recognized as independent from 1931 in the wake of the Statute of Westminster.

•• The dates of the establishment of their separate identity within the British Empire.

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TABLE–XIIA

Commonwealth

Voting Record of Commonwealth Countries in the United Nations General Assembly-1945-65(A) : Resolutions Concerning South Africa/Apartheid/Racial Discrimination

Country	Yes	No	Abstained	Total
Australia	04	07	12	23
Canada	09	05	09	23
New Zealand	08	05	10	23
United Kingdom	03	09	11	23
South Africa	Nil	14	Nil	14
India	23	Nil	Nil	23
USA	13	03	07	23
USSR	21	Nil	02	23

Data drawn from T.B. Millar, *The Commonwealth and the United Nations*, (Sydney, 1967), Appendix-B.

TABLE–XIIB

Commonwealth

Voting Record of Commonwealth Countries in the United Nations General Assembly 1945-65 (B) : Resolutions concerning Liberation Struggles in South West Africa, Algeria, Southern Rhodesia, Palestine and other colonies.

Countries	Yes	No	Abstained	Total
Australia	09	10	22	41
Canada	18	08	15	41
New Zealand	18	07	16	41
United Kingdom	06	12	19	37
India	38	01	02	41
South Africa	04	15	15	34
USA	22	06	13	41
USSR	36	02	03	41

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TABLE–XIII

Selected Minerals Supplied by Developing Countries, 1972 (as percentage of world total)

Mineral	*Percentage*
Aluminium Bauxite	88.2
Aluminia	46.4
Cobalt	43.0
Copper	37.9
Iron Ore	30.6
Lead	31.7
Manganese	55.5
Sulphur	24.6
Tin	96.5
Tungsten	39.0
Zinc	13.1

TABLE–XIV

Commonwealth

Population Distribution by Continents and Region

Continents	*No. of Commonwealth States*	*Population*	*Percentage*
1 Asia	06	794,201,000	74.02
(a) South Asia ... 4 ... 778,375,00			
(b) South East Asia ... 2 ... 015,826,000			
2 Africa	15	170,530,000	15.89
3 Europe & Mediterranean	03	055,836,000	05.30
4 Canada	01	023,937,000	02.23
5 Australia & New Zealand	02	017,800,000	01.66
6 Caribbean	11	005,308,000	00.49
7 Oceania	09	004,311,000	00.49
Total	47	1,072,950,000	100.00

*India's share in total Commonwealth population : 62.74

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DISARMAMENT-DEVELOPMENT LINKAGES : SOME BASIC ISSUES

I

IN many ways there is a nexus between disarmament and development; both conceptually as well as structurally they are symbiotically interrelated. In more than one sense, they are basic prerequisites for the establishment of a just international political and economic order. Hence, it may not be presumptious to suggest that to the extent that disarmament facilitates the process of economic growth and development, it not only generates peace and stability, but also paves the way towards maximum security for all. The spate of reports from the United Nations and independent commissions (especially during the last two decades), the growing numbers of published papers and articles on the subject, and last but not the least the urgency of the non-aligned nations to tackle the issue of what has been called the "economics of disarmament" demonstrate the growing global concern about the challenges faced by the international community.

For long, the absence of any significant progress towards disarmament has been causing worldwide concern, especially among the developing countries. It has been the basic stand of developing countries like India that if somewhow the unabated nuclear arms race could be reasonably checked, and a complete freeze on nuclear weapons be effected, then some of the resources thus saved could be diverted for the much needed developmental tasks of the developing world. It may be recalled here that at the 1976 Colombo Summit, the non-aligned states had given a call for urgently negotiating the burning issue of nuclear disarmament. In this context, India advocated a policy of planning coordination and orchestration of the non-aligned nations' stand in world forums in regard to the question of nuclear disarmament. This was designed to put the world community's concerted pressures on the major Powers to agree to a definite time-table for initiating the process of nuclear disarmament for achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Admittedly, this is one of the prerequisities for establishing a new international political order based on cooperation, equity and justice.

II

Development is the very basis of the stability and continuance of the developing countries as independent political entities. But unfortunately, these newly independent countries, struggling for their economic upliftment have been faced with serious distortions in the system of contemporary international relations. Many of these countries are not only exposed to

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the regional arms race and bilateral disputes and conflicts, but also live under the shadow of a nuclear Armageddon between the two Super Powers. What makes their position further vulnerable is the interventionist, neo-colonial roles of the major external powers in the internal affairs of the developing world. These external powers are ever eager to supply arms to the various parties engaged in the armed contests. In contrast, the developed North (which comprises the military blocs and the major arms-producing countries) has so far enjoyed a certain degree of armed peace in the post-war decades. But in recent years the spectre of a nuclear war is again haunting the international community; people have again started hearing the noises of the Cold War rhetorics in the context of vertical proliferation of more advanced nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction especially in the arsenals of the Super Powers. As if this were not enough some strategic analysts in some developed countries have also started calculating the acceptable level of damages in the event of tactical nuclear weapons-exchange.[1] What is further concerting, there is an unending transfer of a highly sophisticated technology of death from the developed to the developing countries.

Admittedly, while the developed North has been somehow able to insulate itself from the turbulence of the developing South, it has not been able to work out a proper mechanism for resolving its periodic stresses and strains. Obviously, in the backdrop of the ongoing conflicts in the developing world the interventionist policies of the great powers, along with their excessive concentration of destructive arms particularly in the European theatre, underline the possibility of a global conflict between nuclear great powers. This conflictual syndrome is contrary to the global developmental imperatives for setting up a new international economic order. First, tensions and misperception tend to endanger global economic relations based on mutual cooperation. Secondly, to the extent that production and transfer of armaments consume sizeable resources of the developed and developing countries, they tend to hamper the process of development. This calls for an early rectification of the prevailing anomalous situation. What is needed is an early end to the ongoing suicidal nuclear arms race—as the initial step for starting the process of a more comprehensive scheme of general and complete disarmament. This would permit the release of resources from the military sector making them available for developmental purposes in the South in particular, and the world in general.

III

It is unfortunate that since the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1977, things have gone from bad to worse in terms of the socio-economic costs of the unending arms spending. This is taking place

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in the backdrop of the deteriorating performance of the world economy that threatens the global monetary system. Quantitatively the SALT agreements merely touched the tip of the iceberg of the problem of vertical proliferation of destructive nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the two Super Powers in particular, and that of the two military blocs in general. Besides, hardly any attempt has been made to go into the qualitative aspects of the arms race. Reduction in numbers has been more than made up through the increased destructive potentials of the new generation of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. As if this were not enough, the disproportionate allocation of resources for military R and D in the developed countries generate obvious distortions within the economy. In the developing countries it involves greater economic costs because of their scarce resources. While there has been an unabated vertical stockpiling of advanced nuclear weapons, there is also an equally frightening sight of both vertical and horizontal proliferation of more advanced conventional weapons in both the developed as well as the developing countries.

During the past several years, global military spending showed a sharp upward trend at a rate of about 3 per cent per annum; by 1981, expenditures had reached the astronomical figure of $ 600-650 billion of the world output.[2] This roughly equalled the value of fixed capital formation in the developing world as a whole. It was about 19 times as large as all the official development assistance given by the OECD countries in 1980. Significantly, this should be more than the entire income of fifty of the poorest states. If however, only a fraction of the total global military expenditure could be diverted for development of the developing world, then the world could have taken some initial steps towards the reduction of global economic disparities.

Even assuming that the arms race could be kept within manageable limits, there are no reasons to believe that it could reduce the effects of social and economic costs of the political and economic stability of the global system. Given the present trends, socio-economic problems are likely to worsen in the 1980's in the context of an explosive global setting marked by East-West tensions and the widening North-South economic gap.

It may sound incredible that with the price of an advanced fighter aircraft, three million children, say, in the developing world could be inoculated against major diseases. The price of a missile submarine could support an old-age home for a period of hundred thousand years ! It has been estimated that the entire WHO malaria eradication programme could be supported with only a half a day's military spending. Further, with the cost of a single modern tank (approximately priced around one million dollars) storage facilities for 4,000 tons of cereals could be provided. Alternatively, the same amount of money could provide 1,000 class-rooms for the education of 30,000 children.

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There are other revealing illustrations. For instance, less than one per cent of the yearly military spending could help in achieving food self-sufficiency through improved machinery by 1990 in the low-income group countries facing perennial food problems. These anomalies in the arena of international politics have led to investigations into the different ramifications of the disarmament-development link. The Olaf Palme Commission in its investigation of this problem advocated the doctrine of common security in place of the principle of nuclear deterrence.[3] Similarly, on the interrelated issue of development, the Brandt Commission insisted on prevention of nuclear war as the first and foremost objective of disarmament.[4]

There are no easy solutions to this problem. Despite the inherent dangers of the arms race, military expenditure for long has been accepted as one of those unavoidable evils which the international society has to learn to live with. Hence any attempts to reverse this dangerous trend calls for highlighting the positive socio-economic consequences of disarmament and arms control measures for the benefit of the world community in general, and that of the developing countries in particular.

IV

During the last three decades, the United Nations General Assembly has on various occasions sought for an overall cut in global military expenditures for reducing world-wide tension on the one hand, and for saving resources for developmental uses of the developing world on the other. But in some ways, as the UN Secretary General's Report of 1981 quite correctly points out, many of the organization's appeals or resolutions perceived the problem of arms race more in ethical terms from the standpoint of the purely developmental imperatives.[5] It was felt that given the already high level of military spending, it would not be too difficult to divert necessary resources for developmental tasks without however lowering the level of security. More or less on this line even as early as 1962, the United Nations Report on Disarmament, had stated : "...a much larger volume of resources could be allocated to investment for productive development in (developing) countries even if only a fraction of the resources currently devoted to military purposes were used in this way."[6] This view, since then, has been further elaborated and endorsed by other analytic studies. The issue of disarmament has emerged as a realistic proposition for tackling the gigantic global economic problems.

Speaking before the Indian Council of World Affairs, the late Professor B.N. Ganguly had systematically highlighted the financial and physical consequences of arms spending. The "road to sanity," he said, "lies along the process of coldly counting the cost of armaments in terms of human welfare foregone" at global as well as individual countries' level.[7] He suggested that the real cost of national defence spending was much greater

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when assessed in terms of social welfare of a country in particular and the world economy in general. Hence, the conclusion is inescapable that economic dividends would accrue from a process of disarmament. If on the one hand it would lead to expansion of physical and production capacity, on the other it would make available resources for social security, health, housing, etc. More importantly, it would ensure an increased flow of economic assistance from the developed world to the developing countries.

Elsewhere also, social scientists and political analysts have aired similar views. Some works such as *Disarmament and Economy* (1963), an edited volume by two eminent American economists, offers a systematic methodology for attaining positive economic results through disarmament measures.[8] A study prepared by the *Economist* (London), clearly showed, with reference to the British economy, that contrary to misapprehension in certain circles, disarmament is not only a realistic proposition but would also result in socio-economic benefits.[9]

Again, the works of American economists Wassily Leontief and others not only support the above viewpoint but further perceive the problem in terms of the economic and technical feasibility of converting a military-based economy to civilian uses.[10] In recent years this aspect of conversion has been widely discussed at various international forums. A more recently published study from the Soviet Union makes a plea for scientific analysis of the conversion of military production for generating what has been called the disarmament dividends.[11] It contends that disarmament would not only free the world from the possibility of a nuclear holocaust but also promote economic development for the benefit of the international community.

These are only a small sample of the attempts outside the United Nations to investigate the inter-relationship between disarmament and the much-needed global economic growth and development. It is now widely recognized that funding of arms production (rationalised in terms of the elusive goal called security) prevents any fundamental change in the social and economic structure of a particular state. This distortion could be remedied through the process of disarmament measures. But these measures by themselves are unlikely to produce the intended results as they are also related to the conversion and redeployment problems of the existing pattern of production based on military requirements. Besides, there is the vital question of transferring some parts of the released resources from the developed countries to the developing countries with a view to hasten the process of their socio-economic development.

The progress of the second development decade of the United Nations was projected in relation to the progress on the disarmament front. In 1971, a UN team found positive links between disarmament and development in their investigation. This team had proposed for a more substantial cur-

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tailment of the arms race, thereby enabling a massive transfer of resources which would bring about a fundamental change in the prospects for economic and social development.[12]

Incidentally, a UN Report in 1972 reiterated this approach ; it called for constant national or international efforts for development even if the progress in disarmament was slow.[13] Anyhow, by the middle of the seventies global awareness about the disarmament-development links gained certain momentum. Aside from considerations of military budget cuts, there were moves to deal with the problems resulting from a politically decisive and comprehensive scheme of disarmament measures.

The 1974 United Nations Report was quite significant in this regard.[14] It gave a call for reduction of military budgets of states - Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council—by 10 per cent and utilisation of part of the funds thus saved for the development assistance to the developing South. It is worth noting in this context that a United Nations Food Conference in 1974 had concluded that for increased food production in the developing countries (in accordance to the established norms) there was need for increasing annual assistance to around $ 5,000-6000 million by the end of the present century. According to the UN estimate, a reduction of military spending by only one per cent on the part of the developed countries would be sufficient to overcome the lag. Within developing countries as well, disarmament measures would permit the use of people with best skills and available resources for producing better economic results.

The United Nations experts believe that increased external assistance on more favourable terms would be a major factor in hastening the process of socio-economic development within the developing world.

V

The credit for convening the first United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament may be given to the developing countries. Since the origin of the non-aligned movement, disarmament has been one of the basic issues within the system of international relations. At the 1976 Colombo Summit, non-aligned nations had declared that arms race was contrary to the global attempts to establish a new international economic order.[15] The Summit pleaded for the diversion of the resources utilised for the acceleration of the arms race towards socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries. They stressed the need immediately for starting a programme of "genuine disarmament" that involved the banning of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction.

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In response to this challenge, the non-aligned nations had recommended the holding of a Special United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament not later than mid-1978. Later, the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned states again dealt with the problem of disarmament and development linkage, at their meeting at Havana.

In some senses, the Special Disarmament Session of the United Nations General Assembly (1978) was a positive event. The final declaration, adopted by the conference set up the parameters of the disarmament strategy. For the first time the United Nations positively affirmed :

> ...a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly to the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of the disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.[16]

In the wake of this special session, an Independent Commission (comprising UN group of governmental experts) was set up under the Chairmanship of Olaf Palme. The Commission was entrusted with the task of studying the links between the disarmament decade and the development decade of the United Nations. The Commission observed, that sizeable portion of the resources made available as a result of the progress towards general and complete disarmament could be used for increased developmental assistance to the developing nations. It confirmed the findings of the Brandt Commission that had earlier related much of global insecurity to uneven economic division of the world. The Palme Commission's insistance on a comprehensive disarmament programme based on clear cut objectives and fixed term for negotiations and implementation has been fully endorsed by the non-aligned and developing nations. There has however been a general indifference of the developed countries in regard to this vital problem.

VI

So far the most comprehensive study on the inter-relationship between disarmament measures and a balanced and generally acceptable pattern of global economic growth through sustained development, has been the one made by a group of governmental experts (between September 1978 and August 1981) in pursuance of the General Assembly Resolution of 12 December 1977.[17] This study deals with three basic aspects of this problem. First, it relates to the pattern of resources utilization for military activities. Secondly, dealing with the social and economic consequences of a continuing arms race it examines the problem of implementing disarma-

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ment measures. Thirdly, it identifies the operational steps in the process of conversion and deployment of resources (released from military uses through disarmament measures) for socio-economic purposes.

Needless to overstress the need for an appropriate methodology for the promotion of disarmament and development for a systematic comprehension of the linkage between these two different but related issue-areas of contemporary international relations. Admittedly, military activity is a complex process. More than money, it utilises a massive volume of resources such as land, labour, raw materials, industrial capacity and foreign exchange. The total cost assessment of the arms race/spending/production are connected to the entire gamut of international economic and political relations. It is worth noting that the escalatory pattern of the central nuclear arms race (as between the two military blocs) has a vitiating effect on the operation of the contemporary international system. Given the complexity of the issue-area, there are reasons to believe that to the extent that the deceleration in the central nuclear arms race could be effected and all forms of military competition could be reduced, it could well generate the congenial climate for the establishment of a new international economic order based on mutual cooperation.

The estimated resource requirements of emerging developmental priorities entail a closer investigation of furture global military out-lays. In the current decade, given the present trend the developed countries may be faced with serious shortage of men and material on the economic front because of the diversion of resources for military consumption. As for the developing nations, any drastic reductions in the expenditure on military activities would constitute only a marginal element in solving the problem of resource constraints regarding their economic growth and development. Obviously, they have to look for transfer of resources from the developed world, even though the bulk of the investment has to come from demestic sources. It has been suggested that the process of resource (released from military spending) transfer to the developing world could be hastened through various means, such as trade stimulation, lending flows, greater investment technology transfers, and official development aid. According to one estimate of the World Bank,[18] yearly 5 per cent rate of increase in external assistance flow is the minimal requirement for reasonable growth of the developing countries. But this is unlikely to take place without the restructuring of the North-South relations on the basis of mutual inter-dependence on the one hand, and the restoration of the stability in the East-West relations on the other.

As for the problem of conversion and redeployment of resources released from military uses, there is need for advanced global planning and a comprehensive programme so that there would not be serious difficulty in the way of adjusting the rate of disarmament to the rate of movement of released resources for civilian uses. It would be unrealistic to presume

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that conversion will be a single-step affair. There are about 50 million people directly or indirectly engaged in military activities all over the world.[19] It would be a major physical, technical and economic challenge to redeploy them for civilian purposes immediately in the wake of a process of "genuine disarmament." If in general it entails the task of mobilizing the economy towards a non-military direction, it in particular calls for industrial and commercial retooling of the defence industries. Additionally, the conversion process will have to be related to various areas of military activities, such as military R and D Programmes, military personnel with varying levels of skills and expertise, etc., on the basis of the anticipated implications of the disarmament measures in the context of both global and national perspectives.

It is in this context that the first Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament had stressed the necessity of releasing resources from military uses for generating the much needed development assistance to the developing world.[20] In many ways, the global arms race is incompatable with the idea of establishing a new international economic order. In fact, there are potential consequences of disarmament on development in terms of effecting structural transformation of the world economy and international institutions.

In studying the level of disarmament-development relationship a UN team of government experts in 1982 had recommended the setting up of a Disarmament Fund as a basic requirement for utilizing the resources (released through disarmament), for developmental purposes of the developing world.[21] There are several principles of contribution to this Fund. The first is based on what has been called the "disarmament dividend" approval. It calls for full or part allocation of savings derived through disarmament measures for developmental purposes. It is on this line that the General Assembly has proposed a 10 per cent cut in military budgets and then allocation of the savings thus made for socio-economic development. However, such proposals have not been able to achieve any more success in the area of physical arms limitation measures.

The second contributory principle is described as the *armament levy* approach. It implies contributions to development on the basis of an agreed quantum of resources with reference to external military spending (either total or as a percentage of the GNP) of the contributing states. Thus states with higher military spending may have to contribute correspondingly more for development. It is worth noting that in recent years, tax on military expenditure, such as arms trade has also been proposed (e.g. by the Brandt Commission). But then, this is likely to fall heavily on the arms importing developing nations.

The third approach is based on the principle of *voluntary contributions* as in the case of other UN Funds and Specialised Agencies. This approach expects each member country to contribute on the basis of its

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own economic capability. These voluntary contributions could be used for a Special Fund to redirect resources from military activities to socio-economic development and also other inter-related purposes. Incidentally, the 1982 UN Report on Disarmament/Development relationship was funded through these contributions. Similarly, a French Government grant enabled the United Nations to set up the new United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) at Geneva.[23] Alternatively, voluntary contribution has also been related to expenditures on military activities as suggested by the UN Secretary-General at the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament. He wanted the states to devote to disarmament efforts dollars one million for every $ 1,000 million currently spent on arms for disarmament study and information.

On paper the potentials of these approaches looks quite impressive, and to that extent they are well taken. But it would be difficult to overlook their operational constraints coupled with the lack of progress as such in the process of global disarmament.

VII

With a world whith continues to be engaged in a "self-defeating search for security," as one analyst describes, the attempts to link disarmament and development have tended io beeome an unending theoretical exercise. Despite the high-blown rhetorics about the urgency of demonstrating the links between disarmament and development, neither the developed countries nor the developing countries are prepared to compromise on their elusive national goal called security by lowering their military expenditure. Since 1978, and particularly since the end of 1979, the progress on the guidelines of a disarmament strategy (as spelt out by the First Special UN Session on Disarmament), has been rather halting if not nil. The priority measures defined in the final document of 1978, especially regarding the need for concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty remain yet to be implemented. The Committee on Disarmament has been unable to make any substantive progress in negotiations in this direction.

When the Second Special Disarmament Session of the UN General Assembly was convened in June 1982, no progress on the Geneva talks on European missiles had been reported.[24] What is particularly concerning, no progress had been made towards the resumption of strategic weapons limitations talks. The crisis has been further accentuated by the onset of a new cold war climate along with a new round of nuclear and strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the militarisation of the developing world with the familiar pattern of arms transfer from the developed world, merely highlighted the growing sense of world-wide insecurity. The 1982 Special Disarmament Session stressed the urgency of taking several fundamental steps towards disarma-

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ment. But one of the main recommendations of the UN team of experts regarding the setting up of a World Disarmament Fund for Development is yet to be ratified by the member states.

Several reasons can be adduced to this halting disarmament process. The Second Special UN Session on Disarmament had met in the backdrop of several global negative trends – the Falkland conflict, Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iraq-Iran conflict, the upheaval in Poland, the Afghanistan crisis, etc. All these were taking place in a world of spiralling global military expenditures. It was in the context of this on going international tension, that the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi spelt out a five point disarmament programme of action in a note (11 June 1982) to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly.[25] She urged the United Nations to urgently negotiate a "binding convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons." Her five point programme called for : (i) Freeze on nuclear weapons ; (ii) Total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons combined with a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes ; (iii) Immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests ; (iv) *The launching of disarmament negotiations with the aim of achieving a treaty of general and complete disarmament within an agreed* time-frame, as discussed by the United States and Russia in the early 1960's ; (v) *The UN and its specialized agencies should take the lead in educating the public on the dangers of nuclear war, on the harmful effects of the arms race on global economy as well as the positive aspects of disarmament and its link with development.*

The Indian Prime Minister further wanted the Special Session to consider issuing legally binding restrictions on various types of scientific and technological research for purposes that may conflict with humanitarian laws and principles. She called on the Secretary General to undertake an independent study towards this purpose. Taking all thsse problems into proper perspective, it is quite imperative at the moment to urge the great powers again to start negotiations with the positive intention of reaching the goal of nuclear disarmament.

India believes that while the reduction of military expenditures and the consequent diversion of the savings to economic and social advancement of developing countries should proceed in stages, the process should start with the five or six major military powers. Mrs. Gandhi had proposed to the Second Special Session that, "it is only after significant reductions have been undertaken by these states that other states can be expected to freeze or reduce their military expenditures.[26] It is a reasonable stand as five or six states with the largest military arsenals having the most advanced nuclear and non-nuclear weapons account for over 80 per cent of the global military expenditures today. Any miscalculation on their part through even minor human error could end up in a major catastrophe. Hence, what is urgently needed is to initiate a process whereby the threat

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of nuclear arms could atleast be partly, if not fully, reduced. In short, the emphasis should be on declaring a freeze on nuclear arsenals. It should be followed by an immediate suspension of all nuclear tests in all environments.

For India, the Second UN Special Session has been full of disappointments; it started with a bang but ended with a whimper. The session failed to address itself to the most important issues of nuclear disarmament. Besides, it also failed to provide any answer to the dilemma which bedevils governments and peoples, the contradiction between the arms race and development. It is difficult to envisage any sharp cut in military expenditures in general, and nuclear arms freeze in particular, in the foreseeable future. Good intentions in this direction are not enough. One should not overlook the obstructions and difficulties on the road to nuclear/non-nuclear disarmament. Merely using the rhetoric of general and complete disarmament would not lead us to any solution. The task is quite arduous and the road is long before the links between disarmament and development could be sufficiently appreciated and then established for the ultimate goal of a new international economic order. Meanwhile, public awareness of the disarmament-development nexus could be aroused reversing the slackening process of world-wide political and economic cooperation.

SHIVAJI GANGULY*

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DYNAMICS OF WORLD DEVELOPMENT

A Review Article

THE book under review* consists of a series of articles applying the method of world systems approach to explain developments in a number of countries of the periphery and the semi-periphery. The essays, in particular stress the role of the state as well as the problem of state formation in periods when an economy shifts its status from the periphery to the semi-periphery or from being external to the world capitalist system to being in the periphery. State formation is of critical importance, as together with the structure of capitalist accumulation and the division of labour it forms the trinity of basic characteristes of the capitalist world system which this approach analyses. The basic principle of the world systems approach is that events in individual countries cannot be studied in isolation, these events occur as part of the overall development of the world capital of which any country is merely one component.

Analysing the system in terms of its interdependent components implies having an overall view of the economic interactions between nations. The group's approach is that such interactions between the states in the core and the periphery are bad. For instance, in his analysis of the emergence of an independent Greek state, Papadantonales implies that an outward orientation is a weakness while an inward orientation an indication of strength. In the discussion of Brazil's current economic problems, Goldfrank says that Brazil will follow a threefold strategy of export expansion which will be classical dependency through primary exports, sub-imperialism through exports of manufactured good to periphery and as a platform for exports to core, implying that all such actions are in some sense detrimental. Statements such as these ignore the possibility of gain from international trade. The theoretical argument by neo-classical economists demonstrating that both countries gain from trade stand despite the claims for unequal exchange. Proper analysis of the unequal exchange model show that it does not controvert the proposition that both countries gain from trade.

The other argument against trade is that in a dynamic framework it may tie developing countries to industries which do not lend themselves to rapid technical progress. It is extremely difficult to identify such industries, because over a long period of time all sectors have shown themselves capable of rapid technical change and providing the practitioners the

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* Richard Rubinson (Ed.) : *Dynamics of World Development. Vol. IV : Political Economy of the World-System Annuals* (Sage Publications, California, 1981), 264 p., $9.95.

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opportunity to develop skills and a "scientific" temperament. In the dynamics of the World Capitalist System there is little evidence of a decline in the terms of trade of primary commodities and while if terms of trade did decline that factor should affect a country's trade policy, it still does not provide a basis for autarky. Furthermore, it must be recognised that most developing countries are too small to be autarkic and so have to participate in trading relations. What an appropriate trading policy should be does not emerge at all clearly in the articles, unless it is a preference for autarky which I think is neither practical nor beneficial. A possible argument against the neo-classical arguments in favour of free trade might be the distributional impact of such policies. But no evidence is presented to show that a trade policy, different from that followed, would have beneficial income distribution effects.

One of the author's own ambivalence to the role of international economic relations is reflected when Tardanico, while discussing developments in Mexico in the 1920's and 1930's, says that, "clientilistic advances of peripheral states are made not at the expense of core interests—as are nationalistic gains—but rather at the expense of the peripheral states less successful in securing core investments." Such a statement presupposess that developing countries gain from core investments. There is, however, another aspect to this statement and to the general attitude reflected in the book; that is that gains are always achieved at the expense of somebody else. No possibility exists for common gains. There are, no doubt, conflict situations, but there are also situations when all gain. That is why nations engage in voluntary economic relations. A similar point is made by Goldfrank in his discussion on Brazil, though in a different context. He is critical of Chomsky's and Hermann's characterization of the military regime as being imposed by the United States and reflecting merely US interests and ideas. He prefers rather Evans' analysis which points to the role of the right in general, and the military in particular, in the developments and that the Brazilian Government had rejected advice from the United States' Government which ran contrary to its own ideas. But he himself forgets this point when in studying the establishment of steel and petrochemical complexes he argues that the push for these came from external sources. Other analyses suggest that pressure came more from Brazilian sources who were following a nationalistic policy, and that the multinationals often acquiesced not to lose access to the important Brazilian market. The nationalist element in the Brazilian model of co-operation between the triad of multinational capital, local capital and the state is often ignored. The model may not be successful if it is sought to be translated into other environments where the state is not prepared to play a strong economic role. This to my mind explains the economic failure in Chile. The state there relied merely on market forces and that was not sufficient. Goldfrank's characterisation of the Brazil model as

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consisting of internal repression and open invitation to multinational capital is clearly inadequate. Ahmed, who studies agrarian relations, would go so far as to say, "what should determine the extent of capitalization of an economy is the extent of integration of that economy in the world economy." But it is not clear how he would apply that definition. If he measures it by the share of trade in national income then one might reach the conclusion that the United States has a low level of capitalization. Such a definition completely ignores the conditions under which production and trade takes place and smacks of ad hoc rationalisation. The author himself gets into trouble with his definition because he later argues that the attempt at capitalization fails, though he shows that after the land reforms more imported inputs were used in Iranian agriculture and its output was slated for the export market.

In the discussion about state formation and the role of the state an important point made is regarding the power of the state *vis-a-vis* its own inhabitants and also *vis-a vis* the core countries ; it is argued that change of status leads to a strengthening of the power of the state *vis-a-vis* its own citizens, but a weakening of its power *vis-a-vis* members of the core. Thus it is argued in the case of the establishment of the Greek state, after it break from the Ottoman Empire, that its exploitation by the European-American core countries required a state strong enough to ensure extraction of the surplus from the rural areas and its transfer to these interests. But the author also argues that a strong state was needed to maintain the semi-peripheral status held by the Ottoman Empire. Either the central power had to be strong enough to crush the rebellious provinces and maintain its status or some rebellion state, say Greece, had to be strong enough to overthrow the central power and establish its own hegemony. It therefore seems, a strong state was required whether the regime was to be in the periphery or the semi-periphery. This would perhaps suggest that the requisite strength of a state depends on certain overall developments in the size of states and level of armaments. A weak state like the Ottoman Empire could not survive in the conditions of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The inhabitants of a weak state might face greater exploitation. For instance the weaknesses of the Chinese state did not prevent the exploitation of its inhabitants.

Furthermore, it is not clear how strong a state has to be to prevent exploitation of its citizens. Japan seems to be a case where a country moved from being external to the system to being in the semi-periphery. It never really was in the periphery in the 19th century. This weakness in the analysis of the role of the state is illustrated by the statement by Papadantonales that weak and strong states both have the negative effect of entrenching and perpetuating underdevelopment and subordination to the core. While different stages of the development of a country and the world economy may require different kinds of states for exploitation by the core

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countries, the historical circumstances in which this occurs needed further elaboration. In particular, the conditions for improvement in status are not sufficiently analysed. The statement as it stands seems to rule out any improvement in status of a peripheral country. But an earlier footnote had suggested that a strong state in the United States in the period from Hamilton to Jackson had enabled the country to shift from a position on the periphery to one in the core.

The dynamics of state movements needs further analysis. In particular, the main advantage of the world systems approach is to study developments in a particular country as part of developments in the entire world economy. But unfortunately in most cases, such as Brazil, Greece, Mexico, practically no attention is paid to the condition of the world economy and how this condition infringed on the particular developments in each country. In the study of land reforms in Iran, Ahmed states that the world demand for agricultural products in the world economy was increasing rapidly and therefore it was in the interest of world capitalism to ensure change in the Iranian agrarian system which would enable increased production under a capitalist framework. But no evidence is presented to show that there was this large increase in demand. For most of the period since the mid-fifties the developed countries have stockpiled huge surpluses and their problem, except in the brief period 1974-75, has been how to control excess production. Evidence also suggests that elasticity of demand for plantation products produced by the developing countries has been low and given the increases in production, prices for these products have tended to stagnate.

But even at the abstract level of the relationship between evolution of the world economy and the power relations between states there are a number of ambiguities. For instance, it is stated that periods of expansion culminate in the rise of the hegemony of a core power and informal forms of control, while periods of stagnation lead to competition among core powers and more direct colonial type controls. However, no evidence is adduced to support these contentions. In fact, the evidence after the Second World War would suggest that it was the hegemony of the United States which resulted in the prosperity of the post-war period and this prosperity resulted in increased competition among the core countries and consequent disagreement. Also, while understandable that in periods of stagnation core countries might try to move closely to those countries dependent on them, the increased competition among the core countries might enable some "relatively less dependent" periphery countries to get more leeway. Thus it is not clear *a priori* what effect stagnation would have on the nature of controls, and no empirical evidence is provided.

Overall, the book provides an interesting framework for analysis of world developments. In particular, one can readily accept the contention that what happens in a particular economy is affected by developments in

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the overall world economy. But there are a number of problems both at the theoretical and empirical level which need to be straightened out, in the opinion of this reviewer, before this approach can provide a substantial framework for analysis of the problems of individual countries within the framework of the world economy.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

LONDON INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS : The Yearbook of World Affairs, Institute of World Affairs, London, 1982, vi, 277 p., £ 16.00.

THE YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1982, published by the London Institute of World Affairs, is a volume that should adorn every library on foreign affairs, as the fifteen essays of the volume make pointed reading and have a discerning approach to international affairs and values that are so vital for peace, stability and economic balance in the world. The four chapters dealing with international problems, politics of force, disarmament and crisis and survival have made a comprehensive analysis of power politics among the great Western Powers and the Soviet Union, exposing the augmentation of the miltarisation of statecraft and the risk of war where the competing blocs have little regard for values of a world order. The powerful nations controlling nuclear armaments dislike intervention by others as they believe in their might — a primitive Machiavellian doctrine that "might is right" — and even they are unwilling to get controlled by the United Nations whose falling stature is perceptibly seen inspite of the demands and demarcations of the UN Charter. It has rightly been pointed out : "The erosion of normative content in foreign policy tends to underscore the reality of a fragmented political order containing states grossly unequal in all respects." This forms the crux of the whole question affecting most of the non-western world. If world military spending topped $ 600 billion in 1981, the idea that nuclear wars are fightable is nurtured and this builds up tension is the world. The military prowess of super powers has got to be tempered down and *detente* established, as otherwise the entire structure would have a devastating effect on the world economy. These aspects have been brilliantly brought out in the early chapters of the book.

The slant in the book is on the side of the Western Powers and the Russians are described as "creatures of faith and fear." While the book gives a clear analysis of the contents of the Geneva Disarmament Committee and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet the politics of financial power and force have not found lasting solutions to war problems, for, the constant element of trust is totally absent in the Super Powers. It is that that constitutes the stumbling block to ban the use of nuclear weapons to save the human race. How arms reduction is to be achieved remains the crux of the problem and it appears to be almost an insoluble problem in the face of the postures between the Western and Soviet blocs.

The essay on "Politics of Force" is well reasoned and well substantiated by facts, rules and international norms, and it rightly stresses that the

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UN Charter is the only possible basis for such a policy, since it is the only "code of *detente*" to which all nations have formally agreed. While the author does not think much of a World Government, as envisaged by Hans Morgenthau, he believes it to be less radical, perhaps less capable of dealing with what must soberly be described as the crisis of world problems. The ideal of putting all faith in the United Nations Charter regarding the international use of force to ensure world peace and the desire to bring the Soviet Union to this view of thinking, is more a wish which is difficult to achieve. This essay is a brilliant contribution.

The warning given in the chapter on "Crisis and Survival" that if western fortunes fared badly in the eighties and nineties as they did in the late seventies, the prospects for the year 2000 would not be reassuring, is an accurate reading of the future of the international set up.

The articles on "Energy and a New World Economic Order" and "OPEC" are so thoughtfully written that one could regard them as the most notable contributions to the entire volume, for energy has been and is the subject of world-wide concern and the world's economy rests primarily on the availability, production and conservation of energy. The two essays are authoritative in their content and full of research values ; one may aver without fear of contradiction that they predict rightly the impact of energy on world politics and military power—"The growing strength of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and their willingness to cut back oil production in order to obtain greater price increases was not difficult to forecast, given a rudimentary appreciation of the extent of world oil reserves." If the world, including affluent nations, should survive, they could do so only when there is to be an abundant supply of energy at prices (constant prices as the economist would term it), and there lies the only hope of the survival of the nations' economy. The year 2000 shoud be made the target year at least. It is of paramount importance that the OPEC should concentrate on supporting the under-developed countries till new energy sources are available and this is the royal road towards economic development.

States should thus work out a new strategy not only to conserve oil (60 per cent of which is in the Middle East) and gas but also detect alternate sources of energy if necessary with a tax holiday on them, if only to emerge swiftly from the darkness to light and safety. A new technology alone can help the deficit nations in energy in their survival and a right economic climate should be created in under-developed countries. "New energy is by far the most important potential recipient of capital investment." It is rightly pointed out that the OPEC led by Saudi Arabia will have to take the initiative in driving the IEA/OECD countries in adopting common conservation policies and this would substantially help recovery from world recession.

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It is imperative also to test the international financial institutions' petro-dollar position by readjusting the OPEC on the structure of current balances. The stability of euro-currency banks should not be allowed to go over the precipice. It should be remembered, as already pointed out that, "international trade in energy is predominantly concerned with trade in oil although there is a substantial trade in coal and liquified natural gas. Therefore, the balance between domestic energy consumption and production is largely met through oil imports in which case the world market for oil reflects the state of this imbalance across the nations of the world." The OPEC's oil pricing policy should not be allowed to adversely affect society and nations as a whole if the international economic balance is to be safeguarded. The two essays are pregnant with correctly related facts based on research and they are commendable with a firm economic background.

Escalation in South Africa and South Africa's search for a new political system are written with a fund of facts resting on historical background and study. The apartheid policy of the government is blatantly exposed and the political realities as to how the white dominated government controls the Union with potent military power is comprehensively dealt with. Further, its intransigence arising out of the fact that it possesses nuclear capability, is also analysed in depth. Other revealing facts are presented to show that rights of the Africans cannot be quelled for all time to come. The years of the white regime are numbered according to the author.

The articles on "Zimbabwe," "Northern Ireland" and "Disappearance and International Protection of Human Rights" are informative and objective, but appear to be written more to reflect the western thought. The hostages incident is graphically described with an accent on the UN Security Councils's part in finding a solution to the problem along with the International Court of Justice's intervention. The fact of the consequent happy ending is truly narrated and readable for a student of international affairs.

The last essay on the "International Court of Justice" delineates pictures of the role of an independent judge, a disinterested judge, an impartial judge, a conscientious judge and a moral judge—a judge as an embodiment of perfection ! It is difficult to find one such as every judge has a philosophy of his own and he cannot always be expected to discharge his judicial function in that perfect role, for human failings are always there. The political powers of nominating judges have their own riders and restricted outlook, and judicial qualifications cannot always be regarded as pure white in colour. Their election goes to an extent with power groups and their decisions cannot always be regarded as 100 per cent acceptable to one and all. Further, the article rightly states, "factors such as the court's universalisation, the erosion of emoluments by inflation, determination of the court's international environment and changes in the professional

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formation of the Court's members are likely to condition further the character of the judicial corps." Very aptly the article concludes : "If the judge conscientious in adversity can answer in the affirmative these not unduly hard questions in the crucial area of confidence, his judicial credibility is assured and he need not fear comparison with international judges of a less inauspicious age."

Finally, the *Year Book* is a worthy publication deserving allround appreciation.

Salem R.T. PARTHA SARTHY

RAYMOND COHEN : Threat Perception in International Crisis. University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin, 1979, vii, 229 p.

CURRENT professional wisdom in international relations has it that behaviouralism died in 1973. Its death was one of the intellectual consequences of the oil crisis. So profound was the "oil shock" that political concern with economic issues, that now goes under the rubric of political economy, soon forced behaviouralism out.

Raymond Cohen, the author of the book under review, seems unperturbed. Winds of intellectual change have passed him by. Using the behaviouralist mode of analysis, he deals with the problem of "threat perception in international crisis." A sophisticated, but misplaced, precision that is so characteristic of behaviouralist research marks the book. The result is some sparkling trivia that consumes 226 pages of frustrating reading.

I should substantiate these rather serious charges. Believing that threat perception is "the decisive intervening variable between event and reaction in international crisis," (p. 3) Cohen sets out to explore the "circumstances or conditions that lead a decision-maker to interpret a configuration in the external environment as a warning of future danger." (p. 5) He disagrees with David Singer's equation that threat perception=estimated capability × estimated intent. This "tautological equation," he feels, ignores the psychological dimension, "the irrational and the involuntary," that subsumes sources such as "distrust, past experience, contingency planning and personal anxiety." (p. 6) Threat perception, in other words, is not simply a matter of perception; the perception itself is a "cognitive construct," i.e., it is also a judgment based on predisposition. Observable realities "rarely have unmistakeable meaning;" they are interpreted. On the basis of six historical examples of threat perceptions—the 1875 French-German War-in-sight crisis, the Italian Invasion scare of 1889, the Russian perceptions of Germany in 1913, the Prague Crisis of 1939, the Polish Corridor Crisis of 1939—he attempts to develop the components of this cognitive construct.

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The problem, simply put, is as follows : why and how is threat perceived and why might there be a gap between the objective extent of threat and its interpretation by those feeling "threat-ened."

Cohen's basic answer to this question can also be simply reconstructed as follows : a threat is perceived when an "infringement of the accepted norms of international conduct governing relationship between the involved parties" (p. 177) is made and/or observed.

This is all very well, but left at that plane this result is an unilluminating truism. It is important to ask what this infringement amounts to. Cohen does not raise this question explicitly but answers it nonetheless by excluding certain explanations on methodological grounds. And that is the beginning of serious problems. Witness, for example, the psychological forays of the following kind : "Threat perception in international crisis is doubtless analogous to threat perception in everyday life. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics peculiar to international politics which suggest that one should be cautious about applying conclusions taken from the spheres of individual and social psychology. On the whole, for example, *threats perceived in international crisis are to the central values of the staie which the decision-maker represents, rather than to his own private interests.*" (p. 133) (Emphasis mine)

I am not so sure. Don't the elites go to war or create manageable levels of crisis for enhancing their own legitimacy ? Was the Indo-Pak War of 1965 a consequence of the threats to the central values of either India or Pakistan (as opposed to, let us say, the 1971 War, for the sake of argument) ? Is the US invasion in Grenada a response to such a threat ? In any event who defines these "central values ?" Aren't they sometimes, if not generally, defined in such a way that they are identical to the interests of the elites in power ? The point of all this is not to deny that crises or wars do not result from threats to the "central values" but that is not the only (or arguably the most important) reason why they result. Elites do not simply helplessly watch and interpret the adversary moves. The post-1945 history shows that they also create crisis situations either for prolonging their existence in power or for ideological reasons when their world visions are hopelessly ensconsed in ideological straitjackets, or for both.

This is simply a minor part of a complex story. One can launch into arguments about the structure of the present international system and its relationship with the ideological and material bases of threats and their perception. The world system after 1945 has rivals which have clashing socio-economic and ideological systems unlike the phase before the First World War from which are drawn most of Cohen's case materials. Given such a system, the psychological formation of Cohen's cognitive construct is deeply embedded in material and ideological questions of substantial consequence on the one hand, and elite interests and inter-elite struggles on the other. In Cohen's scheme of things, these are not important themes.

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All threat situations from 1871 to 1939 are similar and psychologically analyzable.

I had expected to avoid polemicism, but the book has such a surplus of systematically structured nullities that polemics came naturally. I would highly recommend the book to those who are still not tired of behaviouralism !

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, U.S.A. ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH : Essays from the Poor to the Rich. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1983, vi, 88 p., Rs. 30.

AT a time when the poor countries are trying to catch up with the rich, Galbraith's lectures impel to pause a while and ponder on what they are really achieving. Development has its logic, sequence and pace, depending on the circumstances of individual countries. No country can be the loadestar for others, Galbraith argues. The small book, supposed to contain a piece of advice for the rich, in fact, happily combines reprimands for the rich and warnings for the poor for hasty acceptance of aid.

Galbraith starts with giving insights into the historical process of development. He draws lessons from the history of the development of the now rich countries, that political stability and cultural development have always preceded economic development. Don't rush with grandiose investment programmes, he advises the poor ; attain political stability and political maturity first, spread education far and wide. In the rich countries, the governments made education free and compulsory long before they attained development, he claims. Education enkindled the desire to attain material wellbeing or to put it in his beautiful expression, to reject accommodation to poverty. For an Indian, working with the poor, the expression is gripping ; the poor have always been shy of coming forward and fight for their betterment. They happen to have made peace with poverty. It is one of the reasons why poverty alleviation programmes have failed.

But education is not enough, as Galbraith seems to contend ; further one does not know what education means in this specific context. In his earlier book *Nature of Mass Poverty*, Galbraith dwells on the same theme, but there he adds that while education creates a desire to be free from poverty, an appropriate policy framework should clearly lay down the "escape routes." This is important and it is here the failure is phenomenal. While working with the poor farmers, particularly in adverse conditions, I realised that an absence of a policy framework is more important.

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I would go a step further and assert that an appropriate policy framework would suffice. Once the escape route is seen the poor may look around and grasp whatever means that are available to come out of poverty and misery.

Let me illustrate. The poor farmers can be mobilised and educated to exploit water in an economical manner ; but at the end when they realise that their struggle makes no sense, they cannot even recover the costs they incur—leave aside the profit. The whole experience is so unnerving ! The *antyoday* approach, adopted in IRDP, now being implemented all over the country, once again proves the same. The government offers highly subsidised inputs required for different occupations and also arranges for training and education of the beneficiaries, but an economic environment in which the efforts would blossom are absent. The result is that the participants sink deeper into poverty.

If accommodation to poverty is to be attacked, the first step is to prepare a conducive environment—economic, social and political and not education.

Galbraith then turns to the rich—both the socialist and the capitalist big powers, He is profound and convincingly expressive. Rightly he points out that the poor countries intuitively reject any effort from outside to dominate them ; the evangelists of free enterprise and of socialism as well, are seen in the poor countries as enemies of established social, cultural and economic arrangements. The earlier the big powers understand this, the better. Galbraith forthrightly condemns the big powers for their attitude of support to rulers who only help them in shaping policies—internal as well as international—suitable to them. The massive dose of modern weapons in poorly developed economies is the case in point. It is however not possible to put the blame entirely at the doors of the rich. The poor are itching to fight with each other ; the big powers only take advantage of this situation. Later Galbraith advises the poor, to reject jointly all aid aimed at building up a military set up. This sounds utopian. One would wish Galbraith used his incisive mind to analyse the relationships of the poor *inter se*.

It is on the world of organisation that Galbraith distils his knowledge and wisdom. In the capitalist world a few corporations rule ; while their leaders express their loyalty to the classical market, in practice they use their talents and power to escape from it. In the socialist world, bureaucracy—massive and all pervasive—functions far below its promise. The poor countries are neither socialists nor capitalists ; low productivity, growing inequalities and inflation is the result. Galbraith's lecture on this subject is illuminating. He sounds a little pessimistic, but he sees a glimmer of light and ends up with an appeal to "join the march" to keep the governments on the right-track. There are three and only three ways to control inflation : fiscal policy, monetary policy and incomes and price

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policy. Fiscal policy, a major instrument, fails because organisation and political pressures are pitted against it. This is as much true in India as in the United States. In a poor country, political power of the rich operates from within as well as from outside through international alliance of the capitalists. If the monetarists are to be dismissed for their indulgence in classical market fantasies in the United States, they have to be ridiculed in an underdeveloped country ; the degree of monetisation here is low and the major problem is to initiate the process of development. Galbraith does not refer to the situation in poor countries. Having closely observed the Indian scene he could have given a detached perspective. The reader is slightly disappointed ; has the diplomat in him restrained him ? The poor countries have to face a situation which is much more complicated than the one in rich countries ; they have to spend on an enormous scale for the welfare of the masses and fiscal policy, even if scrupulously followed, cannot yield adequate funds. Creation of money precedes creation of wealth. Inflation therefore cannot be controlled through classical measures; much more regulation of production and distribution is unavoidable. Incomes and prices policy is thus urgent and of vital importance. It alone would help to reduce vulgar inequalities and assure the minimum to all. It is here the governments are weak ; they must realise that "floor" has no meaning without a "ceiling" on incomes. The political and social activists working with poor need to realise this. The reader would wish Galbraith to dwell on this aspect.

Let Galbraith be assured that there are a large number of thinkers and activists in poor countries who are anxious to listen to him or to read his writings, as they are enlightening.

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V.D. DESHPANDE

International Media

ANTHONY SMITH (Ed) : Newspapers and Democracy. MIT Press, Littleton, Mass, 1980, xiv, 368 p.

WHENEVER Anthony Smith writes or edits anything about the media it is invariably worth whetting one's ideas on. He is always thoughtful. *Newspapers and Democracy* is a valuable collection because it catches newspapers at a point of transition. With new methods of

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delivery, a tremendous and continuous change in technology, and the new world of informatics, is the newspaper dying or it being reborn ? That is the question to which the various essays in this book attempt an answer.

Very broadly the issues discussed are : the prospects of technology ; whether subsidies in democracy keep open the channels in what Walter Bagehot called an "Age of Discussion ;" and the problems of freedom in two areas—within newspapers and between governments and newspapers.

The last is extremely important because Smith and other writers have shown over and over again that the role of the government in the media is getting more and more important every day. "At the heart of the study is the realization that there is a late-century swing within the whole of the media from the private to the public sector. It is the government every where that is having to make the decisions affecting the future of the media." Smith himself has made this point vigorously in other books too and it is one often given little attention to by those hung up by their stereotypes.

Paradoxically, it has brought on another phenomenon subsidies. In order to have a diversity of views some governments have taken to giving subsidies to newspapers that are in financial difficulty. Sweden is one of the countries where this is happening in a big way. Such help can be straight operational subsidies, development aid to needy monopoly papers, establishment aid, incentives to collaboration and, finally, loans. In France the objective was approached by tax benefits. Subsidy levels, according to the book, have reached 10 per cent of the total income of the press in Norway, 15 per cent in France and probably 20 per cent in Italy.

One of the most instructive part of the book are the chapters on various countries. A reader in India would never have known about the structure and problems of the press in France and Italy, for instance. The chapter on Japan is reasonably interesting. The Italian Press is not normally quoted by Indians as being part of the Western Press and yet it is fascinating. It has a register of journalists and yet is not considered totalitarian. The whole Italian model is interesting, a hotch-potch of statism and liberalism that somehow continues to run. It is post-bourgeois and is naturally affected by the strong Communist Party in Italy opposed to Anglo-Saxon culture and to the American way of life. The Italian model is worth study in India ; unlike the rest of Western Europe the Italian Press is still quality and the masses are reached by the audio-visual media.

One of the very best of articles in the book deals with newsprint. Will the future of the press lie with newsprint as it has done so far or will different methods of delivery change all that ? There are good analytical pieces on the ways to evaluate liberal newspapers : to give information ; to cement on the events in society ; to scrutinise activities exercised by those holding power in society ; to promote communication within and between groups in society. There is a good chapter on the Political Economy

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of the human interest story. All in all a most stimulating, hard-to-put-down book.

New Delhi. CHANCHAL SARKAR

Pacific Region

RAJARAM PANDA : Pacific Partnership : Japan-Australia Resource Diplomacy. Manthan Publications, Rohtak, 1982, vi, 276 p., Rs. 130.

THE book under review throws light on the shape and substance of economic partnership between Japan and Australia in the Pacific rim. Emerging from Panda's doctoral work, it focusses on the historical developments of Japanese and Australian commercial policy towards each other. At the outset the reader may find the mixing up of too many facts and figures to show the shape of the growth of economic relations between the two countries. The book in some ways underscores the commercial reasonings of the dependency between Japan and Australia. The reason is quite obvious ; the two countries are neighbours with differences in resource endowments. Therefore, it is natural the two economies would be complementary rather than competitive in nature. Australia is a resource-endowed economy in terms of natural resources such as vast arable land, mining, etc. On the other hand, Japan is poor in terms of these resources, but the Japanese economic vitality is clearly revealed in terms of talented entrepreneurship and human skill. Therefore, the Japanese were able to build up a strong manufacturing sector by importing resources from Australia and the Southeast Asian countries. They have successfully penetrated into the world market by sheer competitive advantage and force of their export drive. This is the story of Japanese trade and investment policy all over the world. There is nothing new in the case of Australia. In analysing this aspect probably Panda shows some weakness

Japan has always followed the policy of resource acquisition from reliable suppliers with long-term commitments. In fact, they did adopt the same policy ruthlessly with Australia. Over the years, their economic relationship has grown from strength to strength both with Australia and the Southeast Asian countries. However, the economic relationship could not be built without having some pin-pricks. It is natural, every country would like to obtain maximum economic gains from its commercial transactions with their trading partners. Therefore, at times there would be divergence of interests leading to stresses and strains in relations. More or less, the present day world experiences show that gains are dependent on world market conditions for specific commodities traded across the

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national frontiers. For a long period, particularly after the post-war period, agricultural products and minerals did not receive remunerative prices as compared to manufactured goods. This fact essentially strengthened the bargaining power of importers of agricultural and mineral products *vis-a-vis* the exporters. Japan being the main importer of these products, tried to maximise its gains. This element is built into the Australian-Japanese economic relationship. As a primary product exporter, Australia did receive a better treatment from Japan as compared to other Third World countries. Inadvertently, the author does not examine this point. According to the reviewer such a relative comparison would have improved the nature of the study. An over-emphasis has been accorded to historical developments rather than the commercial compulsions of each of the trading partners. Therefore, the book appears a cut piece on economic history.

In the introductory chapter, the author looks into the future relationship between Australia and Japan and hastily concludes that it may transform into a multilateral arrangement under the Pacific Basin Regional Economic Cooperation framework in the 1980s. His conclusion basically emerges from the historical developments. However, things have changed in the Pacific Basin. Of course, given the option, Japan would like to foster a grand economic alliance in the area. However, other countries are chary to this plan. Broad economic cooperation among the Pacific belt countries does not appear to be bright at least in the short-run. The Pacific Basin cooperation is essentially viewed as a Japanese ambitious economic design to dominate the whole area with export processing and investment activities. So far, the ASEAN countries have resisted to accept the Pacific cooperation idea. They feel, it would be yet another supra-national structure over ASEAN economic cooperation or integration. So far Australia has also not shown any keen desire to forge a grand economic alliance with Japan in the Pacific rim. The obvious logic is that it may serve more the interest of Japan as an export platform. These realities have to be taken into account when one talks of Pacific Basin cooperation.

The chapter on the development of Japan-Australia trade in iron ore, fuels, minerals, agricultural products and food-stuffs is illuminating. It contains rich material in terms of data and supportive arguments The most interesting chapter is on Japanese-Australian trade in fuels and minerals. The author brings out all the salient features of trade links between the two countries and also their impact on the respective economies. The various commissions, committees and working groups set up by both the countries on a variety of commodity trade issues shed light on contemporary economic interests, specifically at the bilateral level. The bilateral trade links of these two countries clearly indicate the process of trade development with its historical roots. The author has ably illustrated this point.

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The chapter on "Japan-Australia Partnership in the Western Pacific" brings out the nature of influence of Japan on Australia and *vice-versa*. Panda here gives an impression to the reader that the Japanese economy is a locomotive in the Pacific rim. This impression appears to be a partial truth, because Australia and the Pacific Basin countries have established strong trade links with equally powerful economies such as the United States and Canada. Over the years, Australia has also made a deliberate attempt to reduce its dependence on a single economy, particularly Japan. This effort is essential for any country because of on-going structural adjustment programmes at the global level. Japan is now gradually shifting from labour-intensive manufacturing processes to a techno-intensive process of production. This element urges both the economies to change the very content of their economic relationship. This point has been well driven home by Panda. However, his emphasis is more concentrated on Japanese industrial development patterns rather than the Australian perspective.

Panda describes the Japanese-Australian economic relationship as a resource diplomacy. This is a debatable point. As far as economic relationship is concerned, each country would like to maximise its gain through commercial instruments; neither Australia nor Japan resorted to political means to settle any of the conflicting economic issues. Therefore, labelling the relationship between the two countries as a resource diplomacy appears strange, at least to students of economics. However, this does not underscore the merit of the book.

The concluding chapter brings into sharp focus studies of the Japan, Australia economic relationship. The basic ingredients of economic relationship between the two countries has remained the same, that is, Japan as a steady purchaser and Australia as a stable supplier. As far as future relationships between the two countries are concerned, the author expresses lurking doubts about this arrangement. The book nevertheless, is rich in terms of content, data and evidences. The author has done justice to the subject from many counts. An objective researcher on bilateral economic relationship must read this book. The bibliography given at the end of the book is highly useful. The book would have been much better had it been published neatly. The publisher appears to be new to his profession. However, the value of the book should not be assessed by its outward appearance.

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United States of America

P.M. KAMATH : Executive Privilege Versus Demoratic Accountability—The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1961-1969. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, xvi, 362 p.. Rs. 150.

THE theme of the book, as entitled by the author, deals with executive privilege versus democratic accountability in relation to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The bone of contention is whether the National Security Adviser (NSA) is legally or morally accountable to the Congress for his role in policy making or should he be allowed to remain insulated from this.

The debate arises out of the constitutional provision under Article II of the American Constitution, granting "special executive privilege" to the President in foreign policy and national security matters. He can withhold information or refuse to testify before Congress or its committees. This provision became increasingly significant in view of the active involvement of the United States in world affairs on the one hand and the Cold War on the other. The task related to foreign policy matters, involving national security became extremely complex and challenging. It was certainly a formidable task requiring deep insight into multi-dimensional world politics with many undercurrents. The regular bureaucratic set-up was slow and often subject to Congress testimony which resulted in leakage of information, thereby affecting the effectiveness of the action taken by the policy makers.

It was at this point that the need for a fresh and dynamic approach was felt. It was decided that instead of depending on rigid bureacrats, intellectuals from the academic world should be called upon to perform this task. As a result, a new group—National Security Council (NSC) headed by the National Security Adviser (NSA)—was formed to perform the task of advising the President on crucial issues of foreign policy and national security affairs. In due course of time the NSC established its own identity as a strong body and the NSA as the "Super Secretary."

Two factors seem to be mainly responsible for the rapid growth in the role and functions of both the NSC and the NSA. Firstly, members of the NSC were above congressional testimony thereby enjoying a free hand in policy areas. Secondly, there was a need to have a coordination of views and news at one central place from where the President could have the overall scenario of the issue. The NSC seemed to fulfill this ; the NSA was asked to coordinate all such activities.

The author has taken enormous pains to trace the origin and evolution of the NSC-NSA role till the time of President Kennedy. From then onwards the book focuses on the two actors of the game Mcgeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow, who served Kennedy and Johnson respectively. Both

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were men of extraordinary insight and knowledge in the field of international relations and known for their anti-communist stance. The choice of Bundy and Rostow ideally matched the international situation where the United States had committed itself to protect the world from communist expansionism. Both of them tried to put into practice what they had preached so far.

It was during the Kennedy-Johnson era that the NSA's role as a keyman in the Government reached its climax. The NSA spoke on the President's behalf and represented him in all high power committee meetings, appeared before TV and the press to explain the presidential viewpoint on vital issues. In the process the NSA came to occupy the basement in the White House where proximity was another factor influencing the Presidency. In other words, both the Presidents were seen to rely heavily on their NSAs, thereby enhancing the latter's reputation as the "Super Secretary" of the State.

United States' strength and commitments were tested in the Cuban, Dominican Republic and Vietnam crises over a period of 15 years. It brought the United States on the brink of nuclear war, costing enormously in terms of men and money. What was the net result of such a heavy price? The balance-sheet of over a decade shows more failures than gains. The American image fell and its commitment to democracy was suspect. There was an enormous loss of men and money. It also brought the country on the brink of nuclear war.

The book therefore raises few pertinent issues, the prime being that of democratic accountability of the NSA to the Congress. The author imperceptibly implies the democratic accountability of the NSA but refrains from taking a firm stand on this issue. If the NSA came to be known as "Super Secretary" of the State, his accountability is not a matter of debate. The executive privilege is a power given exclusively to the President and in no way can the NSA claim to enjoy it on his behalf. This is more so since the NSA enjoys office at the behest and faith of the public exchequer.

The book is exhaustive in its documentation and relevant in its theoretical discussion. The scheme of chapterization is good and the style of writing appealing. However, the author misses two important points. First, it is an accepted fact that the United States is a global power and its policies would have repercussions world over. As seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis, it could lead the world onto the verge of total annihilation. Another point which the author could have highlighted is that of the merits of embodying the role and functions of the NSA in the Constitution. Recognizing the crucial role that the NSA has come to play in American foreign policy, the inclusion of his role and responsibilities should be the logical outcome. This is a serious lacuna which will have to be sorted out by the experts of the American Constitution. This would

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also be in conformity with the democratic norms and values to which the United States is committed.

On the whole the book can be considered as an important contribution to the field. It would be of immense value to students and teachers of American Government and Politics to probe further in the subject.

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DILIP MOHITE

INDIA

History

IQBAL SINGH : *Rammohun Roy* : A Biographical Inquiry into the Making of Modern India. Volume I : The First Phase. Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, vii, 334 p., Rs. 125.

A biographical work is usually treated as a distinct genre from a historical work because it tends to focus primarily on the life of an individual to the neglect of impersonal forces that condition his life. But the credit goes to Sir Lewis Namier who has made history a prosopography (the study of personalities) and has thus emanicipated historical works from the astonishingly rigid compartmentalization. Sir Ronald Syme has applied this idea of history to the last two centuries of the history of the Roman Republic, and Professor W. Etherhard to the study of Chinese history, a field in which our knowledge of personalities is incredibly rich.

Since India's independence quite a number of interesting biographies on Indian leaders have appeared with highly sophisticated techniques used. Sophia Dobson Collet's, *The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy*, which was revised by Dalip Kumar Biswas and Prabhat Chandra Ganguli in 1961, still remains a standard work but essentially retains the original text with additional informatian derived from new historical sources and provided in the form of footnotes and appendices.

Iqbal Singh's work, which is under review, was published in 1958. It gained popularity because it filled a serious gap in the studies of Roy as little material was available on him except Collet's book. Secondly, it presented a sensitive, comprehensive and highly readable account on Roy. The author did not find any new material to justify the revision nor did he consider it desirable to modify his approach. He has added only two appendices including two letters from Roy to H.H. Wilson and some early American comments on him. Thus his original text remains intact ! A five

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page new material hardly adds anything new ! So this reviewer is only to offer a reappraisal of the earlier work which he had the pleasure of reading about two decades ago.

Iqbal Singh's biography deals with Roy as a leading social reformer who was deeply involved in the emanicipation of Hindu society from the thraldom of superstition. He embroiled himself in controversies with the Baptist missionaries but stood on his own. He read voraciously. His knowledge was vast. He knew many languages. He was a sound scholar of comparative religion. He was also like Jeremy Bentham, the questioner of things established. He was the foremost critical thinker of Indian society in the history of Modern India. Whenever he discussed matters religious, his father always quipped, 'Well, Rammohun Roy, you have always your kintu !' He had a high sense of honour, and would never compromise with anything trite or overbearing. His radical views of Hindu society and religion provoked hostility among his countrymen. Things went so far that his life was threatened and he was advised by his admirers not to move about alone.

The book deals with the family life of Roy, especially his relations with his partners which landed him in serious difficulties. When his father was involved in litigation, Roy kept himself aloof for which his mother, a woman of dominating nature and strong convictions, never pardoned him. The relation between the mother and son were so embittered that he did not attend his father's funeral.

The book throws light on the mother-son relations. It is extraordinary that both were involved in litigation over property matters. Such things seldom happen even these days in Hindu society. The mother-son relationship is a delicate one. In the case of Roy and his mother, it was a clash of wills. The question arises whether the conflict between the two arose due to Roy's radical views on Hindu religion and society and his unpopularity among his countrymen ! His mother was an orthodox lady, a staunch follower of old Hindu rites and customs, and a worshipper of Goddess Kali. On the other hand, Roy was a heretic in the eyes of his countrymen ! She could not tolerate his revolt against the spirit of orthodox Hinduism. Could this conflict between the two be attributed to Roy's greed of amassing large fortune and filching other peoples property by means of dubious transactions ? Some of the Marxist historians have stressed the strong streak of ruthlessness in the personality of Roy for acquiring wealth. Ashish Nandy in his perceptive article has applied the psychological method in exploring this mother-son relationship.

According to Nandy in an article in *Rammohun Roy and the Process of Moderanization* (Ed.) V.C. Joshi, pp. 190-94, Roy derived psychological satisfaction from the thought that while his mother persecuted him by her taunts and legal action proferred against him, he, on the contrary, waged a relentless battle to protect women from "men's aggression," and by

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"being polite to all women". I think Nandy's explanation adds a new dimension to the understanding of Roy's relationship with his wife. It is surprising that a writer of Iqbal Singh's eminence should ignore the notion that history in the last resort is an interim report.

The structure of this work is chronological. The author says that two of his volumes are likely to be completed shortly. The author has published only the first volume in a chronological form and surely this gives an incomplete picture about Roy. As an illustration, the chapter on "Widow Burning" (Chapter nine), highlights Roy's part in fighting his battle on purely academic grounds. By questioning the original Hindu religious texts, he showed that *Suttee* was not an integral part of Hinduism. But this volume does not give us any idea about the anti-*Suttee* campaign which Roy waged after Bentinck's legislative enactment. He does not show that in his interpretation of Hindu text Roy was not original—Maritunjay Vidyalankar had anticipated him.

Iqbal Singh has presented his convincing story in a congenial mould wherein Roy's development is attributed to his seminal mind, sound habits and elasticity of temper, capable of deriving the best advantage instinctively by importing ideas from the West. The writer has demonstrated in his work a sense of fact and language. He holds his place in this work for an appraisal and for companionship of a kindred point of view to our own. The best portions in this work are those which capture the social fury of the times.

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MUSHIRUL HASAN (Ed.) : Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India. Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1981, 'x', 387 p., Rs. 150.

THIS is a book by historians for historians and students of history. Not that there is nothing in it of interest to the general reader, but of that something will be said towards the end.

As the Preface tells us the book is a compilation of papers most of which were presented at two seminars held at Jamia Millia Islamia in 1979 and 1980. Appropriately the contributors make an impressive list of scholars and writers of history who have made a special study of the areas covered by their papers. At first glance the title is likely to suggest an onslaught on Muslim communalism before Independence. It is nothing of the kind. On the contrary it is an even-handed treatment of the relations between the two major communities until its explosive culmination in 1947. This is all the more admirable considering that the contributors make a cosmpolitan

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group. All of them have approached the subject as true scholars, not as Muslims, Hindus or Christians, thus producing a book of genuine unbiassed history.

Although "Communal Trends" leads in the title it is the papers on "Pan-Islamic Trends" (ten out of the nineteen), that form the first part of the book. This is not without logic. The focus of Indian Pan-Islamism was the preservation of the Khilafat and most of these ten papers deal with the Khilafat Movement. In a sense the Khilafat Movement and the communal trends were antithetical. One brought them together while the other pushed them apart.

The roots of communalism went deep into Indian history ; the unifying factor in the Khilafat Movement was accidental. It happened that among the European powers that threatened the Turkish Khilafat the great Satan for the Muslims was Britain, which had occupied Turkey after its victory in the First World War. And it was the same Britain from whose grasp the Indian National Congress was struggling to free the country. Had Turkey been with Britain and its Allies in the First World War instead of with Germany, there probably might have been no Khilafat Movement in India, at any rate not one in which the majority community also took an active part. As it was, for almost the first time there came about an identity of interest between Hindus and Muslims against a common enemy. Gandhi was quick to seize this windfall of an opportunity and adopted the Khilafat Movement as part of the Congress's own platform. It was India's finest hour of communal unity, never to be recaptured again. (p. 67) The communal trends that had been developing on both sides were submerged as long as the Khilafat was a live issue. But when Kamal Pasha gave the *coup de gracc* to the Khilafat the communal trends emerged again with even greater vigour.

Why were *Indian* Muslims so much exercised over the Khilafat ? The answer in Paper 1 (page 2), is that the Sultan of Turkey was the custodian and defender of Islam's Holy Places. The author goes on to add, "In fact, the protection of the Holy Places rather than the preservation of the tottering Turkish Empire provided the rallying point for virtually all sections of the Muslim community." This does not seem to a wholly correct view. Besides the religious interest in the custodian of the Holy Places there was a strong emotional concern for the preservation of the Turkish Empire, the last surviving reminder of the glorious past of Islam, whose empire sprawled over three continents. Indeed a few of the other papers say as much and restore the balance between the dual interests that prompted the movement. (pp. 55,71,144)

It is made quite clear that the movement was not by any means monolithic though by and large an overwhelming majority of Muslims were behind it. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the founder of Aligarh College, was violently opposed to it ; the Barelvi School of Ulemas were not happy with

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it either ; for somewhat different reasons, though Sir Syed, because the movement was anti-British while he was ardently pro-British ; the Barelvis mainly because of what they considered the intrusion of Hindus into a primarily Islamic religious movement.

Some of the papers provide shrewd insights into the hidden and, from the national point of view, dangerous possibilities of the apparently happy cooperation generated by the Khilafat Movement. In this view the Khilatfat Movement, seen as a product of Pan-Islamism, implied a dual allegiance for the Indian Muslim. Mohamad Ali, who had one foot firmly in the Khilafat and the other equally firmly in the National Freedom movement made this very clear when he declared (p. 80) :

> I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric; one is India, and the other is the Muslim world. We as Indian Muslims come in both circles....

It could be argued that this simultaneous citizenship of two worlds is true of the followers of every autonomous religion (Toynbee's phrase) and is not peculiar to Muslims. Islam was one such religion while Hinduism was not. Obviously Muhamed Ali did not see a necessary contradiction in such a situation unless one circle attempted to obliterate the other. But fears of such an attempt did create unease in the minds of both the groups even as they joined hands to throw out the foreigner. A renascent and vigorous Pan-Islam frightened the Hindus with the possibility of a reimposition of Muslim rule, while the Muslims were apprehensive of being swamped in an independent India dominated by the majority. So then behind the pleasing facade of unity lay a potential crack. (Paper 4, p. 74) Is this wisdom by hindsight ? For an answer we have to wait until we have read the papers on communal trends.

These papers cover more familiar ground. Indeed the relics of the old communal land-mines still keep exploding periodically here and there to the discomfiture of everyone striving for communal amity. There is an easy assumption that the communal problem in India before Independence had its source in the contest for political power. True, but not exclusively so. These papers expose a deeper malaise that kept the communities apart. How deep this was is explained in detail in Paper 10 ("Communal Consciousness in late 19th century Hindi Literature"—Sudhir Chandra), which makes no pleasant reading to the liberal-minded modern reader. It reveals an almost irreconcilable incompatibility, cultivated prejudices and even "venomous" hatred towards the minority community. In the view of the prominent Hindu writers of this period India belonged to the Hindus ; the Muslims were outsiders, aliens ; they had taken away the religion, wealth and women of the Hindus ; they were the 'abominably impure *mlechchas* ; of aggressive and strife loving nature.' The social evil of *Sati* was attributed to the lecherous character of the Muslims to escape whose clutches the

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brave *kshatriya* women of Rajputana had invented this practice ; "that it had been known in India since the days of the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* did little to ruffle this belief." (p. 175) No wonder the British were hailed as deliverers of the 'Hindustanis from the jaws of death' at the hands of their Muslim oppressors. 'Victory to Huzoor ! May God ever perpetuate your raj !' How these bitter feelings seeped even into the Indian National Congress and how they produced the counter communalism of the Muslim League is shown in papers 11 and 12. One concludes the reading of this portion of the book with the saddening impression of the inevitability of partition. (Whether it solved the communal problem is quite another matter.) Even Gandhi, despite his life-long crusade for Hindu-Muslim unity, seems to have been quite aware of the intractability of the problem. He is reported to have told an audience in Bengal "that the Hindu-Muslim problem had passed out of human hands into God's hand." (p. 216)

Now for the general reader whose patience has been stretched far too long. If he has not had the good fortune of living during the years of the freedom movement or has not had an opportunity even to read about it, he should find Paper 8—"Conflict and Consensus in the Non-Co-operation Movement" A.R Kidwai) of absorbing interest. It is an exciting account of the freedom fever that swept the country from end to end responding to Gandhi's call for civil disobedience and the boycott of British goods. Equally interesting should be the "Political Underworld of Calcutta" (Paper 5—Rajat Ray), composed of a mixture of terrorist revolutionaries, Pan-Islamists and Bolsheviks, among whom, strangely enough, Maulana Azad was one. And since the communal problem is still with us, people who want to understand its roots should not miss papers 10 (Sudhir Chandra's) 11 (Bipen Chandra's and 12 (Mushirul Hasan's) which deal with the communal element in Hindi literature, in the National Movement and in the Indian National Congress.

One is reluctant to pick holes in a work by such eminent scholars. Not that there are many to pick. Just three have caught the reviewer's eye ; two of them rather biggish and the third tiny.

The biggish ones are only omissions. It seems strange that in an account of the Pan-Islamic Movement there should be no mention of that outstanding Pan-Islamic figure, Jamaluddin Afghani, an ardent supporter of the Turkish Khilafat and a dedicated peripatetic propagandist of a unified Pan-Islamic resistance to western imperialism. His *bete noire* was Britain. His mission was to drum up a revolt against the British by the Muslims of every country which they had occupied or dominated. And this included India, where he spent several years, some during and after the 1957 Mutiny and some later in the 1980s. His best-known written work (in Persian), first published in India, was a covert attack on Syed Ahmed Khan for his anti-Khilafat and Pro-British views. It is thought that Abul Kalam Azad was influenced by Afghani's writings.

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Second, the Khilafat Movement in the south, especially in Malabar, deserved better than the faint mention in the rather pejorative phrase "Moplah Riots" (Paper 1). It was a much more serious and shattering event. The government had to use brigades of British troops, besides the police, to quell it. Its wide and adverse effect on the artificial unity brought about by the Khilafat issue and its being a factor in Gandhi's suspension of civil disobedience, are admitted. There was the "train tragedy", part of the cruel British revenge against the Moplahs which raised an uproar even outside the country, but finds no place in the book. In brief nothing comparable to it resulted anywhere else in the country from the Khilafat Movement. Furthermore, historians seem uncertain how to categorize it : as an anti-British rebellion inspired by the Khilafat cause, a bloody communal clash or an agrarian uprising against oppressive landlords? All together a separate paper on the Khilafat Movement in Malabar (as in Assam) would have been in order and added to the value of the book. As it is, the reader has to turn to Roland Miller, who devotes a lengthy chapter to it in his *Mappila Muslims of Kerala*.

Third, the tiny hole (p. 317) is a factual slip-up. The treaty of Hudaibiyah was one between the Prophet and the *Meccans*, not the Medinans (Ibn Isheq's *Sirat*).

Such nit-picking should not, however, detract from the merits of a book which is truly scholarly, well researched, untainted by personal bias and fully documented.

Madras. M.M. GHANI

Foreign Policy

SHANKAR DYAL SHARMA (Ed.) : Studies in Indo-Soviet Cooperation. Kalamkar Prakashan, New Delhi, 1981, xx, 293 p., Rs. 95.

INDO-Soviet cooperation has become a part of Indian reality today. Starting from 1950 onwards, it has spread into various fields. The book under review is a collection of articles written by specialists in different fields. They have given information about the circumstances and reasons for which India opted for Soviet help, collaboration and cooperation. The book was published on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971; it was intended to provide an "assessment of the relationship in all its aspects." (Blurb) The overall impression of the book is very balanced, covering all aspects of Indo-Soviet cooperation and

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in that sense it has achieved its aim. One can also see that the lay-out is very well thought-out. Its division into 1) Background, 2) Shared Values, 3) Economic and Cultural Cooperation, 4) Defence Development, 5) Select Documents, is very useful and immediately gives one a composite picture.

The "Background" has articles written by people who were on the scene directly handling the relations ; e.g. K.P.S. Menon, T.N. Kaul and I.K. Gujral were India's ambassadors to the Soviet Union during different periods. Prof. Bimal Prasad has been studying and writing on Indo-Soviet cooperation for the last as many years as Indo-Soviet cooperation is developing. Although there is some overlapping, each one has tried to deal with different sides or aspects of Indo-Soviet cooperation. Shankar Dyal Sharma and K.P.S. Menon have traced the historical relations between the two countries—starting from Afnasy Nikitin and Lebedev, to date. The Editor has mainly concentrated on the attitude of Congress leaders towards different events taking place in Russia and the Soviet Union. He has also shown the keen interest taken by Tolstoy, Gorky and Lenin in the events of India. Most interesting is Tilak's comment on the 1905 Revolution of Russia, that Indian people should follow the same path. When one reads the reactions of different leaders such as Nehru, Gandhi and Tilak and writers like Tagore, it seems that there was then a lot of interest in the new Soviet State. Then why was there so much ignorance about Soviet Union in India ? Was it due to the unknown language and British hostility to Communism ? Or was there something more to it ?

If one goes through Nehru's writings on the Soviet Union (Prasad has also referred to them), one realizes that many of our intellectuals were attracted to Soviet experiments in planning, education, etc., but were nervous of the accompanying social upheavals that would come in their wake. Moreover, inspite of getting attracted to these superstructures, their values were western (due to their family and educational background). They wanted to change the superstructure of Indian society, without changing the basic structure. They thought this was possible, hence emerged a mixed economy after Independence. One cannot go into the details here since it is not our subject, but that is the reason why India was trying to get help from Western countries, including the United States. Till independence, the United States had been championing India's cause, so the disillusionment had not set in. With the coming of the Cold War, and when our aspirations and plans clashed with their aspirations and plans, India was left with no alternative but to approach the Soviet Union for help for its industrialization plans—a pattern repeated everywhere—Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, etc. This is clear from the articles of T.N. Kaul--who calls it a "mutuality of interests," A Rahman, M.A. Qureshi, K. Subrahmanyam, etc.

I.K. Gujral has traced the historieal relations between India and Central Asia. Some small historical errors could have been avioded, e.g. he writes

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that before the Czarist expansion, Kokand, Bukhara and Tashkent were emirates. Tashkent was never an emirate; in fact during the medieaval period it was an important trading centre on the silk route (China to Europe). Its importance declined after sea routes came into use. It became important after the Czarist conquest when it became a centre of the administration and a booming industrial town of Russian Turkestan (Central Asia). Khiva was the most prosperous emirate before Czarist expansion. Anyway, the spirit of the article, which has narrated the cultural ties between India and Central Asia since ancient times is not lost due to these minor errors.

In his "Fresh Approach to Diplomacy and International Relations," S.S. Mohapatra has dismissed the whole Sino-Soviet conflict in one sentence and without justice to China. One can take sides in the Sino-Soviet polemics but one cannot dismiss it as "chauvinistic tendencies" of the Chinese leadership. Otherwise, it is a good general survey of Soviet foreign policy since the revolution. Bimal Prasad has again talked about the reactions to the 1905 and 1917 revolutions in India. It is a very well-researched and balanced paper; the author has not tried to hide the differences between the USSR and India. Credit goes both to India and the Soviet Union if these differences have not spoiled their relationship.

The second part of the book is titled—"Shared Values." In this, Rasheeduddin Khan has made the same points about Indo-Soviet friendship, nonalignment and the Indo-Soviet Treaty but in a scholarly-academic manner and language. Iqbal Singh has highlighted the points of the Indo-Soviet Treaty and its special features. His main point is that it is unique in the sense that it does not aim at any third party; it respects each other's foreign policy perspectives and has helped to create an area of peace in the region. Subrata Banerjee has shown how India is encircled by the Sino-US forces and this axis (Sino-Pakistan-US) is threatening the integrity of India as well as hampering its economic progress. It is their (axis) policies which according to Banerjee are responsible for increasing the defence expenditure of India and thus denying the poorer section of society. Not a bad piece if you accept the premises that nothing is wrong with the existing system itself. If however, you wonder at the growing disparity between the rich and poor since independence, the growing conspicuous consumer consumption of the richer section, how much can really percolate down in this society proclaiming socialism and equalitarianism as its goals. All the same he presents his case forcefully for Indo-Soviet friendship. Vishnu Dutt has taken up a point of Soviet Union's friendship with the Third World—natural ally theory. He has written about the heroic struggle of the Soviet people during the last war and why the Soviets inspired people—especially the leadership of the emergent nations. He does not support the presence of Soviet Union in Afghanistan but justifies it in the context of US policy (of subverting the Karmal regime). He accuses the United States of not under-

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standing the aspirations of the Third World nations and shows how the former is the main culprit for the deteriorating world situation in general, and Indo-US relations in particular. A very clearly written piece with point by point discussion! While many of the articles are one sided—showing the Soviet Union as "all white" and the United States as "all black"—K.P. Mishra's article is different because of its frankness and candidness. He admits that he was sceptical about the Indo-Soviet Treaty, when it was signed. He thought at that time that it might affect India's non-aligned status. But now, he says, that the behaviour of the last nine years shows that his fear was unfounded. A very good example that he gives of India's differing stand from that of the USSR is on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While India refuses to sign it the Soviet Union has not minimized its efforts at persuasion. Inspite of this no pressure is brought upon India by them. On the contrary India is getting help from the USSR to develop its nuclear resources.

The third section is "Economic and Cultural Cooperation." In this section there are four articles covering different aspects. They are very interesting because they place before you a wide range of activities in cooperation. Satish Chandra has briefly introduced the range of Indo-Soviet cultural exchange in various fields of social sciences, starting from 1972. This includes joint seminars, exchange of scholars, etc. He rightly says that, "Experience in the seminars has exposed the argument that the seminars would serve little academic purpose for the Soviet scientists would not be free to express individual opinions or to disagree with each other but would be putting forward some kind of pre-determined line." (p. 147) The common experience is they have different opinions and put them forward forcefully. There is no uniformity of thinking in USSR as it is humanly impossible. A.J. Kidwai has written on not only official cultural exchange but more in detail on wide cultural relations between the two countries. He has emphasized several times the need to understand how the minority problem was tackled in the Soviet Union, how they dealt with communalism and how they encouraged a secular outlook. His suggestion that the study of Russian language should be on par with the English seems too far-fetched, as he too acknowledges. For that, there should be more jobs created and the situation today is that even with a handful of people knowing the language, they find it difficult to get jobs. So his desire is without proper foundation—a wishful thinking. D.D. Narula has very clearly shown the strategies desired to be opted by Indian planners and the restraints and constraints faced in the implementation of these in the politico-economic structure of Indian reality. A very forthright article! Without mincing words, he has shown how private enterprise thwarts the regional balancing policy of Indian policy makers, how India is being drawn in the world capitalist structure constantly and how the market-oriented economy frustrates the planners desire to have an equitable distribution of

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income and resources allocation to various regions. Some of the villains he has painted are too simplistic – e.g. non-Congress governments of the four-five states. What he does not mention categorically is that, this socio-political-economic structure is the main culprit. The fourth article by Sucha Singh Gill is a very well written and researched article. He has traced the history of Indo-Soviet trade expansion. It is very well substantiated with tables and references by which he successfully shows how expansion of trade with the Soviet Union is not at the expense of any other country. He has also shown how because of fluctuation of world prices steady trade with the Soviet Union has been a stabilizing factor both externally and internally. A very interesting comment which might sound contradiction par excellence is—"Assured market of the Soviet Union helped capitalist Indian economy in achieving diversification in both production and trade."

The fourth section deals with "Defence and Development." Satish Dhawan has shown historically the agreements signed between the two countries on cooperation on space research. A very well-documented piece showing the beneficial results of cooperation in space research. An argument runs through his article that space technology by its nature is universal and hence Indo-Soviet cooperation is in a way a symbol of this international nature of space. Rais Ahmed's article is different in the sense that half of the article is devoted to showing the connection between science and technology and social development and social production. He has also shown the difference between a capitalist structure and a socialist structure. From that a natural argument follows that this being the case it was but natural for the Soviet Union to come to the help of India. The first half is very interesting including a bold statement that self-sufficiency in food, as a result of the Green Revolution, may not be so, if 50 per cent of our population which cannot buy sufficient food (the below poverty line population), gets the capacity to do so. But this part is too long taking into consideration the title of the book. May be there was no point in everyone repeating the same arguments. D. Rahman and M.A. Qureshi have written real long articles—twenty-seven pages. They have covered every aspect of scientific and technological cooperation. They begin their article by showing how the western aid immediately after independence went into the consumer goods industry; how it went against the planning of the economy and hence was harmful for the growth of Indian economy. Thus they establish a case for Soviet cooperation. One by one they have gone into each industry, describing it in detail—what kind of and how much Soviet help has been received by them. It is all well substantiated with tables. Again they have shown the contrast between capitalist aid and socialist aid. They have not ommitted a single point—even collaboration in private sector (Tractor Factory at Loni, U.P) finds place here. They have discussed the political interests of a donor country and also interrelated project aid. (See p. 214) They have discussed the behaviour of Soviet experts—giving them a good certificate.

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A very good article for reference in Indo-Soviet cooperation in science and technology is that of K. Subrahmanyam. There is no pretension to high ideals; he has put out bare facts and traced historically India's compulsion to opt for Soviet collaboration. He has taken the global perspective and global events to show how mutual interests developed in friendship. His arguments are realistic, based on facts. He correctly points out that the United States is unwilling to transfer technology and wants the countries to get into military dependence. He has also analyzed the desire of Western European countries to transfer technology but because of the nature of their economy (small size) they could sell their things only at higher prices than what the United States or the USSR could give. So it is not economical for third world countries. R. Rama Rao has mainly made a case for India to acquire nuclear arms produced locally.

The fifth section—related documents—adds to the value of the book. This book gives one practically everything on Indo-Soviet cooperation from Nehru, to Indira Gandhi-Brezhnev, documents and communiques signed—everything is available. Only one general criticism—excepting a couple of articles, there are lots of typographical mistakes. As a result the Bangladesh War starts on 31st December instead of 3rd December. The book might have been prepared in a hurry but leaves a bad taste. Finally one may say that it is a very interesting and useful book but gives a disjointed appearance.

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VASANTI DAMLE

Political Developments

K.R. MALKANI : The RSS Story. Impex India, New Delhi, 1980, xii, 220 p., Rs. 60.

ABOUT the intuitively realised truth, indeed about all inspiration, it has been said that it is incommunicable. Most of the religious cults become mumbo-jumbo when subjected to objective reasoning. The description of the RSS provided by K.R. Malkani belongs to the genre of devotional tribute, essentially esoteric in nature. About the experience in the RSS, the author says that it was "a tonic for the soul", that it filled the mind with a "certain certitude" and that it made one feel "different" and "better." And the book is an essay in communicating that esoteric experience.

The author's attitude being reverentially subjective he is never able to have a look at the subject from outside. Basing himself on the belief that "persons full of doubt get destroyed," he refuses to pose and even squarely

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face the questions necessary for understanding the organisation. As such the book does not bear out the claim made on the blurb that it is "factual, comprehensive and fully documented."

As regards documentation there is no reference or footnote throughout to support contentions which very often appear astounding. There are anecdotes galore whose authenticity would be difficult to vouchsafe. For example the author has narrated a conversation between Eknath Ranade and Sardar Patel which runs as follows :

> Eknathji told him where the Sangha stood ; that it believed in Hindu Sanghthan in Hindu Sanskriti. Thereupon, Sardar said : 'Do you think I think differently ?' Eknath told him that not all Congressmen seemed to think like him.
>
> Thereupon, the Sardar said : 'What I say today, the whole Congress will say tomorrow.' He said : 'There are a few brethren (*Char Bahi*) like Nehru who think differently and who are irritated by the talk of Sangathan and Sanskriti, but they too will come round. The point is, will you strengthen my hands ?'
>
> Eknathji told him that if that was the case, they would be happy to join hands with him. He added : 'But before any cooperation is possible, you must remove the anti-RSS poison from Congressmen's minds.'

Similarly, reference has been made to Mahatma Gandhi and Zakir Hussain showering praise on the RSS. Now there is documentary proof in Pyare Lal's most authentic account of the Mahatma's life that while praising the discipline of RSS, Gandhi likened it to Hitler's Nazis. And Sardar Patel in his letters held the RSS propaganda responsible for creating an atmosphere which led to the assassination of the Mahatma. How to reconcile the two views ? The author does not help. In fact he just bypasses it without any reference.

Every author has a right to making assertions but the readers too have a right to be enlightened about the basis on which they are made and anecdotes or stories current in a small circle cannot be a substitute for verifiable facts or commonly shared documents.

One becomes wary about accepting such stories when an important incident narrated by the author is found to be baseless. On pages 95-97, we are told that in the last week of February 1977 "Mrs. Gandhi established contact with the RSS" and offered to lift the ban "if it agreed to withdraw its workers from the Janata campaign." On a reference to the Prime Minister's Secretariat it was found that the whole story was a figment of imagination and had absolutely no basis in fact. The comment was published in a monthly magazine, *Secular Democracy*, two years ago but there has so far been no attempt to disprove the denial. It is not a matter of mean significance. It casts a question mark on all the references to the supposed

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reverential attitude of men like Subash Bose.

The fact that the author has failed to refer even to such studies as those of J.A. Curran Jr. and Craig Baxter shows that he has never felt the need to prove anything and treats his account as self-proved and self-evident. The two American authors have not been unsympathetic observers of the RSS. While the former studied it as a participant-observer the latter has acknowledged his debt to insiders like Deen Dayal Upadhyaya and L.K. Advani.

The book is meant to be "a handy introduction" for those who want to know about the RSS but do not have either time or inclination to attend the Shakha ; and yet, it treats the readers as devotees who would lap up uncritically whatever is doled out just because the author has had a four-decade long association with the organisation and because the book "has had the *good fortune* of a glance through by Balasaheb Deoras, Sar Sangh Chalak and Prof. Rajendra Singh, Sar Karyavah of the RSS." It may get the accolades of the initiated who have the same reverence and devotion to RSS but has no use for one who would like to critically examine the beliefs and the practices of the controversial organisation.

Not that Malkani is unaware of the controversies raging round it. The write-up on the blurb itself starts with the acknowledgement that it "has been variously described as a Hindu communalist organisation, a caste Hindu conspiracy, a militant movement of anti-Muslim murderers, a paper tiger, a disciplined band of dedicated patriots, a riddle, a mystery." It is not fair to dismiss all such perceptions as the result of "the ideological inclinations of our intellectuals and the opportunism of our professional politicians," as the author does.

Even if all critics of the RSS are mistaken, misguided or prejudiced it is incumbent upon a serious writer to prove that it is so. That may not convince the motivated critic but it would certainly help those who have questions for clarification and who ask them in a spirit of enquiry.

In Chapter II (Riots...Facts...Courts) the author has tried to deal with the charge of communalism and communal violence that is most frequently levelled against the RSS. He has tried to take cover under the plea that "no RSS man has ever been convicted for any such offence."

The fact is that according to the legal procedure only individuals are tried even for group crimes and the individuals can always deny association with RSS. There has been public criticism of the legal system on this count. But that would not exonerate the organisation of preparing a fanatical mind which finds expression in violence. What would you say to an argument that Muslisms are responsible for all communal violence because they have not identified themselves with India and Indian culture ? Malkani cites a question-answer session with Guru Golwalkar which is pertinent in this regard :

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> The next question was : 'But what shall we do ? How shall we solve this problem ? There are sixty million Muslims.' Guruji said: 'The problem can, and must, be solved by the Indian Muslims owning the country and its ancient culture. Indian history did not begin with Mahmud Ghazni.'

The author himself draws conclusions about the cause of communal violence : "At the root of it all," says he, "is history." And goes on, "The Muslim thinks he is brave, has conquered India before, and can rule it again. The Hindu has an acute sense of grievance against Central Asian Muslim invaders, with whom Indian Muslims tend to identify themselves."

The RSS is not communal only if you accept that line of argument.

He also makes an assertion that, "None of the Commissions appointed to inquire into these riots found any fault with the RSS." The Jitendra Narayan Commission's report on the Jamshedpur riots, directly naming the RSS as culprit, had not appeared when the book was written. But even the earlier commissions had pointed accusing fingers in its direction. One may refer the author to some of the observations made by the earlier commissions. Let us first take up the Raghubar Dayal Commission Report. It says :

> On August 12, the Jana Sangh organised a procession and a meeting at Ranchi. It distributed a hand-bill in this connection. The contents of the hand-bill referred to the undesirability of making Urdu the second official language of the state and made it clear that the opposition was to Urdu being made the second state language and not to the taking of such steps as might be considered necesary for encouraging the study of Urdu in the state. It was said that participation in the procession and the meeting would save the country from further partition and from going into the claws of Pakistan ; that the question of language which had led to the partition twenty years ago had been raised by some Pakistani and anti-national forces.

After the public discussion on the relationship between the RSS and the Jana Sangh even Malkani, we are sure, would not deny the ideological identity between the two.

And this is what Justice Vythayathil says in his inquiry report on Tellicherry :

> (i) I have no doubt that the Jana Sangh has contributed in large measure to the creation of communal tension in Tellicherry which led to the disturbances.
> (ii) There can be no doubt that the RSS is a blatant communal organisation.

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(iii) P8WI (U.P. Rajagopal, RSSchief worker in Cannanore District) admits that the Sangh has its branch at Thiruvangod in Tellicherry town. I have no doubt that the RSS had taken an active part in rousing up anti-Muslim feeling among the Hindus of Tellicherry and preparing the background for disturbances.

Justice D.P. Madan who conducted the inquiry into the Jalgaon riots made the following observations :

The communal harmony and amity which prevailed in Jalgaon was shattered by the Jana Sangh on October 1, 1970.

The organizations which have fomented communal tension in Bhiwandi are :

i) The Jalgaon City Branch of the Jana Sangh, and
ii) the Shree Ram Tarun Mandal which was completely controlled and managed by the Jalgaon City Branch of the Jana Sangh and the Jalgaon District Branch of the Jana Sangh.

There is no evidence that any organization or group outside Jalgaon has fomented communal tension in Jalgaon.

In the face of such evidence what can one make of the assertions about patriotism and communalism made by the author ? The questions of caste and untouchability have also been given similar treatment.

The book is an interesting document to know what kind of mind the RSS builds although it throws very little light on how it is done. It has a poor opinion of human reason and is a poorer guide to human action. The redeeming feature of the Indian situation is that the ideas and organisation of RSS have not had any wide appeal to Indian people.

Secular Democracy, D.R. GOYAL
New Delhi

PAUL WALLACE and SURENDRA CHOPRA (Eds.) : Political Dynamics of Punjab. Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1981, x, 381 p., Rs. 75/$ 15.

PUNJAB is in turmoil and during the last three years a serious Sikh-Hindu confrontation has emerged in this most prosperous state of the Indian Union. The Akali Dal, the BJP, the RSS, the Hindu Suraksha Samiti as communal organizations of the Sikhs and the Hindus are confronting secular parties like the Congress (I) and the two Communist parties of India. The communal challenge in Punjab was so intense that

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the Congress (I) Ministry was dismissed and President's rule was imposed to maintain law and order, but this strategy has also failed to contain communal frenzy in Punjab. Are the communal traditions in Punjab so powerful that the secular forces find themselves incapable of challenging the role of religion in politics ? Is the Punjab issue related to the cultural identity of the minorities ? Has the economic prosperity of Punjab made religion as the rallying point of the minorities and the majority communities ? Many perplexing questions in Punjab have emerged where communalism is posing a challenge to secular nationalism, and the edited volume by Wallace and Chopra is a timely contribution to the understanding of some important dimensions of the Punjab problem in the broadest sense of the term. Paul Wallace talks of two political systems in Punjab, i.e. a Sikh political system and the Punjabi political system and he suggests that an accommodative politics is the proper answer in such a situation. Perhaps categories of analysis in Punjab should be around communalism versus secular nationalism and not what Paul Wallace is trying to explore. Ethnicity can be a category of analysis but in Punjab religion in politics overshadows even ethnicity and Harish Puri rightly concludes by observing the complexity of the situation. Many chapters in this edited volume have presented rich data but their main failure lies in categories of analysis. The volume is rich in description but it is poor in explanations because a harply defined theoretical framework for analysis is conspicuous by its absence. The volume has chapters, information, facts, but nothing binds the scontribution of various scholars. Poverty of theory is clearly revealed in the book.

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Economic Perspectives

M.L. QURESHI : A Survey of Economy, Resources and Prospects of South Asia. Marga Institute, Colombo, 1981, xx, 274 p.

THE introductory survey of economy, resources and prospects in the South Asia region was undertaken as part of the groundwork for the programm of studies on South Asian Cooperation for Development.

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As aptly described by Godfrey Gunatilleke, in the Foreword to the book, "it presents an overview of the countries of the region and organises the information within a broad comparative framework, enabling us to perceive the regional setting in which the efforts at multilateral cooperation in South Asia would have to be initiated."

The constraints which emerge from the study are indeed formidable. The region as a whole is relatively poor in natural resources and has an unfavourable man-land ratio. This region contains the largest concentration of hard core poverty in the world with a population growth rate higher than developing Asian countries as a whole.

As against this background, the Survey highlights the disparities in the region ; disparities with regard to endowment of natural resources, size of population, economic structure and technological capability. India appears to be well ahead of the others in respect of all these indices. However, in terms of social indicators such as literacy, life expectancy at birth, infant mortality, levels of fertility, it is Sri Lanka which is way ahead of the other countries. There is hence considerable scope for the countries of the region learning from and cooperating with each other's development experiences.

While emphasizing the constraints, the Survey does not go in any detail on the prospects for regional economic cooperation. However the vast potential that exists in exploiting the Himalayan resources as well as the resources of the sea is rightly stressed. The author further stresses the need for setting up a common secretariat to undertake necessary studies for identifying possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation and translating them into concrete action programmes. The author is further convinced that the countries can achieve better results by acting jointly rather than singly in their negotiations with the developed countries for a new international economic order.

The author has been successful in organising a vast mass of data covering all the major commodity and social sectors pertaining to all countries in South Asia. No doubt these will provide valuable inputs for further research in South Asian studies. While assembling this vast array of statistical material the author has had to rely mainly on the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and ESCAP sources. A close scrutiny however reveals some inconsistencies. Table V.I reveals agricultural production, as percentage of gross domestic product in India, having increased between 1970 and 1976. India's Economic Survey 1982-83 however indicates a declining trend during this period. Again observing the balance of payments data for selected countries in South Asia (Table VIII. II), one notes incopsistencies in

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columns 6, 7, and 8 for Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India for the years 1970-72. In view of the fast changing domestic and international environment, it will be worthwhile to have the Survey repeated say, every five years.

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LARS BONDESTAM and STAFFAN BERGSTROM : Poverty and Population Control. Academic Press, London, 1980, ix, 227 p.. $ 29.

POVERTY AND POPULATION CONTROL edited by Lars Bondestam and Staffan Bergstrom, two Swedish scholars, is a refreshingly new addition to the considerable stock of literature on the subject. In the Preface to the collection of articles under review, by twelve scholars from different countries, the editors have very clearly stated their ideological position on this much debated issue. According to them, "the interpretation and understanding of underdevelopment, exploitation and poverty have been obfuscated by a widespread pseudo-scientific analysis of the population problem—as a problem of hnman reproductive behaviour." Until recent years, the predominant opinion among Western aid-giving agencies was the neo-malthusian belief in population growth as a menace against developmental efforts and social achievements. At the World Population Conference in 1974, held in Bucharest, a different opinion was launched by several Third World representatives. These representatives made it clear that family planning programmes do not work in isolation and that population policy measures work in the context of simultaneous economic and social development.

The contributors to this anthology share the views that there are other factors than population growth that caused economic stagnation and underdevelopment. In the opening article—"The Political Ideology of Population Control"—Lars Bondestam attacks the neo-malthusians by stating that when unemployment, poverty, hunger, misery and famine spread and deepen, Malthus's theories offer a rescue to the powers that be. Bondestam traces the origin and historical function of Malthusianism and unequivocally declares that, "With the rapid development of capitalism, including the imperialist penetration of the periphery, Malthus deserves no respect at all in today's text books on underdevelopment." According to him, Malthus did not provide any acceptable empirical evidence in support of his "law of constant relative growth." Further, the combination of the two theses—the demand for food expressed in numbers of people always tend

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to grow faster than the supply of food—was coloured by his own states' limited experiences and motivated by the need to prove the inevitability of the existing order.

Staffan Bergstrom in his article– "Fertility and Sub-fertility as Health Problems—Population Control Versus Family Planning by the Family" raises the very basic question of who is planning what ? For whom ? and Why ? He very persuasively argues that the problems are to be understood in the background of individual households constantly under the threat of child losses and consequent insecurity in a poverty stricken social situation. According to him, the assumption of authorities imposing family planning, that by controlling the family size all families will have a better share of existing resources, is totally erroneous and as such unconvincing. Where children constitute the only insurance for support in old age, advocacy of limitation of family size cannot but offend the communities. To get an answer, why the vast majority of family planning programmes have been failures, Bergstorm argues that a direct relationship between a high infant mortality and the resistance to decrease birth rates is understandable when we consider that very few of the children reach adulthood. In India a couple, statistically speaking, should have at least five to six children to be fairly sure that at least one son should remain alive when they reach old age. He therefore argues for a more vigorous effort at integrating mother and child health care programmes to remove the fear of childlessness and reduce the number of pregnancies.

Goran Djurfeldt and Staffan Lindberg in their contribution—"Family Planning in a Tamil Village"—note changes in the family planning attitudes and family planning programmes of the Government of India due to pressures of American aid-giving agencies. In their review of India's family planning programmes they have noted a strong new-Malthusian bias in the basic tenets. They have questioned the common misconception of Western aid-givers that the villagers in India breed "like rabbits." They have concretely demonstrated through actual investigation that a Thaiyur woman having gone through six or seven pregnancies, on reaching fifty, is expected to retain on an average two children. They have also found evidence that the mothers in rural India traditionally space pregnancies and practice family planning in accordance with their own needs and perceptions. Djurfeldt and Lindberg have questioned the validity of the concept of "absolute over population." They very correctly point out that the neo-Malthusians confuse relative as absolute over population.

The anthology includes an excellent discussion—"Japan's Abortion Laws and Birth Control Ambitions in the Underdeveloped Countries in Asia"—by Bo-Gunnarsson on the population debate in Japan, the only country in Asia which has moved far away from situations obtaining in other countries of the Third World. Bo Gunnasrson notes that the official Japanese attitude definitely smacks of racism against other Asians and their advo-

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cacy of population control in Asia is not very different from that of controlled genocide. Gunnarsson also feels that Japan's extreme dependence on large scale imports from the Third Word taints its attitude towards population control in this region. Saburo Okita, an expert on aid to developing countries, quoted by Gunnarsson, considers that, 'Controlling the population is important for us in maintaining the present pattern of consumption of natural resources and food in the future. If we do not exercise control now we may be inevitably forced to go to war with other countries to feed our population and maintain our industrial growth rate.'

Bertil Egero, in his study—"People and Underdevelopment--The Example of Tanzania"—adds a new dimensionto the entire discussion. While underlining that no study has ever established any simple relation between economic growth and density and/or growth rate of population, shows that structural change is the real key to the problem. Basing himself on the experiences of socialist societies in the Third Word, Egero asserts that the fallacy in the neo-Malthusian approach is more than adequately proved by the experiences of countries like China, Vietnam and Cuba.

The anthology includes five other contributions covering a wide range of issues related to the central theme. The editors deserve sincere thanks for bringing out this collection as a formidable challenge to the misanthropic ideas rampant amongst "affluent" aid-givers for population control in the Third World.

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NRIPEN BANDYOPADAYAYA

Social Perspectives

AKOS OSTOR, LINA FRUZZETTI and STEVE BARNETT (Eds.) : Concepts of Person, Kinship, Caste and Marriage in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1983, xiv, 271 pp., Rs. 150.

STUDY of kinship has been a central concern of anthropologists ever since Morgan's studies of the Australian social systems. In relatively simple societies kin groups constitute holistic social structures ; it is within kin groups that all spheres of functional activity are integrated. The study of kinship thus becomes a key to the discovery of basic principles of ordered social living as well as modes of limiting social tension, conflict and change within the society. *Concepts of Person*, the book under review, is a varried contribution of research and thinking by a number of anthropologists to

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the study of kinship systems of a number of Indian communities. The book is the outcome of a conference on "New approaches to South Asian Caste, Kinship and Marriage" held at Harvard University during 10-13 December 1976.

The contributors to this volume have not used a single theoretical framework. In fact the theoretical framework of the editors viz., Akos Ostor, Lina Fruzzetti and Steve Barnett are considerably different from the rest of the contributors. If one can identify any common thread of thinking in all the papers, then it can be summarised as follows.

Firstly, there is the idea that kinship, as a field of sociological investigation, is central to the very heart of the study of the structure and culture of a society. Kinship theory cannot be treated "as distinct from cultural (or social) theory." Secondly, there is the common concern of practically all the social anthropologists with the idea that while an individual's existence within a society is structured by the society, there is sufficient scope in the functioning of the society for alternative definitions of personal roles and functions.

There are altogether seven case studies constituting chapters 1 to 7. The introductory chapter and the concluding chapter present the editors' point of view and summarise the discussions and general areas of common interest discovered in the conference. Only two of the participants in the conference are Indian authors, all the rest being American or European. The contributions therefore, on the whole represent, by and large, an outsiders view of the Indian kinship systems. The conference, whose deliberations are no doubt reflected in the introductory and concluding chapters, had included besides the paper contributers, David Maybury-Lewis, David Schneider, Louis Dumont, Nur Yalman, Ralph Nicholas and Stanley Tambiah. The conference, thus, was a powerful collection of anthropologists who had made significant contributions to the understanding of kinship systems in India and Sri Lanka.

In practically all the studies on Indian kinship systems the influence of Dumont seems to be pervasive. Dumont's discovery of South Indian cross cousin marriage as a means of establishing pervasive alliances between the wife-givers and wife-takers, lasting over generations, stands in contrast to the European systems marriage where the depth of affinal relations is far less. The North Indian Hindu marriages are similarly seen as alliances, but with relationships more or less confined to two generations only. "Though the analysis is inspired by the alliance theory, Dumont finds consanguinity in the north Indian nomenclature but no marriage rules (except the one's related to the basic principle of caste endogamy and gotra exogamy -- GSA), whereas in the South, the logic of the nomenclature expresses the rules for the system of marriage." What has Dumont's alliance theory to do with the concept of person ? — the central idea in the mind of the editors. In the European kinship systems, a person gets his/her familial position or

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status within the context of his agnatic and affinal relations, by and large limited to the parents, siblings and the next succeding generations. To some extent these fixed relations are expressed by a relatively simple terminology, more or less ignoring distinctions between affinal and agnatic linkages by generalising such relations as MB and FB (uncles) and MBS (cousins). By emphasising generalized consanguinity, the European, systems de-emphasise particularity of kin roles. The South Indian kinship terms on the other hand, reflect the particular kind of inter-linkage between affinal roles suggesting marriage alliances between wife-givers and wife-takers, thus also reflecting the concept of the person in the context of specific culturally defined relationships. This kind of analysis of kinship terminology has a major theoretical implication. Such terms as consanguinity, affinity, descent, filiation etc., are anthropologists' linguistic devices to delineate "kinship" as a separate "sphere" for each society. These are, however, not specific types of social facts. Very often the specific cultural reality cannnot be fitted into these terms. While confronted with the task of describing the specific culture to outsiders, it may become necessary first to understand the organising principles of a culture and then to describe specific genealogical terms through the use-meaning of the term within the culture. There can, thus, be no exclusive study of "kinship" as a universal phenomenon, but "kinship" studies only as heuristic devices to study different cultures.

Let us take Fruzzetti, Ostor and Barnett's comparative study of Bengal and Tamilnadu (Chapter I). The Tamilian ideology of a person's position in society is directly connected with the emphasis on a person's purity of blood (*irattam*). Blood purity is itself of two kinds, viz., bodily (*utampu*), communicated to a person through his father, and spiritual (*uyir*), communicated through the mother. The second rule is that, on marriage a woman loses her father's *utampu* and mothers' *uyir* and gains her husband's *utampu*. Each caste group, *vakaiyara*, is divided into marriageable and unmarriageable groups on the basis of the notion of blood purity. Thus while marriage is prohibited within the male line *kulum*, it is preferred with sister's daughter, who belongs to a different *kotirum* and is permissible with father's sister's daughter who belongs to a different *kulum*. In this way a unity is created within a group of families, through exchange of *utampu* and *uyir*.

In Bengal the "unity" of caste is maintained through not only the ideology of purity of blood but also through other kinds of secular relationships. The general terms used is (*attiyo*) relatives. But relatives can be by blood (*rakto*) or by marriage (*biye*). While purity of blood can be disturbed by marriage outside the caste, the unity of the "relatives" by residence in a locality-*para attiyo*, is affected by lack of cooperation in local activities. Since blood is communicated from one generation to the next through both the male and the female line, there can be no marriage between any cousins.

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The secular status of a person is reflected not only through his blood but also through his social standing. Social standing is reflected in the choice of marriage. Each marriage is a link not only between bride and groom but also between their extended kin groups or *attiyos*. Unlike the Tamilian marital alliances which somewhat restrict the choice of marital alliances within a relatively small group, because of the custom of preferred marriages between cross-cousins, the North Indian marriages are more open and establish networkings within a much wider network of *attiyo*. However, this very characteristic means that the alliances are loose-jointed and the consequent sense of familial cohesion weaker.

Lina Fruzzetti and Akos Ostor's—Bad Blood in Bengal—(Chapter 2) illustrates the implication of extending the concept of kin category to include affinal relations as if they were blood relations. Thus marriage between ego (woman) and mother's sister's husband's brother would be considered inauspicious because he is in a brotherly relation with *ego's* MZ. Thus while in Bengal marriage is a device to extend the circle of *attiyo's*, in the South, marriage is a mechanism for increasing the cohesion between interlinked groups of wife-givers and wife-takers.

Sylvia Vatuk's excellently written paper concerns itself with forms of address in a north indian family (Chapter 3). Here we are made aware of the moral connotations of kin terms as brought out, in their usage in non-formal contexts. Thus the term *mama* (mother's-brother) may be used in such contexts as : (a) actual (*saga*) mother's brother; (b) related as mother's-brother because he is placed in the category of *brother* by the mother *rishte me mama* ; (c) considered a *mama* even though related only through non-kin linkage such as neighbour's son in mother's village. Thus peer group within a neighbourhood may be considered members of a brotherhood.

T. N. Madan's paper—"Ideology of the Householder among the Kashmiri Pandits"—is strictly speaking not a contribution to the sociology of kinship, but is a perceptive contribution to sociology of knowledge. The question answered is : How do Kashmiri Pandits explain the ideal modes of behaviour and socio-cultural identities? Like other North Indian Hindus, Kashmiri Pandits are shown to be concerned with release from continual rebirth. This can be achieved either through the path of *bakti* (prayer); *sanyas* (total abnegation of wordly life and attachments) ; *sakti* (achieving divine power through *yoga*) and *grasti* (dharmic or moral performance of the duties of wordly life).

A. T. Carter's paper –"Hierarchy and the Concept of the Person in Western India" (Chapter 5) too deals with the broader problem of "personhood" as a cultural concept. Carter considers cultural definition of a person in the context of Marathi culture as arising from the occupancy of "positions" in different contexts of existence varying from caste and family (*grahsta*) to rebrith (*punarjanam*). However, while holding of a position refers to

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stage a (*ashram*) in the life of bondage, the ultimate freedom is in attaining *moksha*, which may be obtained either through *dharma* or *bhakti* and *sanyas*. The paths of *karma-dharma* within the world (*sansar*) and *bhakti* are very different ways of constructing ones "personhood." *Karma-dharma* accepts hierarchy as natural and necessary, while the life of *bhakti* and *sanyas* is a total rejection of hierarchy. Multiplicity of roles, positions and moral codes associated with *karma-dharma* are replaced by an attitude of mystical union with the Godhead.

R.S. Khare has written a paper dealing with the specific case of changing social status of women from that of an unmarried young girl to a mother. The changing status goes through various stages *rajadharma* (menstruation) when physical womanhood is achieved and the *kanya* (daughter-woman) becomes *vivahayogya kanya* (virgin ready for marriage). At this stage her potential social status is measured within the context of her caste, utrine and agnatic links as well as her personal attributes—physical astrological and achieved. This (evaluation) is preliminary to her ritual conjugation or marriage. Marriage ritual is itself treated as a dual gifting—of bride to groom's family and vice versa. *Suhagin*, the next stage in the process of the transformation of kanya is the physical conjugation supported by personal symbols—such as putting *sindoor* in the hair, parting and wearing of red bangles, etc. *Suhagin's* status changes if she conceives. She is now *garbhvati*, one who has proved her fertility. A number of ritual and food taboos, etc., are associated with this status. By giving birth she achieves the status of *mata*. Together with her husband—*pita* she is now ready to take her responsibility towards her role within the structure of the *karma-dharma* of the householder. The paper demonstrates the relationship between a specific role and its evolution and the broader societal ideology.

Pauline Kolenda's paper—"Widowhood Among Untouchable *Chuhras*"—is a comparison of the cultural order of the low caste *Chuhras* and the high caste *Rajputs*. Her conclusion is that both higher and lower castes spare a common regional kinship system characterised by a strong patrilineal bias. The different customs regarding widow remarriage suggest a persistence of an ancient sanskritic custom which the upper castes have given up, while the lower castes have persisted with it. This together with the prevalence of bride-price as opposed to dowry differentiate the Rajput cultural order from the cultural order of the *Chuhras*.

Concepts of Person is a rich collection of papers and should be a necessary reading for all those interested in kinship studies.

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Nuclear Policies

K.K. PATHAK : Nuclear Policy of India—A Third World Perspective. Gitanjali Prakashan, New Delhi, 1980, ix, 276 p., Rs. 85.

THIS volume is based on the author's Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Kurukshetra University in late 1976, and therefore covers devements in India's nuclear policy upto the immediate post-Pokhran period.

Out of the eight chapters, three deal with the evolution of India's nuclear policy, its institutional framework and the application of nuclear energy in the country. The next four, before the concluding chapter, discuss the Indian stand on the non-proliferation question, the 1974 PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion), its global implications and the policy direction in the post-Pokhran phase. The book also contains seven appendices, a chronology, a select bibliography and an index.

The author says that the nuclear policy of India "reveals that it is the product of India's domestic compulsions and foreign policy goals of international peace and security." It was formulated, according to him, "in response to the socio-economic situation of the country prevailing at the time of independence." (p. 205) Again, the nuclear policy of India "is the extension of her efforts to promote the development of modern science and technology to fulfil the socio-economic aspirations of her people in a peaceful world." (p. 22) Elsewhere it is also been asserted that the Indian atomic policy flowed from the Nehruvian vision of restructuring the international power relations.

Although a great deal of truth can be attributed to all these statements, unfortunately the author does not go beyond making such pronouncements (which sound subjective and simplistic), in rigorously analysing the subject matter to come to grips with the underlying theme of what appears superficially as a rubric of incoherent, or at least ill-defined, nuclear postures of India.

However, this lapse has been partly compensated by a rather comprehensive narration of history. This chronological documentation of events and pronouncements, rather than a serious assessment of the policy, stands out as the asset of the book and hence is a useful reference to students and future researchers on Indian nuclear policy, particularly at a time when there appears to be a revival of the Indian nuclear debate.

Press Trust of India,
New Delhi.

P.K.S. NAMSOODIRI

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian Publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences.

AHMAD, Karuna *The Social Context of Women's Education in India 1921-81 : Tentative Formulations* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 6). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 70 p. (Mimeo).

Presents a sociological explanation for the growth and expansion of women's education with a focus on key issues, namely curricular change, regional variation, differential responses by religious communities and co-education. The problem is discussed in two parts—the pre-independence and the post-independence period and is based on official documents and literature.

ANAND, Balwant Singh *The Sikhs and Sikhism*. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, Delhi, 78 p.

It presents the basic philosophy and doctrines of the Sikh faith and surveys the two phases of Sikh history—the Guru period and the period of the political struggle leading to Sikh Raj. It also presents a biographical sketch of Guru Nanak and the four odysseys he undertook to propagate his faith and the influence on the men and women who met him. His devotion to God for the attainment of salvation (*nirvan*) has been described with quotations from his *Gurbani*.

BANERJEE, Brojendra Nath *Company Takeover*. Paribus Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, 479 p., Rs. 200.

A critical analysis of the social, economic and political themes of our nation in the backdrop of the takeover threat of well-managed companies by non-resident investors and the growing tension between the private corporate sector and the public financial institutions. The study also discusses the organisation and business of the Caparo Group of Companies of Swaraj Paul, London-based Indian industrialist, and the events that followed after the declaration of purchase of shares of DCM and Escorts by him, under the Government scheme of non-resident investment.

BEHAL, Rana Partap *Forms of Labour Protests in the Assam Valley Tea Plantations 1900-1947* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 11). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 74 p. (Mimeo).

Discusses the expansion and growth of the tea industry, which was the earliest commercial enterprise by private British capital in the Assam Valley during the nineteenth century, focusing mainly on the practices followed for recruitment of labour force, employer-labour relations and the labour movement against exploitations, low wages, harsh conditions of living, labour laws, punishment to deserters and the indignity perpetrated on the labourers and their womenfolk. It also discusses the formation of labour unions—the Assam branch of the All India Trade Union Congress (APTUC) and the characteristics of the labour force.

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DHARAMDASANI, M.D. *India's Aid to Nepal: Nature and Quantum* (Occasional Papers Series 6). Centre for the Study of Nepal, Department of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, 1982, 35 p. (Paper).

Discusses the objectives and orientations of India's aid policy to Nepal and its major aid projects in the country supported by statistical data.

GUPTA, Amit Kumar *The Communists and the Outbreak of the Telengana Rising, May 1944-February 1947* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 8). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 51 p. (Mimeo).

Study of the genesis and causes of the partisan struggle in Telengana which marked the climax of the Communist opposition to feudal-colonial rule in India.

JANATA PARTY *White Paper on the Toppling of State Governments: Subversion of the Constitution*. Secretary General, Karnataka Pradesh Janata Party, Bangalore, 1984, 62 p., Rs. 3.00 (Paper).

Annexures contain a table of President's Rule in the states 1950-1984, constitutional position regarding President's Rule, transcript of the Moily tapes, correspondence between Dr. Farooq Abdullah and Governor Jagmohan, correspondence between N.T. Rama Rao and Governor Ram Lal and the memorandum of the Andhra Pradesh MLAs to President Zail Singh.

MISHRA, Girish *Some Aspects of Bihar's Industrial Economy on the Eve of Independence* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 10) Nehru Memorial Museum and Library New Delhi, 55 p. (Mimeo).

Study of the state of industry in the state and the attitude of the local population towards industrialisation and the advancement of their socio-economic status.

The Nepalese Elite (Occasional Papers Series, 2). Centre for the Study of Nepal, Department of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, 1982, ii, 64 p. (Paper).

Study of the nature and changing structure of the elites in Nepal, especially since the dawn of democracy in 1915, and later on the inauguration of a new political system in 1960.

PATIL, R.L.M. *Maharashtra-Karnataka Border Dispute: A Study in Conflict Resolution*. Department of Political Science, Bangalore University, Bangalore, 1983, 58 p. (Mimeo).

Presents the genesis of the border dispute between the two states and the efforts made by the respective governments and the Central Government to resolve it. The study analyses in details recommendations made by the Mahajan Commission, appointed by the Government of India in 1966.

RASANAYAGAM, Mudaliyar C. *Ancient Jaffna: Being a Research into The History of Jaffna From Very Early Times to The Portuguese Period* (Reprint edition), Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 1984, xxiv, 390, p. Rs. 95.

History of more than 1,600 years of Jaffna, written by a civil servant of the Ceylon Civil Service, based on archival materials — Tamil, Portuguese, Chinese, Sinhalese and Mughal literary accounts of travellers like Fa Hien, Suleyman, Abu Zaid, Ibn Batuta, Marco Polo, etc., translations of the *Mahavansa*, court chronicle containing the annals of the Ceylon Kings, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*. The author in this research study presents an account of the ancient traditions, archaeology and epigraphy, dynasty and origin of kings who ruled over Jaffna, Naga and Kalinga Kingdoms, growth of foreign trade and intercourse and establishment of northern Ceylon as a centre for the distribution of trade between the Far East, the far West and the Arya kings of Jaffna.

SABERWAL, Satish and HASAN, Mushirul *Communal Riots in Moradabad, 1980: Economy, Polity and Administrative Regression* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 13). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 29 p. (Mimeo).

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Deals with the general position of Muslims in North India, social setting in Moradabad and the specific developments between August and November 1980. It also describes the course of Hindu-Muslim relationships and the role of administration.

SARKAR, Sumit *The Conditions and Nature of Subaltern Militancy : Bengal from Swadeshi to Non-Cooperation 1905-22* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 2), Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 87 p. (Mimeo).

The contrast between the Swadeshi Movement in Bengal (1905-1908) and the Non-Cooperation-Khilafat up-surge in the region (1919-1922) is used to analyse the conditions and nature of subaltern militancy in the anti-imperialist movement in this paper, of which a revised version was presented at a conference on "The Subaltern in South Asian History and Society," Australian National University, Canberra, November 1982. The term "subaltern" is employed in the paper as a convenient shorthand for three social groups : tribal and low-caste agricultural labourers and share-croppers ; landholding peasants, generally of intermediate caste status in Bengal (together with their Muslim counterparts) ; and labour in plantations, mines and industries (along with urban casual labour).

Some Aspects Of Nepal's Economic Development (Occasional Papers Series 4). Centre for the Study of Nepal, Department of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, 1982, 60 p. (Paper).

A collection of papers dealing with Nepal's economic and industrial development and foreign trade. It includes lectures of Vedanand Jha, the Nepalese Ambassador in India and J.B. Shrestha, a former President of the Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industries.

SREENIVASAN, Kasthuri *India's Textile Industry : (A Socio-Economic Analysis).* South India Textile Research Association, Coimbatore, 1984, ii, 266 p., Rs. 120.

The author, who has done outstanding service to the textile industry and in recognition of which he was awarded the title of Padma Bhushan in 1969, provides a comprehensive study of the industry. He discusses its growth and various other aspects, *viz*, raw materials used – i.e. cotton – organisation and management productivity, modernisation, marking, profitablity, sickness, nationalisation, National Textile Corporation, cooperative spinning mills, handlooms, powerlooms, knitting industry, khadi, industrial relations, growth of trade unions, machinery, silk, man-made fibres and wool, supporting organisations and the Textile Committee. Further, he discusses industrial problems and makes suggestions for its future growth. Related statistical data is provided in the Appendix.

SRIVASTAVA, Gobind Narain *India, Non-alignment and World Peace.* New Delhi Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984, viii, 242 p., Rs. 75. (Paper).

This study highlights the constructive contribution of the NAM in its struggle against colonialism, domination and subjugation, and its role in consolidating peace. India's contribution to the development and strengthening of the movement is also discussed. The book contains select documents of the Seventh Non-aligned Summit. It was brought out to mark the first anniversary of the Seventh Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Nations in New Delhi in March 1983.

TILAK, Shrinivas *The Myth of Sarvodaya : A Study of Vinoba's Concept.* Break through, New Delhi, 1984, 102 p., Rs. 45.

Master's thesis submited to the Department of Religion, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada, is a critical study of Vinoba's efforts to bring about revolutionary changes in traditional property, polity and family relations for establishing economic equality and social justice in Modern India. The author also argues that Vinoba used the medium of Hindu myths and metaphors to transmit hts ideals and concepts.

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THE NATURE OF THE DOMINANT ELITE IN AFRICA

By NEERA CHANDHOKE*

> We were ready for big and beautyful things, but what we had was our own black men hugging new paunches scrambling to ask the white men to lead us out of our despair.
>
> AYI KWEI ARMAH**

African countries seem to be constantly groping for the distinctive political paradigm as evinced by the fact that forms of political order have followed each other in rapid succession—the multi-party state, the one party syndrome, the charismatic presidency, the military coup d'etat *and in some cases, like that of Nigeria and for a short while in Ghana, a return to civilian rule.*

The future of the African continent is thus viewed with deep rooted pessimism by political analysts, economists and literary writers. They prophesy in symphony that African countries are catapaulting down the path of political unrest—economic disorder, suspension of human rights, a breakdown of law and order—towards instability and general anomie. In the words of the noted author Chinuah Achebe, in Africa "things fall apart."[1] *Dennis Austen using the title of this book for his article, writes that since their inception African states have been in a state of flux moving with regularity in and out of misfortune :*

> *The treachery of political life has been very real : armed coups, civil wars, public executions, the threat of secession, the recurrence of famine, the fanaticism of religious beliefs, regional wars, the near genocide of entire communities, the transitory nature of military and party regimes and the indebtedness not only of corrupt dictatorships (as in Zaire) but also of governments that still struggle to preserve an element of political decency in their public life (as in Tanzania).*[2]

The keynote of the criticisms made in this vein[3] *is the absence of stability and the consequent destabilization, disorganization and anarchy. However, all evidence in the African countries points to the centralization of power and authority, which can lead to a kind of stability—i.e. if stability is the only end of government and politics. The post-colonial state in Africa has created*

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** *The Beautyful Ones are Not Yet Born* (Houghton Miffin, Boston, 1968), p. 79.

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strong centralized administrations to weld the various social groups in common structures. The striking feature of post-independence politics to Markovitz, is not the lack of stability, but "indeed from any long range historical perspective the rapidity with which stability has been achieved.... The military coup d'etats *and civil wars, appearence of anarchy notwithstanding, have furthered this process of consolidation."*[4]

The modern African state is one which is increasingly dominated by a powerful public sector, an overpowering bureaucracy and increasing militarization.[5] *The highly centralized nature of the African state is almost a throwback to the early colonial state. The colonial state was based on patterns of domination, its very* raison d'etre *was domination. The colonial institutional form consequently was aimed at establishing hegemony over the subject population, together with its essential militarised character and the system of irresistable power and force associated with it. In the Belgian case, the state was known as "Bula Matari" (the crusher of rocks).*[6] *The pre-independence state forms have persisted. The observations of De Tocqueville are brought to mind. To De Tocqueville the 1789 Revolution did not bring an end to the ideas and order of the old regime in France. Springing from the chaos created by the revolution was a powerful institutional framework. Never since the fall of the Roman Empire, he commented, had the world seen a government so highly centralized. This new power was created by the Revolution, or, rather grew up almost automatically out of the havoc wrought by it. True, the governments it set up were less stable than any of those it overthrew; yet paradoxically they were infinitely more powerful.*[7]

In Africa the heritage of colonial politics, namely power-politics, has been taken up by the post-colonial state. The colonial tradition has led to a scheme of affairs in African states where a premium has been placed on the holding and consolidation of political power. Politics has been construed strictly as a "struggle for rulership."[8]

Political power is seen as a means of controlling the socio-economic structures of society. What becomes important in this context is the identification of the group that wields power. What is the nature and social basis of this ruling elite? As a pre-requisite to this, is the question as to what is the nature of class in Africa, so that the nature of class domination can be comprehended,

I

NATURE OF CLASS IN AFRICA

CLASS in Africa, as an analytical construct, has been by and large neglected both by the "modernizing" theorists and relegated to a secondary position by the dependency school of thought. The theories of development which dealt with elites, nation-building, modernization, integration and other related aspects, spoke in terms of the capacity of the state to

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manage various functions. Classes were regarded more in the nature of social groups exhibiting various degrees of attitudes, beliefs, and skills and in the modicum of modernization they possessed.

The underdevelopment theorists took up the arguments of the "Modernization" School and explained the absence of development in the third world societies as deliberate underdevelopment of the periphery by the developed core of the international economy. The theory has been primarily concerned with the economics of the world capitalist formation. Judged purely in terms of economic roles "classes have emerged as objective realities in the world economy."[9] In the core countries, class consciousness is present where control over the state is sought by competing interests. In the peripheral areas of the world economy, however, "the primary contradiction is not between two groups within a state each trying to gain control of that state structure, or to bend it. The primary contradiction is between the interests organized and located in the core countries and their local allies on the one hand, and the majority of the population on the other."[10]

The dominant class is thus in power because of its relationship to the international capitalist class. Consequently, the nature of the ruling elite in Africa can be understood in terms of the relation of the African countries to the international power structure. The "dynamics" of the continent being placed externally, the policies followed within the continent result in the "development of underdevelopment."

The thrust of the underdevelopment school is radical,[11] it is based on criticisms against the orthodox school of development. Yet there are finite limits on the underdevelopment thesis as a means of understanding the nature of politics in most third world societies.

As two notable authors have pointed out "this school has an equally Eurocentric perspective as the 'development school' because it casts the countries of Africa (as well as Latin America and much of Asia) in a common role, a largely passive recipient of historical forces unleashed in Europe (and later in North America) to which no response was possible."[12]

Every African country responded differently to its incorporation in the capitalist world system which was dependent on its degree of integration. The degree of dependence of the ruling elite accordingly varies. Thus the attempt to treat all third world countries as undergoing the process of satellization is misleading.

Secondly, the developing world is becoming increasingly sensitized to the concepts of domination by either power-blocs or transnational actors like the Multinationals. This is evinced by the non-aligned posture in International Relations and the attempts to "rationalise" or "indigenize" foreign enterprises in whole or part. There is a definite attempt to move towards autonomy from the international bourgeoisie.

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Thirdly, every society generates its own dynamics of change. Internal contradictions emanate from particular economic structures of society, the use of surplus, the ownership of property and class antagonisms. To place the onus of internal developments and class crystallization on exogenous sources is to largely negate these indigenous forces of change or class consciousness. It is to argue in effect that the dominant class is based in an alien society, whereas the strength of the ruling elite may be established on the basis of indigenous power relations. In this school of thought as Colin Leys notes, "...social classes play an important part in it. Yet rather abstractly and passively, not as protagonists in intensifying struggles, but providing its central dynamic political power, control of the state is also seen to be important, but again somewhat abstractly, not as a pervasive dimension of the struggles between classes and of the structures of oppression which permit one class to exploit another and which indeed are bound up with the very formation and development of classes."[13]

Richard Sklar points out that if the arguments of the dependency school are accepted in full, then the ruling elite lacking real power

> are not really responsible for their actions. It then becomes logical, in a superficial way, to attribute both economic mismanagement and political oppression by such persons to their presumed foreign masters. By implication, the denial of national political responsibility minimises the significance of local organisations and institutions since these do not seem to be a matter of great moment. Hence, the 'neo-colonial' puppet doctrine helps to create a frame of mind that lacks concern for the values of liberty, conversely, it fosters attitudes that are compatible with various justifications for authoritarian government.[14]

The school of underdevelopment theorists focused mainly on an indictment of the capitalist world system and hence the problem of specifying the political was given secondary consideration. On the basis of Sklar's analysis we can conclude that disparagement of the ruling class as comprador had unforetold consequences, in so far as in the process it was characterized as irresponsible.

The underdevelopment theory offers valuable insight into the constraints operating on the indigenous ruling elite, the international dynamics which accelerate the process of indigenous class formation and it provides an international context thus emphasising how indigenous structures interact with exogenous forces. As such we have to take the contributions of the dependency school as one of the factors in our study of the dominant class in Africa. Underlying this is the realization that we cannot study class structures purely in terms of local areas but understand the degree of incorporation in the world system since the class structure is part and parcel of the international division of labour; however, they are a mere reflection

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of centre-periphery relations. They are shaped as much by social and historical conditions and the indigenous structures of power.

Class Formation in Africa

Class in Africa has been approached in a cautious manner. As Cooperstock points out, cash cropping and traditional forms of subsistence agriculture, colonial patterns of stratification superimposed on pre-colonial ones, kinship, locality and ethnic loyalties, and, above all, the interplay among these processes, serve to discourage all but the most reckless from attempting to apply any one paradigm to the African stratification system.[15]

It is undeniable that ethnic ties permeate class structures and transcend purely class lines. It is not uncommon for a member of the elite group to sustain close social and cultural ties with the rest of his ethnic group, irrespective of social stratification. It has been observed that a member of the elite may have a sister married to a peasant farmer and a brother who is a clerk.[16] Ethnic solidarity is a powerful agent of mobilization in a new state where groups compete around ethnic labels for the fruits of independence. Further ethnic conciousness possesses "emotional dimensions not usually found in class solidarities even when these are well rooted."[17] Inequality may be linked to social class; however, it has been concluded that ethnic conflict is more salient and deep rooted than class conflict because it combines interest with a powerful emotional appeal.[18]

Superimposed on this is a patron-client relationship where cultural ties and primordial sentiments create linkages and bonds cutting across class distinctions. Miller concludes that "kinship plays a vital social welfare function in African countries because, for the time being, they do not have the resources necessary to emulate the modern welfare state."[19]

Secondly, the question arises as to whether a class system exists in Africa; i.e. a) is there class antagonism in African societies and b) is there class consciousness which would lead to corporate cohesion and the existence of a "class for itself"? Sandbrook insists that "social class shapes the attitudes and actions of its members only to the extent that individuals occupying similar economic roles recognize their common interests *vis-a-vis* an antagonistic grouping."[20] Thus, for class structures to acquire any meaning, what would be required are distinctive groupings organized to engage for class conflict.

However, in between class formation and class consciousness i.e. "the concepts of class-in-itself and class-for-itself can surely be seen as ideal-typical poles opposites—joined by a continuum along which it is at least, theoretically possible to locate a given case."[21] Objectively, classes can exist whether there is class consciousness or not. Class consciousness can be muted by ethnic loyalties, this does not however invalidate the existence of classes or the development of class consciousness.

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Locating the Dominant Class in Africa

Class relations in Africa and the emergence of the dominant class cannot be grounded only in relation to the means of production as most countries in Africa practice some version of state socialism which in effect means the presence of a massive state sector. Thus, other factors have to be taken into account in determining the dominant class. Ossowski comments that the model of capitalist society between the French Revolution and Marx's *Das Capital* was a society in which the only form of real power was the power of capital, and the relations of ownership were the only determinants of the system of social statures.[22] He further says, "the relations of ownership to the means of production are still a factor of immense significance in the formation of human relations."[23] However the Marxist-Leninist model for analysing social structures of countries in which the means of production have been nationalized is inadequate.[24] Ossowski points out the rise of a "new middle class of civil servants, trade union officers, local government officers, technicians, white collar workers, which was considered in a marginal fashion in the classical Marxian division."

In the contemporary context, political authorities can overtly change class structures by a re-distribution of privileges or by distributing a higher share of the national income to a particular group. Thus, "the nineteenth century concepts of class becomes more or less an anachorism and class conflicts give way to other forms of social antagonism."[25]

Political authorities play a major role in the distribution of resources to the people. "The state is the principal employer of a substantial sector of the population ; is the main actor in developmental and economic activities ; patronage ; licenses ; contracts and foreign exhange. Thus, political power becomes a means to the acquisition of economic power—it is a short-cut to wealth."[26]

Class stratification, therefore, results as the consequence of relationships to the structures of political power in the society. Through a monopoly of power a particular section of the population forms a dominat class and a part of the population is depressed. "In all cases dominant class formation is a consequence of the exercise of power by these who control various and diverse social organisations."[27]

In fact, Richard Sklar argues that class relations at best are determined by relations of power not production.[28] This new class—as the expression has come to us from Yugoslavia—"may be said to be made up of those who have special privileges and economic preferences because of the administrative monopoly they hold."[29] The class thus acquires its power from the state and not because it holds independedent control of the economy. It thus strives to increase state power to deal with both internal as well as external contradictions. The state thus is an autonomous actor both in relation to indigenous class structures and external actors. It is

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the state which thus plays a central role and a vital role in every sphere. Possession of the government and of the resources of the government is thus vital in achieving economic power and what is important to note about this class is that its members have used their strategic positions in society and their power to acquire wealth and status through their interlocking interests—"possession of government and the resources of state proved the decisive means of [accumulation]."[30]

The method of transfer of power from the colonial authorities has to a large extent determined the nature of this class. In most African countries, excepting those where a prolonged armed struggle took place, there was a low degree of political mobilization of the masses. As such no clear concepts of the kind of society following independence developed among them. Power was transferred to a body of men who seemed capable of following the patterns by the colonial powers. To Amilcar Cabral, the only logical inheritors of state power are the petty bourgeoisie—that stratum of the Africans who have been in touch with the colonial administrative apparatus. In the developed capitalist society, the petty bourgeoisie plays a marginal role ; however, in the colonial context it acquires a historically determinist role because of the underdeveloped nature of the working class, and because the peasants being largely removed from colonialism do not comprehend the nature of exploitation.

Conscious of exploitation, the petty bourgeoisie is the leader of the revolution and the class upon whom the mantle of power falls. The political and moral awareness of the heirs to the colonial state determines the direction which the revolution takes. If the petty bourgeoisie lacking an economic base follows its natural tendencies towards embourgeoisement it becomes anti-revolutionary, but on the other hand it has the choice of strengthening its moral consciousness, committing suicide as a class and aligning itself with the workers and peasants.[31]

The petty bourgeoisie is thus caught in a dilemma ; it cannot commit class suicide and yet it must. However, everywhere one witnesses the phenomena of this strata moving towards consolidation of its own power "with all its energies directed towards the unambigious retention and acquisition of power without similarly clarifying the ideology and goals of government or of development."[32]

In Fanon's words it is "a greedy class, avid and voracious." which "sees no further than the end of its nose, and reveals itself as incapable of bringing national unity into being or of building up the nation on a stable and productive basis.[33]

Ayi Kwei Armah in his powerful novel discribes this new class which has taken over the customs, conventions, the mode of dress, education, speech, their very value system from the colonial elites. He asks : "How long will Africa be cursed with its leaders ? There were men dying from the loss of hope, and others were finding gaudy ways to enjoy power

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they did not have - they came like men already grown fat and cynical with the eating of centuries of power they had never struggled for, old before they had ever been born into power and ready only for the grave."[34]

Contemporary African novelists writing on the African scene have revealed the extent of their disenchantment with the new regimes characterized by corruption, nepotism and venality. The emphasis is on the growth of the elite which hankers for power while the poor are given slogans.[35]

Who Constitutes this New Class ?

Shivji uses the term "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" to signify this new class. With the state and its institutions occupying an important place in the economic structure—political power over property comes to rest in the same class, which, however, is not a national bourgeoisie because it is not as historically mature as its western counterpart nor does it have an objective economic base, since it is dependent upon the international bourgeoisie. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie consists of a) the Politico-administrative class, i.e. the top civil servants, politicians, heads of judiciary, police, security and the top leadership of the party ; b) the Economic class i.e. heads and higher functionaries of parastatals, public corporations and other quasi-economic i.e. state-run or state supervised institutions and c) the top ranking military officers.

The control of privileges, power and institutions had led to an overlapping of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the top strata of the petty bourgeoisie, i.e. the intellectuals, civil servants, professionals, prosperous traders, farmers, transporters, businessmen, executives in private firms.[36]

Thus the politicians, the senior civil servants, the military officers, the private entrepreneurs and the traditional elites use their links to build up a cultural awareness in order to sustain themselves. Sklar uses the term "managerial bourgeoisie" and Markovitz the term "organizational bourgeoisie" to designate the "combined ruling groups consisting of the top leaders and bureaucrats, the traditional rulers and their descendents and the leading members of the liberal professions and the rising business bourgeoisie. Top members of the military and police forces are also part of this bureaucratic bourgeoisie.[37]

What is relevant however is the point that "the organizational bourgeoisie is not simply a collection of individuals. Its members derive their power from organizations. They are located at pivotal points of control in the over-arching system of political and economic power analyzed by Hobbes, Marx and Weber—the nation state and capitalism."[38]

This class does not only manage the resources of the country, it exploits them in its own interest. One cannot distinguish on clearcut lines the

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various elements elements of this class, as "the same men can play many roles and take part in politics, administration and commerce....The result is a web of relations that brings the holders of power into overlapping and sustained contact.[39]

The dominant elements of this class may formally shift around; basically, they remain a class governed by corporate interests. Thus an armed *coup d'etat* does not necessarily bring forth a new elite, a dominant stratum, e.g. a group of politicians may be removed, but the nature of the elite replacing them is not diametrically different.

Armah describing the post-Nkrumah (army) governing elites comments: "But for the nation itself there would only be a change of embezzlers and a change of the hunted and the hunters. A pitiful shrinking today when all the powerful could think of was to use the power of a whole people to fill their own paunches, endless days, same days, stretching into the future with no end anywhere in sight."[40]

After all the military establishment is part and parcel of the society it is based in. The masses have recognized that the elite – literate, educated, well-fed and secure is radically different from them. "The masses recognize this and they also accept the elites' monopoly of power, and unless some unbearable escalation leads to desperate revolt they will accept its policies. Equally they will accept a change in government whether legal or otherwise. After all, it is merely another lot of 'them' taking over."

It is a continuation of a familiar pattern with some exceptions, i.e. a significant portion of the energies of state government functionaries and all public institutions being expended in the struggle for power and for keeping particular regimes in power with little left or allowed to be left for the tasks of development.

Here the absence of development in African societies gains meaning. The inequalities of African societies are marked. Farmers have a life expectancy of 38 years, diet of starch 3 times a day, 7 days a week, an infant mortality rate which is the highest in the world at 137 per 1000. In development indicators such as life expectancy, public health, energy consumption, literacy rates, it trails behind the other third world countries. Underdevelopment and unemployment affect 45 per cent of the active population of the continent. Decline in food production is accompained by hnuger and malnutrition where people do not have the capacity to buy Jood. By current estimates, approximately 150 million out of Africa's 450 million people suffer from some form of malnutrition originating in an inadequate supply of foodstuffs. A Food and Agriculture Organization report stated that 28 countries were faced with imminent famine.[42] Africa is now on the top priority in the International Development Agency, the soft loan agency of World Bank which devotes 54 per cent of its resources to the continent.

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One way in which this recurrent problem has been approached is from the dependency viewpoint, i.e. the African countries have been looked at as part of the pattern of international capital, where they are exporting agricultural commodities, e.g. coffee, cocoa, tobacco and soyabean and importing food.[43]

Africa is heavily dependent on external aid ; however it has been noticed that the priorities in aid are disturbing. US aid to sub-Saharan Africa for instance rose to $1.046 billion in 1982, a rise of 15 per cent since 1981 when aid was $909 billion. The proposed aid total for 1983 is $1.119 billon, an increase of only 7 per cent which is minimal when adjusted against inflation. The problem lies in the priorities level of 1981-83. Milltary assistance has increased from 9.3 per cent to 18.4 per cent, to 21.7 of the total, while development aid declined from 33 per cent in 1981 to 31.4 per cent in 1982 to a proposed 28.9 per cent in 1983.[44]

This military aid goes to support authoritarian regimes. Richard Sandbrook has calculated that in mid-1982 half of the African states had military or quasi-military regimes.[45] Combined with authoritarianism is an intense social polarization where the top 20 per cent of the population appropriates 60 per cent or more of the national income.[46]

Ruth First writes that "African development has been held to ransom by the emergence of a new privileged African class. They are obsessed with prosperity and personal performance in countries where all but a tiny fringe own hardly more than a hoe, a plastic bucket, an iron cooking pot and maybe a bicycle."[47]

Income differentials are tremendous. In Ghana 1959-60, at Kumasi and Accra there were traders with a turn-over of £5000 to £20,0000 per annum who were handling direct imports. The go-betweens—the middlemen in Nigeria—in 1965 had an income of £100,000 per annum. In Nigeria's western region though the advertised wage rate for unskilled labour was only 5sh. a day,[48] in Togo in the mid-1960s, 5 per cent of farmers possessed 1/5th of the planted cocoa land.

The growth of the public sector and the continual expansion of gorvernment expenditure for administration has led to huge sums being expended on the official class. Gerard Chaliand reveals that 47.2 per cent, i.e. almost half of Senegal's budget 1964-65, was devoted to administrative salaries, not a single dollar was spent on direct investment.[49] The civil service in the Central African Republic absorbed 81 per cent of the budget. In the Congo Brazaville the 11,000 state employees in a population totalling 826,000 received 62 per cent of the budget. In the Ivory Coast in 1964, 15,000 civil servants, less than 0.5 per cent of the total population, absorbed 50 per cent of the budget. Dahomey spends 64.9 per cent of its budget on civil servants' salaries. Between 1959 and 1962, administrative costs rose to 80 per cent in Guinea, 60 per cent in Mali and a comparable

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percentage in Ghana. In 1974 during the oil boom, Nigeria increased its civil servants' salaries by 133 per cent to combat inflation.

Ruth First writes that in 1964 in the fourteen former French colonies, six times as much was spent in importing alcoholic beverages as in importing fertilizer, half as much was spent on perfume and cosmetic imports as on machine tools. Almost as much went on importing petrol for privately owned cars as on the purchase of tractors, and five times as much on importing private cars as on agricultural equipment.[50] First quotes Rene Dumont who comments that the cost of African Presidential Ministerial Establishments was probably higher in relation to national income than the cost to France of the Court of Louis XVI in 1788.[51]

In one way, the colonial inheritance took the form of a highly paid bureaucratic class culturally and ideologically separated from the masses. The colonial civil service remained the blueprint for the new elite which was to control the resources and transfer of political power was handled in this manner. "Given the inheritance of this highly elitist and politically dominant bureaucracy," writes Paul Bennell, "it was hardly surprising that senior civil servants continued to be remunerated so generously."[52] The tremendous surge of Africanization of the top posts in the post-independent era led to the retention of these pay scales.

In another way the point of reference for the African elites as far as living standards are concerned is the expatriate population. In sum, the ruling class acts in pursuit of an interest that is in conflict with the other classes The dominant class, therefore, arises on the basis of protected interested and privileges.

II

ZIMBABWE : A DOMINANT CLASS IN THE MAKING ?

An attempt to evaluate the trends and forces which will dominate Zimbabwean politics is of necessity a risky venture, given the fact that the country has been independent for as short a period as three years. However, a few tentative observations can be made—after all Zimbabwean political, economic and social development has not taken off from a "*tabula-rasa* ;" the independent state has an inherited colonial legacy carefully built up by the settlers for 90 years, and superimposed on a highly polarized economy and society is the Lancaster House Agreement. This has given to the state a liberal democratic set-up and all its attendant features. The scenario is considerably complicated by the fact that the country is rapidly moving towards the imposition of one-party rule. The one-party syndrome has its own defenders and it has been ably argued by President Nyerere that the one-party state can be as democratic as any other form of parliamentary democracy. What concerns us, however, is not the form but the content of the political patterns in the country.

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The nature and roots of the dominant elite in the country is likewise a subject matter of enquiry in order to discern the substance of politics. The identification of the major elite groups in the country and the foundation of their power thus becomes a vital question in the context of Zimbabwean political trends.

The Socio-Economic Profile of Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe, until the rise of oil rich Nigeria, has been ranked as the largest economy in Africa second only to South Africa and more than three times higher than the third-ranking Angola. Manufacturing, mining and the agricultural sector dominate the economy equally. Zimbabwe has 21 per cent of the world's chrome resources ; the five other leading minerals are – gold, asbestos, nickel, copper, coal. These six account for over 90 per cent of the total value of minerals.[53] Mining contributed more than 20 per cent of the export earnings till the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. The contribution of mining now to the GDP is 8 per cent and about 40 per cent to foreign exchange. The output of the mining industry has doubled since UDI ; it was estimated as $400 million in 1980.[54] Almost all of this is exported. Forty-two of the largest mines, employing 87.5 per cent of the mine workers, produce 92.7 per cent of gross output.[55]

The large majority of the largest fifty mines are owned by British or South African companies. The United States' mining companies have invested mainly in chrome. These mining houses had been given financial and technical support by the settler state, as well as help to hold down African wages. The South African Anglo-American Corporation operates the most extensive mining and refining properties in Zimbabwe. It is engaged in coal, nickel, and ferro-chrome mining. It also holds extensive investments in property, agricultural, financial and manufacturing fields. As such it is the single largest investor in Zimbabwe, followed by the British Company Lonrho, Rio Tinto Zinc, Turner and Newhall and the American Company Union Carbide. Mining is thus dominated by foreign companies accounting for 88 per cent of jobs and almost 95 per cent of the output.[56]

The manufacturing industry expanded mainly after the imposition of economic sanctions. Now it is the country's biggest economic sector contributing almost 25 per cent to the GDP. Zimbabwe has a large iron and steel industry, feeding a large mechanical engineering industry well-integrated with other industrial sectors.[57] Almost all the large investments in this continually expanding sector involved foreign capital in fertilizers, cement plants, wood, textiles, sugar, food, etc. Ann Seidman and Neva Makgetla Seidman hold that despite domestic investments manufacturing remained critically dependent on transitional corporate involvement.[58]

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British investments in food, drink and automobiles, tobacco, chemicals, electrical and non-electrical machinery was about 9 million each. British Steel owned a third of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation, a parastatal producing raw iron and steel. South African capital likewise dominated the manufacturing sector, in chemicals and fertilizers.

South African capital is predominant in agriculture. Agriculture is the largest income-generating sector for a majority of the Africans. Its contribution to the GDP has declined from 26.9 per cent in 1984 to 12.4 per cent in 1979 because of the war and sanctions. It is important to understand that there are two interrelated sectors in agriculture - a subsistence peasant traditional sector and the large-scale commercial sector.[59] This White-dominated commercial sector generated about three-fourths of the output, of which 90 per cent was marketed. Investment by foreign companies amounts to almost Z$ 150 million in agriculture, Z$ 30 million in machinery and Z$ 50 million in forestry.[60]

British and South African companies are engaged in the production and processing of tobacco, sugar, beef, maize and cotton. The largest companies are British American Tobacco, Rothmans, Huletts Corporation (South-African), Liebef and Brooke Bond (British). In agriculture it has been estimated that three-fourths of the profits accrue to externally-owned companies.

Thus in the three segments of the Zimbabwean economy, foreign capital dominated by British and South African investment has considerable stakes. By 1980, the total amount of foreign capital was rated at Z$ 2,500 million with British and South African shares at around Z$ 1000 million.[61] In the period 1966-79 official statistics indicated that investment income payments abroad amounted to Z$ 638 million while net capital inflows were Z$ 501 million from which Z$ 40 million was of unrecorded capital outflows. The direct consequence of foreign ownership of the economy has been a capital outflow for twenty years already, and this net outflow is likely to increase.[62]

What concerns us is the political implications of the presence of such a large amount of foreign capital in the country. Firstly, despite its socialist rhetoric, the ZANU (PF) has had to tread warily upon coming to power. The ZANU had in its Election Manifesto indicated that it would nationalize the mines; the Minister of Mines, Maurice Nyagumbo, has however repeatedly stated that this would not be the case. The country needs foreign exchange and the mining sector earning 40 per cent of the foreign exchange cannot be tampered with. The government has recently acquired 40 per cent of the WANKIE collieries, however with stagnating exports and imports coming up by 25 per cent, the government facing its first trade deficit will not be able to cope with an outflow of capital that nationalization would entail.

Despite Mugabe's stance before coming to power that Zimbabwe would be transformed into a people's democracy "socialist egalitarian and

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democratic," he has had to reconcile with the presence of foreign capital. Upon assumption of office he announced that the government recognized that the "economic structure is based on capitalism and whatever ideas we have must build on that. We are not going to interfere with private property, whether it be farms or whether it be the mining sector." Mugabe has assured foreign mining interests that they would not be threatened and that other foreign investors would be welcome. Apart from the need for international capital, technology, access to export markets, the government is dependent on these foreign companies for jobs to cope with unemployment.

Undoubtedly, the Mugabe Government can move towards stricter controls over the transnational capital, but the latter has tremendous bargaining capacity, aided by the fact that it has had a long history of integration and incorporation into the Zimbabwean economy. The presence of a substantial bloc of funds more responsive to the demands of its shareholders than the needs of the people can prove to be a significant factor in the evolution of the country. It is certainly a constraint on the freedom of manoeuvre.

At the some time it must be noted that transnational capital has never held unmitigated sway over Zimbabwe. The settlers have always directed the economy in a manner suited to their own interests. "The settler class in Rhodesia," argues Giovanni Arrighi, "acquired a 'national' character and this national character of the White rural bourgeoisie distinguished... Rhodesia from practically all other African colonial territories north of the Limpopo and south of the Sahara, where exploitation of resources was carried out by large scale international capitalism."[63]

The Inherited State Structure

This was because the settlers set up a strong state apparatus to defend White interests. The state not only acquired the best land, mineral concessions, industrial projects and education, through a series of acts,[64] but also made available the supply of cheap African labour to the White and transnationaly owned mines and farms through a series of taxes, labour and residential laws. The Africans were controlled through the native (later District Commissioners) who had tremendous power over the native population. The government also extended its control over the economy through a proliferation of parastatals—Marketing Boards ; Industrial Boards ; supportive services to white farmers ; through research extension services ; subsidies ; pre-planting prices and credit programmes.

The state sector played an extensive role in the country's railways, electric power, iron and steel, cold storage and processing industries. The role became particularly powerful after UDI when the state took over the control of the country for devising counter-sanctions measures. The Transnational Corporations were subjected to stringent regulations to continue

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operations, prevent laying off of labour, financial controls, control over foreign exchange and import of essential materials and equipment. The emergency situation prevailing during the civil war led to further interventions by the State; so in effect, independent Zimbabwe inherited a substantial state structure. As Hamza Alavi points out, in many post-colonial societies the "superstructure" of the state is overdeveloped. "The colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operation of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled."[65]

Thus, the independent state in Zimbabwe is faced, on the one hand with a substantial sum of transnational capital which was controlled by the state apparatus during an emergency period but which may prove resistant to further control, and on the other, by a state apparatus which has been used as an instrument of control by the settler class and which has played an autonomous economic role. It has always defended the interests of a particular elite. Thus it has concretized within it the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the indigenous White settler bourgeoisie.

This is the institutional heritage of independent Zimbabwe and as Lionel Cliffe points out : "State institutions, although modifiable to a limited degree, are not suited for tasks diametrically different from the ones for which they were created. The existing state was a White state and remains a capitalist state responsive to a capitalist definition of 'growth', 'progress' and 'welfare'. It might regulate labour in a more colour-blind, less repressive, manner than before but is not yet an instrument for exerting the working class's control over the country's resources. It might now offer some advice and credit to black small farmers but it is not yet an instrument for exerting the working class's control over the country's resources."[66]

The nature of the inherited state apparatus becomes of critical importance given the fact that the ZANU has to function through the state apparatus to fulfil its socio-economic programmes. For instance, the government has used the fiscal, monetary and pricing mechanisms to reallocate resources within the economy. The Zimbabwe Development Bank and the Zimbabwe Development Corporation will likewise involve the state in developmental activities.

In one way the Mugabe Government can present the substantial state control "as some initial approximation to socialism."[67] Yet, the activities of the Mugabe regime to ameliorate the conditions of the people is mainly welfarism, rather than grass-roots changes. The UNCTAD report "Zimbabwe : Towards a New Order," has advocated increased action by state control over banks, industry and mining, and regulation of industry and of the private sector as a means of overcoming the lacunae in development.

Thus, the government has moved towards fixing of minimum wages ; hours of work and rates of essential goods, equalization of White and

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African pay-scales ; provision of free compulsory primary school education, health facilities, and the establishment of workers' committees on farms and factories. Yet it is a far cry from a) collectivization of agriculture ; b) control of the commanding heights of the economy; and c) workers' control of production, which the ZANU Party Manifesto spoke of. The level of the state in the meanwhile has led to a top heavy-bureaucratic set up. To quote Alavi : "The state in the post-colonial society directly appropriates a very large part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development."[68]

Bratton writes, that to date the movement to acquire state power has far outpaced initiatives to transfer economic ownership. In the first year of independence, the number of top public servants who were African was doubled to almost 50 per cent of the occupied posts—14 out of the 33 strategic positions at the level of Permanent Secretary, or equivalent, were Africanized.

The Civil Service is now becoming top heavy with an increasing number of party appointments. Fifty-four out of 80 Africans in Parliament have been appointed to Ministries. Ministers' and top civil servants' salaries are Z $ 24,000 to Z $ 25,000 a year as compared to a minimum wage of Z $ 50 for the farm labourer and Z $ 105 for the industrial worker. Kumbirai Kangai, a Marxist ideologue and Minister of Labour, earns Z $ 25,000 per year. A bus driver gets Z $ 2,880 a year. Deputy Ministers receive Z $ 19,942 a year. Recently Deputy Ministers, M. P.s and Senators received increases upto 21 per cent to combat inflation.[69]

The mantle of ZANU legitimacy has fallen on the regime. What is striking is what has been referred to as the "convergence" of the party and the state. Party officials have replaced the District Commissioners in the rural areas. Membership of the party is becoming helpful not only for the state owner but also for the civil servants and academicians. Edison Zvobgo, a Minister in Mugabe's Cabinet, has urged that licenses should be withheld from opposition members Party petronage is an outstanding feature of promotion.[70]

Much of this gap between rhetoric and reality results from ideological confusion. Television and Radio use the world "comrade," yet for the thousands of landless peasants the "*Chimurenga*," i.e. the second war of liberation, has been betrayed and thousands of Africans have invaded White-owned farms to evade landlessness. The government wants to settle 34,000 families on 2 million hectares of purchased commercial land by 1984 and to settle 162,000 families on 8 million hectares within a decade. This would however involve dismemberment of the commercial land providing 90 per cent of the marketable food, and the government understandably is recluctant to interfere with the system. The Africans thus remain as they were squatters on land owned by the Whites.

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In another instance the right to strike is being curbed ; in January 1982, 243 striking railway firemen, and later in the year 1,000 striking bus drivers were arrested, fined Z$ 50 and were given prison sentences. Many of them were dismissed from their jobs and it was reported that Kangai's brother was the Personnel Manager of the bus company. What was even more peculiar was the fact that the Zimbabwe C nfederation of Trade Union agreed with the government that the bus strike had inconvenienced the public and lost money for the bus companies.

Zimbabwe is witnessing the building up of a ruling elite—albeit in a dependent situation to external funds, but consolidating state power and acquiring economic power. The African private sector, which at the time of independendence was controlling 12 per cent of the productive sector of the economy, is increasing its investments. The state is undoubtedly entering into a partnership with domestic capital and controlling it through the allotment of foreign exchange.

There is a sense of *deja-vu* in Xan Smiley's words—Zimbabwe is fast turning into a class society with the 20,000 educated Africans slipping into positions vacated by the Whites and taking over the privileges — a domestic private sector in partnership with a substantial foreign sector, and a top-heavy bureaucracy ruling the roost, as it were, through the very same channels that the Ian Smith Government had used to repress the Africans. In this context class alignments in Zimbabwe and the makings of a dominant class are not difficult to foresee. Here again Ruth First's analysis prove valuable :

> The first phase of independence was characterized by the efforts of the power elite to use the state not only as an instrument of political domination but also as a source of economic power, in the interstices of the economy unfilled by external control. Possession of government and the resources of the state proved the decisive mean .... It was political power that made possible the creation of economic power, not the other way about.[71]

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AFRICAN REFUGEES : AN ANALYSIS

By VANITA RAY

The past decade has witnessed a staggering increase in the number of refugees in Africa; from 1.5 millions in 1969, their numbers have today risen to more than 5 million—that is, of the 10 mlliion refugees in the world, 5 millions are African. Even more alarming is the fact that the number of refugees in Africa is now greater than the populations of very many African countries. They criss-cross the entire continent and there is not a single country in Africa which has not been affected by the refugee problem. And always behind the flight of these peoples is the spectre of injustice and strife, of racial persecution or civil war—all violations of human rights.

The first major group of African refugees arose as a result of national liberation struggles; thousands were dispersed to the neighbouring countries. While the National Liberation Front of Algeria (FLN) fought for the country's independence (beginning 1956), many women and children waited in refugee camps in Tunisia and Morocco. Thereafter, fortunately, most of sub-Saharan Africa obtained independence peacefully, but as the waves of independence struck the strongholds of settler and white dominated southern Africa, the travails of refugees emerged once more. Massive movements of people accompanied the strife in Angola, Mozambique, as well as Guinea Bissau. Thereafter, there was a stream of refugees from South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Meanwhile, because of internal conflicts, Africa was having its own refugee problems. Some of the most serious ones arose out of the inter-ethnic clashes in Burundi and Rwanda, with the Tutsi fleeing Rwanda and the Hutu escaping Burundi. Then the civil war in Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo) occurred in different places at different times (1960-65 and then again in March 1977-78), and has still not completely subsided. Similar is the case of Chad; the civil war in the country, which has recurred time and again, has sent large numbers of refugees fleeing to the Cameroons. Again the 20 year civil war in Sudan caused much of its southern population to scatter to the surrounding countries and as they were returning home, Sudan started receiving Ethiopian refugees from 1967—first from Eritrea, then other parts of Ethiopia. The warfare in Ogaden, the defeat of the Somalia Army by Soviet-armed and Cuban-reinforced Ethiopian forces in 1977-78, left Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti with large displaced populations. Large sections of the populations of Guinea, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda were forced to seek exile because of harsh rule in their countries. New waves of refugees—millions of men, women and children—came out from Nigeria following the civil war in that country.

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Finally, the other important category of refugee that the continent cannot ignore are the "economic" refugees—people who leave their home simply because they cannot eke out a living or are escaping starvation due to the recent droughts. This last category usually pass unnoticed as long as the host countries accept them. Nevertheless, when sent back to their own countries, as Ghana and Uganda did and most other countries would ultimately do, they have difficult problems of integration.

Keeping in mind this conceptual heterogeneity of the refugees in Africa, an attempt is made to analyze three types of problems and their combinations which cause refugee migrations in sub-Saharan Africa. For this purpose, sub-Saharan Africa may be divided into three parts—Southern Africa, that is the frontline states; Tropical Black Africa and states neighbouring the Sahara. For further analysis, the cause for which people seek refuge may be characterized as : 1. Domestic instability arising out of tribal issue conflicts and apartheid; 2. Border clashes, again resulting out of tribal rivaries and apartheid; 3. Foreign intervention towards preserving domestic clientele.

I

CAUSES OF REFUGEE MIGRATIONS ANALYZED

Internal Instability and Civil War

IN the first category the two countries that have been dealt with are Namibia and Chad—countries from where large sections of the local populace have migrated because of domestic instability. While Namibia is an example of growing domestic instability, arising out of the apartheid policies and practices of the South African Government, the peoples of Chad have been bedevilled with internal unrest and civil war following definite ethnic lines. It would be well to emphasize here that while Namibia is a case of extreme hegemonic control by one group, Chad is a case of total absence of any hegemonic control. These however are not the only two instances of domestic instability leading to the flight of large sections of their populations. Similar to the case of Namibia would be South Africa; many people have fled from the latter country because of its apartheid policies.

Namibia has had a particularly unfortunate fate; as a German colony the local populace suffered massacres at the hands of the colonial administration. Now under South Africa, the people are struggling with yet another form of domination—apartheid and separate development. Despite a dramatic start to desegregation and rapid social change effected by the Pretoria-appointed Administrator, General Marthinus Steyn in 1977, the move was abandoned before it made much headway. The measure, an obvious move to woo urban blacks to South African policy, ended segregation of Windhoek's hotels and restaurants and promised to open

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residential areas. That move took over a year to complete; but desegregation was never extended to Windhoek's schools, hospitals or employment. Outside the capital, no effective desegregation occurred in any sphere.

On the political front also, the hopes stirred by South Africa's acceptance of a transition plan negotiated by the Western Contact Group, in April 1978, stagnated. The result was that the South African Government continued its ethnic-based institutional structure under which the Whites control all the local administration, including schools and other public institutions. This has compelled thousands to flee the country and seek a safe haven in the neighbouring countries of Angola, Zambia and even Botswana. In Angola there are 50,000 Namibians, small numbers are in Zambia, and they along with the South Africans, constituting almost 20,000, are in camps in Botswana also. In fact, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia is the root cause of the refugee problems associated with the territory.

Namibia, it should be recalled, has been the responsibility of the international community for the past sixty years, ever since the League of Nations in May 1919 ordered South Africa to protect the territory and prepare its people for independence. But South Africa flouted this mandate, as also the General Assembly's Resolution of 28 October 1966 which terminated its mandate to administer South West Africa (Namibia). At the same time a Council for Namibia, to administer the area until independence, was also appointed. But after thirteen years, the Council is still not recognized by South Africa which continues to openly defy the world community, its innumerable efforts for solution and its decisions.

South Africa is naturally stalling the issue and with good reasons of its own. Namibia is indeed a treasure house; it has the world's largest uranium deposits and also large quantities of gem diamonds. It is interesting to note that one drum of uranium oxide contains energy equivalent to 23,000 drums of oil. Moreover, in the entire African continent, Namibia is the largest producer of refined lead, second largest producer of cademium and the third largest of zinc It is also the world's second biggest producer of lithium and it exports considerable quantities of copper, diamonds, silver, tungstan and salt. Mining is in fact the most dominant industry and most of the mining capital is either from South Africa or from major Western countries.

Then again, ever since Robert Mugabe's landslide victory in Zimbabwe, the South Africans are apprehensive of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), recognized by the United Nations as the only legitimate representive of the Namibian peoples, winning a free election. A SWAPO election victory would be unacceptable for fear of the African National Congress setting up bases in SWAPO-ruled Namibia and then sending guerilias through Botswana into the Transvaal.

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Soviet supplies could also be landed at the port of Walvis Bay on the Namibian coast, which South Africa claims as its own. Above all the South Africans fear the political consequences at home; it would depress the white morale and aggravate the government's own growing problems with its hardline Afrikaaner community.

Faced with all these problems, South Africa continues its policy of apartheid and its strategy of eliminating SWAPO militarily by destroying its bases in Angola. These military raids and encounters have naturally created a continuing unstable internal situation and resulted in growing numbers of refugees.

Chad's internal problems (civil war) which have led to the flight of more than100,000 peoples to the Cameroons,[1] Nigeria and the northern reaches of the country are directly linked to the country's age-old ethnic problems and rivalries. Added to it are also the aggravating problems of centre-periphery tension and cleavages.[2]

Chad's territory stretches across the ethnic, cultural and religious divide of Muslim North Africa and Black Africa. The nomadic, livestock-raising tribals of the Sahara are Arabized culturally, religiously and even linguistically. The Southerners, on the other hand, are ethnically Africans practising animism, and a minority of them adhere to Christianty. Originally engaged in tilling the soil, hunting and collecting various fruits, they later on switched to growing cotton which was processed in the metropolis.It may not be out of place to mention here that cotton is the mainstay of the country's economy and accounts for about 80 per cent of Chad's export earnings.

An analysis of the content of the country's population is in itself explanatory of the continuance of age-old ethnic rivalries and cleavages. Some 50 tribes, speaking different languages and practising different religious and marriage customs, live in Chad The largest community is the Sara (1 million strong in a total population of 4 millions), resident in the South and engaged in the cultivation of maize and cotton. This group, and other southerners, now forming the economic backbone of the country's economy, still harbour resentment against the northerners, because prior to the colonial epoch, it was these latter tribes that led slave-hunting expeditions into the *Steppes* and forests of the south Also, these warlike ethnies provided the dynasties and sultanates which ruled the agrarian southerners.

Living in the Sahel belt, centred around Abeche, their former capital and in the extreme eastern prefectures of Ouadai and Biltine, are the, northern tribals. The most numerous among them are the Maba, semi-sedentary Muslim pastoralists, who are culturally more strongly drawn to the Maghreb and to neighbouring Darfur in Sudan rather than to distant N'D jamena, the present capital of Chad. The Sahelian groups had constantly resisted the French, their influence and the imposition of colonial rule. Says Decalo of these ethnies : "Proud of their former slave trading

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empire and unable to adjust to the reality of the renascent south in political control of the country, the Maba—and the east in general—lagged behind the rest of Chad on most socio-economic indicators."[3] Educational levels stood at only 4 per cent for Ouadai during the 1960's compared to over 61 per cent in some southern prefectures. In fact it would not be an exaggeration to say that just as under the French, even after independence these regions have been neglected while the South has received more attention.

The other northern tribals are the semi-nomadic and highly independent Toubou, who formed the backbone of the rebellions against N'Djamena since 1966. Numbering about 160,000, the Toubous are divided into two main branches—the Teda of Tibesti and Daza of Borkou and Ennedi— each of them gravitating to different Islamic orders and into many autonomous clans and sub-clans. Fierce raiders, they exacted tribute from all those who used the caravan routes. Only nominally pacified by the French, they had been pushed to rebellion by President Tombalbaye's inept rule.

The country's history highlights these antagonisms and the continual tug-of-war between these various ethnic communities—between the Muslim slave kingdoms of the Sahel (Baguirmi, Ouadai and Kanem Bornu) and the animist South. It was these same antagonisms which surfaced after independence in 1960; in 1965, the northern Saharan ethnic groups rebelled against the political dominance of the hitherto despised "black South" and its hegemonic political control. The 20-year civil war, beginning 1965, is a reflection of the total ethnic-social fragmentation of the country from the pre-colonial days.

The civil war in Chad has now turned full circle; with N'Djamena in Muslim hands, the Sara south has now become the centre of resistance. However, efforts have been made in recent times by President Habre, a Muslim Toubou, to restore unity to his fragmented country. On 24 June 1984, he dissolved the *Front de Liberation Nationale Forces Armee du Nord* FROLINAT/FAN to create in their place a new political party, *l'Union National pour l'Independance et la Revolution* (UNIR), to which he has invited all Chadians, including his enemies, to join. Nevertheless, the involvement of the various external powers in the country on behalf of the different ethnic factions do not forebode well for Chad. Having involved themselves in the internal strife of the Chadians, they now find themselves too entrenched to extricate easily. Libya, which has since 1977 extended extensive aid to the FROLINAT and intervened militarily[4] in the country, continues to have a dual attraction—access to the country's mineral, uranium and oil rich northern regions and extending its influence to the Sahara. France's colonial presence in the country—on the side of the southerners—is another factor that may lead to clashes any time. The French have maintained strong commercial links after independence in 1960, and by 1968 were providing Tombalbaye with military support

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against the FROLINAT-led rebellion in the north. Though this military presence was withdrawn in 1975 when Tombalbaye was overthrown by Felix Malloum, it returned again in 1978 to prop up Malloum's tottering regime.[5] Of the other foreign powers, Egypt and Sudan play their own role. They have been supporting Hissan Habre's faction, motivated by their dislike of Quaddafi.

Given this situation, the future is indeed bleak and the numbers of refugees constantly increase. The worst sufferers are those in Chad for whom little aid is available because of the fighting and the lack of communications in the country.

Border Clashes Leading to Refugee Exodus

The second important factor responsible for the growing refugee exodus in Africa is the border clashes between African countries resulting from tribal and apartheid factors. In this category, an attempt is made to analyze the Angolan-South African, Rwanda-Burundi and Somalian-Ethiopian clashes. While the latter two are clear examples of countries having refugee migrations because of inter-ethnic rivalries, the Angolan-South African case is one of border clashes arising from reasons of apartheid policies and also South African ambitions of dominating the southern region of the continent.

Beginning 1975, soon after Angolan independence from Portuguese domination, the South African-Angolan clashes have intensified in recent years essentially because of South African fears of encirclement by independent Black States. This fear has been further heightened by the presence of an independent Zimbabwe on its northern borders and the international moves of granting independence to Namibia.

The most serious South African announced invasion into Angolan territory, on the ostensible pretext of pursuing SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organization) guerillas, who were operating on its frontiers, took place in August 1981, The Angolan Defence Ministry stated on 30 August that the provincial capital Cunene and eight small towns near the capital had been captured by the South African troops. It also reported that Angolan forces had shot down 5 South African planes, two in a bombing attack on the town of Tohibemba, 300 km from the Angolan-Namibian border. At the same time the Angolans threatened to call military assistance from other countries. These raids indicate not only South African determination to disable SWAPO guerillas, coperating from Angolan bases, by destroying these latter, but also the determination of the Angolans to fight back. Thus the clashes between the two countries continue.

The South African strategy is obvious—to disable the SWAPO guerillas and further to create a buffer zone right across Angola that would block

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SWAPO movements in Namibia.[6] Towards this purpose, United States' support to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola[7] has helped South Africa to further control Namibian political developments. It is interesting to note that so great is the overlap between these two wars—the South African-Namibian clashes and the Angolan Civil War—that sometimes one has a problem deciding as to which is the key to the other. Many prefer to operate as though the Angolan Civil War were simply an extension of South Africa's battle with Angola and the Zambia and Angola-based SWAPO guerillas. While this power game of South Africa, supported by the United States[8] and the Western countries (who have their own stakes in the region) continues large numbers of refugees have migrated from both countries taking safe refuge in the neighbouring countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Zaire.

Taking up the case of Rwanda and Burundi, one notes that inter-and intra-ethnic rivalries, dating back to the pre-colonial days, characterize the periodic convulsions and clashes between the two countries. Of like ethnic character, in these two countries the Tutsi represent about 15.20 per cent of the population while the Hutu constitutes the remainder 80 per cent. In Burundi, the Tutsi hold almost all the cabinet positions, while in Rwanda the government is controlled by the Hutus.

In Rwanda, in the late 1950's and again in the 1960's, Hutus rose up against their traditionol Tutsi warriors and took control of the infant government. As a result about 100,000 Tutsis fled to the neighbouring countries while half took shelter in Burundi, where as indicated above, the Tutsis held power. Though attempts were made to encourage the refugees to return back to the country these failed and a steady trickle of refugees (Tutsis) continue to move into Burundi because of the government's efforts to introduce a system of identity cards.

In Burundi, the tensions between the two groups remains high mainly because of the Tutsi Government's efforts to control the Hutus through a process of elimination. Genocide of large numbers of Hutus (estimated variously at 50-300,000) occurred during May 1972.[9] Though Burundi officials blamed these *evenements* on the exiled inheritors of Patrice Lumumba, who had allegedly incited the docile Hutus to rebellion in order to establish a base for themselves from whence to attack the Mobutu regime in the neighbouring Zaire, the continued flow of refugees and the fact that they have not returned back to their own country is indication enough of the reasons of the exodus. This outflow of the repressed ethnies from both countries to safer havens in their own countries, as also the neighbouring states, continues even until today.

The Horn of Africa is another ethnically volatile region which has because of its ethnic cleavages been continuously plagued by border clashes. Apart from the inter-ethnic clashes between the two major countries of the

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Horn of Africa—Somalia and Ethiopia—there have also been inter-ethnic problems in Ethiopia, where Haile Selassie's successor Mengistu Mariam has had problems in retaining his hold over the former Empire—the provinces of Eritrea, Wolo, Tigre, Sidama, Bale and Harare. The result is a wave of refugees seeking shelter in neighbouring countries; the Horn of Africa in fact has the continent's largest refugee problem. The wave triggered off in 1974 with the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie, increased tremendously following the defeat of the Somali Army by Ethiopian forces in the Ogadan War of 1977-78. At the start of 1978 the number of refugees registered in Somali camps was 80,000, by the end of 1978, this figure rose to 103,159 and by September 1979 it was 332,800. By 1980, their numbers further increased to between 700-800,000[10] and by 1981 it had touched the 1 million mark. Additional Ogadan refugees live in Somali villages, where they have been taken in by their clansmen.

The genesis of this large number of refugees in Somalia is the latter's dream of uniting all its people's under one flag; this is symbolized by the five-pointed star on its flag. The five points stand for northern and southern Somalia (the former once a British Colony, the latter an Italian, both now merged to form the present republic), Djibouti, Western Somalia (Ethiopia's Ogadan) and Kenya's frontier district. The one thing common about Somalia's irredentist claims is that all the territories share a considerable degree of ethnic homogeneity. The peoples of the Ogadan region, who form the largest section of the refugee population in Somalia, are the Islamic Somalis, sharing the same culture and language as the peoples of the Republic of Somalia. For a long time the Mogadishu regime maintained its territorial claims to Ethiopia's Ogadan, over which Ethiopian sovereignity had been achieved in the late 19th century through collaboration with Western Powers. Then by its new Constitution of 1979, Somalia gave up its claims, at least on paper, but in reality the idea of a "Greater Somali" remained the ideal of the country.

This ideal has received the most consistent push by the Somalis through the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), a partisan organization fighting for an independent state of Somalia.[11] It continued incursions into the Ogadan until the effect of Soviet supplies and Cuban forces was felt with great intensity in 1978. Thereafter, the WSLF maintained guerilla campaigns against the Ethiopians, resulting in large numbers of refugees streaming into Somalia.

For its claims on Kenya also—again to unite all Somalis under the same flag—the Somalis have waged an intermittant campaign for secession with light arms and political backing from Mogadishu. The NFD (Northern Frontier District) Liberation Front still functions with financial support, an office, transportation and recognition by the government.

Apart from border clashes and incursions leading to refugee migrations, this part of Africa also suffers from drought which has dislocated large

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sections of the population. In Somalia the result is that live-stock production, which accounts for 80 per cent of the country's export earnings, has declined considerably. The country has no export earnings, and according to one government minister, the total export earnings in recent years have been devoted to meeting fuel needs. The result is as the Somali Vice-President, Hussein Kulmiye Afrah remarked in a statement to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in September 1980: "We Somalis live in a beautiful but most demanding and sometimes even harsh environment where surplus, if any, is quite marginal."

In Ethiopia also, several regional/ethnic movements—Eritrea, Tigre and the Afars—pressing for freedom from Amhara hegemony, through rebellions and traditional guerilla hit-and-run tactics have created refugee situations. There are large numbers of Eritreans in Somalia, Djibouti Kenya and Sudan.

Foreign Intervention Supporting Domestic Clientele

Foreign intervention supporting domestic clientele—the ruling class, which in its turn safeguarded the interests of its foreign patrons—is the third important factor responsible for refugee migrations analyzed. Countries under this category on the African continent would be Zaire, Central African Republic and to some extent even Angola. Zaire is of course the most glaring example of a corrupt ruling elite backed by its foreign patron, having interests in the country and who did not hesitate to assist in their so-called hour of need. The most notablea mong these are the Western States—more recently of course Morocco and China have also pitched their support to Mobutu Sese Seko's regime. Emperor Bokasso's Central African Republic is too well known for the financial and military support (of course in return for certain rights), that it had continuously received from France. Angola, is the other country which has received Soviet and Cuban support since its independence to fight the apartheid South African state. This foreign support, financial and military, has often led to internal suppression of the opposition, and in some cases to clashes, creating refugee situations and migrations.

Zaire is the only country that has been analyzed in the light of the above categorization. Its ruling elite, led by Mobutu Sese Seko, who acceded to power after a bloodless *coup* on 24 November 1965, is as one Africa observer noted : "One of the longest-lived in Africa. However, sheer-longevity might be one of the regime's most positive traits."[12] The so-called Zairian "revolution" proudly announced in 1965-66, and elaborated over the years, lies in tatters. In terms of economic independence, administrative efficiency, military capability and the well-being of the population, the situation is indeed disastrous. Nevertheless, Mobutu and his immediate supporters flourish and corruption is the outstanding characteristic of the regime beginning from on the highest echelons (including the

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President)[13] and the process repeating itself till the lowest levels of the ordinary *gendarmes*, typists and school teachers who extort modest sums from the population.

This corrupt leadership, and its supporters down the line, have all along since 1965 allowed and facilitated the continuance of foreign interests in the country. It gave its patrons a series of costly and prestigous (but of doubtful utility) projects.[14] In 1973, while the regime seized a wide range of economic enterprises, including most commercial businesses, plantations, constructions and transport firms owned by the Portuguese and the Greeks, the Americans were allowed to continue. They also continue to hold large interests in the copper mines of the country. To safeguard these interests and also to support its indigenous clientele, these foregin powers have intervened on several occasions on behalf of Mobutu. It was with the assistance of paratroopers and military forces from France, Belgium and Morocco that Mobutu could face up to the Shaba Crisis of 1977-78. These interventions and clashes with the Katanga *gendarmes* naturally led to many seeking asylum in neighbouring countries.

On the internal front, these foreign interventions on behalf of Mobutu, naturally boosted the ruling clique. Internal oppression as a result has been continual and widespread. In January 1978, members of a millenium sect staged a brief insurrection in the Kwilu sub-region; they were brutually put down by the Zaire Army, many were killed while others took to safer areas. In March 1980, University students who organized a strike for higher scholarships were detained and several students murdered in custody. Amnesty International has reported that although Mobutu is no Idi Amin, political oppression is growing in the country. Hundreds of Zairians have been detained arbitrarily and jailed in remote camps in the jungle; the most notorious of these, Ekafara, in the Equateur Region, is reported to house between 400-500 detainees.[15]

II
REGIONAL DIVISIONS AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS

Having indicated and analyzed some of the factors responsible for refugee migrations on the African continent, an attempt would be made to relate these to the earlier indicated geographical delineations.

Dealing first with the states neighbouring the Sahara, one notes that refugee exodus from these countries is largely due to inter-ethnic disputes and droughts in the Sahel belt. Inter-ethnic rivalries and disputes in these countries are directly linked to the fact that the region spans the ethnic, cultural and religious borders between Muslim North Africa and Black Africa. The nomadic live-stock raising tribes of the Sahara and its southern periphery are Arabized culturally, religiously, and in some cases even linguistically The Black Africans, on the other hand, are mainly animist

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and a minority subscribe to Christianity. One also notes that the resentment of the southerners is age-old, largely because of the pre-colonial slave-hunting expeditions of the notherners and because the warlike northerners were politically and militarily dominant often providing the ruling dynasties. It is these ancient antagonisms which formed the basis of the post-independence civil wars on the continent—Sudan 1956-72, Nigeria (the Biafran conflict 1967-68), and the tensions between the Africanized and Arabized sections of the Mauritanian population. Civil war has of course, in this particular case, been averted. The example of Chad, where the northern Saharan region tribals rebelled against the southern-dominated govefnment has already been extensively dealt with. Thus the two distinctive features of this region are inter-ethnic cleavages and civil war.

The second geographical region taken up to facilitate the analysis of the refugee problem is that of Tropical Black Africa. The distinctive features of the refugee situation here, as already noted in the earlier analysis (in the case of Rwanda-Burundi), were essentially inter-and intra-ethnic clashes between rival ethnic groups. Similar is the case of Uganda, where as a result of ethnic/tribal rivalries translated to the political level, there have been continual clashes. Before the 1980 elections fighting recurred again in the West Nile area after an alleged invasion by Idi Amin supporters, resulting in the depopulation of the area. Some 230,000 people are believed to have fled to neighbouring Sudan and Zaire. As armed opposition to Milton Obote's Government continued (there were several guerilla-groups—Uganda Freedom Movement led by Dr. Yusufu Lule and the People's Revolutionary Army led by Yoweri Museveni, an ex-Defence Minister in the pre-Obote caretaker government), the Government responded harshly Many people have been detained and the State Research Bureau, the secret police organization of Idi-Amin's days has been revived. As the government's repressive measures increase in the face of these guerilla attacks, thousands have sought refugee in neighbouring Tanzania, Sudan and Kenya. The Central African Republic, in this region, is another example of refugee migrations because of repression of tribes other than the ruling group.

Finally, the last geographical categorization is the region of Southern Africa. In this region, refugee migrations—the smallest in numbers as compared to the earlier two geographical delineations—are essentially from the countries of white minority rule, that is South Africa, Namibia and till recently Zimbabwe. Refugees from these countries, fleeing their homeland because of racial discrimination and apartheid, have sought asylum within the South African enclaves of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. Others have also moved on to Zambia. But as noted by Holborn, if many problems inherent in refugee situations in Zambia stem from its position as a lonely black outpost at the edge of "White Redoubt," one has only to look at the geographical situation of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to understand that these newly independent islands on the sea of White-con-

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trolled territory face problems which are even more difficult ahd challenging.

Given the above analysis of the causes of refugee migrations on the continent, we may conclude that this very serious issue of the "invasion" by unarmed and uprooted peoples has created problems not only for these latter unfortunate peoples obliged to leave their hearth and home, but also the contries in which they seek asylum and their own former homeland. For the refugee himself, the problems are innumerable. Not only has he to adjust in an alien environment, but more importantly, he is always faced with the possibility of persecution and forced repatriation.

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3 Ibid

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NON-ALIGNMENT : IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM

By SAMAAN BOUTROS FARAJALLA*

There is no doubt that the world scene has undergone fundamental evolution in every respect during the past thirty-five years or so. The Non-Aligned Movement followed this evolution and became an important factor of international relations after the Second World War. The Non-Aligned states themselves feel very strongly about the importance of their role as they are convinced that their policies have to be taken into account, even by the Super Powers. Nevertheless in recent years, they have also become deeply conscious of the shortcomings of their policies due to their military and economic weakness and disunity in many instances. They have also realized the limitations of their influence. These shortcomings and limitations have generated a deep sense of frustration to a point that the Non-Aligned Movement is currently under stress, facing even an acute crisis of identity. Needless to point out, this crisis is related to the complex phenomenon of non-alignment itself which has always been beset by different currents and cross-currents depending on divergent national interests. It is therefore necessary to fully understand the concept of non-alignment in the context of the contemporary world environment in order to clarify its general objectives and their relevance to the present world situation, loaded as it is with a host of problems which remain without adequate answers or solutions.

WHAT is non-alignment ? There is no precise answer to that question. The expression implies an abstention from taking the side of one or the other antagonistic blocs in the Cold War. However, the non-aligned countries reject this negative and passive attitude and insist upon the positive character of their policy. They conceive of non-alignment in terms of "positive action" arising from a certain vision of the world, aimed at the satisfaction of their national interests and the fulfilment of their aspiration towards the installation of a "New International Order" based upon global "justice" and "peace". Once we admit this concept, it would be quite natural to expect a variability of content in the policy of non-alignment as a result of the wide heterogeneity of its constituents. It is in this perspective that some observers, mainly in the West, have denied the existence of non-alignment as a "general phenomenon," although they admit that there are non-aligned states. According to this view, it is more appropriate to study non-alignment in a national context or in relation to specific cases,

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each case having its own components; accordingly non-alignment is no more than a "series of reactions, each one having its own originality."

But these national studies alone, or individual case studies, are not satisfactory, for they do not distinguish between those national influences which are unique to non-alignment, and those which are common to aligned and non-aligned states alike. For example, to speak of nationalism and anti-colonialism as being the reason why a given country opts for non-alignment is not very illuminating. It is undoubtedly relevant to draw attention to these features, but their significance is not clear-cut, once it is observed that they do not characterise only the non-aligned countries, Latin-American countries, some European countries, and even some Asian and African countries are anti-colonalist, although they are aligned states. Moreover, national case histories tend to attribute more importance to local and current influences than a broader perspective would justify. Of course there are significant local causations and therefore characteristic national differences in the policies of non-alignment, but there is also strong evidence of common features as well as common causation. It is striking to find remarkable similarity of thought and expression among all non-aligned states; all of them share the same approach to international problems. The fact that they have met together as such and work together especially in international conference and in the United Nations, suggests that their policies have some common origins and objectives which cannot be explained away merely by local circumstances. Non-alignment has been admitted to be a real general phenomenon by all the actors on the world scene. But this phenomenon should be properly understood and evaluated in order to grasp both its possibilities and limitations. Such evaluation should be uudertaken in an historical perspective in order to elucidate, without favourable or unfavourable prejudice, its fundamental concepts and its international role.

The gestation and the birth of non-alignment, as a concept and as a political movement, cannot be dissociated from the general characteristics of the international system following the Second World War. These characteristics may be summed up into four basic and interconnected factors : decolonization, the Cold War, socio-economic underdevelopment, and the development of international organizations.

One of the most striking phenomena of the world order after the Second World War, is the emergence of national self-assertion and independence among Asian and African people demanding their equal place in a modern world. The new states of Asia and Africa not only refuse to be the "objects" of the international diplomacy of the "Big Powers" (a negative objective), they also aspire to play an active role as "actors" on the world stage with their own urgent problems to solve (a positive objective). Therefore, the first objective of the new states (and perhaps the only one because all the others are its by-products) is to pursue an independent

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foreign policy freed from any political or military shackles which would tie them up with a predetermined orientation by the Super Powers. Non-alignment is then a declaration of independence in world politics. This explains the militancy of the non-aligned movement in regard to problems of colonialism and racism.

But it is evident, on the other hand, that the simple fact of acceding to sovereign status in legal terms does not mean that those states would be able to assume a positive role of responsibility on the world stage; it does not even mean that they would be able to realize their respective, most vital interests. The new states were born indeed in an environment predominantly unfavourable to them.

The independence of the new nations occurred in an era of compulsory interdependence of nations and states in the framework of a universal system. Modern technology, which continues to expand at an ever accelerating rate especially in the fields of armaments and communications, has established in fact an inescapable interdependence of all peoples everywhere. Within such a framework the two Super Powers—the United States and the USSR, play a predominant role in determining the policy of non-alignment.

The international system is also characterized, in terms of the nuclear age, by a bi-polar configuration of power around the United States and the USSR. This characteristic helped to bring about the policy of non-alignment. Indeed, immediately after the Second World War, Europe was at the centre of rivalry between the two Super Powers and was compelled due to geopolitical and economic factors, to gravitate towards them. In Asia and Africa, the compulsion was not as pressing. Although the political, economic and military instability of most of the Afro-Asian states entailed their transformation into fields of competition between the two world camps, they still enjoyed the practical possibility of avoiding the fate of the bi-polar divisions of Europe. Some observers consider that this possibility was the only *raison d'etre* of non-alignment. According to this view, non-alignment was not the expression of a specific identity of the new states of Asia and Africa; it was not justified by the similarity of problems facing them but was merely a passive attitude towards the confrontation of the two Super Powers on the European continent.

The logical conclusion of such a view, is the existence of a causal link between the Cold War and non-alignment. If the Cold War fades away, non-alignment will immediately disintegrate. The crisis of non-alignment, which started from the middle of the sixties, is a direct consequence of the substitution of cold war diplomacy *of detente* between the two Super Powers. Since non-alignment has no specific content apart from its opposition to cold war diplomacy it was bound to be undermined by the policy of *detente*. On the other hand, if the Cold War extends to other continents besides Europe, the policy of non-alignment of a given state will end if it

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antagonizes the vital interests of one of the super power.

Rightly, the non-aligned states do not share this point of view. It is evident, of course, that there was a historical coincidence between the rise of the Cold War and the birth of non-alignment. It is equally evident that the atmosphere of the Cold War eased the outcome of non-alignment. Nevertheless, no causal link exists between the two phenomena. The rise and evolution of non-alignment had been conditioned by many factors of which the most important is a deep awareness of belonging to a specific world, mainly the Afro-Asian world. The non-aligned states share similar problems and they are deeply conscious of the weakness of their position in an area dominated by the big powers. It is their experience of colonial subjugation, their unflinching will to safeguard their independence in fact and not only in law, their state of socio-economic under-development, which are the real constituent elements of non-alignment. Non-alignment is therefore a permanent phenomenon which illustrates the drive of the non-aligned countries toward the substitution of the present world system based on the concept of "balance of power" by another one based on the recognition of the principle of "real equality" for all peoples and their right to an integral socio-economic development according to their respective genius. Such endeavours could only be fulfilled in an atmosphere of world peace and security. Certainly the opposition to "bloc politics" is a feature of non-alignment, it is a manifestation of the will of the non-aligned countries to decide freely upon their own affairs as well as to share with all other states the responsibility of conducting world affairs (the concept of democratization of world politics). In other words, the opposition to cold war diplomacy is not a constitutive element of non-alignment, it is rather its manifestation.

One of the most salient phenomenon in contemporary world politics is that the traditional classification of states as "big," "middle," and "small powers is now intersected by another classification between "developed" and "underdeveloped" or "developing" nations. Of course, differences have always existed among nations that have been characterized by the predominance of one over another. Since the industrial revolution, we have been able to note that the economic growth of nations was a prerequisite to their participation in international power politics. What is new is the awareness of poverty and the will to overcome it. As Professor Myrdal has pointed out, it is interesting to note that the term "developing countries" has a dynamic connotation. It implies the value judgement that it is an accepted goal of public policy that the countries so designed should promote their economic development not only as a major target in itself, but also as the means to a real independent status. We notice then the close connection between "nationalism" expressed in the legal status of sovereignty, and "economic development" as a prerequisite to participation in international politics as "subjects" and "makers" of policy and not

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merely as "objects" of the big powers' policy. Therefore, the relations between the underdeveloped and the more highly developed areas of the world constitute one of the most serious contemporary and future problems in international relations. The tensions thus generated would exist irrespective of the "East-West Conflict;" but the fact that the more highly developed states of the world are antagonists, further contributes to the tension. All representatives of the non-aligned countries have stressed this point.

The interaction between the "national question" and the "economic question" is illustrated by the fact that the mere wish to attain the socio-economic benefits of a modern way of life does not supply the wherewithal to do so; non-aligned countries have been brought into contact with the world industrial poles ef attraction. It is within this framework that underdeveloped areas (mainly non-aligned) must find the instrumentation to solve the problems of their economic development. Thus, a relationship of economic subordination and dependence of the underdeveloped areas of the world may end in political subordination voiding the legal status of sovereignty of any concrete content. Therefore, international stratification in terms of economic stature, by its implication of the political subordination of the underdeveloped countries to the highly developed ones, may be a substitute for military alliances. The non-aligned states accommodate their foreign relations in such a way as to benefit from the technical and financial sources of the industrial powers without endangering their political independence. In so doing they accept and, indeed bid for economic aid from both sides of the Cold War blocs to neutralize their political influence. On the other hand, they try to promote multilateral aid through the channels of the International Organlzations. Ultimately they press for the installation of a New Internatioaal Economic Order (NIEO). What is important to underline in this context is that the economic development of non-aligned countries is conditioned not only by their internal economic structures, but also by external factors which could limit the scope of the concept of "self-reliance".

In conclusion, either from a political or economic perspective, no state can isolate itself from the present context of international relations Therefore it seems absurd to equate non-alignment with a policy of isolation, or even a policy of "equidistance" from the two blocs of the Cold War.

The extension of international relations to a global and integrated system found its institutionl expression in the proliferation of international organizations, universal or regional, governmental or non-governmental.

It is not our intention to evaluate the role of the international organizations in shaping and orienting the foreign policy of individual non-aligned countries, or their collective diplomacy. It is enough to appreciate the fact that international organizations offer new possibilities to the non-aligned countries Membership of these organization enables the new states to avoid the discomforts of isolation and encourage the making of

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a wide range of international contacts to promote their respective national interests. Moreover, given their institutional character and their procedures of decision-making, international organizations offer the possiblity of using them as a machinery for persuasion or pressure especially on colonial and economic issues, or their use for the purpose of "preventive diplomacy" in cold war issues. Furthermore, international organizations certainly give impetus and strength to the policy of non-alignment, offering the best opportunity for collective action, especially if we take into consideration the increasing voting power of the non-aligned states.

To sum up, non-alignment in its essence is the expression of the drive towards political and economic emancipation in the context of a bipolar configuration of world politics. If the concept of non-alignment is theoretically clear enough its translation into action gives rise to controversial problems which at moments threaten the basic foundations of the Non-aligned Movment, and has always limited its efficiency as a stabilizing factor in international relations totally dedicated to the cause of human freedom, development and world peace.

If this is the place for generalization, it is obvious that it is imposible to make an exhaustive inventory of all the problems facing the Non-aligned Movement today. We will only try to make some brief comments on some of the problems closely related to the concept of non-alignment itself.

One of these problems concerns the priority of issues. There are some attempts to direct the Non-aligned Movement towards economic problems alone in the framework of a "North-South Conflict." This orientation, shared mainly by Latin American and some African countries, stems from an understandable awareness of the explosive nature of the differences in development between the "North" and the "South." This orientation is not a new one. It emerged at the end of the sixties when it became obvious, after the second UNCTAD in 1968, that the developed countries were not disposed to make concessions required to satisfy the just demands of the large underdeveloped part of the word. This view creates a confusion between non-alignment and underdevelopment. In other words, it takes into consideration only one constitutive element of non-alignment and disregards all the others. Moreover, to accept this view would mean to leave resolution of acute world political crises to the power blocs alone. Finally, this view ignores the obvious fact of interdependence between politics and economics.

The priority of issues is not limited to the opposition between economic and political problems, It was also raised within the category of political problems. At the Belgrade Summit in 1961, the Asian states underlined the priority of East-West conflict, while the African states stressed the importance of colonial issues.

In our view the problems of priority of issues is a false problem if the

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term "priority" is understood as meaning "intrinsic importance" of some issues in comparison with others. Economic issues are not more important than political problems and vice versa, The priority of issues is a matter of contingency subject to change in time and space. As an illustration of this, Bandung (1955) gave priority to anti-colonialism; Belgrade (1961) to East-West conflicts; Cairo (1964) to internal instability and in-group conflicts; Algiers (1973) to economic development; Havana (1979) to anti-imperialism, etc.

Another problem threatening the identity of non-alignment as a concept and as a policy concerns the relations between the non-aligned countries and the Super Powers and their respective blocs. There is no need to remind ourselves that the "non-bloc" character has been the deepest historical hallmark of the Non-aligned Movement. We should then notice with satisfaction the erosion and final collapse of the blocs' military alliances in Asia, and the obstruction of the territorial extension of the blocs to other regions. But unfortunately, other forms of bloc confrontation are rising under different labels such as "treaties on mutual cooperation and assistance," or a politico-military understanding know as "strategic consensus" involving some non-aligned countries with the power politics of the Super Powers and, consequently pressuring the Non-aligned Movement into divergent bloc orientations. It was in this sphere that particularly heated discussions were conducted in Havana (1979) on the foundations, aims and orientation of the Non-aligned Movement. A minority of states tried to reorient the movement towards a close alliance with the East European bloc against the "aggressive designs of the western bloc." According to this theory of "natural alliance," the entire movement should be subjected to an "ideological differentiation," that "reactionary" states should be "expelled" from the movement and the remaining so-called "revolutionary core" should be considered as the "natural ally" of one bloc—the "socialist camp" (excluding China). This orientation was called "true non-alignment."

In reaction to this trend, another minority of states revived the old idea of "equidistance" in relations to the blocs regardless of the merits of their positions in specific cases.

Both trends had been rightly rejected by the majority of the non-aligned countries. Indeed it is not possible to accept one bloc as a "natural ally," without destroying a basic concept on which the policy and movement of non-alignment was grounded--steering clear of politics. On the other hand, the concept of "equidistance" distorts the very essence of non-alignment because it would transfer the Non-aligned Movement into an amorphous body in the role of a passive observer of world events rather than an independent and active agent in contemporary international relations.

It is true that the majority view prevailed in the Havana Summit and

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especially, under the impact of the Afghan issue, in the New Delhi Ministerial Conference in February 1981. Nevertheless both minority groups continue to lobby for their respective concepts of non-alignment. It was, therefore, thought by some leading non-aligned countries to counter these trends by appealing to the movement to abide by the "authentic principles" of non-alignment (Yugoslavia), and the necessity to "come back to the right path of non-alignment" (Egypt). Such proselytising for "orthodoxy" should be continued, not by rigid and static dogmas, but in enlightened and realistic spirit, taking into consideration the complexity of the conditions under which the movement is functioning today. In this respect, the non-aligned countries should critically reconsider the drive of the Super Powers to project their political and military influence in the vast expanses of the non-aligned world, taking advantage of the accumulated internal problems in these countries, and the increasingly conflictual situations which characterize their mutual relations.

We would like also to draw the attention to another basic concept of non-alignment which had been disregarded in practice. We refer to the principle of "non-intervention" in the internal affairs of other states, which is a corollary to the principle of independence. Indeed, one of the salient features of the Non-aligned Movement in recent years is the increase and the intensification of conflicts among its members. This situation is quite normal for such a broad and heterogenous movement. These conflicts have varied aspects and, on the whole, are firmly founded on concepts of national interests which, at a given time, cannot be adjusted to the concepts of others, most often neighbouring non-aligned countries. These conflicts usually take the form of ideological confrontations ("progressive" versus "reactionary" regimes) and lead to interventions in the internal affairs of other countries. This is a very serious situation because it undermines the basic non-aligned concept of "peaceful coexistence," as it is a rejection of the political and ideological pluralism of the movement.

When speaking of non-alignment, it is important to note that this is one of the most sensitive and complex contemporary international movements because of its heterogeneous composition, and because of the complexity of the conditions under which the movement is bound to function. It would certainly be unrealistic not to take into account the many differences that exist among the non-aligned countries; differences in socio-economic and political systems, differences in their geopolitical positions, differences as regard their levels of economic development, etc. It should, therefore, be expected that various ideological orientations will emerge from these differences. As distinct from the monolithic ideological structure of the blocs, the Non-aligned Movement rests upon ideological pluralism. Evidently, this may lead to clashes

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between individual countries on the one hand, and between national interests and common interests on the other. It should be stressed here that the factors of similarity are much stronger than those of differences. Therefore, it is in the global interest of the non-aligned countries to ensure the unity of their movement through diversity as a prerequisite to genuine political and economic emancipation and to the vitality of the movement itself.

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ECONOMIC ISSUES BEFORE THE NON-ALIGNED

By S. R. SEN*

THE achievement of a "New International Economic Order" or NIEO (involving structural changes in the present international monetary, financial, trade and industrial institutions and systems) and "global negotiations" for the purpose in the United Nations forum are two of the most important issues before the non-aligned countries.

The United States, and a few other developed countries, however are basically opposed to both: to the NIEO because it will reduce their economic dominance and to global negotiation in the United Nations forum because they will lose the weighted voting advantage that they have in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Their tactics in the past, especially when faced with a crisis (e.g., in 1974, 1979 and 1982) for which they thought the support of developing countries might be necessary, has been first to make a gesture to show that they would be prepared to consider their demands, but delay later, under one pretext or the other, any effective negotiations. Since President Reagan came to power, the United States in particular, has taken openly an hostile attitude. The United States Congress is even more hostile than the country's Administration. It seems extremely unlikely that there will be any change in the situations until the next presidential election in 1984.

The next two years therefore, are not likely to be propitious for "global negotiations" for the New International Economic Order. It may be tactically better for the developing countries to press now with such negotiations at sectoral and regional levels as may help mitigate their immediate difficulties, at the same time aiming for the achievement of NIEO as their ultimate goal. The sectoral and regional level negotiations should keep this in view all the time and be conducted in such manner that they help prepare the ground for global negotiations for NIEO after 1984.

The IMF and the World Bank (together with GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which are the keystones of the present international economic order are overwhelmingly dominated by the United States with the help of weighted voting which it secured in 1945, when other developed and developing countries were very weak. Although the relative economic position of the latter has changed very much now, the United States is not prepared to accept any significant reduction in its voting power. It seeks often to use its weighted voting power to control the

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economic policies of the developing countries in particular.

Neo-classical economic policy is the basic philosophy of these institutions and they do not give due consideration to the handicaps that face the developing countries as a result of unequal competition. Suitable reform of these institutions is essential if the developing countries are to get a fair deal. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that these institutions were established in the immediate post-war years when the United States Congress was in a much more liberal mood than it is now. Any proposal that enables the Congress in its present myopic mood to re-open the charters of these institutions may very well be quite counter-productive. This was one of the reasons why in 1964, the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development was set up as an integral part of the United Nations Secretariat instead of a separate specialised agency so as to by pass the US Congress and thus avoid the fate that the Havana proposals for an International Trade Organization met earlier at the hands of the United States' Congress.

For the present, therefore, the developing countries would be well advised to build on the IMF, the World Bank Group, GATT, UNCTAD and UNIDO (the United Nations Industrial Development Organization) pressing for their reform as and when feasible. Such reform may be easier if the main allies of the United States like West Germany, Japan and Britain can be won over and the important lobbies in the United States itself, having trade interest in developing countries, can be persuaded to appreciate their own long-term self-interest. Non-aligned countries need to make a special effort to cultivate these lobbies in view of their influence on the United States Congress and the key position of the United States in the world economy.

Two advantages of the developing countries in the IMF, as compared to the World Bank are that:

(a) they can exercise, as a group, as much veto power as the USA or EEC (the European Economic Community) and are therefore in a better bargaining position; and
(b) they can review the policies and programmes of the developed countries no less than the developed countries can review the policies and programmes of developing countries.

They can, however, benefit from this advantage only if they are careful not to take such action as would throw other developed countries further into the arms of the United States.

It needs to be recognised that all developed countries do not have the same interest. These countries can be divided into at least three distinct groups--the United States which can be called self-sufficient; Japan and the West European countries which are fully developed but have to

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depend upon raw material and markets in the less developed countries; and, those who are developed but are still struggling towards self-sufficiency through regional cooperation like the East European countries, Turkey, Greece, Spain or some others from the Mediterrranean area. The West European countries and Japan have now become economically much stronger than they were when the IMF, the World Bank and GATT were established. They are not happy about the undue heavy weightage and voting power that the United States enjoys. Their dependence on the developing countries for oil, raw materials and markets is also much greater than that of the United States A serious attempt needs to be made to secure their support for a better economic deal for the developing countries.

The strategies of the developing countries need to be reviewed so as to isolate the most conservative of the developed country group from the other two. Unfortunately, some of the unrealistic strategies adopted by the Group 77 countries in recent years have often tended to unite these three groups among the developed countries. That strategy needs to be basically reviewed now by the non-aligned countries and a more sophisticated approach worked out.

The two premier monetary and financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, have today reached almost a monopolist and hegemonistic position. In the name of closer coordination and better rationalisation, they are being used by the USA and other conservative developed countries to squeeze the developing countries in a suffocating stranglehold as it were. This matter requires urgent consideration of all the developing countries. If monopoly is bad in trade, it cannot be good in aid and credit, and for that matter in financial and monetary management. On the other hand, if monopoly is inescapable, the developing countries, which contain the bulk of the world's population and natural resources, should demand and secure at least an equal share with the developed countries in the voting power and the top management of this monoply. A limited range of weighted voting may be conceded by the developing countries, if this basic principle is accepted by the developed countries for the IMF and the World Bank.

If due to the intransigence of the United States Congress such reforms are not feasible, a serious attempt needs to be made to reduce the monopoly of the IMF and the World Bank by setting up new "regional" and "special purpose" financial institutions for, say, technology transfer, export-import trade, energy development, sea-bed exploitation, industrial development, commodity buffer stocks, food security, etc. The United States may be left out of these institutions if it refuses to accept an equitable voting power.Similarly, regional monetary funds or unions may also be set up, whenever necessary and practicable.

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The World Development Fund, recommended by the Brandt Commission, may also be set up as a competitive body if adequate funds can be mobilised from non-US sources.

In all these, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries can play a crucial role. It should be in their own long term interest to diversify their investments. Non-aligned countries are their natural, political and economic allies. If they channel a larger proportion of their foreign investments through the banking systems of these countries, it would not only help their security but also strengthen their bargaining power vis-a-vis the close coterie of Euro-American bankers.

The IMF's role as an "objective" and important "surveillance" organisation needs to be improved. Its "conditionality" clauses need to be kept under careful review and made less irksome and more perceptive of the needs of the developing countries. It is important that the IMF does not become a tool of private commerial banks. Rescheduling and redemption of unwise loans of commercial banks of the North should be undertaken with resources other than those of the IMF. It may not be wise for the developing countries as a group to seek to use as a "bargaining counter" (as has been suggested by some people) the recent proposal for involving the IMF in the commercial debt management problems of a handful of their members which were given unduly large and imprudent loans by some commercial banks of the North.

There is need to use the opportunity presented by the "debt crisis" of 1982-83 in a more sophisticated manner than the "oil crises" of 1974 and 1979. It would be better to concentrate on "what is practicable" instead of "what is ideal" and a "step by step" rather than an "all or nothing" approach.

Greater attention needs to be paid also to the composition of the staff of the IMF, World Bank and GATT. They determine substantively the policy and functioning of these institutions; what is their training, field experience and outlook is no less important than their citizenship. There should be less inbreeding and greater introduction of fresh blood at all key levels on fixed term secondment of experienced officers from developing countries At the same time, care should be taken to ensure that bureaucratic rigidities are kept down to a minimum in these institutions. The situation of developing countries change so much from region to region and from time to time that even normal bureaucratic proclivities may turn out to be counter-productive procrustean beds in many cases.

Better South-South economic cooperation will be a useful way of putting pressure on the North to bring about a better North-South relationship. It will in addition enable the developing countries as a group to develop faster.

The grant by the non-aligned countries, as a group, of special preference

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in the matter of non-tariff barriers to all developing countries (and possibly such developed countries as may give substantial concessions) may constitute an useful bargaining tool, if the non-aligned countries act together. Giving special preference to bids from sister non-aligned countries (and friendly developed countries) for government-controlled contracts may be another such tool. If they can secure the support of some sympathetic developed countries, their bargaining power will be even stronger.

The road to a New International Economic Order will not be easy or short. But the developing countries must keep on marching along this road. If there have to be diversionary, nibbling, or even holding operations at times, that should not be taken as a sign of defeat, but oniy as a preparation for a massive assault at a more opportune time. Care needs to be taken however, all the time, that the divide and rule policy of some hegemonistic countries does not deplete the ranks of the non-aligned Recent weaponry and other developments have tended to reduce the "cost of intervention" (e. g. in Lebanon) by the hegemonistic countries while their deepening economic crises has increased the temptation of such intervention. It is only by standing united and strengthening their capability to assist one another that the non-aligned countries can hope to survive the frightening "period of trouble" that faces the world community in the eighties.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD ORDER

THE population of the developing nations is growing rapidly at rates ranging between 1.5 per cent to nearly 3 per cent per year.[1] The population of India doubled itself in thirty years between 1951 and 1981, and will exceed 100 crores at the end of the century.[2] The developed world on the other hand, showed much slower growth rates and in some cases a stable situation has emerged. Technological progress in developing countries has been even more phenomenal and has kept pace so far with the needs of food and clothing of the peoples. However, the world's technological progress and the distribution of its benefits have been lopsided benefiting the rich far more than the poor. Technology also has produced a new set of problems that of *environmental stresses* due to industrial effluents, emmissions, noise, distortions of land form and psychological disturbances. Intensive agriculture has also added to the problems of environmental degradation in the form of excess fertilizers and pesticides in the soil, food and water bodies. More people thus face far more environmental problems than ever before.

Population has a two-fold impact on society; primarily, it is a pressure on the resources of land, water, energy and mineral resources. These pressures are in proportion to the population of an area. There is an aggravating condition that more demands are made on these resources than the simple proportionality, as people, very naturally, wish to have a better life, more amenities and more energy at their disposal, more movement, labour-saving devices and entertainment. These increasing demands have not yet shown any saturation or limit. The *environmental stresses* thus tend to increase somewhat more rapidly than the population increases. There are ameliorating factors as knowledge and modern technology tend to provide better management, less polluting or energy consuming technologies. There are however serious disturbing factors as human populations seriously reduce the living space of animals and plants leading to critical ecological situations. These effects are often threshold effects which come into play in a dramatic, even drastic way, beyond a certain limit of pressures on the ecological system. There are other possible effects on human populations also. It is known in some mammalian species that beyond a certain limit of overcrowding these populations exhibit stresses such as fighting amongst themselves, sometimes group self-destruction. In studies of human populations, overcrowding stresses, such as increase in crime, mob violence and social tensions have also been noted. It is enough to note that population increases beyond certain limits can cause psychological disturbances in humans. That is, beyond pressures on resources, stresses on the environment, there are also perhaps psychological tensions related to high density of populations.

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NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Role of New Technologies

Given the nature of the problem, it is important to enquire whether there is any possibility of solution as knowledge of various technologies grows. Technological achievements have led to the use of new materials; for example, titanium has substituted aluminium and its alloys in many aircraft and other special structures. Its high cost today has limited its more common use. Tungsten, molybdenum, nickel and other refractory metals have increasing uses, as also glasses and ceramics. The main or common metals and alloys, such as those of iron, copper, aluminium, chromium and nickel have been and will continue to be extensively used. Mining of the bulk ores and their processing to final metal or alloy needs substantial amounts of energy. Moreover the changes in the land forms, reaching into waters and agricultural lands produces *environmental stresses* which can only be corrected with wise management and expenditure of energy needed for treatment and transport.

In principle, technological fixes are known or can be found out to reduce the environmental degradation caused by use of technology in varying degrees by all industries and most agricultural activities. On the one side, growing population leads to greater industrial and agricultural activities. On the other hand, growing populations lead to greater need of land for those needed activities. In fact land or space is needed for biotic systems to recover from the degradation caused by land-use. The better managed an activity the less the environmental deterioration, the more intense the activity higher the deterioration, the greater the biotic space available the quicker and easier for land to recover from the effects of environmental degradation.

There are however two limiting rules which need to be kept in view. The first is the critical or threshold effects of degradation on an environment or ecosystem. If the degradation exceeds the resiliency thresholds, an ecosystem, an environment, can go beyond a recoverable stage. For example one or more species of plants or animals can be so decimated that it becomes extinct. If the role of such plants or animals was crucial in an ecological system as food, predator, or equilibriating agent, its absence also can disrupt such an ecosystem. Such effects can take place in nature through accidents. However, human intervention has increased the probability of such occurrences manifold. Human interventions have tended to increase with increasing human populations. It has also increased due to an unforeseen impact of technology, such as acid rain and increase in global atmospheric carbon dioxide.

The increasing use of coal and oil as energy sources, the release of non-degradable or very slowly degradable wastes from modern industry and some of its products such as plastics and stainless alloys, have the poten-

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tial of substantial global accumulation and movement, carried by air and ocean currents. Thus modern technology and the scale of industry have created a situation entirely new in human history, where the effects of human activity in one part of the world can affect other distant parts of the globe. The nature and scale of such effects are dramatically increased as increasing populations of the countries want more of the goods and services rendered accessible by modern technology. Modern technology, in many instances have also devised procedures and processes which can alleviate some of these effects. However, there are several caveats in this statement. There are many wastes and pollutants to which such technological fixes do not yet exist. Scientists and technologists are working on some of these problems and by the very nature of such problems, there will perhaps be solutions in the future. The costs of alleviation are sometimes substantial and many industries and nations are unwilling to invest in such remedial action as they increase costs of products. The affected population is either distant or in the future and the motivation for such increased expenditures and costs therefore tend to be low. For example, the slow increase in global carbon dioxide affects global climate only in the long run, say around a hundred years. Acid rains affect neighbouring nations or even sometimes distant nations. Pollutants dumped in a river can be carried dowstream to affect the water supply and aquatic life of nations downstream. Even pollutants dumped in the coastal waters intentionally or by accident, as in the release of large quantities of petroleum in a tanker accident, can be carried by tides and currents to the shores of neghbouring nations. Radio active wastes are a ubiquitous hazard.

Thus a consequence of modern technology is that the environmental hazards created involve nations which are neither producers nor beneficiaries of the specific technology. Some of the consequences of these technologies are global in character simply because the atmosphere and the oceans are a single world-wide receptacle of many of the undesirable products of human activity. The amount of discharge of these undesirable products is proportional to the intensity or size of the industries and multiplicatively to the number of people who use the products. The number of people using PVC packages may well be closely related to the number of people in the user country rather than the population of the producer nation which packages and markets them. Since pollution spills over beyond the boundaries of nations, since the amounts of such undesirable products are mostly related to technology and population, environment problems have an international aspect of some consequence. The international nature of environmental problems is now recognized fully. The United Nations held the first global conference on environment in 1972.

Sweden has suffered from acid rain due to the industries in Germany. Oil spills by tankers have affected the Malacca Straits between Malaysia

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and Indonesia, and in a more dramatic manner, accidents such as of Torrey Canyon polluted the coasts of France and the United Kingdom.

Need for Recognition of the Global Nature of Environment

The one important consequence of technology and modern science is the recognition that the environment is global in character. If one nation does something that degrades or seriously disturbs the environment, many other nations are likely to be affected; in some instances the global environment is going to be disturbed, possibly seriously, if such interference is of a magnitude beyond the resilience of the environment to correct itself in reasonable time. A distinguished British biologist, Lovelock, coined the word *gaiea* to denote the global environment as a single entity. While this common awareness is fairly well realised by scientists, it is, unfortunately, not greatly appreciated or even understood by the political leadership of the nations of the world. This is of some serious concern to the common people of the world. Political and technological ambitions have led to a serious arms race which is not confined to the two big powers only. Even the production and testing of these armaments have no small effects. The missile and aircraft exhausts in the stratosphere and above cause dissociation and formation of new molecules which produce effects in the rarefied medium that can be observed.[3]

Wars have a much larger effect and can disrupt the ionosphere substantially. A war with nuclear weapons by the large powers can be totally destructibe to all living beings not excluding human beings. It can destroy the atmosphere, the earth and the oceans beyond the resilliency of the global system. Such a prospect is within the realms of possibility. It can only be kept out of bounds by the good sense and the responsible actions of nations. The environmental destruction in Vietnam, over twenty years ago, has not yet been completely repaired. And yet much greater destruction over much vaster areas is possible if the nations, and particularly the powerful nations of the world, do not exercise restraint. Such possibilities increase as the number of nations increase, and the contiguous pairs of nations multiply.

Population Increase Produces Global Tensions

Increasing populations and pressures on resources have increased tensions between nations. Wars that are purposely designed to destroy the environment of a nation are now increasingly possible. This may be likened to the sieges of olden times designed to starve a population to surrender ; for, the destruction of the environment will aim to deny food, contaminate water and poison the air. In the many localised conflicts that have taken place in the last thirty eight years, the only one that was aimed to deny the environment, or rather to destroy it so that the will to fight is lost

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did not succeed for a variety of reasons, particularly that of the big power strategic balance that acted as a restraining influence. In case such restraints disappear, local wars can be environmentally disastrous to a small nation with all its ecosystems under attack. Although the United Nations have often reiterated the need for outlawing environmental war, or, rather wars on the environment, a satisfactory methodology to prevent or stop such wars has not been evolved. However the role of the United Nations is undeniable in stopping or preventing such wars.

The more desirable situation would be the prevention of tensions that lead to war or a conflict which no doubt affects the environment. As the United Nations Declaration of 1972 rightly emphasises :

> The protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic development throughout the world. It is the urgent desire of the whole world and the duty of all governments.

There are many elements which tend to build up tension. High populations and attractive resources are the push and the pull that can lend to estrangement and potential conflicts. Unhappily, if there are no conflct resolution mechanisms, such incipient tensions can escalate to subvert or obvert acts such as surreptitious poisoning of reservoirs of water, or destruction of water courses. Finally, it would escalate to war as conflict resolution becomes increasingly difficult and as nations persistently act unilaterally in their supposed self-interest to the detriment of the interests of other nations.

Sociologists have observed that human endemony increases with a man interacting with neighbours only upto a point. Stresses tend to increase as the interaction between neighours due to their larger numbers increases rapidly. Thus endemony maximises at a certain population density and and decreases on both sides of a graph. In animals, such as rats, mice and lemmings it has been observed that excessive overcrowding increases conflicts and violence as well as withdrawal symptoms.

NEED FOR PRESERVATION OF ENVIRONMENT AND WORLD ORDER

It is not possible to make analogous studies, but sociologists have tried to find the reasons for the higher incidence of crime in slums and congested urban human settlements. These have been sometimes attributed to overcrowding, lack of privacy, poverty and unhealthy living conditions. The point is that population densities and social environment are interrelated. The human environment in its totality improves to an optimum with population, thereafter there is degradation which can be decreased or minimised through human endeavour and application of knowledge. An optimal environment, or a truly endemonic environment, will also tend to

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reduce not only internal tensions but tensions with neighbouring nations. We see in a small way the external relationships and internal environment interrelations between the Scandinavian nations of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Whether such conditions can be extrapolated to the South Asian nations would be an interesting total concept connecting the environment, the internal and nieghbour-nation relationships and populations of a region. Such a study, for a better world order between nations, is indeed worth making.

Finally, whether such ideas can be expanded to the entire globe and the United Nations as the messenger of the concepts, will be an exciting prospect to work for. Peace and some prosperity is inseparable to preserve the environment and reduce the prospects for conflict. A population living in harmony with its natural support systems will no doubt avoid conflicts and wars between nations. Indeed Charles Darwin's theory of human evolution was merely an extension of the idea of human kinship and kinship with living organisms all over the world. Realisation of this kinship has become more important in the present phase of human history.

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1 Following statistics arep rovided in the United States Census Bureau. See *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 11 July 1980. Population growth in Africa increased from 2.5 per cent during 1965-70 to 2.9 per cent during 1975-79. The overall global rate dropped from 2.1 per cent in 1965-70 to 1.7 per cent over 1975-79. Growth rates in Europe were the lowest—0.6 per cent during 1975-79 compared to 0.8 per cent in 1965-70. Similarly in North America the rate had dropped during 1975-79 to 0.8 per cent compared to 1.1 per cent, in South America 2.4 per cent compared to 2.7 per cent, and in Asia it was 1.9 per cent compared to 2.5 per cent in the earlier period of 1965-70.

2 According to the 1981 Census, the population of India doubled to 68 crores in 34 years since Independence. The figure on 1 March 1981 was 68 crores compared to 54 crores in 1971. The addition of 12 crores during this period represents a 24.75 per cent growth in the last decade compared to 24.80 per cent in 1961-71 period. By 2001 A.D. the estimated population is 950 millions. Birth rates have dropped from 46 per 1000 in 1971 to 36 in 1981, and death rates have fallen from 15.7 per thousand 10 years ago to 14.8 in 1981. Life expectancy has also increased from 46 years in 1971 to 54 years in 1981. These figures were given by the Registrar General of India, See *Time of India* (New Delhi), 19 March 1981.

3 For an interesting study of depletion of ozone due to man's activities in aerospace region, see Report of Carl Q. Christol prepared for the United States Senate entitled—"The International Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Stratosphere's Ozone Problem," 1975, pp. 132.

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BOOK REVIEWS

CHINA'S ASCENSION IN WORLD POLITICS

A Review Article

THE work under review* is addressed to the principal question, as the Preface goes, whether China's "rapid and unprecedented" "ascension" in world politics "corresponds to her real capacity to influence global trends and whether this status has not in part been thrust on her by those nations whose declining power has led them to build her up in order to establish a credible counterbalance in the international configuration of forces—however marginal it may be." And the answer the author seeks, "not so much by focusing on the issue itself but rather by presenting a detailed analysis of China's foreign policy behaviour towards the principal actors and towards the principal regions of the globe". (p. ix) True, there are various ways of looking at one particular problem, and this is valid even for introspection into China's foreign policy. The author has no doubt made a well-documented survey of China's behaviour towards the principal world actors and in principal areas of the globe. One may argue that a chronological treatment of the totality of Communist China's external relations might yield better results by avoiding repetition of the soul and substance of China's external policy that applies to all actors and all areas at a particular point of time.

The author seems to be convinced that an analysis of China's foreign relations has little meaning without an understanding of the changing Chinese perceptions of the world. "When the traditional view of the world order had been thoroughly discredited and was no longer considered to offer a valid explanation of the changing international reality of the 19th and the 20th centuries the Chinese elite turned to Marxism-Leninism." (p. 13) According to them, it offers a "conceptualised view of the international and national reality." Within the broader parameters of Marxism-Leninisn China's relations with the outside world can be best elucidated in terms of "contradictions" – the core of Maoist foreign policy schema.

Contradictions are central to every relationship. Every actor-relationship can be characterised in terms of a set of eontradictions ; at any given moment, there is a principal contradiction. A principal contradiction can become a secondary contradiction and "antagonistic" contradictions can turn "non-antagonistic" (and vice-versa). This has been perspicuously reflected in China's external behaviour. The initial years of the post-liberation period witnessed China going extreme radical ; the United States being the principal enemy during this period, China was out to form

* Harish Kapur : *The Awakening Giant : China's Ascension in World Politics* (Sijthoff and Noordoff International Publishers, B.V., Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1981) s, 314 p.

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an international united front against the former with the Socialist Bloc and the colonial and ex-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa. This was in tune with the Soviet line of a "two-camp" theory. Soon after, changes in the internal politics and swift developments in its external environment compelled the Chinese to reformulate their foreign policy strategy. As a result, their "intermediate zone" concepts emerged to counter both the Super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. However, this phase did not last long as the Sino-Soviet border has complicated the entire power game in international politics. China at this juncture found the United States a suitable ally tocounter Soviet influence "The principal elements that have caused the development of this new relationship are the Sino-Soviet disputes and the burgeoning Soviet power in world politics." (p. 94) The United States which had been China's enemy number one in the fifties and sixties turned to be its friend in the early 70's with the rapidly changing world situation and Mao's world order. In the meantime, China having emerged from the wilderness of the cultural revolution had been trying to project a good image in the Third World. Its political interactions with the Third World countries began to increase with growing emphasis on pragmatism. As a logical corollary, Mao's pronouncement of a three world theory in the mid 70's—a device for seeking the cooperation of the countries belonging to the Second World and Third World against the duopoly of the Super Powers in international politics—gave a new orientation to China's foreign policy. Though both super powers, as China perceives, are the enemies of the vast underdeveloped world, in reality it is the "social imperialist" Soviet Union which has been singled out as being more "incidious", more "aggressive," and more "dangerous" This trend continued even after the exit of Mao from Chinese politics. In other words, China's foreign policy and foreign relations have been largely determined by its equation with the Super Powers. Any change in its relations with either super power is followed invariably by changes in its relations with many other countries. In line with the above perspective, the operational aspect of Chinese foreign relations is well depicted in the book.

While looking at the chapterization, the present reviewer is amused to note that the author himself has followed a three-fold division in conformity with Mao's concepts. He has dealt with the two Super Powers (First World) in chapters two and three, Japan and Europe (Second World) in the following two chapters, and the Third World in the last but the concluding one. While throwing light on the prospects of the Sino-Soviet relations the author is quite realistic—taking a down-to-earth analysis. Some of his observations are very accurate. As he says, "insofar as no pattern of inter-state relations can be viewed as permanent, it would be imprudent and short-sighted to attach the label of irreversibility to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations." (p. 52) Formulating his hypo-

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thesis on the basis of their past interactions and present relations, the author speculates :

(i) While the prospects of an open conflict cannot be ruled out .. the scenario of slow de-escalation and some mutual accommodation appears to be more real. (p. 56)
(ii) 'Limited *detente*' with the Russians has become an important element of new Chinese thinking. (p. 57)
(iii) If the prospects for an actual confrontation are remote, the possibility of a Chinese return to a unified communist bloc is even more improbable. (p. 57)

As far as Sino-American relations are concerned, the author gives primacy to the Soviet factor. The present "Sino-American relations are principally based on the common perception of a Soviet threat which for the Americans developed about four decades ago and for the Chinese only about two decades back." (p. 95) Besides, the author shares the view that as long as Taiwan remains outside the realm of China's occupation, it would be the major focal point for tension among them. Though for the time being, the Taiwan issue has receded to the background, yet its relegation is neither final nor permanent. As we have seen, Taiwan as an issue has always been linked to the national interests of the two countries.

In view of the author's expertise it is not surprising that the analytical description of the chapters on "China and Japan," "China and Europe" and "China and the Third World" are well done. The merit of the work lies not in its ability to provoke a rethinking on any aspect of China's external behaviour, but in bringing out a well-balanced, objective piece on China's foreign policy. The present work carries the stamp of painstaking effort at marshalling facts and figures, opinions and attitudes in one place. It will prove to be a useful, handy text book not only for students of China affairs but also a manual for foreign policy makers in various lands.

It is difficult to find fault with the author of such a work ; it is, however, not so difficult to point to the areas where the author could show some originality by going beyond the spoken words, the recorded statements, etc. The present reviewer, being a resident of the Third World, was reasonably more interested in the relevant chapter. He feels disappointed at finding no thought-provoking analysis of the reverses China has met within this area. In the concluding chapter entitled "Towards a Great Power Status" the author defends his argument by saying that "considering the facts that China possesses all the important prerequisites for becoming great and that since time immemorial the world has continuously witnessed the rise and fall of civilizations such a possibility can hardly be excluded." (p. 289) But the "awakening giant," as China is according to the author, has not been able to win a large following or a spectacular sphere of

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influence even in the Third World whose mantle of leadership it claims. Vast manpower and an ocean of untapped resources are no assurances of a certain rise of China which is far behind an average industrialist nation of the West today. With rapid strides in scientific achievement and the growing curse of sophisticated weaponry it is a futile exercise to assess the strength of a nation-state in terms of population and territory. It is more so in the case of the Third World which is desparately groping in the darkness to devise an appropriate way of development.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

JAYANTANUJA BANDYOPADHYAYA : North Over South : A Non-Western Perspective of International Relations. South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1982, ix, 290 p., Rs. 95.

AS an academic discipline international relations has been developed in the post-Second World War West, mainly in the United States. Naturally, therefore, the subject is studied from the Western perspective ; the analyses offered are based on Western experience and the theories propounded seek to take care of the concerns and goals of the West. These are irrelevant most of the time and often even wrong from our perspective. In this context Bandyopadhyaya's *North over South* is a particularly fascinating study. He has written with a view "to highlight the inadequacies of the Western approach" and also to suggest steps towards making the study of international relations more relevant to the World as a whole. The author is quite successful on the first count. He does fairly well on the second count, which has yet to go a long way in this ethno-centric world of ours.

Bandyopadhyaya asserts that the contemporary world is still burdened with the "structures of imperialism" that are more or less intact. Four centuries of imperialist exploitation had become so entrenched that racial superiority of whites (and the inferiority of the coloured peoples) became the conscious and even the subconscious reality. The inferior were powerless and deserved to remain impotent. In such an international system based on power "the powerless cannot exist with freedom and dignity." Racism created a vertical schism in the international system, which did impose a certain degree of unity on it and even endowed it with a sense of stability. But, the unity was "architectural" rather than "organismic" and the stability was the outcome of the institutionalised imperialist exploitation based on power and racism. While the author makes some theoretical distinctions between the capitalist and socialist countries in this regard, he rejects the Marxist view that race is indistinguishable from class. He insists that racism is an autonomous structural characteristic of the international system as a whole and is prevalent at the "systemic" and "subsystemic" levels as well. He finally argues that the struggle of the poor and non-white countries against the rich and white countries must assume the form of a global class-race struggle. Only such a revolt agaist racism can liberate us and the international system from the clutches of the two reigning paradigms, i.e., those of power and the sovereign nation states. Only then could we hope to move on to a new non-racist (non-western) paradigm like world order, peace, development, justice, and humanity as a whole.

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Bandyopadhyaya ably argues that development-oriented disarmament cannot be achieved unless there are systemic and subsystemic structural changes in the economies and societies of the military-industrial nations. While the domestic milieus of the two Super Powers are different in significant ways, the author argues that both are dominated by military industrial establishments of their own. In fact he highlights the role and reach of the Global Military Establishment (GME) in the world today. He strongly urges its victims, "the third world nations," to organise themselves politically and functionally against the GME. Despite the "unsatisfactory" performance of the United Nations so far, the author advocates that the LDCs should work through the world body and not fall into the trap of bilateral dealings with the DCs.

He rightly condemns the failure of the DCs to fulfil even such a lowly target of giving 1 per cent of their GNP as aid to the poor countries. This, he argues, is not because of "intransigence" or "lack of political will" on the part of the DCs as is popularly believed. Emphasising such subjective factors, he insists, is a misperception of the structural compulsions within the DCs. The LDCs must seek a way out by freeing themselves from the imperialistic shackles imposed on them by the DCs. The author is fully aware that this is easier said than done. In this context he discusses the inadequacy of the Sun Yat-Sen model and favours what he calls the Gandhi-Mao model as more suitable for the overthrow of the contemporary racist/imperialist international system. He is conscious that in achieving a New International Economic Order the LDCs have to go a long way from the soft strategy of conference diplomacy to that of a global class-race struggles. The author reposes a great deal of faith in international communication and the non-aligned movement as instruments in effecting a revolutionary transformation of the prevailing international system. Here maybe his faith runs ahead of the record or even immediate prospects. But, such hope is understandable, especially when no better options are in sight.

The book is a really welcome addition to the non-western literature in the field. The fact that the author has to use a negative term of identification for his perspective ironically is an apt indication of the long distance our scholarship has to travel before we can offer positive and "adequate" perspectives on a non-sectarian basis and boldly call them human, global, or even cosmic approaches to the study of international relations.

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ROBERT I. MCLAREN : Civil Servants and Public Policy : A Comparative Study of International Secretariats. Wilfrid Laurier University Press Ontario, Canada, 1980, xvi, 144 p.

THE dictionary meaning of "hypothesis" is the starting point of any analysis, but this book ends with no less than four suggested hypotheses all of which are of little value as they simply state the obvious—that international civil servants are neither expected nor often allowed to influence or initiate public policies—in a wordy and long-winded fashion. For example hypothesis numbered (3) reads : "The greater the technical expertise of the member-government representatives relative to that of the international secretariat officials, the smaller the political effect of the international secretariat in the policy process of the international organization." The others are no better either in substance or in presentation.

The book sets as its goal an attempt at comparative study of international secretariats in order to determine how far international civil servants can affect public policy ; in practice it concentrates on the small and technical international organizations in the family of the United Nations, i.e. the Specialised Agencies, such as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), The Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the World Meteorological Organization (UMO). The author seems to have personal knowledge of the IMCO and perhaps a little of the ICAO. Some half-hearted explanation is given for a rather arbitrary classification of the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies, nor is it clear why even important non-governmental organisations have been left out. Apart from these shortcomings, the bulk of the book is concerned more with describing the various small organizations than in answering the question which the author asks himself. Even on these descriptive matters, the pretentious bibliography can be ignored as it does not add to much ; popular pamphlets put out by specialised agencies themselves give a more readable account of their structure and functions than what the condensation attempted in Chapter III produces.

Even after two-thirds of the book has been completed, the groping continues for what is to be put on the slab for dissection and analysis.

Some obtuse words seemingly give a scholarly touch to the long discussion on methodology. In Chapter II titled—"The International Secretariat as an Actor in International Affairs"—immediately becomes "the International Organization as an Actor in International Relations." Such a distinction without any perceptible difference is a hall-mark of all the chapters that attempt any kind of analysis. In discussing and comparing various organizations, some account of their buildings, locations, personalities may be unavoidable, but is it necessary to wax sentimental about the IMCO building in Piccadilly ? (the author calls it Piccadilly Street ! –

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perhaps he alone does. He also refers to London as England !) For many organizations in Switzerland, the author cannot resist such popular generalization as, "Switzerland has two images for the outside world ; it is a very open and internationally-oriented country when its relations with the rest of the world are considered, but it is a very narrow and closed, provincial society when it is Switzerland by itself that is thought of." For the substance of comparisons, phrases like "conciliar pattern" (meaning councils under full assemblies which are called plenary in the book), "federal" organisations, programme orientation versus Secretariat, conventions versus resolutions abound and many similar mumbo-jumbo is indulged in. In the final distillation, the influence of the Specialised Agencies is to be sought in (1) problem identification ; (2) fact-finding ; and (3) identifying alternatives ; only seldom, very seldom indeed, is any policy recommendation required from the International Secretariats.

Meanwhile, there is much diversion by comparison between the national systems (including Secretariat) and the international organizations and several tantalising promises, dispersed all through the book, that further information and enlightenment can be found elsewhere ; however, quite often they are not found in any comprehensible or discernible form. To cite a few examples : p. 34 refers to Chapter III, p. 67 remits discussion "later," p. 86 speaks of "later in the chapter," and page 82 the sentence—"This (different kinds of resolutions) required very subtle distinctive," is left in midair as the subtlety required is never discussed. For quite unknown reasons, C hapters V, V and VII have little "introductions" to them. Then of course, a few Latin tags are not forgotten (e.g. *tabula rasa*).

At the end of it all, the conclusion is reached, hesitantly and tentatively, that civil servants in International Organizations do not, even by the criteria set by the author, influence policies or political decisions. This is a wellknown fact and one wonders why it took over nearly 140 pages of dry and nearly unreadable prose to come to this conclusion. The question whether the civil servants in International Secretariats should affect policies or policy decisions must be answered by a resounding no, but the book evades or avoids such a question.

I put down this book more than 50 times over several months, and each time I picked it up again, it was simply because of my promise to review it. As I could not overcome its tediousness, I could not gain any knowledge or reap any benefit. Some readers may be more fortunate but the author (and his patrons, if any) is bound to wonder if the time, money and energy spent on a book like this have been worthwhile.

New Delhi. SAMAR SEN

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Regional

DIETER BRAUN : The Indian Ocean : Region of Conflict or 'Zone of Peace'? Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1983, xii, 228 p., Rs. 130.

THE strategic importance of the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area came to be recognised only in the 1970's when the region was drawn into the global strategy and political plans of the Super Powers. Since then, the increasing naval presence of major foreign powers in the Indian Ocean, and especially the United States' build-up of the Diego Garcia base, are seen by the littoral states as a threat to their own security. While their response has varied from the muted to the strident there has been a continuing cooperative effort, mainly through the United Nations forum, to get the international community to accept the Indian Ocean region as a "zone of peace." In the case of India, the deterioration in the security environment and the possibility of super power confrontation in the region have of late taken on a new dimension pointing to the urgent need for strengthening the Indian Navy to protect the country's maritime and economic interests. To those seriously interested in the subject, Dieter Braun's book provides a global perspective in a highly analytical framework.

The introductory portion of the book gives geographical, historical and other useful background information concerning the Indian Ocean and its coastal states, their characteristics and general trends. This is followed by a long chronicle of developments (forming the bulk of the book) in so far as these relate to "the interests and instruments" of the United States and the Soviet Union, as also "other outside interests," *viz.* China, Japan, the United Kingdom, France and West Germany. The author then proceeds to examine the political and strategic interests of countries and sub-regions in and around the Indian Ocean and to analyse the specific developments and trends with reference to "the web of interaction" between regional and outside interests, so that the local perspectives are viewed in the context of the policies, pulls and pressures of foreign powers and of the global power balance. Lastly, regional and multilateral security concepts and initiatives, mainly pursuit of the Indian Ocean's Peace Zone proposal through the United Nations, are outlined. There is also a discussion, of particular relevance to Indian policy-makers, of the efforts towards a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia, in which India is shown to have been mostly at the receiving end ever since the Pokhran explosion.

A whole lot of literature is available dealing with various aspects of the political, economic and military importance of the Indian Ocean region. The merit of Braun's work lies in its comprehensive treatment of the subject themes in their wider geo-political context. It thus contributes to a better understanding of events as they unfold in this region. It

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examines in great detail the complex interplay of involvement of different nations, their priorities, ideologies and other policy determinants, and attempts a meticulous analysis of inter and intra-regional political forces and causal relationship of developments in the area. This analysis is generally both perceptive and balanced, and particularly when it concerns the characteristics and foreign policy motivations of the United States and the USSR. Indeed, he is at his most convincing in his analysis of the changes and contradictions in the policies and mutual approach of the two Super Powers.

Braun traces the first step towards tension in the decision of the United States "to exploit for military purposes the centrally located atoll of Diego Garcia in the Northern Indian Ocean," followed by a small but regular Soviet naval presence in the ocean. The littoral states "thought they recognised a reincarnation of colonial methods in the activities of the great powers," and this led to the "peace zone" demand. According to him, the Western Powers also "thought they perceived a threat to their free access and to their traditional transport and trading links, which was made all the more ominous by what they saw as the possibility of an alliance between Non-Alignment and world communism." Thus a classic conflict situation developed, its level fluctuating in response to whether it was the cold war polities or the policy of *detente* that was being followed. Further, his lucid treatment of the nature of the littoral states' initiatives, the United Nations Resolution of December 1971 and procedural wrangles offers an excellent insight into the complexity of the seemingly simple peace zone concept.

Braun does not take sides, but it is difficult altogether to avoid the impression that a mild pro-western bias does show through in a few random observations. For example, a perfectly valid statement that the Indian Ocean Peace Zone idea can make headway only when the present confrontation between the Super Powers is reduced, is marred by the qualification—"in so far as it is not a utopian scheme for 'driving out' major powers from an ocean which, after all, does not belong to the littoral states." India is at more than one place depicted as being pro-Soviet and anti-American. Here are samples : "India, one of the most ardent advocates of the peace zone concept, went much further by lauding the Soviet Union for its positive attitude and chiding the United States for its negative stance." The New Delhi Conference of April 1982 was sponsored by "the World Peace Council, the Afro-Asian Peace and Solidarity Organisation and several other notorious pro-Soviet groupings . both Mrs Gandhi and Leonid Brezhnev sent messages. The tenor of the conference was fully in line with Soviet policy...." Again : "...the Indian Ocean will never become an idyllic lake of peace; it never was one in the past—something which is conveniently forgotten by people who think only in simplistic terms of foreign devils responsible for all their ills."

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Leaving aside the progress of concepts and initiatives relative to the Indian Ocean Zone, the discussions are organised in two topical parts: first, of characteristic traits of interest groups' behaviour—both of the major powers and the Third World—and, second, of interaction and interlinking of regional and outside interests. Inevitably this approach lends itself to repetition of points. The changing priorities and the rivalry of the Super Powers comes in for repeated analysis, as also the interludes of their converging interests. We are reminded again and again that the littoral states, mostly belonging to the Third World, came to acquire the attributes of a major political region in its own right only since the early 1970s; that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan ushered in a qualitative change in the strategic situation; and so on.

The catholic sweep of the study is somewhat flawed by its over-emphasis on political and strategic developments, to the virtual exclusion of the economic component which is often so necessary for a proper evaluation. At places the painstaking detail is viewed from so close that there is a blurring of focus; at others the compulsions of debate bring in episodes and observations far removed from the immediate theme. (No such compulsion, however, explains the inclusion of a section on West Germany among "other outside interests"—which apparently owes more to the patriotism of the author than to any significant influence or direct interest of that country in the region.) The author probably regarded purely military concepts as outside the scope of the work. For example, he does not discuss the vulnerability of large carrier-based task forces against nuclear submarines and precision-guided shore-based missiles in the context either of Diego Garcia or the long-term strategic plans of the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, the part that the Indian and Indonesian navies could play in any future conflict in keeping open the eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean is not looked into. There are also pardonable slips in making use of press material. For instance a comment appearing in the *Times of India* is given the status of "the verdict of the Indian Press;" at another place a report in *India Today* is implied as reflecting "Indian public opinion."

While the multi-faceted analysis maintains throughout a commendable depth, Braun does not offer solutions and presents no models. He allows the sub-title "Region of Conflict or 'Peace Zone' ?" to remain by and large a poser, though it is quite clear that the potential for regional conflicts, involving mostly the non-aligned and developing countries, is strongly linked with the climate of confrontation between the western power blocs. The brief look into the future that he does permit himself at the end of the book is content with staid observations like: "Afghanistan will probably remain the heaviest burden with which the Soviet Union has burdened itself;" "The future of the littoral, hinterland and island states of the Indian Ocean...will...be only partly determined by the involvement of these

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countries in international politics;" "The future remains uncertain." In this sense Dieter Braun's excellent work is a multilayered substantial sandwich without much filling.

There is no doubt that much labour and extensive research have gone into this comprehensive study, though, predictably, Braun draws generously on his own earlier books and articles. The language is clear, if sometimes wooden; the matter-of-fact preciseness of the original German has not suffered in the translation. The book is on the whole a valuable contribution to the understanding of current trends and postures concerning the Indian Ocean region and its coastal and hinterland states. There is much in it that should educate the general public in India and help in evaluating the present environment.

New Delhi G.C. KATOCH

LARRY W. BOWMAN AND IAN CLARK (*Eds.*): The Indian Ocean in Global Politics. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, xi, 260 p., $ 25.

THE book is a compilation of select papers presented at the International Conference on Indian Ocean Studies held in Perth, Western Australia, in August 1979. Though the conference had covered a large canvas like history, culture and civilization, economics, etc., the book highlights only some of the papers presented on the political and strategic problems connected with the Indian Ocean region. It contains twelve articles by authors who are well-known in the field, and is divided into three parts; Regional Powers and the Indian Ocean, External Powers in the Indian Ocean and International Organizations in the Indian Ocean.

In the first part, the emphasis is placed on the Persian Gulf, India, Australia and Southern Africa. The first article deals with the "Strait of Hormuz : The Global Chokepoint." The author does elaborate the often repeated arguments about the importance of that strait but fails to explain how it becomes a "global chokepoint." By the same logic, the Turkish Straits will become a "global chokepoint" for the USSR. Will the author concede to the Soviets all those arguments about controlling that "chokepoint" that he has so painfully elaborated in this article in the case of the West. Moreover, Professor Ramazami not only advocates the creation of a common patrol authority to supervise the passage of oil tankers through that strait but also suggests that such a common patrol authority be created for the Indian Ocean as a whole. Why should he have limited himself to the Indian Ocean only? If it was such a good idea he should have suggested the creation of such authorities to protect all the inter-

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national waterways and sea lanes and should have suggested the UN as a supervisory body for the same.

India is covered in two articles by two scholars: Dieter Braun of Germany and Joel Larus of the United States. Dieter Braun deals with the growing interaction between India and other states in the Indian Ocean area both within the larger framework of South-South cooperation and in the narrower one of regional cooperation. He believes that such an interaction has been made possible not only because of industrial and technological growth in India but also by its realization among the neighbouring states. Joel Larus, however, reflects the average American view of the so-called pro-Soviet stance of India's policy regarding the Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Like many Americans, the author too would like India to be more non-aligned than what it is today !

Harry S. Albinski gives an even-handed account of Australia's Indian Ocean policy within the broader canvas of its domestic, economic and foreign policies. Larry W. Bowman deals with the conflicts on the eastern coast of Africa and analyses the linkage of the strategic triangle : the Cape of Good Hope, Diego Garcia and the Horn of Africa.

The second part highlights the impact of the oil crisis and the October War, Carter's diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region, Soviet arms transfer and naval policy and the French interests in the Indian Ocean region. It It may be a mere coincidence that Britain, a power that dominated that region for centuries, is missing from this part. Or, it might even reflect the harsh realities that have been understood in Western Australia.

Kim C. Beazley has presented a logical and objective analysis of United States' policy towards the Gulf, including its oil interests, and has sought to analyse the reasons for the continuous US military buildup in the region. Basing his arguments on hard facts he comes to the conclusion that the American proposals for the creation of the Indian Ocean fleet did not come in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but followed the collapse of the position established by the United States in the Gulf. According to him, access to oil remains the primary focus of US interest, and the principle threat is the local developments, in which the Soviet Union plays only a minor role. (p. 126)

Ashok Kapoor deals with United States' diplomacy during the Carter Administration and analyses the background of the US-USSR talks on the Indian Ocean in 1977-78.

Ian Clark, in his article, seeks to correlate the Soviet diplomacy with its arms transfer policy. The analysis is balanced and data-based and the author concludes that despite huge transfer of arms littoral states like Somalia, Iraq and India have not been susceptible to undue Soviet influence. Geoffrey Jukes, while analysing the Soviet naval policy in the Indian Ocean, highlights the anti-submarine warfare alongwith political flag showing as constituting the major thrust of the Soviet naval strategy in the area.

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He demolishes the usual arguments about the oil blockade or the seizure of the oil fields by the USSR and argues that it has very limited naval interventionist capability for that role. Jean Pierre Gomane's article on the French policy is useful in the sense that besides the traditional arguments based upon political and economic interests (oil) he also talks about the new interests in the 3 mn. sq. km. exclusive economic zone controlled by the French in the Indian Ocean and the Antarctica nearby. Apart from major fishing grounds this area also reportedly contains rich deposits of the polymetallic nodules.

The third part deals with the question of the Indian Ocean "Peace Zone" as discussed in the United Nations since 1971. Philip Towle, while analysing the role of the Ad Hoc Committee, poses the very pertinent question whether it is not a blind alley. He also discusses in details the Super Power talks on the Indian Ocean between 1977-78 as well as the 1979 meeting on the Indian Ocean, held at New York, which enlarged the scope of the Peace Zone concept more than was envisaged in the 1971 Resolution of the UN General Assembly.

George W. Shepherd (Jr.) seeks to find peace in the Indian Ocean through demilitarization. He has sought to demonstrate empirically the growing Super Power rivalry through the medium of arms transfer. He has also made an interesting analysis of the linkage between Great Powers and the regional powers within the framework of the tribute system ; the strong protect the weak for a price. According to him, today, the North seeks tributes (economic benefits) from the South in return for protection. Other scholars have analysed this under the framework of neo-colonialism. Both, however, emphasise the economic dimensions of the pattern of systemic linkages between the countries of the North and the South. In some ways, one of the reasons why the "Peace Zone" proposal is sabotaged even by some of the littoral states is that these elite find it difficult to break out of the tribute system. Shepherd believes that such a thing can be made possible only by strengthening the concepts of non-alignment and self-reliance among the countries of the South.

It is an interesting book. While some articles reflect the traditional and oft-repeated Western views, there are others which show a fresh outlook, a deeper understanding and, therefore, a more objective analysis of the problem. It is a welcome addition to the otherwise large volume of works that is being produced on the subject.

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R.K. JAIN (*Ed.*) : China and Malaysia, 1949-83. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, lx, 364 p., Rs. 150.

THE book is only a compilation of documents (362 in number) pertaining to China-Malaysia relations since the founding of the People's Republic. The cover of the book, however, gives the impression of bein much more than that. This volume is one in the series "China and South-East Asia" of which R.K. Jain is the editor.

As is usual with volumes of this kind there is an introductory essay which is basically a descriptive account of the main developments in Sino-Malaysian relations. One shortcoming of the essay is that the author makes no mention of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. Atleast from China's side this is too significant to be ignored. The Cultural Revolution militancy, as is well-known, did affect China's Southeast Asia policy, among others, rather seriously.

The editor has included many unimportant documents in the volume—for instance condolence messages sent from one country to the other, messages of greetings, etc., could have been avoided. Also, just any document from China that contained the word "Malaysia" has been included regardless of its significance. This has helped in adding to the size of the book but not to the quality.

It would have been a greater service to students of Chinese and/or Southeast Asian affairs if fewer official documents and more secondary materials, particularly analytical and interpretative, ones were included. The book, therefore, may be only of limited use to somebody who plans to write a dissertation or a monograph on the concerned subject. It has not in any considerable way eased the task of that person in terms of collecting data and preparing a list of materials. A lot more needs to be done. Of course no one bibliographic source can ever be fully adequate for any kind of advanced research but this one is far from being "an indispensable reference work of permanent value for all scholars and students of political science and international politics, contemporary China and Southeast Asian Studies," as is described in the book-jacket.

The binding and cover are quite well-done, but beyond this the publisher cannot be praised as there are several printing mistakes. However, despite these drawbacks the book is likely to find a place in the libraries largely because of paucity of such specialized studies. R.K. Jain's efforts, therefore, should not be totally discounted.

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Legal

S.C. JAIN : Nationalization of Foreign Property : A Study in North-South Dialogue. Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1983, 298 pp., Rs. 125.

THE demand for a New International Economic Order has precipitated a reconsideration of the structure and processes of world political economy among all the principal interests. This has resulted in a large and growing literature, that to date, if has not entirely clarified the problems and issues besetting the world political economy, has at least made it possible to identify certain salient currents of thought about them, each setting forth a mode of analysis and a strategy of action.

Dr. Jain's work is a study of challenges to traditional rules of international law relating to expropriation of alien property. The newly independent nations, belonging to the so-called Third World, have taken initiative in several international forums to restructure the traditional international law and have demanded to create a new order that reflects changing needs to the international society and the pattern of economic relations among the states on the basis of equitable distribution of wealth and resources.

The process of decolonization has created certain problems of readjustment and even structural changes in international economic relations. The treatment of alien property, foreign investments and nationalization thereof are the key problems, resolution of which is considered vital to the establishment of a new international economic order. With the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa the controversy over the law relating to expropriation of alien property has become a controversial problem in international law.

Several pertinent questions arise. What is the legal basis of payment of compensation ? What should be the criterion for such payment ? Is there a minimum standard of international law on payment of compensation ? Is this standard reflected in the due, prompt and effective compensation ? The act of taking of alien property by the State may involve individual or general expropriation. The question arises whether compensation is payable in all these cases? Does every interference with alien property amount to expropriation ? Does the nature of state action affecting foreign property or foreign national's contractural rights have bearing on the amount of compensation payable ?

The book under review attempts to answer the above questions. It comprises seven chapters. In Chapter II the author deals with the concept of expropriation. In the context of expropriation of alien property, the question often arises whether concession contracts are in the nature of proprietary rights. The treatment accorded to these concession contracts in state practice, judicial pronouncements and in juristic writings has bee n ably examined by the author in Chapter III. In the subsequent chapters

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the doctrinal basis of expropriation of alien property in traditional international law and various issues in the context of the North-South dialogue have been examined in the light of state practice and recent developments in the United Nations. In Chapter V, the nature and scope of local remedies, rules and their place in the contemporary international law have been attempted. Chapter VI deals with the treatment of foreign investments and property in India.

The author's treatment of the subject is quite comprehensive. The study, being the outcome of the author's practical experience as a legal adviser in the Legal and Treaties Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, and on account of his having access to a vast amount of source material and by reason of his having had the privilege to work under the supervision of an eminent professor of international law, contains a scholary exposition of all the current issues involved in the expropriation of alien property in the context of the North-South dialogue.

The author has ably provided international law perspectives of the developing countries on the subject. It would have been worthwhile had the learned author analyzed the approaches and attitudes of revolutionery governments on the subject of expropriation of alien property and examined the relationship of law and economic development to basic human rights in detail.

In sum, Jain's book is a good piece of work and will be highly useful to those engaged in the study and research of the law of international economic development.

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B. N. MEHRISH

POLITICAL THOUGHT

FRANK THAKURDAS : German Political Idealism. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, xi, 368 p., Rs. 110.

FRANK Thakurdas had originally planned to bring out a single volume on the English and the German idealists but as that turned out 700-pages long, he decided to publish the section on German Idealists as a separate book, leaving out, quite appropriately, the English to fight the intellectual battle amongst themselves. So this can be treated as a companion volume to *The English Utilitarians and Idealists*. The book does not claim to offer fresh insight into the working of the idealist mind nor into its decisively path-breaking German variant. It confesses without hush or blush its limitations, borrowing freely from commentators who have spent their life-time on one or the other aspect of the philosophical system of

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thinkers here accorded admirable respect by a person who knows no German and could well have spent his own life-time trying to convince the unfriendly and the indifferent that if he were to spend his own time reading these philosophers in the original, he would not be doing something irrelevant. If it is true that most of us invest our time in assuring ourselves or others of the need to read thinkers rather than actually reading them, then it must su rely be said to Thakurdas's credit that he has produced a book on them, i ndeed that he has dared to do so.

It is difficult to summarise a book that by its own declaration is intended as a summary of the general thoughts of the chosen thinkers. Since it does not provide us any fresh interpretation, one cannot bring to one's aid older or later interpretations with which to contest it. And since there are few arguments in defence of a thesis in fact it has no thesis to defend—it is unnecessary to apply oneself to locate the inconsistencies that may have crept into the analysis or to judge the general validity of the claims that have gone into its formation. All one can do is to test the fidelity of the presentation with the thoughts of the thinker under consideration. One may ask if the basic structure of his thought is reproduced intelligibly or if the presentation is sensitive to the interpretation most likely consonent with his generally accepted intentions or if the philosophical picture drawn matches the original. True, one can never get to the original but it is fair to ask if from the sketch offered, one can infer the extent to which it is capable of speaking the language of the tradition in which the original was situated.

Even a cursory reading of Thakurdas's book is enough to reassure us that we have in front of us the work of a man who has spent his time usefully on trying to understand Kant, Fichte and Hegel. That the general contours drawn of each of these thinkers are correct. The sections on Kant and Fichte should be particularly useful as there are few commentaries easily available. Yet one does not get the impression that the book has been written with the intention of making an enthusiast turn to the originals or that it was ever intended as a text book, for many of the difficult terms remain as distant for the layman as they were at the beginning of the book. Many of the complex ideas are insufficiently discussed and some of them are merely paraphrased in the notoriously elusive vocabulary of the entire German tradition.

There are a number of reasons why it would be imprudent to raise objections to the book but equally it may turn out to be unwise not to express genuine doubts or point out the difficulties. I cannot help suggesting that we be careful when using terms like "ontological monism," particularly if we are applying them to the systems of Hegal and Marx. For both are deeply aware of the differentiated character of reality. I hardly need mention that it is unjust to say that for Hegel and Marx "History is governed by inevitable laws and what has to happen has to

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happen," or that, for both "history is an evolutionary process that ends in a rational, just social order in which all forms of social contradictions have ended." I am not certain what is meant by the "not so strictly idealist epistemological monism of Berkeley." I am a little unhappy on being told that Rousseau was a prophet of nationalism in France or even that Hegel's absolute spirit manifests itself in the nation or in the nation state. I am perplexed when confronted with a statement such as this : "Almost at one stroke Fichte shed his liberalism and his individualism and his cosmopolitanism for socialism, for collectivism and for nationalism." And certainly horrified, when I learn that Hegel compared Greek religion as an instance of subjectivity with the essentially objective character of Christianity.

The conclusion, certainly the weakest part of the book, states that the history of Positivism from Comte to Kolakowski is yet to be written. This implies, much to anyone's surpise I imagine, that a movement that begins with Comte either ends with or has found its latest exponent in Kolakowski. But what is merely implied here becomes explicit later in the chapter. Thakurdas says : "Unlike Jean Paul Sartre, Kolakowski having been thrown out of the Communist Party of Poland has openly declared himself to be a positivist which from my point of view is a matter of regret." This is a truly baffling statement. It has all the seductive qualities of the irrational but lacks its charm and is as drab as a government White Paper. Does it mean that unlike Sartre, Kolakowski has declared openly that he is a Positivist ? If so, it follows that Sartre is a positivist, although he is not open about it, which is absurd. Or does it mean that unlike Sartre who was not thrown out of the Communist Party, Kolakowski declared himself a positivist because he was ? This is simply false and quite obviously so for Sartre was never a member of the Communist Party. And do I detect here one of those classical fallacies in proposed causal explanations which take temporal sequence as sufficient evidence for a causal relation ? That Thakurdas has concluded that simply because Kolakowski reportedly turned positivist after his expulsion from the Communist Party, the former is the effect of the latter ? But what is most outrageous of all is the main suggestion itself : Where on earth did he discover that Kolakowski has turned Positivist, what forum did he use to declare that he has become so ? This is a full-blooded comedy of errors ! Poor Kolakowski, he has written on Positivism and may have renounced Marxism, but he has not gone over from one to the other.

There are some glaring printing errors and some others that seem to belong to the manuscript before it reached the printer. Portions of "Epistemological" always mow themselves out. And "notion" is always on the run. I had a hard time searching monism in the long and short dictionaries I possess. The case of individual philosophers is worse. Heidegger finally becomes the grave-digger that many have always suspected him to be. It is evident to anyone that there is an excess of the letter "e" in Berkeley, not

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so obvious that the idealist philosopher occasionally finds it difficult to manage all three. He comes and goes always leaving behind one or the other. But it is Descartes who has the most serious problem. He has erased it from his memory that he ever had the letter "s." It is no simple case of forgetting but a silent testimony to the fact that we live in a terrible age when not to be spoken about is not to exist at all. Do we not all have deep inside us a compelling need to talk about ourselves out of the fear that if we do not or do not get others to talk about some of the qualities we possess we are in danger of forgetting that we have or ever had them at all? We may in fact have unintentionally adopted a new philosophical maxim : To be is to be heard. So, even our gabble fulfils a need !

There are more problems in the book which the printer could well have avoided. Footnotes bear the look of exiles, helpless little wanderers, deprived of their sense of belonging or else like our MLAs they keep their options permanently open which is why they are deliberately tentative. The manner in which the general normlessness of our society has crept into the book vindicates the Hegelian thesis that nothing is exempt from the sweep of "Zeit Geist," that there are after all only "circles within circles," one essential centre that sends the same massage to all the points. Full stops, commas, question marks come and go as they please, appear and disappear of their own volition. To be sure, they do follow a pattern but one of their own making and show little respect to rules laid down by tradition. There is an anarchy even in the order of words. One example should suffice the sympathetic reader : "Reference must be made to Fichtean interpretation of the idealist position disimilar to Berkeley, ruins the theological bias. But it is maintained that Berkeley's system of thought while it was idealistic, but it is not subjective idealism of the type Fichte was."

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RAJEEV BHARGAVA

J.B.H. WADIA : M.N. Roy—The Man. Popular Prakashan, 1983, xxi, 121 p., Rs. 50.

THE history of the Indian Nationalist Movement is studded with many colourful personalities. Of them M.N. Roy was perhaps the most colourful. The author, Wadia, who always played the host whenever Roy with his wife Ellen visited Bombay, has presented in this book a vivid pen picture of M.N. Roy the man.

Nobody in the galaxy of Indian nationalist leaders had so picturesque a

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political career as that of Roy. Sent abroad by his terrorist group in Bengal during the First World War for the purpose of collecting arms from German sources for the Indian revolution, Roy travelled from country to country under different names, eluding the British and Allied Press intelligence agents. He reached Mexico after evading arrest by the American police, transformed the Mexican Socialist Party into a Communist Party, and was elected its first General Secretary. He was invited to Moscow to attend the Second Conference of the Communist International in 1920. There he came into close contact with Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other communist leaders. He became a member of the Presidium of the Communist International and was entrusted with the task of developing a communist movement in India. He parted company with the Communist International on account of his heretical views, returned to India in early 1931, and after undergoing a jail sentence of six years, joined the Indian National Congress in November 1936. He tried to radicalise the Congress on the basis of a concrete programme of agrarian revolution.

It was the Second World War which brought out the greatness of Roy as a political thinker and his inability to adjust to the type of political practice which alone could succeed in India at that time. It appears in retrospect that it was the extraordinary intellectual calibre and rock-bottom honesty of Roy which led to what is described as his failure in Indian politics. He was able to foresee that while the success of the fascist powers would spell the doom of all the aspirations of democratic freedom for India, the success of the Allied Powers would, instead of strengthening British imperialism, actually weaken it and would bring us near to the objective of national independence. It is an irony that, although the course of history fully confirmed Roy's prognosis, power after the end of British rule went into the hands of those Indian leaders who had opposed India's war efforts either because they were unable to foresee the possible consequences of the defeat of international fascism or because their conscience was flexible enough to enable them to participate in the Quit India Movement, although by doing so they were aiding the fascist cause. Roy "failed" in Indian politics because his intellectual integrity required him to swim against the current of nationalist sentiment which favoured England's defeat in the war.

The last phase of Roy's life, from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to his death on 25 January 1954, was devoted to the development of the philosophy of Radical Humanism, the theory of partyless democracy and a projection of new ways of revolution based on what Roy described as "politics without power." Roy predicted that in the Indian situation, pursuit of power politics would lead to immorality and corruption in public affairs and may result in the emergence of an Indian brand of fascism. Recent developments have shown that there was a good deal of truth in what Roy said. There is consequently some revival of interest in Roy's political philosophy. The ideas of participatory democracy, people's

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committees and total revolution popularised by Jayaprakash Narayan were largely derived from Roy's writings. There is a growing body of activists in the country who are working at the grassroots level for bringing about a peaceful total revolution without being involved in power politics. Many of these activists draw their inspiration from M.N. Roy and Jayaprakash Narayan.

While there is thus a revival of interest in Roy's political philosophy, Roy the man has remained largely unknown to the people. Wadia has tried to fill in the void. He has described his book as "An Incomplete Royana." "I am aware," he writes in the Preface, "that my Royana is just what we call a 'jhalak' in film parlance. It is incomplete and its chief merit, if I may say so, may lie in its being tantalising, say, like a film trailer." However, Wadia's Royana, although incomplete, is vivid, graphic and eminently readable.

As Wadia has rightly observed, Roy had a radiant personality and a gift of transforming the banal into the lively, if not the poetic. Whether he dealt with an abstruse philosophical topic or a matter of mundane experience, his conversation was full of vivacity and was always stimulating. One was always tempted, after leaving him, to recapitulate what he said and to ponder over its implications.

Inspite of his involvement in matters of national and international importance, Roy retained a keen personal interest in all his friends, comrades and colleagues. He had a phenomenal memory and he remembered the likes and dislikes of each of his innumerable friends and admirers. His company was always immensely rewarding. Young comrades who spent the best years of their lives in working with him, and who derived nothing of material value from his association, cherish the fond memories of the years they spent with him and regard those years as the most glorious part of their life. Roy was a humanist, not only in theory, but in practice. In presenting a pen picture of Roy as a human being, Wadia has served the cause of humanism.

New Delhi. V.M. TARKUNDE

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INDIA

Regional Political Developments

ANJALI GHOSH :Peaceful Transition to Power : A Study of Marxist Political Strategies in West Bengal 1967-77. Firma KLM, Calcutta, 1981, 174 p., Rs. 80.

THE book is a revised version of the author's Ph. D. thesis submitted to the Jadavpur University. It is a useful addition to the literature on affairs in West Bengal where the Left parties, with the CPI(M) in a dominating role, has been in power since 1977. In the Assembly the CPI(M) alone has a majority.

Lying at the centre of the vast region which the British once called the Bengal Presidency and we now refer to as Eastern India, West Bengal occupies a strategic position. This is the region that contains and produces the bulk of the country's industrial minerals and coal, and earns very substantial amounts in net foreign exchange through exports of tea, jute goods and minerals. Till the late sixties, tea and jute goods were the topmost earners of foreign exchange and, in addition, yielded over many years very considerable amounts of revenue by way of export duties on them.

Our Constitution has been aptly described as "unitary with some federal features." Those who have wielded and now wield power at the Centre and those who have prospered under the socio-economic system that has been built, the existence of, for example, a DMK or ADMK or even Telugu Desam Government in a state does not cause concern of the kind that the Communist-dominated Leftists in power in West Bengal do.

Dr. Ghosh says in the Introduction that she has offered the reader a study of "the social roots of politics from pre-independence days" so as to "provide a basis for a clear understanding of the political character of West Bengal." Bengal, she says, "developed a distinct identity from the rest of India" during the British period. Bengal alone ? Does not the history of the sub-continent provide ample evidence that the different regions or, if you like, different racial-linguistic groups were tending to go each its own way during the declining days of the Mughals ? Did not the Marathas, to cite an instance, have a distinct identity of their own at the time ?

History was taking its normal course in the sub-continent when the British imperialists seized power, reversed the process, and in order to be able to exploit the country, bound different regions and linguistic groups with a strong Central Government and a single economic net. In any case, the happenings over reorganisation of the states in the fifties and the sixties explode the thesis that only the Bengalis had developed a distinct identity before independence.

The author speaks of the partition of 1947 having created in the "radi-

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cal forces" in West Bengal "bitter distrust" of the Central Government, but almost in the same breath says that "the strong antagonism that was nurtured against the British from the decree of 1905 [the first partition of Bengal] was "transferred against the Congress at the Centre" in 1947.

She goes further and writes : "As the ill-effects of partition began to unfold themselves through the years, the feeling of separatism began to be intensified till in 1964-67 it reached an explosive situation." It is the suggestion of the author that efforts to dislodge the Congress from power mean propagation of "separatism"? This was the period which saw the decline of the Congress in the state. Whatever else one might say about the Communists in particular, and the Leftists in general, they can hardly be charged with fostering separatism which in our present political context has a definite connotation. They are indeed among the most vociferous advocates of integrity of the country. She does not, however, leave even the State Congress out of the scope of her statement. "The politics of disenchantment that follows from the perception of relative deprivation in West Bengal," she says, "has further combined with regional consciousness among the Bengalis. Even the State Government that took office in 1947 in West Bengal was not sentimentally attached to the Union Government." It does not need a soothsayer to foretell that; if the Centre goes its present way, no one will be able to block the growth of separatist forces in West Bengal.

On the causes of the growth of the sense of "relative deprivation" in West Bengal, Ghosh refers, among other things, to discrimination against the state in the matter of devolution of funds and rehabilitation of refugees. She does not discuss these issues in any great detail, but the few facts she has cited about what has been done by the Centre for the rehabilitation of the West Pakistani refugees in contrast to what the same Government has done or not done for the Bengali refugees are enough to bring out the extent of the neglect and deprivation of the latter.

She has also mentioned some facts about the economic crisis that afflicted the state during the Third Plan period and the sharp fall in the share of the state in the country's capacity even for industrial production since those days. The food shortage also became acute because of diversion of large amounts of land from paddy to jute cultivation. As a result, discontent became widespread in both urban and rural areas. She does not, however, refer to the Centre's policy in respect of pricing of industrial raw materials and agricultural commodities produced in different regions of the country or to the freight policy which has taken away the locational advantages for industrial growth of not only West Bengal but of the entire eastern region while the locational advantages of the other regions for the industrial raw materials they produce and the eastern region does not, such as cotton, have been left untouched. But she does say that the sense of relative deprivation "ushered in an era of discontent

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in state politics as a result of which the Leftists gained pre-eminence in West Bengal."

One fact of India's planning is patent. While from its premier position in industry, trade and agriculture in 1951 West Bengal has yielded place to several states, the other states in the eastern region—Bihar, Orissa and Assam—have remained at the bottom of the rung in economic development. Clearly, the resources in industrial raw materials and foreign exchange extracted from this region have benefited not this region but the other regions.

The author gives details of the moves made by the non-Congress parties from the time of the First General Election to pool their votes against the Congress. The crucial election was the one in 1967. In every election since 1952 the Congress had increased its strength in the Assembly; so had the Communists, but at a much lower level. For the first time the Congress failed to get a majority in 1967, and Atulya Ghosh, the WBPCC President, announced that his party would not form a Government.

Ajoy Mukherjee had fallen with Atulya Ghosh in 1966 and formed the Bangla Congress. The Communists had split in 1964 when the CPI(M) came into existence. Ranged against the Congress were two fronts, one including the Bangla Congress and the CPI and the other led by the CPI (M). Promptly after Atulya Ghosh's announcement (a fact not mentioned by Dr. Ghosh), these two fronts coalesced, produced a majority and formed a government with Ajoy Mukherjee as Chief Minister. This Government was dismissed in November that year and a government of some defectors from the United Front was formed. The Congress backed it. It went out of office in February 1948. In the mid-term election in 1969, the two fronts of 1967 fought as one front and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Congress. Ajoy Mukherjee again became Chief Minister but he resigned in March 1970, and the Centre imposed President's rule. After the 1971 election, Ajoy Mukherjee joined hands with the Congress and formed a government which soon disintegrated because of internal quarrels. The state went under President's rule for the third time. In the 1972 election, which created electoral history of a dangerous sort in the country the parties ranged against the Congress, including the CPI(M), were reduced to tiny groups. Siddhartha Shankar Ray became Chief Minister and ran the State till the 1977 election.

The decade 1967-77 was an extremely trying period for West Bengal. From the moment of assumption of charge as Chief Minister of the first United front Government, Ajoy Mukherjee was in league with the Prime Minister to bring his own government down. In October 1967 he had, with the assistance of the Governor, Dharma Vira, finalised a scheme to dissolve the United Front Government and form a new government with the backing of the Congress. He backed out at the last moment, and his government was dismissed. In 1969, again after consulting the Prime Minister, Mukherjee began a satyagraha in a public park against his own government which

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he called "barbarous." The author makes the astounding statement that "in spite of concerted attempts by...the Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi herself, the deadlock (in the United Front Government) could not be resolved." The then Prime Minister did exactly the opposite.

In 1971, the CPI(M) with a few tiny groups still allied with it might have won a majority in the Assembly—it needed only 18 more seats than it got—had Hemanta Basu of the Forward Bloc, a highly respected leader, not been murdered in broad daylight in a congested Calcutta street twenty days before the election. The Congress, backed by the CPI, launched a big campaign blaming the CPI(M) for the murder. The CPI(M) lost a number of seats in the Greater Calcutta area. But who killed Basu? Even the court judgement in the case has not left the police beyond surpicion. No real investigation was ever made of the murder. There must have been a good reason for this neglect by the police.

The 1972 election stands in an entirely different and highly dangerous category. Immediately after it, even a section of Congressmen charged the government under President's rule with rigging the election. The author refers to allegations about rigging but suggests that the results reflected the political opinion of the people at the time. The strength of the CPI(M) was slashed from 111 in a House of 280 to just 14. Its few allies were also made to suffer badly. On the other hand, the strength of the Congress was pushed up from 105 to 216 and of its the then ally, the CPI, from 13 to 35. The Congress did not have its own government either at the Centre or in the states at the time of the Assembly election in 1971, and lost heavily. The CPI(M), the leader of the Left Front, alone had a comfortable majority in the Assembly.

The period 1967-76 saw frequent clashes between different parties, also between the partners of the United Front. The Naxalite movement burst into the state's political stage in the late sixties. No party was above violence. The worst phase was from 1969 to the announcement of the 1977 election. The author refers to these sad happenings in which many lives were lost, but does not even attempt to assess the role played by the guardians of law and order, Central and State, uniformed and in mufti. The murder of Hemanta Basu has escaped her notice altogether. She has also not taken note of the murders of many political activists in jail by those who held charge of them. She has also ignored the fact that thousands of political workers opposed to the Congress had to live as fugitives from armed gangsters backed by the guardians of law and order—Central and State.

After 1967, the most peaceful time in West Bengal was when either the Janata or the Lok Dal-Congress(U) coalition was in power at the Centre and the Leftists in the state—from the election in 1977 to that in 1980. Violence returned to the State after Mrs Gandhi returned to power at the Centre in 1980. One of her Ministers even declared that the Left Front

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Government would be drowned in the Bay of Bengal. Dr Ghosh revised her thesis in 1981. One expected that she would analyse the significance of these facts, but she has not.

I have sought to make some critical points not to detract from the value of the book but in the hope that Dr Ghosh would do some more research, and when the time comes for another edition of the book or when she attempts another major work on West Bengal, she would tell her readers in precise details what happened on the law or order front in the state during the period and why. The more the relevant issues are discussed the better not only for West Bengal but for the entire country.

One last word, I wish the proof reader had done his job better, and the author had, particularly in the Introduction and the chapter on "sociology of political change", kept the general run of readers in mind and used a language that would have been easier for them to follow.

Calcutta. RANAJIT ROY

BALRAJ PURI : Jammu and Kashmir : Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi 1981, x, 280 p., Rs. 90

THE title, under review, deals with a most sensitive chapter in the history of Indian federalism. Kashmir, the northern most state in the Indian Federation, separated from the plains by the Pir Panchal Range and bounded on its exterior frontiers by the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and China, with whom India has a disputed relation, constitutes a sensitive border region over which political leaders and thinkers in the country alike, have been ever vigilant.

The book represents an expert treatise on the experiments with federation in one of our most sensitive border regions, Kashmir as well as Jammu. Authored by one who had been in the whirlpool of affairs, the study deals with the intricacies of accession of a state whose nerve-centre has been sensitised with the reverberation of Islamic revivalism of its next door neighbour, Pakistan. The primary focus of the book rests on the trials and errors of the federalisation principle in India and the policy of its constitution-makers with reference to communal integration in the state.

The study however, attempts at portraying the personal ambitions, class interests, ideological factions, inter-regional and inter-communal relations at a national and sub-continental level with little interest on an in depth study of the local sentiments in the state. In its course, the author attempts at answering the following queries : Why had the Muslim leadership of Kashmir to opt for India at the time of the partition of the country

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when the Hindu Maharaja was reluctant to do so ? Why did the majority of Muslims of Jammu not join the anti-monarchy movement led by Sheikh Abdullah ? To what extent was the formation of the National Conference in 1938 a logical culmination or reversal of the factions that aroused Muslim consciousness in 1931 ? How far was the alienation of Kashmiri Muslims from the national sentiments in 1953 logically consistent with their mood in 1947 when they appeared to have favoured accession to the Indian Union ? What were the factors that further strained emotional, political and ideological affinity of the Kashmiri Muslims with the national identity in 1965, the lowest ebb it ever reached and caused, what might be called, a process of de-federalisation in Kashmir—its isolation from the rest of the nation ? What were the factors that reversed the process leading to re-integration of Kashmir with national life, termination of the plebiscite movement and what is called the Kashmir Accord of 1975 Finally, What are the prospects ahead ? (p. vi)

In his attempt at a narrative study of the working of the Indian federalisation in the state since 1947, the author provides a fairly exhaustive account of the background of political revivalism in the state. He correctly traces, though in short form, the origins of federalisation in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The interactions between the British and local rulers contributed much towards laying the plinth of modern Kashmiri consciousness in the state and brought to light the problems of communal integration with national identity. The interplay of personal conflicts in the state and the latter's attitude and compulsions of accession to the Indian Union are adequately dealt with. The author supports his views with a well-found-out opinion survey in the state based on class and party divisions.

The author raises the factor of Muslim consciousness and traces the causes of the isolation of Kashmiris from the rest of the nation. The issue of plebiscite, unilaterally committed to by the Centre, to determine the future of the state caused uncertainty in political conditions, and combined with a religious appeal from Pakistan, intensified communal sentiments and prompted alienation from the Indian Union. The issue of "self-determination" for Kashmir no more remained an internal matter but flashed upon international public opinion, calling for intervention from the United Nations. The Sheikh's emotional rift with the Indian Prime Minister (inspite of the former's political nourishment from the Centre) and his soft-pedalling towards Pakistan lent leash to the latter's zeal for Islamic brotherhood in the state. Kashmir became a bone of contention between India and Pakistan and because of its sensitive geographical position, the matter became one of serious concern for India's territorial integrity. The author also points to the Praja Parishad agitation that precipitated regional distinction between Jammu-Kashmir-Ladakh threatening solidarity in the area According to the author, the religious appeal from Pakistan was an important factor in alienating Muslims from Indian

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nationalism. Other factors enumerated by him are, encouragement to secessionism given by foreign powers (the factor has not been dealt in great details), discontentment against the ruling party, uncertainty about the future of the state on account of commitment to plebiscite by the Government of India, threats to the identity of the state by merger slogans of the Praja Parishad agitation, suspicions regarding the "designs" of the Central Government to change the communal composition of the state by settlement of Hindu refugees from Pakistan in the state, and lastiy, lack of rapport between the Indian Army and the Central Policc on the one hand, and people of Kashmir on the other. (pp. 133-134)

In the succeeding chapters, the author traces the causes leading to the re-integration of the state with the Indian Union and the experimentation with the principles of Indian Federation. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which provides for a special status for Kashmir within the Indian Federation, has been discussed at length along with the effects that ensued regarding the application of the constitutional provisions in the Valley. Sheikh Abdullah's "wayward" attitude and his consequent detention, the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and Pakistan's futile attempt at "liberating" Kashmir have all been listed in a journalistic tenor. According to the author, the "Indo-Pak War decisively established India's armed superioity over Pakistan and exposed the latter's utter incapacity to "liberate" Kashmir from India. Pakistan's military and diplomatic reverses, reluctance of the people of Kashmir to translate their anti-India sentiments into pro-Pakistan sentiments and their non-cooperarion with Pakistani infiltrators and a firm Kashmir policy of India, without ambivalence, struck a serious blow to the secessionists in the state, (p. 162) and paved the way for the re-alignment of the state to the Indian federalism principle. The emergence of Bangladesh caused disilusionment with the political system in Pakistan and pushed Kashmir closer towards the Indian Union. These were followed by a series of internal repercussions whieh ultimately led to the withdrawal of plebiscite and the signing of the Kashmir Accord between the Indian Prime Minister and Sheikh Abdullah. In fact, resurgence of regional patriotism was another factor which played a part against the appeal of Muslim solidarity. According to the author, of course, the more important factors that called for the success of the Accord were the "common ideological commitments and personal equations" between the national and Kashmiri leaders, namely, Sheikh Abdullah ; "even at the height of his anti-India tirade Sheikh Abdullah had not allowed his ideological umbilical cord to be cut off from India." (p. 171) Further, as Balraj Puri rightly asserts, "Indian democracy and federation had better potentialities of accommodating Kashmiri aspirations for which there was less room in the theory and practice of Pakistan....The military adventures of Pakistan in Kashmir in 1947 and 1965 as also the Indo-Pak War of 1971 not only successfully reduced its capacity to annex the state by force and thus disillusioned its supporters in the State, but also gradually exploded

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the fence on which some of the Kashmiri leaders were sitting." (p. 171)

The success of the Indian federalisation process in Kashmir was thus prompted by circumstances, by econamic interests and the practical conditions prevailing in the state. In his concluding chapter, Puri discusses the effects of the Accord on state politics and asserts that it has been an "outstanding triumph for Indian federation as it aspired to make Kashmir a willing part of India." (p. 192). In 1977, Sheikh Abdullah won the elections to the State Assembly, which in effect "demonstrated the vitality of Indian democracy and federalism in accomodating rather intense sentiments of Kashmiri regionalism and Muslim consciousness which so far used to be channelized into seccessionist outlets." (p. 190) Hence the course of Indian federalism in the state, which started in 1947 and moved through many ups and down, completed its full circle with the State Assembly elections in 1977 "when secessionist movements in the state lost all incentive and *raison d'etre*." (p. 191) Finally, the author rounds up by bringing into reckoning the realities of the situation—of the factors (ethnic, regional, religious and otherwise) that tend to pull in the opposite directions—factors against which no state in the federation is ever immune.

The book on the whole, is a reflective study together with a personal memoir. The writings of the author represent a journalistic fervour with little or no attempt at theoretical analysis. The author further restriets himself from making any predictions or concrete suggestions for the future. Nevertheless, it is an interesting study of one of the dlfficult areas of the Indian federalising process and is delicately dealt with. The book also contains useful appendices, and with the relevant source materials and bibliography, it no doubt provides a firm platform for future research workers to start on.

University of Calcutta, Calcutta.

ANJALI GHOSH

Social Perspectives

T.K. OOMMEN : Social Transformation in Rural India : Mobilization and State Intervention. Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1984 xx, 326 p., Rs. 125.

THIS volume contains a collection of fifteen research papers written by the author between 1965 and 1980. Twelve of them have already been published, while three are published for the first time. The fifteen essays are grouped into three broad sections: (i) "The Unit of Analysis and Techniques of Research," dealing with methodological issues in social research; (ii) "The State and the Rural Poor," mainly discussing the role of the state in bringing about socio-economic change among the

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rural poor; and (iii) "Agrarian Organisations and Movements," dealing with the themes of social mobilization and institution-building for social transformation. As the essays in parts two and three deal with the problem of social transformation of rural India, their contents may be briefly examined.

The four papers in the section "State and the Rural Poor" deal with some of the measures taken by the state for ameliorating the problems of the rural poor and their impact. Even though the state envisaged the participation of the deprived sections in the process of economic development and political activities, and several agencies have been institutionalized for these, their achievements have been negligible due to divergence between the needs and interests of the community and the programmes of the government, dependence of voluntray agencies on governmental support and inadequacy of leadership among the rural poor. In the paper "Green Revolution and the Rural Development: The Issue of Distributive Justice," it is argued that prosperity and pauperization of agricultural labour may take place independent of, or inspite of, the Green Revolution. The crucial factor in the betterment of agricultural labour is their bargaining power, resulting either from their scarcity or their political mobilization. In the paper "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes: A Social Report, 1947-72," the author argues that though measures like reservations in educational institutions and government employm ent have helped these sections, these benefits have been appropriated by the elites among them, furthering the social differentiation among them. At the same time, a large segment of these deprived sectors remain restive, as their aspirations cannot be met. The author advocates political mobilization of the really poor scheduled castes and tribes and channelization of resources to these categories by a bureaucracy committed to the cause of the poor. The paper on "Eradicating Untouchability" argues that instead of a frontal attack on the zealously guarded ritual aspect of untouchability an indirect attack on it through the secular means of education would be more rewarding. The author also thinks that institutions like agrioultural credit cooperatives for Harijans are irrelevant unless they are preceded by passing land to them.

The articles in the section-"Agrarian Organizations and Movements" deal with (1) agrarian legislations and movements as sources of social change; (2) agricultural labour movement in Alleppy; (3) Rural Cooparatives; (4) and the Bhoodan Movement. The author emphasises, that not only agrarian legislations and movements can be independent sources of social change, but there is a certain amount of complementarity among them. The last two papers deal with the now forgotten Bhoodan Movement.

A collection of papers prepared on different occasions, for different purposes, could hardly expect to provide community of approach. There

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is none in the present volume. Probably more useful than the introductory chapter, summarising the subsequent papers, would have been an epilogue reflecting upon the process of social transformation in rural India.

While Oommen's papers give a good descriptive account of different phenomena examined by him, they generally fail to go deeper and touch some of the basic causes. As he has indicated, sociology has passed the stage of ethnography and should be able to explain the phenomena. For example, why India is not able to achieve a transformation in any sphere of its social life? Why there is little change in the agrarian relations in India, even though India has enacted the largest number of agrarian legislations in the world, and produced charismatic movements like Bhoodan? Why radical politicisation of the poor is not taking place in India, as advocated by the author. In the absence of suggestions of answers to any of these basic issues, the study of the fifteen articles does not make any one the wiser.

National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad. K.C. ALEXANDER

Human Rights

H. O. AGARWAL: Implementation of Human Rights Covenants With Special Reference to India. Kitab Mahal, Allahabad, 1983, x, 210 p., Rs. 80.

THE present book is important because of the accession, though with some reservations, to the Human Rights Covenants by India in 1979. The volume sketches the evolution of ideas regarding human rights since the proclamation of the Four Freedoms by President Roosevelt at the height of the Second World War. The Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are looked at, in this context, as the preparatory steps towards the passage of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights along with the Optional Protocol in 1966. Another tortuous decade passed before the final ratification by the minimum number of states to both the Covenants so that the Covenants could come into force. The Optional Protocol and Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have also come into force since, and now at least in principle it is possible for states making a declaration under Article 41 to pursue complaints against each other before the Human Rights Committee though the number of states so willing is still very small. This is also true of the Optional Protocol

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which makes it possible for individuals aggrieved to move the Human Rights Committee. The machinery therefore exists today for international protection of human rights, so that human rights activists can ask their governments to come under the purview of the machinery more fully.

There is also the view, discussed by the author, that no matter whether a particular state is a party to the covenants or not, provisions of these have become part of the customary international law.

The author covers all the above points adequately and the effort is admirably informative; the full texts of the two covenants as appendices make the volume even more useful than otherwise.

The author, Agarwal, is not among those who think of the international instruments as constituting a panacea for human rights. He notes the failure by India to submit the reports it is obliged to to the international machinery on implementation, not to talk of the failure to amend the Constitution and laws to bring those in line with the covenants. In this context, Agarwal also notes that the Judiciary has not allowed this executive failure to come in the way of their pronouncing decisions that would be in harmony with the provisions of the covenants. The author of course rightly does not think that the judicial process is a substitute to the legislative process.

It is also important to add that, apart from those areas noted by the author where the Judiciary has upheld the rights the covenants provide for despite the absence of legislative focus in the Indian statute book, there is a more recent decision in a case in which the Supreme Court upheld a right enshrined in the Covenant on Political Rights, despite specific reservation of India in the course of accession; this is the right for compensation in case of illegal detention.

One does get the impression that there is no consistent thinking in India on the international protection of human rights; take the failure to provide the reports of implementation, or Justice Bhagawati's personal opinion (in the course of his Foreword to this book) on the Optional Protocol, ratification of which is not necessary according to him because non-Indian members of the Human Rights Committee may not "appreciate the socio-economic context in which certain legislative or executive action may be taken, while determining whether it is a violation of any basic Human Rights." This raises the question whether that cannot be said generally to militate against our becoming party to any international codes not simply the Optional Protocol.

The whole philosophy behind international instruments of human rights is that human rights transcend any narrow considerations and that nations are accountable to the international community in this regard. Without being profound, somehow this volume manages to capture that vision.

Secunderabad.

M.V. SASTRI

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INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as librarics, a compact bibliography of such current Indian Publications in the field of Social Sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of the journal, does list publications of importance, usefut for libraries and research workers in the Social Sciences.

ANNUAL REPORT (Election Commission, India, 1983) New Delhi, 1984, 148p. (Paper)

First report presents activities of the Election Commission and highlights election matters of public interest.

BHAGIA, N.M. *Research in Educational Administration : Retrospect and Prospect* (NIEPA Occasional Paper, 3). National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, 1983. (Mimeo)

Review of research trends and developments in the field of educational administration. It points out gaps and areas which so far have been neglceted. This paper emphasises the research needs in the areas of role performance of educational administrators at various levels, profiles of educational administrators, University level administration, non-formal and adult education, private enterprise, management of cc-ocurricular studies, management of examinations, student and teacher associations, management of time and change, training activities and material-development of educational adminstrators.

BHASIN, Prem *How Socialism* ? (Democratic Socialist Alternative Series, 1). Indian Centre for Democratic Socialism, New Delhi, 1984, 12p., Rs. 2.50. (Paper)

BOSE, Pradip *The Role of Socialists in the 80s* (Democratic Socialist Alternative Series, 2). Indian Centre for Democratic Socialism, New Delhi 1984, 22p., Rs. 3.50. (Paper)

CHANDRA, Sudhir *Communal Elements in Late Nineteenth Century Hindi Literature* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 15). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi., 30p. (Mimeo)

On the basis of late nineteenth century Hindi literature, the three writers chosen for this paper are Bharatendu Harish Chandra, Pratap Narain Misra and Radhacharan Goswami. The author examines the ambivalence of the Hindu attitudes towards the Muslims.

CHANDRA, Sudhir *Literature and the Colonial Connection* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 5). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 78p., (Mimeo).

Examines the complexities of colonial consciousness as revealed in the Indian responses to British rule during the later nineteenth century through an analysis of contemporary literature of Hindi litterateurs. Bharatendu Harish Chandra, Chaudhari Pandit Badari Narayan Upadhyaya 'Premghan', Radharcharan Goswami, Pratap Narain Misra and Balkrishna Bhatt are the Hindi litterateures, Dalpatram Dahyabhai, Govardhanram Madhavram Tripathi and B.K. Thakore, Gujarati litterateurs whose works have been analysed in this paper.

Democratic Socialism : An Indian Imperative (ICDC Periodic Papers, 1). Indian Centre for Democratic Socialism, New Delhi, 1981, 15p., Re. 1. (Paper)

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Discusses basic principles, distinctive attributes and policy implication of democratic socialism.

INDIA, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS TRAINING DIVISION. *Five Year Plans and District Planning* (Training Monograph, 1-84). New Delhi, 1984, iii, 50p. (Paper)

A review of administration and implementation of District Development Programmes laid down in the five year plans starting from the First Five Year Plan to the Sixth Plan.

JANTA PARTY. *Manifesto : Elections to the Eighth Lok Sabha, December 1984.* Janta Party, New Delhi, 1984, 18p. (Paper)

JOSHI, Chitra *Bonds of Community, Ties of Religion* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 16). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 62p. (Mimeo).

The essay discusses the socio-cultural milieu in which the Kanpur workers lived, the relative segregation between communities as reflected in the housing patterns, the social attitudes which conditioned relationships between caste and community groups and the peculiarities of the labour market in Kanpur. It also discusses the social-cultural context in which community identities within the working class emerged, their participation in communal riots, the Plague Riots of 1900, the Machhli Bazaar Mosque Riot of 1913 and the riots of 1931, and the impact of the activities of communal organisations on the phenomenon of rioting in general, and the working class in particular.

KAPIL KUMAR *The Use of Ramcharitmanas As A Radical Text : Baba Ram Chandra in Oudh, 1920-50.* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 4). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 38p. (Mimeo)

The paper assesses the use of religious literature - the *Ramchartimanas* of Tulsidas, popularly known as the *Ramayan*—by a peasant leader Baba Ramchandra whose real name was Shridhar Balwant Jodhpurkar, in the Oudh countryside to expose and oppose the British and to highlight the inner contradictions of the Indian society. He used it to characterise the British, Princes, landlords and the leaders of the National Movement ; to describe the condition of the peasants ; to make the peasants aware of their exploitation and of the necessity to organise and assert their rights ; to tell the peasants their duties during the national movement ; and finally, what the achievement of independence meant to the peasants as against the upper strata of society.

NARANG, A.S. *Indian Government and Politics.* Gitanjali, New Delhi, 1985, xvi, 381p., n.p.

Textbook on Indian political systems; it deseeribes the evolving political process in India, the functioning of the system, the larger socio-historical context in which the system operates and the overall achievements and failures. It seeks to provide a perspective, rather than a narrative, of institutional arrangements, constitutional forms and legal debates on the Indian model of democratic development and makes students aware of the distinctive features of the Indian experiment, the contradiction that such an experiment encounters and the problems faced by the polity.

RAY, Jayanta Kumar *Foreign Aid, Domestic Administration and the Rural Poor : A Study of Thailand.* Centre for South and South East Asian Studies, Uuiversity of Calcutta, 1984, 58p. (Mimeo)

Presents an account of the interaction of US aid and Thai domestic administration from the middle of the 1950s to the early 1980s in the context of the rural poor, poverty and regional disparity in Thailand. It is based on source material—unpublished papers of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) previously known as the United States Operations Mission in Thailand.

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RAZA, Moonis and AGGARWAL, Y.P. *Inequities in the Levels of Literacy in India* (NIEPA Occasional Paper,4). National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, 1983, 32p. (Mimeo)

Examines the different aspects of the inequities which have acted as impediments in the path of educational development of the Third World countries in general, and that of India in particular. It also studies issues relating to the identification, measurement and explanation of inequities in the territorial spread of literacy in India with the help of district-wise data on literacy for the year 1981. Further, the study examines the relationship of disparity indices with the levels of literacy as well as with economic base indicators and finds that the economic base of a region exerts a strong impact on the spread of literacy. The process of urbanisation and industrialization also strongly influences the levels as well as the inequities in the distribution of literates.

RAZA, Moonis *et. al. School Accessibility in India : The Regional Dimensions* (NIEPA Occasional Paper, 6). National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, 1984, 29p. (Mimeo)

The paper discusses the inter-regional variations in the population coverage by schools of different levels within the range of distances perceived as walkable. It also computes the weighted mean distances to schools of different levels for the states of the Indian Union and analyses their spatial patterns. This study, based on the data derived from the unpublished records of the Fourth All India Educational Survey, reveals that the areas with inhospitable physical conditions are characterised by poor accessibility to schools. Related data is provided in the Appendices.

REDDY, P. Jaganmohan *A Constitution : What It Is and What It Signifies* (Prof. S. Venkataraman Endowment Lecture.) Andhra University Press, Waltair, 1984, 78p., Rs. 23.

Justice Reddy discusses the spirit, purpose and function of the Constitution and argues that the Constitution is not merely a blueprint of the frame of its governance and polity but should sufficiently secure, nurture and promote human freedoms and human personality.

TILAK, Jandhyala B.G. *Centre-State Relations in Financing Education in India* (NIEPA Occasional Paper, 5). National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, 1984, 35p. (Mimeo).

Presents a historical perspective of centre-state financial relations in India in relation to education. It also discusses the role of the Planning Commission and the Finance Commission in striving for equity, the accepted goal of Indian planning, through their respective processes of allocation of resources for education.

TILAK, Jandhyala B.G. and VARGHESE, N.V. *Resources for Education in India* (NIEPA Occasional Paper, 2). National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, 1983, v, 54p. (Mimeo)

It is a study of finances as one of the major constraints in achieving "universalisation of elementary education" by the year 1990. It is in this context that the study reviews the allocation trends in the past to education in general, and elementary education in particular, and analyses the performance of elementary education in terms of enrolment in different states for the past decades. It further estimates the required (state-wise) growth rates and their financial implications for the present decade, and as a necessary condition to achieve the goal suggests that at least 7 per cent of GNP should be allocated for education—5 per cent from the public exchequer and another 2 per cent from the household sector by 1989-90.

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VERGHESE, N.V. *Education, Technology and Development : A Perspective* (NIEPA Occasional Paper, 1). National Institute of Educational Planning and Adminstration New Delhi, 1983, 29p. (Mimeo)

This paper deals with the importance of technology in the development process and the contribution that education can make towards this end. It argues against the import of technology, which is one of the important instruments of domination. In this connection the paper suggests setting up of a national agency to coordinate and recommend the judicious import of technology and to provide guidelines for developing indigenous technology based on the social needs and national goals.

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INDIRA GANDHI

By

S C PARASHER*

INDIRA GANDHI was a child of Indian revolution. She was born in the wake of non-violent revolution led by Mahatma Gandhi and died a martyr to a violent counter-revolution engineered by religious fanaticism. She was drawn into the national struggle when she was barely three since both her illustrious parents were in the forefront of it. Anand Bhavan reverberated with "Inqlab Zindabad" in those days and jail had become the second home of the Nehrus. She herself was imprisoned in the 1942 movement. After independence, when Nehru became the Prime Minister, Indira was the hostess of the Prime Minister's household. She was privy to important decisions as President of the Indian National Congress in 1959. She became Prime Minister in January 1966 and remained so till her death in October 1984 except for 1977-January-1980. Her father was the founding member of the Non-aligned movement; she became its Chairperson in 1983. She indeed, became a legendary figure both in India and abroad in her life time.

She had the temperament of an artist. Her aesthetic sense and perception sought a world of harmony, colour, sensibility and proportion. There was no scope in it of ugliness, hate, intolerence, injustice, violence or insincerity.

She steered India through a momentous period in its history. After Nehru, who? was a favourite pastime of western political pundits in the early sixties. She provided the effective answer and during her stewardship India became a factor in international politics. When she took over, the country suffered from drought, famine and low foreign exchange reserves. India had to import food and with it came pressures, hidden and not-so-hidden, on our internal and external policies. At the time of her death, India had built up its external balances, became self-sufficient in food grains and regained its position in international forums. There could be no better tribute to her statesmanship.

She was the Northern Star of Indian politics. Those who followed her as well as those who opposed her plotted their pasitions with reference to her. And once she was removed from the political scene, her opponents were literally at sea and did not know how to chart their course. It is a measure of her greatness that her bitterest opponents were the most baffled after her death. Without that magnifying glass they revealed themselves as Liliputians as many of them really were.

She was a colossus, a unique colossus who in personal life was gracious, charming, human, almost shy. In public life she was granite not easily

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moved from what she considered was right and her duty. She was, at the same time, accessible to people and gave them the feeling that when everything had failed Indira was there to listen to them. She was the last court of appeal for them. She remained the undisputed leader of the masses whose politics was a loaf of bread, a small roof over their head and some security for them and their children. She articlated the felt need of common humanity for peace and well-being. Their welfare was her first concern and they returned her confidence in full measure. They knew that she cared for them and cared deeply. They gave her strength as they derived their strength from her. She possessed an alchemist touch to make the common person feel uncommon.

Her empathy with people was amazing. It went beyond the Indian frontiers and encompassed the entire humanity. The great leaps of science paled before the upsurge of people all over the world. "Our age has been called the Space Age," she told the UN General Assembly; "but I would call it the Age of the people. . . .For the first time now, 'we the people' does not mean a few representing the many, but the masses themselves each of whom is seeking to assert his rights and to voice his demands." She was, however, equally aware that a wide chasm separated the common man's dream and international reality. The colonial nations had relinquished their political hold over the colonies but they held them fast all the same by clever manipulation of terms of trade and international financial arrangements. The poor nations still ministered to their needs and attended to their welfare. "Empires have ended," Mrs. Gandhi said at the UN General Assembly, "but the colonial pattern of economy remains with us in one form or another."

The New International Economic Order is not a day-dream or wishful thinking or mere rhetoric of the under-developed; it is a necessary condition for their survival and world peace. She urged "the strong to dismantle the economic walls which they have built to defend themselves from the weak. In so doing they will be fortifying the defences of peace before it is too late." In 1983 at Belgrade, she described developing countries as the "step children of Industrial Revolution." These countries, generate 20 per cent of the world's output, absorb 30 per cent of the total exports of developed countries, then "why should they be denied their rightful share in decision-making ?", she asked. North has not yet made any imaginative response to it and continues to hedge on this issue. It leaves the door open for super powers to exploit the simmering discontent and in possible repercussions push the world into a nuclear holocaust.

It is true that peace is essential for development but it is equally true that without third world development peace will elude the North as well. Mrs. Gandhi considered it her duty in the interest of the human race to bring this sobering realization to the fire-eaters of the North. They should understand that the world like the nation cannot remain half slave and half free. She bemoaned that, "Nations continue to place narrow national ends

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above the larger purpose of peace and universal security." She told the U N General Assembly. "We yearn for peace. . . because without peace there can be no improvement in the lives of the vast majority of the world's people."

She, therefore, worked ceaselessly for just economic relations between the nations and disarmament. The nuclear danger is not limited to the battlefield or the warring countries. It extends to the entire globe. It will usher in a 'nuclear winter' which will freeze human life all over our planet. "The nuclear stock piles," she told the Seventh Non-aligned Summit, "can kill human life, indeed all life many times over and will prevent its appearance for ages to come." Not heeding the warnings of their own scientists, powerful nations were extending areas of their strategic groupings, military blocs and alliances, "That is why," she appealed to the Heads of State and Government, "Our responses must be surer, swifter and sharper." The nuclear-stuck nations did not listen to her or to other counsels of restraint in international relations. They are so frozen in their attitudes that they may soon freeze the entire life on earth. There will be no winners then, only the vanquished buried in an avalanche of nuclear ice. And no Judgement Day either. The dead shall never rise from such a deadly sepulchre of humanity. Deathly science would have completely annihilated even the life promising scripture. She warned of "the total extinction of human race, its memories, its achievements and its prospects." It was too grim a prospect for mankind. "The time has come," she said, "when the world's meek and disinherited are no less concerned and must be heard."

She had nothing but contempt for trimmers and factious confederacies in politics. Having seen what they had done to the party in the later years of her father's life, she decided not to suffer from the slings and arrows of such outrageous people. She hated ingratitude in whatever shape or form it existed and never excused those who showed it. Her critics often magnified it and portrayed it as her failing. The fact is that real mettle comes out in a crisis when one faces heavy odds. Those who scurry to leave a ship they think is sinking have no place in it when chance winds bring it safely to some sunny shores. Flexibility in certain circumstances is wisdom but bending oneself for immediate political gains is no virtue. One cannot blame Mrs. Gandhi if she distanced herself from such persons at home or abroad.

Indira Gandhi embodied the Indian spirit of courage and sacrifice and the womanly values of tolerance, fortitude, compassion and true humility. She was a woman of utter determination and fearlessness. She was undaunted by adverse circumstances and never gave into bluster or threat. She was a rare combination of Durga and Indian womanhood. She was moved by misery and would do anything to help people in distress. She appealed to the world courts about the plight of East Bengal in 1971. The great champions of human rights shut their eyes to the atrocities heaped on it. Instead of applauding what she was doing for the unfortunate people there, the Seventh Fleet menacingly sailed towards the Indian Ocean. Her

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espousal of the cause of the dispossessed also irritated the neo-colonialists. Her bold initiatives in international affairs did not endear her to the powers which wish to reduce the developing nations to docile camp followers in their selfish moves on the international chess board.

Her independent foreign policy and strong stand in favour of New World Order to redress the imbalances of the old deeply disturbed the beneficiaries of the old order. An India divided in the name of religion in 1947 provided fresh temptation for them to stir troubled waters and then fish in it. Religion was the ostensible basis of Pakistan and despite Bangladesh remains its only sheet anchor. Secular India is anathema to the neo-colonialists who can count on their obliging proteges to locate persons willing to play the old game. Operation Blue Star was for her a painful decision. She was well aware of the consequences that it may entail in the circumstances. But for her, nation was above self. A week before her tragic death at the hands of her assassins she said in a public meeting at Lucknow. "Even if Indira Gandhi dies, her blood would spring up from the earth and thousands of Indiras will emerge to serve the people of the country." She stood for certain values and principles which were indestructible. "I say so," she added, "because Indira Gandhi is not the name of a mere woman but a philosophy which is wedded to the service of the masses."

Again, a week before the fatal shots that rang round the world, she said at Lucknow that certain forces were bent upon eliminating her. Her appeal, "Shed hatred, do not shed blood" to her countrymen was beyond the perverted vision of her assassins At Belgrade in 1983, she had warned the nations that "today's arms can deny us our tomorrows." Alas ! the arms which were meant to protect her, denied those tomorrows to her. She seemed to have a premonition of what was to happen. "Every drop of my blood," she said at Orissa the previous day, "will contribute to the growth of the nation and make it strong and dynamic." Indira on that fateful day merged in India. The last drop of this great martyr's blood was shed far the country. She lived for India, she died for it.

And as time recedes, she will shine brighter in the Indian firmament and illumine the path of future generations with her example and enjoin them to eschew hatred and strengthen the forces of sanity and national integration at home and enduring peace abroad.

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SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION*

I welcome you and have pleasure in inaugurating this meeting of South Asian Foreign Ministers.. At a political level this is an important step in the development of mutual relations in our region.

We seven who are gathered here are close geographical neighbours. The same monsoon governs our lives. We share experiences, aspirations, challenges. Our region is the cradle of one of the earliest human civilisations. In more recent centuries we have suffered from the political and economic consequences of colonialism. The very process of liberating our peoples from external rule has renewed awareness of one another's needs and potentialities. Today, our major task is to overcome economic backwardness. As members of the Non-Aligned Movement, we seek peace with development among ourselves and in the world as a whole.

Although there are similarities, we are different. Each country has its individual personality, distinctive perception and a different political system. Subscribing to non-alignment, we respect the right of every country to choose and follow its own form of government without interference from others. At the same time we recognise the duty to resolve whatever differences there might be through dicussion and in a spirit of goodwill.

India is big in size and that means that the proportion of our problems and difficulties is also gigantic. We don't want to take on more problems. Our policy is not to interfere in the affairs of others. But ours is a troubled region. Most of our countries are multi-racial and multi-religious. It would be idle to pretend that we are not affected by what happenes elsewhere. Even as we meet there are disturbing and tragic developments in our neighbourhood.

We have always believed in cooperation and as world events unfold we find that cooperation in solving problems is becoming more necessary and vital to each of us and, I believe, to our region.

The world can survive and progress only with a strong sense of the unity of humankind and tolerance of the right to political diversity. Within this framework, we seven must conduct our affairs so as to eliminate tension and promote greater peace and stability in the region. The regional grouping that brings us together is not aimed against anyone else. Nor are we moved by any ideological or military considerations. Our cooperation in no way limits each country's freedom of judgement. It is allied solely to development and to the strengthening of the economies of our individual countries. Our hope is to work together and to share our experiences in agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, health technology, culture, art and sport.

* Inaugural Address by Mrs. Indira Gandhi at the South Asian Regional Cooperation Meeting of Foreign Ministers at New Delhi, 1 August 1983.

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The past has shown how brittle is the cooperation which is based on narrowness of any kind. Beyond the tangible cooperation to which I have referred earlier is a desirable wider framework of a people to people relationship. Even if we proceed step by small step, the only lasting cooperation is that which involves all sections of the people and gives them a sense of participation.

In our effort to build a better future for our peoples, we face very similar problems and obstacles. We are all bedevilled by shortages of production and employment, undernutrition and a too rapid growth of population. Yet there are natural and human resources waiting to be developed and utilised to their fullest potential. There are complementarities between our economies. With better planning and greater exchange of information we could make the optimum use of our capacities.

Confrontation is dangerous and unprofitable. All the historical, technological and economic forces and factors at work in the world demand cooperation. The threat of nuclear war must be averted. Its consequences are too horrendous to contemplate. We have always spoken out against violence and destruction--these must be cu rbed. Simultaneously, the world must do something to shake free from the grip of the economic crisis which hurts all countries, rich and poor, big and small. But the worst sufferers as each of us knows, are the developing countries. The recent conference of Non-Aligned Countries here in this city made some constructive suggestions. We are trying to make the industrialised countries recognise the reasonableness of our proposals and the moderation with which we have expressed ourselves.

The more recently concluded session of UNCTAD in Belgrade was an opportunity for some concrete, if not bold and imaginative, steps to initiate the process of restructuring international economic relations and to start an earnest North-South dialogue. The opportunity was allowed to slip by. Some statements have been made recognising the inter-relationship between growth in developing countries and economic revival in the advanced. Alas, there is still no sign of this sentiment being translated into positive action.

We do not look for magic deliverance. The only sure road to prosperity is to mobilise our people for work. Enduring solutions call for the strengthening of our own economies towards self-reliance. This does not preclude international cooperation. The two are mutually supportive. Hence, along with a North-South dialogue, we urge greater cooperation among developing countries. South-South cooperation is an integral part of the New International Economic Order that we envisage. The Non-Aligned Summit suggested that we draw up a comprehensive blueprint for cooperation and collective self-reliance among developing countries, taking into account their needs and resources, their exigencies and capabilities.

Experience in other parts of the world has shown that sub-regional and regional cooperation is an important factor in bringing about

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economic and social progress. The countries of South Asia have been rather slow in realising this. I am glad that we are making a beginning. We had our political differences in the past or have even now, but economic cooperation will give a strong impetus to closer friendship and greater stability in South Asia. I hope that this meeting of ministers will push forward the programme. In this forum, we should avoid bilateral differences and aim at concentrating on what unites us and helps us in our common quest of peace and development. We are all equals. We are against exploitation and domination. We want to be friends with all on footing of equality. We should be ever vigilant against attempts of external powers to influence our functioning.

There are many regional organisations, some fully developed, some still at a tentative stage. Even fully developed groupings like the European Economic Community have not been able to sort out their problems by the mere fact of a common regional personability. Let us not be disheartened if we have some difficulties and differences to contend with. We are at the beginning of what promises to be a useful journey.

As regional cooperation progresses, new tasks will unfold themselves, bringing in new problems. Let us not be daunted. Our very cooperation will increase our capacity to withstand pressures. With unity we can hope to move ahead to a future of freedom, peace and prosperity.

I have pleasure in declaring this meeting open. I give you my good wishes for yourselves, for your countries and for your work here in this meeting.

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REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY : COALESCENCE AND CLASH IN INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

By K.P. MISRA*

I

The post Second World War years witnessed a series of concurrent revolutions which included :

1 developments in the field of science and technology heralded by the advent of nuclear weapons and unprecedented innovations in the fields of transport and communication ;

2 horizontal and vertical extension of international relations resulting in the rise of nearly a hundred new nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the one hand, and an increase in the multiplicity of international concerns in the lives of nations and peoples, on the other ;

3 opportunity for continuous multilateral diplomacy with the establishment of the United Nations.

This enumeration is by no means exhaustive or fully self-explanatory. These changes are also not exclusive categories ; they influence, interact and even overlap, each other.

These metamorphoses have had a variety of implications in international relations during the last four decades. The most significant among them was the rise of superpowerism *which meant that the two Super-Powers had become so strong as to be able to dominate over and dictate to the countries of the world. This situation also enabled them to try to assume and discharge global interests and global responsibilities with a fair degree of success, if they so wished.*

Questions relating to peace and security of any region have rarely been autonomous at any point of time in recent history. But the scope of this autonomy has been substantially attenuated by superpowerism. *The kind of internationalisation of issues relating to regional peace and security, which we have been witnessing in recent years, is indeed unprecedented. The situation worsens when the tensions between the Super Powers become acute.*

In South Asia, the relations between the two principal powers—India and Pakistan—could not escape, and in fact have not escaped, the consequences of this trend. To the already existing American-Soviet rivalry were added the ambitions of the People's Republic of China which is highly relevant for the region. The triangular interaction between America, the Soviet Union

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and China has played an important role in conditions of war as also peace between India and Pakistan.

Ever since they became independent states in 1947, India and Pakistan have been involved in serious differences leading sometimes to open warfare. The three armed conflicts in 1947, 1965 and 1971 were interspersed by cold war diplomacy. The graph of the relations within cold war periods has been, of course, zigzagging indicating the ups and downs in the levels of tension between the two neighbours.

II

THE divergences between India and Pakistan are of a fundamental and multiple nature and they have outstripped whatever convergences they have. Let us have a bird's eye view of the situation. Firstly, the foundations of the two states are not only distinct but different ; Pakistan is founded upon the two-nation ideology, holding that Hindus and Muslims are separate nations. Though the leaders of the Indian National Congress agreed to the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, the state in India is based on secular ideals which is antithetical to the other view. This basic fact had serious implications, the most crucial of them being the status of millions of Muslims living in India. The establishment of states on the basis of religion has been rejected by the modern state-system. The ideology is thus not only obsolete but would play havoc if concretised in other parts of the world.

Secondly, Pakistan has almost always, since its inception, been an authoritarian political system. India, on the other hand, has been a functioning democracy. Pakistani rulers have been mostly military dictators (Ayub, Yahya and Zia-ul-Haq) though sometimes even civilians have headed the system with no democratic values and institutions. Threatened from within, and sometimes even without, these rulers have never represented the hopes and aspirations of the people of Pakistan. They have paraded their interests as the national interest. It is significant to remember that the two armed clashes, 1965 and 1971, took place when there was military dictatorship in Pakistan. The army is central to the politics of Pakistan, in fact its internal and external policies cannot be understood without knowing about the army's role. India stands out as a shining example of democracy. Contrary to the prognostications, its democratic system has survived all the stresses and strains, including the passing away of Jawaharlal Nehru and the assassination of Indira Gandhi. The primacy of civil authority over the armed forces has never been questioned in India. Briefly, a comparative study of the political systems of the two countries would indicate that to a large extent their foreign policy perspectives were shaped by their rulers. A representative and responsive government in Pakistan would have evolved an enlightened foreign policy which

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would have served the national interest (as against the interest of rulers) by maintaining the unity and independence of its polity and in developing friendly relations with its neighbours and others.

Thirdly, India has been treated as the most decisive factor by the Pakistani ruling elite in shaping their foreign policy and relations. On the other hand, the ambit of India's foreign policy has been much wider than that of Pakistan. A distinguished Pakistani writer has said :

> Robert Schuman, former Prime Minister of France, once observed that since 1871 the foreign policy of his country had been continuously dominated by one main preoccupation, that of ensuring its security and independence from its neighbour, Germany. Unfortunately, the foreign policy of Pakistan has in a similar manner been dominated by considerations of security and independence from its neighbour, India.[1]

Pakistan may explain this somewhat misplaced obsession about India in terms of its smaller size and inferior military strength. There has also been unfounded propaganda by the rulers of Pakistan that India has not accepted the fact of the partition and that India would like to undo it, if possible. These allegations have been denied by India many times. In fact all its responsible leaders have repeatedly said that a united, strong Pakistan is in the best interests of both countries.

Closely linked with this is the fourth point. After the initial phase, Pakistan's leaders decided to become partners of the Western world in the Cold War politics as well as military alliances. Contrary to this, India had right from the beginning chosen to follow the policy of non-alignment. On account of this, Pakistan demanded and secured from the West a large quantity of arms which the latter gave liberally in order to "contain Communism." But history is witness to the fact that this enhanced military strength emboldened the authoritarian rulers of Pakistan to pick up armed conflicts with India. The arms supplied to Pakistan, it should be remembered, have never been used for the purpose for which they were supposed to have been given. They have been used against India and India alone.

The fifth point is also related to the above two. Pakistan has sought and secured involvement of foreign powers in the sub-continent while India has attempted to minimise any such influence. Since Pakistan wanted to alter the *status quo* in Kashmir, augmentation of its military power was necessary, because India's was a superior and larger military strength. Pakistan's policy resulted in the United States and, to a lesser extent, Chinese involvement in the affairs of the sub-continent[2]. When Pakistan tried to secure the military assistance of Communist China along with the western help "to fight Communism," it dismayed many people. Galbraith wrote thus : "History can be idiotic. A staunch American ally against Commu-

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nism (Pakistan) is negotiating with the Chinese Communists to the discontent of an erstwhile neutral (India). I hope that John Foster Dulles, from wherever he is, is being required to watch these developments."[3]

Finally, Pakistan's quest for identity led the newly born state to seek and follow the above policies India had no such problems. Pakistani leaders had practically no experience of international affairs since the Muslim League had no such orientation. Its leaders were afraid of India. On the pretext of establising an identity, dictatorial rulers of Pakistan silenced domestic opposition and sought external aid to strengthen their rule, many a time in utter disregard of the country's own interests. In fact the break up of Pakistan in 1971 was a major consequence of this policy. India has not been without problems, but its difficulties have been of a different kind and have been manageable so far.

III

It may be a matter of debate whether the Kashmir issue is a cause or a symptom of Indo-Pakistani differences, but it is a fact that the subject has been almost continuously discussed in and outside the United Nations. There is hardly any forum in which Pakistan and India have not clashed over this issue. If the events of 1947-48 are briefly recalled, Kashmir acceded *de facto* as well as *de jure* to India. However, Since Muslims formed the majority in Kashmir, it was claimed that it legitimately belonged to Pakistan, and raiders were sent across the border. This resulted in an armed conflict between the two countries.

India lodged a complaint with the United Nations. After months of acrimonious debate a commission was appointed by the Security Council. It passed a three-part resolution ; part one provided for a ceasefire ; the second called for a truce agreement under which Pakistan was to accept an unconditional obligation to withdraw its troops, nationals and tribesmen from Kashmir. The necessity to keep some Indian troops to maintain law and order was recognised. The last part laid down that after the first two parts of the resolution had been implemented, steps would be taken to ascertain the will of the people in Kashmir about its future political set-up.

Without going into the details of the complicated story of Kashmir thereafter, and without being guilty of over-simplification, it may be said that part two of the Security Council Resolution was never implemented by Pakistan. There was, therefore, no question of ascertaining the will of the people of Kashmir.

After this initial phase, the Kashmir issue has been a subject of discussion on numerous occasions. Some positive thinking was attempted at Tashkent in 1965 and at Simla in 1972. The Simla Agreement is perhaps the most positive and constructive document in attempting to evolve peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries. In a sense the

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agreement provides for a durable way out of the Kashmir problem. Its Article 14 (ii) says :

> In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

Ruling out the use of force for settling the Kashmir issue is indeed a great gain for peaceful evolution of relations between the two countries.

After more than three and a half decades of acrimony there seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel in so far as the Kashmir issue is concerned. The military solution has been tried and has failed. A diplomatic solution has also not been successful. It requires a high degree of sincere and enlightened statesmanship on the part of the rulers of the two countries to take some bold and imaginative steps. Taking the totality of the circumstances into account, the only way out appears to be to transform the ceasefire line into the international frontier between India and Pakistan. In other words, freezing of the *status quo* should be accepted by the parties concerned for the good of the sub-continent. At long last they should realise that enough is enough.

IV

As has been indicated above, the first armed conflict between the two countries took place soon after their formation as independent sovereign states. The Pakistani Army and tribesmen invaded Kashmir in October 1947. To begin with the Government of India did not retaliate, but on 26 October the Maharaja of Kashmir offered to accede to the Indian Union.[4] Only after this did the Indian troops go into action against the invaders. The military operation clearly indicated that India had an edge over Pakistan and in a few days it would have cleared Kashmir of the Pakistani troops and tribesmen. In spite of the advantageous position, India not only took the matter to the United Nations on New Year's Day 1948, but subsequently also agreed to a cease fire on 31 December 1948. Some people are even today, as they were then, critical of the Government of India and its head Jawaharlal Nehru. They rightly think that the entire Pakistani aggression would have been vacated by the advancing Indian troops if asked to do so. If this had been allowed, the so-called Kashmir problem would have been taken care of perhaps for ever. It was the sheer idealism of India's new rulers which impelled them to take the Kashmir question to the United Nations without fully being cognizant of the realities of power.

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Notwithstanding all this, what is important from the point of view of our discussion is that once cease fire was agreed upon, Pakistan obstructed every effort to reach an amicable settlement. The subsequent 16 years have witnessed an uneasy relationship between the two neighbours, a period in which the arms aid by the Western countries, particularly the United States, emboldened the authoritarian rulers of Pakistan to suppress internal dissent and prepare for an armed conflict with India.

The year 1965 saw the culmination of this period of cold war; war broke out between the two neighbours. It would serve no purpose to go into the issue as to who started the war, what was its course and who won it. But it merits mention that even a UN report came to the conclusion that "the series of violations that began on 5 August 1965 were to a considerable extent in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL *from the Pakistani side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side.*" (emphasis added) This makes it evident as to who initiated the conflict which lasted for about a month.

On account of geo-political and geo-strategic reasons the Soviet Union took interest in bringing the armed conflict to an end and, if possible, to help evolve some framework for a durable peace in the sub-continent. A.N. Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister, took the initiative in August itself but had to wait for a few days before the two parties agreed to a cease fire and sit around the negotiating table. The Soviets arranged the meeting between the President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan and India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri at the Central Asian Soviet city Tashkent in early January 1966. It was essentially and formally a bilateral meeting in which the Soviet Prime Minister was around to offer his good offices and give a helping hand, if and when necessary. On 10 January 1966, the well-known Tashkent Declaration was signed by the two leaders of the sub-continent in the presence of the Soviet leaders.

Though there had been no formal declaration of war in the international legal sense, the Pakistani President had said that "we are at war with India." Notwithstanding the formal legal position, there was a complete breakdown of normal relations and communications between India and Pakistan. The Tashkent Declaration was an important, and the first of its kind, document in the conflictual relations between the two countries. It attempted to deal with—

(a) the immediate problems arising out of the war;
(b) the wider issues of Indo-Pakistani relations.

The cease fire had already materialised. The Declaration provided that all armed forces of either side shall be withdrawn to the position they held prior to 5 August 1965. Of some significance was a declaration of principles, saying that the two countries "hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to pro-

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mote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples." On the whole, the Tashkent Declaration did take care of the main problems arising out of the August-Septembar War but in terms of basic issues very little could be done.

The international dimension of the Tashkent Declaration is interesting. It was accomplished apparently on account of the good offices of the Soviet Union but the invisible hand of the United States was also there. China's role was of minor significance. Hence at that time it seemed as if the powers external to the sub continent had discovered a way of limiting their own rivalries so that the overall system was not disturbed by sub-continental conflicts. The two Super Powers agreed to have a similar, though not identical, outlook on problems between India and Pakistan. As time showed this convergence of interest was a transitory phase and Indo-Pakistani relations once again deteriorated. Within a few years, both the Super Powers began taking sides rather than cooperating in evolving a common policy in the sub-continent. It became clear that outside powers could neither solve Indo-Pakistani problems nor impose solutions over them.

After Tashkent, it took sometime to restore a degree of normalcy in the relations between the two countries. While there was a cold war atmosphere between them for 16 years in the first phase, in the second (between the 1965 War and the 1971 conflict), it took not even 6 years to witness another armed clash, but this time larger and deeper in its dimensions.

Apart from a few relatively smaller problems between the two neighbours, this time the reasons for the conflict were the spill-over effects of the domestic flare-up within Pakistan, more specifically between its two wings. A lot has been written on the relationship between them.[5] As Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh, said : "Even 200 years' rule by the colonial British could not exploit the people to such an extent as the unchallenged exploitation of this wing (East Pakistan) of the country during the last 23 years by the vested interests from West Pakistan."[6] The then East Pakistan, 1,200 miles away from West Pakistan, was mercilessly exploited by the latter in all fields—politics, economics, military, culture, and even education. The December 1970 Election demonstrated unambiguously that Mujib's Awami League was the only representative political organization. It had won 167 out of 169 seats allotted to East Bengal in the National Assembly of Pakistan, whose total strength was 313. This massive mandate was disregarded by Yahya Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan.

India got involved in what was apparently a domestic conflict mainly, though not exclusively, on account of the influx of refugees from East Bengal into the eastern parts of India. Their number rose to around 10 million which meant tremendous economic and even politico-security strain on India. The Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister, travelled

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to some of the countries and particularly endeavoured to convince the United States and other Western powers, who were supporting the tyrannical military rulers of Pakistan, to exert pressure on them. But these efforts did not produce any significant results. The liberation movement in East Bengal grew into unmanageable proportions in spite of severe repression by the West Pakistanis. At long last the Indian Army was sent to assist the freedom fighters ; it did not take much time to secure the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces. The United States tried to threaten India by sending the *S S Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal, arguing that its purpose was to evacuate American nationals.[7] India was not cowed down by this. It had concluded the Indo-Soviet Treaty earlier to secure necessary political and, if necessary, other kinds of support against a possible American threat. The American tilt towards Pakistan was now complete though the latter had suffered a grievous blow. Pakistan's defeat was nearly total ; it had been dismembered. India had 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (as against 5,000 Indians in Pakistan) and more than 5,000 square miles of territory *outside Kashmir*. It was not surprising that Yahya Khan was replaced by Z.A. Bhutto.

A few months after the surrender of Pakistani forces, initiatives were taken to normalise the situation. If the 1971 conflict was critical in terms of long range consequences for Indo-Pakistani relations, the subsequent peace initiative, which resulted in the Simla Agreement, was the most important effort to lay down the structure of peace. The conference at Simla was held in June-July 1972 and was attended by the leaders of the two countries—Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto.

In many respects the Simla Agreement is a historic document. According to its provisions, India released the Pakistani prisoners of war and readily restored the territory occupied in the Western region. But the main significance of the agreement was that it attempted to lay down a framework of peace and for the solution of disputed issues, including Kashmir, between the two countries. An attempt was also made at Simla to have agreed principles for the normalisation of relations in such areas as trade, travel, postal and telecommunication facilities. The general principles of the agreement were as follows :

> The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto married their relations, and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.

An exceedingly significant contribution of the Simla Agreement is a provision that in future all problems between the two neighbours would be

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resolved *only on a bilateral basis*. This has an important implication to the effect that the role of outside power in the sub-continental differences and conflicts is ruled out. This was agreed upon because third party initiative had not been very helpful in the past. Thus bilateralism was made a foundation of the relations between the two countries. Never before in the history of the two countries an agreement of such far-reaching consequences had been concluded.

In spite of a degree of willingness on both sides to evolve peaceful relations, the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the agreement—and once the agreement had been signed, its implementation—have been by no means smooth. The Simla spirit could not wipe out deep-rooted differences in the complex relationship between the two countries. It took nearly a year and a half to delineate the line of actual control in Jammu and Kashmir and to repatriate the prisoners of war. Subsequently, there was a rather longish delay before diplomatic relations were resumed at the highest level and postal, rail and communication links revived. Through discussions and negotiations many steps towards normalisation have been taken though the state of full and complete normalcy has not yet been reached.

V

Nearly 13 years have gone by since the Simla Agreement was concluded. India and Pakistan have been proclaiming their faith *ad infinitum* in the Simla principles though some section in the domestic politics in Pakistan are of the view that their country had accepted the provisions under duress.

The period, particularly since the closing years of the 1970s, has witnessed new features in Indo-Pakistani relations. The international situation has been surcharged with the renewal of the Cold War between the two Super Powers. The Iran-Iraq War and Soviet action on Afghanistan in 1979 have also affected the power balance of the region. A couple of years before this, the domestic politics of Pakistan had undergone a sea-change with the overthrow of Bhutto by the Army under the leadership of Zia-ul-Haq.

Maybe Pakistan feels threatened by Afghanistan in the west and India in the east. It is therefore following a policy which seems paradoxical at two levels. At the international level, Pakistan has walked out of the military alliances sponsored by the West and has joined the Non-aligned Movement ; but at the same time it has become a part of the strategic consensus of the United States. This has enabled it to secure a large quantity of sophisticated military equipment worth millions of dollars from the United States. The same old story is being repeated. The arms that Pakistan received in the past for containing communism were used only

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against India. In the present situation, if the Reagan Administration thinks that the American arms will help Pakistan to force "Soviet hegemonism," it is sadly mistaken. In order to avoid undue pressure or threat from the Soviets, the Pakistani rulers are also keeping their doors open and their policy flexible.

The other paradox is at the regional level. While each country has a right to protect its security from all possible threats, what Pakistan is acquiring from the United States, and to an extent from China, appears disproportionates to its requirements. This is a matter of concern to India. Perhaps a Pakistani may argue that India's military might is superior, therefore, there is no need for it to feel threatened. There is some substance in this argument but the domestic problems facing President Zia are not always easy to manage. So in order to divert public opinion and thereby save his position, he may pick up a conflict with India relying on American arms. In the process, the arms are likely to be used not only against India but against Zia's opponents within Pakistan also.

The development of nuclear capability by Pakistan has serious international as also regional implications. Perhaps nobody has a definite idea about the stage this development has reached. According to press reports China and some elements (not necessarily the governments officially) in the West are helping Pakistan. India's worry on this count is natural. So far as India is concerned it has already tested and exploded a nuclear device more than a decade ago. Thereafter there has been no testing and a categorical declaration has been made that it would not go in for nuclear weapons. There is no other instance in contemporary history where a country has proved its nuclear capability and at the same time not produced a nuclear weapon. The decisive point about Pakistan is the lack of credibility of its military rulers.

Currently there is intermitent discussion on two proposals. Pakistan has proposed a no-war pact and India has come forward with a treaty of friendship and cooperation. India's view is that a no-war pact had been time and again proposed by its leaders, and has always been rejected. But now when Pakistan has acquired sophisticated weapons from the West, it is making the same proposal. Though these proposals have not been made public, Pakistan seems unwilling to accept the treaty proposal because, among other things, it seeks a guarantee that Pakistan would not give bases to any foreign power. Further the relations between the two countries have been strained by the allegations that Pakistan is encouraging separatist and anti-government elements in India. Briefly, behind the occasional cosmetic friendliness, there is an unmistakable under-current of distrust and sometimes even hostility. Moreover, the international environment is unfortunately adding fuel to the fire.

On balance, it is obvious that India surpasses Pakistan in area, population and military strength. Its scientific, technonogical and industrial

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developments are much higher than perhaps of any other developing country. Its democratic political system has shown amazing resilience to continuity and peaceful change. The supremacy and primacy of its civil authority has really never been questioned by the military. Notwithstanding these plus points, threats to India's security arise not only from Pakistan. It has had serious problems in the north and the growing militarisation in the Indian Ocean is causing concern from the south also. India's domestic situation also has been far from tranquil. The need for a higher level of military preparedness should, therefore, be judged in this overall context.

At the beginning of this paper it had been pointed out that in the contemporary international situation it is not possible for any region to entirely insulate itself from the overall situation. But within reasonable limits it is certainly possible to evolve policies which are in the enlightened interest of the peoples (may be not necessarily so much in the interest of the narrow-minded ruling elite). India and Pakistan, particularly the latter, have to learn from past experience. No external power can bail out countries like India and Pakistan from the economic and security problems. If it does, then the cost would be prohibitive and even unacceptable to the recipient.

Both the countries are facing a multitude of problems of development and security. Domestically there are secessionist elements. In Pakistan the strength of the forces which want to restore democracy should not be underestimated. The presence there of nearly 3 million refugees from Afghanistan is another problem. What is of utmost importance is that instead of continuing hot and cold war between themselves, they should try to concentrate all their energies to attending to these problems. It is, indeed, unfortunate that in spite of many similarities between the two peoples, progress in establishing better relations in such areas as transport, water management, trade, cultural relations has been held up. The overarching political situation has been responsible for this. In other words, the critical factor in Indo-Pakistani relations is the problem of image which they have of each other. Many a time their images have been far from the reality and utterly distorted.

In the current phase, proposals and counter-proposals are being made by the two countries apparently with a view to evolving their future relations on the basis of peace, friendship and cooperation. On close scrutiny their purpose seems to be to score diplomatic points which are hardly important in the long run. The Simla Agreement offers practically all those elements which are contained in both the proposals—no-war pact or treaty of friendship and cooperation, i.e., non-use of force in resolving differences and conflicts, especially in Kashmir ; and the principle of bilateralism to keep out foreign powers trying to fish in the troubled waters of the sub-continent. These twin principles should guide the mutual relations of

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the two neighbours. It must not be forgotton that India and Pakistan cannot, even if they want to, escape the logic of geography. Instead of fighting against each other, they should make a sincere and determined effort to fight the common enemy : the extreme poverty of their people.

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INDIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

By M.L. QURESHI*

The process of the South Asian regional cooperation (SARC) concept, mooted by Bangladesh President Gen. Zia-ur-Rahman in April 1980, entered a crucial phase following the recently concluded Ministerial Meeting of South Asian Nations in July at Male in the Maldives. Though much has been achieved by way of forging regional cooperation in agreed areas much still remains. India's special position in ihe sub-continent necessitates more than ever the need for fuller cooperation in the processes of regional development strategy.

INDIA is about three quarters of the South Asian region ; according to the World Development Report 1984, India had in 1982, 78 per cent of the area, 73 per cent of the population and 77 per cent of the gross domestic product of the region. In view of India's size, relative to the rest of the region, there can be no worthwhile regional cooperation without full Indian participation. Apart from the Indian economy's predominant position there are other factors also which point in the same direction. India is industrially much more advanced than the other countries of the region and is in a position to meet many of the capital goods requirements of these countries. The capacity of its capital goods industry remains underutilized for lack of sufficient domestic demand.

There is however, a potential market for the Indian capital goods in the other countries of the region. But this potential remains underutilized, because, the other countries' trade with India would become heavily unbalanced, if they allow unrestricted imports of these goods from India. This is so because the Indian policy of self-reliance or self-sufficiency in consumer goods implies that India does not provide a market for the consumer goods which the less industrially developed countries of the region could produce.

Thus, modification of the Indian policy of self-sufficiency in respect of consumer goods can create a market for such goods in India that could be manufactured in the less developed countries of the region. If these countries can increase their exports to India, they would have the means to pay for the larger imports of capital goods from India. There would thus be no need for them to restrict their imports from India for reasons of balance of payments.

A change in Indian policy of self-reliance need not have any adverse impact on the existing consumer goods industries in India. It would

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rather only mean a slower rate of future growth of consumer goods industries to meet a part, and not the whole, of the domand for such goods, for the market for such goods would be expanding rapidly due to an improvement in the economic conditions of the people and the growth of the population. The strategy should be for a more rapid growth of the capital goods industry in India for meeting the increasing demand for capital goods in the other countries of the region, based on proper market studies in the other countries. Such a strategy would be quite in line with the comparative cost advantage of both India and other countries of the region. It would also suit the other countries, as it would not stand in the way of their aspirations for the industrialisation of their own economies.

The larger imports by India from other countries of the region would be at the cost of Indian balance of payments, for these imports would be paid for by the larger exports of capital goods from India to the other countries. In one word, if India plans to increase its imports from other countries of the region, its exports to these countries would take care of themselves. This development strategy by India would result in the expansion of exports and imports, both of India and of its trading partners in the region.

A shift in the development strategy emphasis of India, with reference to the problem of poverty, can have even a greater impact on regional cooperation. Various estimates, official and unofficial, indicate that a little less than half the population of India lives below the poverty line. The Indian development strategies, as stated in the various Five Year Development Plans, aimed to eradicate poverty. Nevertheless, these strategies have not been fully implemented, for there is no evidence that the number of the poor in India has declined. Future successes achieved in the reduction of poverty would result in a very large increase in the demand which the domestic Indian industry, inspite of some expansion, may not meet fully. Thus the imports of such goods from other countries may become inevitable. This inerease in the size of the Indian market for consumer goods can promote the production of such goods in the other countries of the region for export to India.

Poverty cannot be removed by mere emphatic statements of this objective. Considering the scale of the problem of poverty in India, the achievement of this objective would require enormous resources. So very large resources would have to be diverted from other purposes, including defence, to the programmes for the eradication of poverty. A reduction in Indian defence expenditure would tend to remove the fears entertained by some of the smaller countries of the region about the possible military domination of the region by India and should result in a reduction in their own defence expenditures. These countries would then be able to divert some resources from their defence to development. Thus this shift in Indian development strategy in favour of the eradication of poverty can lead to a

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more rapid development of the Indian economy, to the industrialization and a more rapid rate of growth of the economies of the other countries of the region, and to much greater regional cooperation.

To sum up, Indian development strategy can play a crucial role in a more rapid development of South Asia and in greater regional cooperation.

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TRANSPORT LINKAGES IN SOUTH ASIA

By JAGJIT SINGH*

A recent study of the Industrial Revolution by Sydney Pollard —The Industrialisation of Europe 1760-1970—*has shown that industrialization for the first century or so, being the consequence of individual decisions, was not so much a national as a regional phenomenon. It was not governments and planning agencies but conditions of the market, availability of labour, accessibility of raw materials and the state of transport and communications systems that determined which areas got industrialized and which remained undeveloped. Even in the "Workshop of the World" it was not Britain itself but specific parts (the Black country and Lancashire) which moved forward, while others (Cornwall and Shropshire) remained pre-industrial.*

This amiably anarchic process of growth, according to the principle of laissez-faire, *was rudely interrupted in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by the actions of governments and the even more influential principle of nationalism. Protectionist tariffs, spiralling ever upwards, tried to exclude certain commodities; governments urged on industrialists to produce strategically vital goods, and each society sought to be less dependent on the foreigner. World War I accentuated this tendency to an enormous degree, not only by physically interrupting commerce but also by "import substitution." In fact, it was the "import substitution" of the Chilean nitrates, a vital raw material for the manufacture of explosives and fertilizers, by Haber's nitrogen fixation process to produce ammonia that precipatated World War I. But for it Kaiser's Germany woruld never have dared to declare war. Ruthless pursuit of self-sufficiency can provoke a rogue reaction like World War I.*

The inter-war years, characterised by new frontiers and teriffic shortages of capital and further bouts of national rivalry, again checked the spread of industrialization—or at least ensured that the process was not purely an economic one. Far from what the Marxists call the "economic substructure" determining politics, political and ideological considerations determined economic development resulting as we all know, in such global catastrophes as the Great Depression and its aftermath in the twenties and thirties.

Only in the period after World War II was the old trend revived and industrial recovery came about. Europe was, of course, now divided into two blocs; but within each of them, in their different ways, an impressive industrial growth took place, spreading into new regions in accord with those basic determinants of market, labour, raw materials, transport and communications. The role of governments is certainly much more pronounced in the modern world than in Adam Smith's day. But the relative failure of, say,

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the depressed regions of northern England or northern France, despite large-scale support, is a measure of the way things are going.

IF any lesson emerges from this cursory glance at the industrial revolution in the West, it is that all the countries of the South Asian region would have grown much faster if the partition of the Indian sub-continent had not done to it what World War I and its aftermath had done to Europe. It is time that we now learn to do what Europe began to do after World War II, namely, foster regional cooperation instead of promoting national rivalries. Each country in the Indian sub-continent has already paid a heavy price by obstructing the play of economic determinants, including transport and communication, that promote development and growth. Instead of nursing and strengthening them we have deliberately emasculated them. We can no longer afford to persist in this folly. We must now begin to repair the broken linkages so as to let the flow of labour, raw materials, finished commodities be determined by economic factors instead of political and ideological considerations.

REVIVAL OF TRANSPORT LINKS PRELUDE TO COOPERATION

Naturally this means the revival of transport linkages that formerly existed before the countries of the region became independent. All the six countries of the Indian sub-continent—Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bhutan—were part of one administrative set up ruled by the British ; the erstwhile British rulers of the region had built extensive transport links connecting the diverse parts with one another. With their departure, and independence of the different countries of the region, the links have gradually fallen into disuse. Now are they to be revived as as a prelude to regional cooperation ?

With the exception of the two land-locked countries of the region—Nepal and Bhutan—all the other four countries are maritime countries with their own national merchant fleets. They can therefore cooperate by participating in the recent revolution in shipping – the new mode of container transport. Nearly all the countries of the region are gradually veering round to this modern mode of transport in their own way because of its indubitable advantages over other rival or alternative modes ; this mode of transport envisages the carriage of cargo in large standard containers or "boxes" that can move on road, on truck chassis, or on rail, on flat trucks, or in ships specially equipped to handle them. It is this inter-modal system of transportation that provides a fruitful area for regional cooperation among countries of the sub-continent and even further afield. The scope and possibilities of regional cooperation in transportation have expanded greatly with increasing containerisation and the wide diffusion of this international multi-modal transport all over the world.

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"Land-Bridge" Transport Concept Should be Exploited

When the overseas trade was mainly in break bulk form, overseas transport was limited to movements of cargo from a port in one country to a port in another and rail/road transport of cargoes at either end. The two were considered to be distinct operations. This fragmented transport involved delay, uncertainties, loss and damage to cargo, higher costs and other inconveniences to shippers. With the onset of containerisation in the sixties and its rapid progress in the seventies, possibilities emerged of carrying the "box" on a multi-model transport chain on a through bill of lading. The advent of the "box" also made it possible for national railways to act as a "land-bridge" for ocean transportation between the countries on either side. It is the exploitation of this "land-bridge" concept that offers the most fruitful area of regional cooperation in surface transport.

"Land-bridge" transport means a combination of two or more transport organs. For example, cargo going from Japan to Europe may go by ship from Japan to the Pacific Coast of North America, then by train to the Atlantic coast of North America and then again by ship to Europe. The "land-bridge" thus connects two marine transport routes by a land transport route. The "land-bridge" system with several variants, already exists in the United States, Soviet Union, Western Europe and Australia.

The Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), for example, operates as a low cost alternative to the all-water route for shippers from Europe to the Far East. It is the shortest journey distance between Europe and the Far East. A trans-rail service covers the transport of containers from points within continental Europe to various Soviet border stations. At the Pacific coast ports, containers are transferred by feeder vessels for shipment to Japan, South Korea, Hong-Kong, Malaysia and the Philippines. In the reverse direction, cargo is carried from several Japanese ports to Nakhodha by ships, then by unit trains to stations at the USSR border with Eastern European countries or to ports of European Russia. The Siberian land-bridge transport 120 TEU unit trains run at an average speed of 65 km/hr; whereas an all-sea carriage in this case would require 30 days, TSR requires only 18 days.

In the context of the Indian sub-continent, it should be possible to aggregate cargo in containers at one or two selected ports on the east or west coast and then carry them by rail to one or two selected ports on the other coast through a fast block train, thereby avoiding the longer sea haul round the coast. The railways of the Indian sub-continent can thus act as a "land-bridge" in respect of the following traffic :

(i) International containers moving from countries in the west to countries in the east with railways of the sub-continent providing a "land-bridge." We can visualise such movement between Karachi

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and Bombay on the west coast and Chittagong/Haldia on the east coast.

(ii) For carriage of containers between suitably developed inland container depots with adequate parking area, handling equipment and siding facilities at the major ports.

(iii) To avoid cost-intensive container carrying ships moving on the Indian sea coast extending over 10,000 kms, containers can be channelised at one or two ports on the east and west coasts thereby saving time and cost.

The development of the inland bridge concept described above is only a prelude to fuller participation in the container revolution by each regional country. India is already taking steps to do so. Thus, the overseas traffic of India handled at Bombay port consists mainly of imports and the traffic handled at Calcutta or Haldia mainly exports. This generates a number of empty containers at Bombay which are required to be repositioned at Calcutta through the Railways. The Railways could also arrange loading of domestic cargo from Bombay to Calcutta in these containers so that the container capacity could be gainfully utilised. The trade interests will prefer to put domestic high-freighted cargo in containers. Therefore, cross-country movement of containers on railways will augment per unit earnings of the railways which at present carry mainly low-freighted cargo.

Need for Rationalised Road-Rail-Sea Transport Linkages

In order to facilitate speedy, efficient and economical movement of the import and export cargo of the Indian sub-continent it is necessary to develop the road and rail networks of the Indian sub-continent as a link between ports on the east and west coast. There are two alternative ways in which the proposed link can be forged. One is to use these networks as a "land-bridge" on the lines of the American and East European models outlined above, the other is to run a feeder container service along the Indian sub-continental coasts and to marry this service to on carrying mother container vessels touching only one of the South Indian ports. To take the latter alternative first, the proposed feeder service is only an exploitation of the feeder method that is being very extensively and effectively used by leading container companies so as to minimise the number of ports of call as well as time spent in port by the highly capital-intensive mother vessel. An independent feeder service on the west coast and the east coast should commence from Karachi and Chittagong respectively, and terminate at either Tuticorin or Colombo. This service should call at say Bombay, Goa, and Cochin on the west coast and Haldia, Vizag and Madras on the east coast for aggregating container cargo at the terminal port of Tuticorin/Colombo. From Colombo/Tuticorin, mother vessels

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running towards Europe and the Far East would carry these containers after discharging inward cargo, which would be loaded on the feeder vessels for discharge at various regional ports on the east and west coasts. From these regional ports the containers could be carried to destinations by railway or by road transport. Feeder vessels, not being very large would be able to go in and out of ports quicker and if these vessels are fitted with adequate gear, they will be able to handle cargo operations independently of port equipment. This service would, in addition to serving the inter-regional demands, also promote the international trades of countries within the region. Needless to add, the service could also carry cargoes on the Indian coast.

For deciding whether a terminal port should be located at Tuticorin or Colombo, a study of the traffic patterns, facilities in these ports, and the infrastructure available should be made. In order to ensure participation by the regional member countries, either this feeder service can be run by a joint consortium or each country can operate and control a part of the route involved.

To revert now to the "land-bridge" model; in this model, the ports on the east and west coast receive the mother vessel and the railways and road networks act as a "land-bridge." To develop this concept dynamic changes will be required in the working of the sub-continental railways. For this, the railways of each country should have arrangements with the road transport operators to provide ancillary service for the movement of cargo in containers or in breakbulk form. If an integrated multi-modal transport system consistiug of sea-rail-road transport has to work efficiently, then the Indian Railways, which already have a vast network and experience, must take the major responsibility for developing the concepts which have proved their utility in other countries of continental dimensions like USSR, USA, Canada, Australia, etc.

In India, inland container depots (ICD) are being set up at Bangalore, Delhi, Ahmedabad and Guntur. The idea is to aggregate cargo emanating from adjacent areas at the ICDs, stuff the containers, transport the containers from the ICDs in full rakes to ports for shipment overseas. In respect of imports, ICD's will act as distribution points for consignees within the particular region. The present ICDs are only make-shift arrangements. What is needed is much more than improvisation, namely, extensive container parking areas, suitable railway sidings and proper container handling heavy equipment with a modern system of container control. The setting up of ICDs and an integrated system of sea-cum-rail-road transport would defuse the existing concentration of cargo from the ports to various areas where the cargo can be aggregated according to the convenience of the trade and the business community. After studying traffic flows more ICDs could be provided. The Indian Railways are taking up this task of container movement in right earnest. They are also undertaking a

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detailed study of the prospects of cargo movement between ICDs and the major Indian ports so that a rationalised rail-road-sea transport system could be devised on the models already developed in foreign countries. Documentation and procedures are also being suitably modified to ensure perfect coordination with other transport media.

We suggest that similar studies be undertaken by the Pakistan and Bangladesh Railways if they have not already done so. The matter is of some urgency as the development of the International Multi-Modal Transport system by the Railways on the lines indicated above is a long-term project. It involves the provision of appropriate type of flat wagons for the carriage of international containers and auxilliary handling facilities at the container depots.

The introduction of through inter-modal transport with the Indian sub-continental Railways acting as a "land-bridge" should greatly assist the foreign trade of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan and Iran.

Presently trade between Pakistan and Bangladesh may be moving in ships between Karachi and Chalna/Chittagong which involves journeying round the vast Indian coast. Similarly, the trade of Pakistan with the countries in the East would presently be going by ships round the Indian coast. The comparative distance and transit time between Karachi and Chittagong, and Bombay and Haldia by the sea and rail routes is shown in the table below :

	Sea Route		*Rail Route*	
	Distance by sea Nautical miles	Transit* Time in days	Distance by rail in Kms	Transit** Time in days
Karachi/Chittagong	2657	9.3	3694	6
Bombay/Haldia	2112	7.4	1359	2225

* At the present speed of 12 nautical miles per hour
** At the present speed of 600 kms per day of through trains

It will thus be observed that the "land bridge" route is much shorter both in distance and transit time than the sea route. It is but natural as the "land-bridge" route is only one side of the triangle that is the Indian sub-continent of which the other two sides form the sea route. In actual fact, the distance and transit time by rail will be even shorter than indicated in the above table as both the terminals—Karachi and Chittagong—are at the extreme ends of the route. Actually the destination of the cargo will be the interior points of the land route and the therefore the transit time of the route will be very much shorter than by the sea route. There will thus be no need to send materials from the interior points to the port nor to despatch them from the port to the destination points in the hinterland, for both the origin and destination points in the interior are directly accessible by the contemplated land link.

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Need for Inter-Connected Sub-Regional Rail Network

The major items of import of general cargo into Bangladesh consist of engineering goods, chemicals, cotton waste, coal tar, dyes, dyestuffs, diesel engines, medicines, textiles and tobacco. Exports of Bangladesh consist mainly of tea, jute, and jute goods, tanned leather and marine products.

Imports of Afghanistan consist mainly of tea, light engineering goods like sewing machines and building materials. Exports of Pakistan consist mainly of cotton and assorted general cargoes. The Railways can act as a "land-bridge" for the trade between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan on the one hand and the countries in the east on the other, viz. India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Imports of Iran consist of engineering goods, steel tubes, vehicles, structural steel, cotton textiles and jute goods. The trade between Iran and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh can be covered by an inter-connected railways network.

For the trade of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran with Bangladesh and the countries in the east, and similarly for the trade of Bangladesh and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran and other countries in the West, railways can act as a "land-bridge." Introduction of the "land-bridge" concept with the railways acting as a "land-bridge" would result in speedy, efficient and economical transport.

Container Transportation to Facilitate Bilateral Trade

Container transportation being a highly sophisticated and capital intensive technology both in terms of ships and cargo handling equipment at ports, it would be in the interest of overall economy of the countries in the region to concentrate on container transport at a few selected ports and then move the containers by rail or road from/to the places of origin/destination. Karachi and Bombay, on the west coast, and Haldia and Chittagong on the east coast can be developed as full-fledged container ports to deal with traffic emanating from/destined to west and east respectively. Containers loaded at Chalna and Chittagong can be carried by rail or by feeder sea or river vessels to Calcutta or Haldia ; those between Karachi and Bandar Abbas on the one hand, and Bombay on the other, by feeder vessels and trains.

One great weakness of the present state of affairs is the absence of any through transportation link between the countries of the Indian sub-continent ; bilateral trade between Pakistan and Bangladesh, for instance, has in the absence of such a link to move by the longer and devious sea route all the way from origin in Karachi by rail or road then by sea to Chittagong, and then from Chittagong to destination by rail or road. Similar is the case with trade between Pakistan and Nepal. Such a link can be readily developed by moving the traffic in containers which can be moved

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by road, rail or sea as is being done now by the developed countries. But as the installation of the container system is both capital intensive and time consuming, the creation of the transport link to facilitate bilateral trade between the countries of the Indian sub-continent need not wait the installation of full-scale container facilities.

The main purpose of the container service is to have a sealed "box" which can be cleared by the customs authorities at the national borders without opening it and examining its contents. The same purpose can be served by moving the national cargo in "sealed trains" which may be cleared at the national borders in the same way as the "containers." Since the numbers of such "sealed trains" will be limited to a few trains per week or fortnight, it should be possible for the railways of the sub-continent to provide a pool of wagons which is sturdy enough to move between the terminals without having to be detached as damaged *en route* or for any other reason. Such stock can be intensively examined at either terminal of the "land-bridge" before loading so as to avoid any detachment of "damages" *en route*. Later, as container facilities are developed in due course, the "sealed train" movement can be replaced by "container train" movement. In fact, Indian Railways have already introduced container services for internal goods movement. Perhaps Pakistan and Bangladesh Railways have also done so. These can be used for bilateral trade between the countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh, on the one hand, and Nepal on the other, where there is a break of gauge. At the break of gauge transhipment point, namely, Garara, the sealed containers can be transhipped from BG to MG and vice versa. Such "sealed train" or "sealed container" movements between centres in Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Pakistan will greatly facilitate the bilateral trade between these countries besides being a lot cheaper.

Need for Integrated River Transport Facilities

In a through chain of international multi-modal transport, marine transport through the river system of Bangladesh, West Bengal and Assam can also be integrated with Chalna/Chittagong and Haldia acting as the inlets/outlets for overseas cargo movement. There is considerable industrial activity around Dhaka in Bangladesh and also in West Bengal and Assam in India so that for domestic transport to/from the major ports the river system can be utilized with advantage. While even the break-bulk cargo can move in smaller vessels and self-propelled barges up and down the rivers from/to the main ports, there will be an additional advantage as it would provide door-to-door transport facility. In this case the cargo can move in sealed containers through the rivers from the points of production to the points of consumption/distribution. The increased transport through the river system, can also reduce the load on rail transport in the countries involved.

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Uniform Sub-Regional Rules for Multi-Modal Transportation

For smooth international multi-modal transport it would be essential that all the countries involved follow a set of uniform rules and procedures. A Convention of International Multi-Modal Transport has been adopted by consensus in Geneva in May 1980 by 30 countries. The Convention lays down principles and uniform rules relating to the carriage of goods under international multi-modal transport contracts with a view to ensuring orderly development of international multi-modal transport and thereby facilitating expansion of world trade.

The railways and concerned agencies in the countries in the Asian region proposing to introduce intra-regional multi-modal transport, say, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran should undertake a detailed study of this convention with a view to adopting uniform rules for the carriage of goods between different countries in the region by multi-modal transport on through bill of lading.

In short, for the introduction and smooth functioning of intra-regional multi-modal transport the countries involved will have to take a series of steps like :

(i) Proper assessment of the cargo movement and their suitability for container transport ;
(ii) Consolidation of cargo to make train loads ;
(iii) Adequate facilities for container handling at ports and railway yards ;
(iv) Modified uniform port and customs rules and procedures to ensure that a container once examined and sealed moves to the ultimate destination without the need to re-open for re-examination.

Finally it needs to be stressed that the successful implementation of the "land-bridge" idea, described above, is intimately linked with the maintenance of compatible standards on the sub-continental railways mainly the three railway systems of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. The three railways originally followed compatible standards as they were part of one system under the erstwhile British rulers of the sub-continent. But after partition of the sub-continent the standards adopted on the three railway systems have begun to diverge. The most serious divergences that can completely block rail communications between the three countries are two – the coupling system between wagons and the braking system. Both were originally the same, namely, the screw coupler on wagons and the vacuum brake system on trains. The Indian Railways in their modernization plans have begun to change both. The new standard wagon adopted by the Indian Railways is the bogie box with a centre buffer coupler which is not compatible with the older screw coupler. This change has created a problem even on the Indian Railways itself. It has been partially over-

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come by a new transition coupler which has been designed and fitted on the new bogie box wagons to enable them to be coupled with screw coupler wagons. The incompatability between the new air brake and the older vacuum brake wagons is, however, more serious in that it is not possible to make even an interim device (like the transition coupler) to enable a vacuum brake wagon to run on an air brake train. But the Indian Railways' change to air brakes has just begun and will take long to complete. Meanwhile, the present stock of vacuum brake wagons will continue to operate for the next two decades or more. Accordingly the sub-continental through trains on the "land-bridge" route could all be made of only vacuum brake wagons.

It may also be mentioned here that the current energy crunch has now begun to revive rail transport almost universally everywhere. The reason is, it consumes per tonne-kilometre only one fifth the fuel road transport does. It will therefore come into its own gradually in all the three sub-continental countries. Hence the imperative need for the three countries of the region to ensure that in modernizing their wagon and locomotive fleets the standards adopted are, at least, mutually compatible if they cannot be uniform. It is the most important area of research in south Asian regional cooperation.

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TRADE FLOWS IN SOUTH ASIA

By P. R. BHATT*

An important principle enshrined in the Colombo Declaration of the Fifth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned nations (August 1976) was the reiteration of the need for economic cooperation among developing countries. The resolution on the Seven-Point Plan called for the creation of a confident spirit of collective self-reliance which included the willingness to pursue the possibilities of cooperation among themselves in financial, trade, industrial and other fields.[1] *Economic cooperation among developing countries has increased considerably during the last decade and it continues to be further strengthened and broadened in the various activities covered, especially, at the sub-regional level. In South-East Asia, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made a remarkable break-through in the field of trade liberalisation, industrial collaboration, food security, energy and transport.*[2] *The ASEAN experience can serve as a good example for the formation of other mutual sub-regional groups in the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP) countries. The increasing interest in the sub-regional economic cooperation is reflected in the initiation that emerged in South Asia in the early 1980's. The regional groups or sub-groups facilitate easy accessibility to each other's market and substantial diversification of the type of goods which they can exchange and hence increase the share of foreign trade in national income.*

According to a report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it is observed that in the 1960's trade among developing countries grew at a slower rate than their trade with the developed nations, but between the 1970's and 1980's this trend was encouragingly reversed.[3] *Trade among the South Asian countries over the last decade has, however, not shown much buoyancy ; in fact, for many years it has remained stagnant.*

Although South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal) claim 20 per cent of the world population (about 927.6 millions in mid-1982), its share in the world Gross National Product (GNP) is less than 2 per cent. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the region was around US $ 193 billion in 1982.[4] *The region's share in world trade is also meagre ; it had been exporting goods worth US $ 14 billion in 1983, which constituted only 0.8 per cent of the world exports, whereas its imports were about US $ 23 billion which represented 1.3 per cent of the world's imports.*[5] *This indicates that the value of imports was nearly double the value of its exports and hence showed an adverse balance of trade of the order of about US $ 10*

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billion in 1983. This trade deficit accounted for about 5.2 per cent of its GDP.

In spite of the geographical contiguity and proximity of the South Asian region and enormous potential for trade and development, the region remains most backward and has the largest concentration of poverty and low income. The contiguous geographical facilities had never been exploited for the total development of the region.

The income level of all countries of South Asia is very low : the per capita GNP varied between $ 140 to $ 380 in 1982 and the per capita growth rate during 1960 to 1982 was also deplorably low.[6] The highest per capita growth rate was shown by Pakistan (2.8%), followed by Sri Lanka (2.6%) and India (1.3%). The per capita growth rate was negative for Nepal (−0.1%) and 0.3% for Bangladesh. The Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) as a percentage of GDP of the countries of the region varied between 14 per cent to 31 per cent, whereas savings as a percentage of GDP varied between −3 per cent to 22 per cent in 1982.[7] India topped the list of savings level −22 per cent—and Bangladesh stood at the bottom with −3 per cent of the GDP. The South Asian countries are predominantly agriculture-based with more than 50 per cent of their labour force engaged in agriculture. While India employs 71 per cent of its labour force in the agricultural sector, the percentages in Bangladesh and Nepal are 73 per cent and 93 per cent respectively. In the case of India and Pakistan about 30 per cent of GDP flows from agriculture whereas its share is the order of 47 per cent and 27 per cent respectively in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

The gowth of exports exceeds that of imports in India and Pakistan whereas the growth of imports exceeds growth of exports in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In the case of India and Pakistan the average annual growth rate of imports was 2.6 per cent and 3.9 per cent respectively in the 1970's, while the average annual growth rate of exports was 4.7 per cent each in the same period. Bangladesh had shown a negative growth rate of 0.8 per cent in exports whereas Sri Lanka had shown a positive growth rate of 0.1 per cent in exports in the 1970's. The high propensity to import, coupled with the obstacles to expand exports, creates a typical situation whereby the exports of most underdeveloped countries lag behind their imports.[8] What has been the relationship between the value of imports and exports to the national income of various countries can be seen below. In 1982, Sri Lanka topped the list of exports (27% of GDP) followed by Nepal (11%), Pakistan (10%), Bangladesh (8%) and India (6%). The structure of exports of these countries indicated that over 32 per cent of exports of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh consist of primary commodities whereas in the case of Sri Lanka and Nepal the share of primary commodities to total exports represents 65 per cent.[9] On the other hand capital and manufactured goods shared 50 per cent of their total imports for all countries execpt India in which case its share was only 38 per cent in 1981.[10] India exports about 20 per cent of its total exports to

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developing countries, the rest 80 per cent goes to developed countries. This proportion in the case of Pakistan and Srt Lanka is 37 per cent and 46 per cent respectively. Bangaladesh and Nepal are exceptions since the major portion of their exports—over 50 per cent—is directed to developing countries. Thus it is observed that the South Asian countries' exports to developing countries are at the lowest ebb. This calls for new strategies and policies to boost trade among them. In this context, it will be revealing to analyse in greater detail the trade flows amongst them.

INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE IN SOUTH ASIA

The countries in South Asia largely depend on the developed countries for marketing their products. But the attitude of the latter, their growing protectionist policies, does not enable them to sell their products. Hence, it is high time for the developing countries to evolve suitable strategies for economic cooperation among themselves to reduce their dependency on the developed world. The trade relations among the South Asian countries have continued to be at the lowest ebb. The bulk of their exports and imports come from and moves to the developed world. The data on the international trade of the South Asian countries is given in Table 1. The region's share in total world imports and exports in 1982 was 1.3 per cent and 0.8 per cent respectively. It reveals that the share of imports is nearly double that of the exports. Imports' share showed an increasing trend from 1 per cent in 1973 to 1.3 per cent in 1983 whereas exports' share remained more or less stable at 0.7 per cent —0.8 per cent during the same period. The deficit trade balance had shown an alarmingly increasing trend from US$ 1,005 million in 1973 to US$ 10,558 million in 1983.

Export Structure

The intra-regional exports of South Asia are given in Table 2 ; they had increased by 47 per cent from $ 312 million to $ 458 million over a period of one decade 1973-83. The share of the region's exports in its total exports to the world constituted only 3.1 per cent in 1983. India accounted for half of the total intra-regional exports while Pakistan's share was less than one-fifth, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh shared a little more than one-tenth each. Pakistan had shown maximum percentage increase of 500 per cent over the period 1973-83, followed by Bangladesh —142 per cent—Sri Lanka 79 per cent and Nepal 22 per cent. Interestingly, India's exports in the region remained almost stagnant during the same period.

The country-wise export data indicates that India's exports to Pakistan amount to only a very small proportion of its total exports. There was a phenomenal increase of 950 per cent of exports to Sri Lanka from $ 10 million to $ 105 million during 1973-83 and its export share was 45 per

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cent of India's total exports in the region in 1983. India's exports to Nepal also increased by 130 per cent during the same period, but its exports to Bangladesh declined markedly from $ 174 million in 1973 to $ 36 million in 1983. In 1973, India's share in Bangladesh was about 80 per cent whereas in 1983, it declined to the rock bottom level of 16 per cent. In the case of Pakistan, its exports to all countries declined during 1979-83. However, its exports had increased by about 40 per cent to India and 56 per cent to Bangladesh between 1979 and 1982. Its exports to Sri Lanka continued to decline from $ 50.1 million in 1976 to $ 11.7 million in 1983, while its exports share to Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka represented 50, 35 and 14 per cent respectively in 1983. Bangladesh's major customer in the region is Pakistan, who shares four-fifths of its exports and India, a little over one-tenth of its exports. Bangladesh's exports to Pakistan had shown some stability whereas towards India, its exports declined very sharply from $ 23 million in 1973 to $ 12.1 million in 1979, but increased to $ 20 million in 1982, but again declined to 16.9 million in 1983. Sri Lanka and Nepal are minor trade partners of Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka's exports to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have shown a definite trend ; exports to India increased more than two times during 1979 and 1983 and India claims 44 per cent of its exports whereas Pakistan's share is 48 per cent. Sri Lankan exports to Pakistan has shown a declining trend from 1979 onwards. Bangladesh's share was insignificant and its exports dropped from $ 4.1 million in 1979 to $ 3.5 million in 1982, but increased to $ 4.7 million in 1983. Nepal's major customer in the region is India which takes 80 per cent of its exports.

Thus, the proportion of exports to individual country's indicated that 45 per cent of India's exports to the South Asian Region was going to Sri Lanka, followed by Nepal—37 per cent—and Bangladesh—16 per cent—in 1983. Pakistan's exports to Bangladesh constituted 50 per cent of its exports, followed by India with 35 per cent and Sri Lanka's 14 per cent. 83 per cent of Bangladesh's exports were claimed by Pakistan. Sri Lanka's exports were shared by Pakistan—48 per cent—and India – 44 per cent— In the case of Nepal 80 per cent of its exports were directed to India.

Import Structure

Now let us analyse the intra-regional imports of South Asia (Table 3). Intra-regional imports had shown an increase of 76 per cent from $ 264 million in 1973 to $ 464 million in 1983. The rate of growth of imports was more rapid than that of exports during the same period.

A perusal of country-wise imports indicates that imports in India from Sri Lanka have shown a definite increasing trend during 1979-83, whereas from Nepal, over the same period, it is a declining trend. In the case of imports from Pakistan and Bangladesh, there was no definite trend. The imports of India were equally shared by Pakistan and Sri Lanka (36 per

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cent each) in 1983. In the case of Pakistan, imports from all countries increased during 1973-79 but declined drastically in 1983 from all countries except Bangladesh, in whose case it increased by 78 per cent. The decline was more than 74 per cent in the case of imports from India during 1979-83. Bangladesh's imports from the South Asian countries fell substantially from $ 120 million in 1973 to $ 64 million in 1983 ; its imports from India steadily declining from $ 114 million in 1973 to $ 38 million in 1983, the decline being 67 per cent whereas its imports from Pakistan showed stability during 1979-83. Except from Pakistan, its imports on the whole showed an irregular and unstable trend. Sri Lanka's imports from India had shown a phenomenal increase from $ 12 million in 1973 to $ 149 million in 1979, but declined to $ 115 million in 1983. Similarly imports from Pakistan also have been steadily declining from $ 32 million in 1976 to $ 14 million in 1983. Sri Lanka's imports from India constituted 88 per cent of its imports from the region in 1983. Nepal imported goods within the region mostly from India. Thus the statistics on intra-regional imports reveals that India's major imports are coming from Pakistan and Sri Lanka whereas Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are major sellers of their products to Pakistan. Bangladesh's imports are shared by India and Pakistan, whereas Sri Lanka's major import is from India. In the case of Nepal, India is the lone country which supplied its goods.

The major reasons for the low share of intra-regional trade can be attributed to : (i) the long domination of the region by British colonial rule ; (ii) the low level of economic development of the region and the feeling that trade within the region would not be as much beneficial as that with the developed countries ; (iii) the technologies of production are not well developed resulting in high cost of production hence unable to compete in the international market. Developed countries are able to provide goods at comparatively cheaper prices and they are also able to supply the most up-to-date machinery which those countries urgently required ; (iv) inability to extend credit facilities on medium and long term basis ; (v) the adoption of restricted import policy to promote local production. There are some non-economical reasons also such as fear psychosis of dominance by the neighbouring country.

Balance of Trade

Intra-regional balance of trade of South Asian countries is given in Table 4. India is the only country in the region which had a positive trade balance throughout the period 1973 to 1983. The positive trade balance increased from $ 180 million in 1973 to $ 242 million in 1979, but dropped to $ 147 million in 1983. Pakistan had improved its position significantly from an adverse balance of trade of $ 19 million in 1973 to a positive trade balance of $ 36 million in 1982. Bangladesh narrowed its adverse balance of trade substantially from $ 95 million in 1973 to $ 2.6 million in 1983. Sri

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Lanka's positive trade balance of $ 5.5 million in 1973, has turned into a huge negative balance of $ 123 million in 1979 but was contained to $ 67.2 million in 1983. Nepal had an adverse trade balance throughout the period 1973-83.

The country-wise balance of trade data reveals that India had a positive trade balance with all countries of the region except Pakistan, in which case there was an adverse balance of trade of $ 25 million in 1983. Pakistan had a negative trade balance with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Bangladesh however had a negative balance of trade with Sri Lanka but a positive one with Nepal. Sri Lanka had a positive trade balance with Nepal. Thus it is revealed from the above analysis that the intra-regional trade of South Asian countries favoured only India and to some extent Pakistan also. A better balance of trade may be achieved among the countries through regional economic cooperation.

A look at the intra-regional flow of commodities will give a clear picture as to which direction the balance of trade should be given so as to be favourable to individual countries.

Exports of all countries of the region, except India, are concentrated on a limited number of products. For instance, Pakistan's major share of primary goods goes to raw cotton and rice, whereas cotton textile, leather and footwear constitute main manufactured exports. While hides and skin, fish, tea and jute account for major primary exports, leather and jute textiles form the major manufactured exports of Bangladesh. Sri Lanka's primary exports constitute tea, rubber and coconut, whereas rice and crude materials are the primary exports of Nepal. In the case of India, its exports are diversified among textile, leather, tea, sugar, fish, iron, etc.

A brief listing of exports of the countries of the region is given below.

The main commodities supplied by India to various countries of the South Asian region are :

Pakistan : Wheat and muslin unmilled, tea, crude vegetable materials n.e.s. ; rubber tyres, tyre cases, tyre flaps and inner tubes, etc., glassware, hardwood, mineral manufactures n.e.s., parts and accessories of motor vehicles.

Bangladesh : Fruits and nuts (other than oil nuts), fresh or dried coal, lignites, peat, briquettes and resort carbon, synthetic organic dyestuff, etc. Textile yarn, glassware, pig iron, ferrous alloys, ingots and other primary forms of iron or steel plates and sheets of iron or steel, tubes, pipes and fittings of iron or steel, manufacture of metals n.e.s., textile and leather machinery and parts thereof, machinery for special industries n.e.s. motor cycles, scooters and other motorised cycles and railway vehicles.

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Sri Lanka : Fish dried, smoked fish, vegetables (fresh, chilled or frozen), cane sugar refined, spices, rice, cereal preparation, preparation of flour, starch of fruits and vegetables, medicinal and pharmaceutical products, textile yarn, cotton fabrics woven, blooms, billets, slabs, sheets of iron and steel, manufacture of metals n.e.s. internal cumbustion pistons, engines and parts thereof. Machine tools for working metal, heating and cooling equipments and parts thereof, electrical apparatus for making and breaking electric circuits, motor vehicles for transport of goods and special purpose motor vehicle parts and accessories of motor vehicles, motor cycles, scooters and other motorised cycles, etc., electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.s.

Nepal : Spices, crude vegetable materials, petroleum products, refined, paper and paper boards, textile yarn, cotton and woven fabrics, lime, cement and fabricated construction materials, manufacture of metals n.e.s., electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.s., parts and accessories of motor vehicles, medicinal and pharmaceutical products.

Main exports of Pakistan to other South Asian countries are as follows :

India : Raw cotton, rock salt, furnace oil, naphtha, petroleum products, crude petroleum, crude material (excluding fuels).

Bangladesh : Fruits, oil seeds, raw cotton, vegetable oils, dying and tanning substances, pharmaceutical products, rubber manufactures, textile yarns and fabrics, metal manufactures, machinery, footwear.

Sri Lanka : Rice, petroleum products, cotton yarns, cotton threads, cotton fabrics, synthetic textiles.

Major exports of Bangladesh to other South Asian countries are :

India : Newsprint, jute goods, textile yarns and fabrics, paper and paper boards, manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials.

Pakistan : Raw jute cuttings, jute goods, tea, betel leaves, ginger, rayon, newsprint, paper.

Sri Lanka : Raw jute, jute goods, newsprint, hides and skin.

Nepal : Paper, newsprint, hides and skin, jute goods.

The major exports of Sri Lanka are :

India : Natural graphite, dried vegetables, fruits, cloves, coffee, tea, cocoa, residual fuel oil, cinnamon leaf oil, raw hides and skin, lobsters, spices, copra, crude rubber including synthe-

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tic and reclaimed, petroleum products refined, lifting and loading machines, transport equipments.

Pakistan : Arecanuts, coconut oil, natural graphite, natural rubber sheets, lobsters, black tea, betel leaves, margarine, nutmeg and mace, cardamom, coir yarn, dessicated coconuts and copra.

Bangladesh : Chanks, arecanuts, coconut oil, lobsters, spices, natural rubber, crude fertiliser, vegetable oils, rubber manufactures, textile yarns, etc.

Exports of Nepal to India are as follows :

Food and live animals, tobacco and beverages, crude material inedible (except fuel) mineral fuels and lubricants, animal and vegetable oil and fats, chemicals and drugs, manufactured goods classified mainly by materials, machinery and transport equipments and miscellaneous manufactured articles.

TOWARDS REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Regional economic cooperation enables the countries to utilise their natural endowments optimally and derive benefits of complementarity. The low share of intra-regional trade in the South Asian region can be reversed by evolving suitable strategies for regional economic cooperation. In this regard they can follow the ASEAN model. Late Zia-ur-Rehman, President of Bangladesh, initiated the idea of South Asian Regional Cooperation based on mutual trust, greater understanding and unity among the countries of South Asia. In pursuance of his initiatives, the first meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held in Colombo in April 1981 The conference agreed to constitute five study groups, one each in the fields of agriculture, rural development, telecommunication, meteorology and health and population activities.

The second meeting of the Foreign Secretaries was held in Kathmandu in November 1981. It converted the five study groups into working groups and proposed to institute studies in three additional areas of transport, postal services and science and technology. Subsequently, the third and fourth meetings were held in Islamabad (August 1982) and Dhaka (March 1983). The Islamabad meeting identified some other areas for cooperation such as sports, arts and culture. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Secretaries held in Dhaka, a meeting of Foreign Ministers of seven Asian countries was held in New Delhi in August 1983, preceded by a preparatory meeting of Foreign Secretaries of these countries at the initiation of India.

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The meeting adopted a Declaration on an Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) which includes activities for short-term and long-term co-operation. The officials of these countries formulated projects in nine fields—Agriculture, Rural Development, Meteorology, Telecommunication, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Health and Cooperation activities, Transport, Postal Services and Sports, Arts and Culture. A technical committee consisting of the country representatives was asked to inspect the implementation of projects in each of these new fields. A Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries will coordinate and monitor regional cooperation; approve the projects and determine the modalities of financing and materialising regional and external resources.

The Second Ministerial Meeting of the seven-nation* South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) held at Male, the capital of Maldives in July '84, reviewed the progress made since the launching of the SARC integrated programme of action in the nine identified areas of cooperation and felt that considerable progress had been achieved in implementing the programme. It was also hoped that the decision taken by the Standing Committee with regard to medium-to long-term projects of regional co-operation, on the basis of the technical committee report, would make a significant contribution in achieving further projects under the integrated programme of action. The meeting stre sed on the urgent need for improving telecommunications and air transport links especially between the capitals of all South Asian countries. It has also called for utilising offers of internal assistance made by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

The SARC Joint Communique expressed concern over the worsening condition of the poor countries due to the harsh aid and trade policies of the developed nations. They expressed deep regret over the failure of the London Summit of Industrialised Nations held in June 1984. The communique had pointed out that despite strong pleas from developing nations, it had not yet been possible to augment the resources available for the seventh replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA). The communique also announced the first summit meeting of South Asian countries in Dhaka at the end of 1985. The third meeting of Foreign Ministers in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan, would serve as a preparatory meeting for the summit.

The success of SARC depends on mutual trust. If the countries of the region work together on one platform, they can achieve more bargaining power for their products in the international markets. The SARC is a good beginining in this regard; it can take the issue of trade in a few commodities like tea, jute, cotton, etc., in the North-South dialougue.

By way of conclusion, it would not be out of place to recall here that,

* The seven nations are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Republic of Maldives.

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in a working paper circulated by Bangladesh on an earlier occasion, it was stated :

> In the South Asian region of the world, we have countries at different levels of development, some are relatively less developed than others. Any proposal for economic cooperation must be formulated with great care in order to ensure that the weak are not exploited and that the strong do not dominate. The areas selected should only be those in which cooperation will mutually benefit all the countries irrespective of existing economic disparities so as to make regional cooperation meaningful, strengthen the spirit of mutual trust and understanding and bridge the developmental gap.

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South Asian Countries' Trade in the World 1973-83

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TABLE 1

South Asian Countries' Trade in the World 1973-83

Year	Imports		Exports		Trade Balance
	Millions US $	Share in total world Imports (per cent)	Millions US $	Share in total world Exports (per cent)	
1973	5,708	1.0	4,703	0.8	— 1,005
1974	8,810	1.0	5,975	0.7	— 2,835
1975	10,784	1.0	6,400	0.7	— 4,384
1976	9,529	0.9	7,785	0.8	— 1,744
1977	11,082	1.0	8,878	0.8	— 2,204
1978	13,878	1.0	9,628	0.7	— 4,250
1979	17,521	1.1	11,619	0.7	— 5,902
1980	24,283	1.2	12,562	0.6	— 11,721
1981	26,976	1.4	12,936	0.7	— 14,040
1982	25,761	1.5	12,780	0.8	— 12,825
1983	23,025	1.3	13,467	0.8	— 10,558

Source : 1) International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics, Year Book 1981 and 1984.*
2) United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, January 1982.
3) Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, *Annual Reports.*

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TABLE 2

Intra-regional Exports of South Asia

(*Value US $million*)

Destination/ Origin	*Year*	*India*	*Pakistan*	*Bangladesh*	*Sri Lanka*	*Nepal*	*Total*	*World*	*Percentage share of South Asia in total exports*
India	1973	—	—	174.0	10.0	37.0	221.0	2958	7.5
	1976	—	5.0	59.0	32.0	57.0	153.0	5020	3.0
	1979	—	11.0	98.0	121.0	77.0	307.0	7679	4.0
	1982	—	4.0	39.0	66.0	78.0	187.0	9322	2.0
	1983	—	6.0	36.0	105.0	85.0	232.0	9705	2.4
Pakistan	1973	0.1	—	—	13.3	—	13.4	951.8	1.4
	1976	—	—	10.9	50.1	0.1	61.1	1162.1	5.3
	1979	36.4		48.3	41.3	0.1	126.1	2055.8	6.1
	1982	50.5	—	75.2	16.2	0.1	142.0	2401,7	5.9
	1983	28.5	—	41.2	11.7	0.2	81.6	3074.9	2.7
Bangladesh	1973	23.3	—	—	2.2	—	25.5	357.0	7.1
	1976	7.1	10.7	—	0.6	0.1	18.5	400.8	4.6
	1979	12.1	37.4	—	2.0	0.1	51.6	658.7	7.8
	1982	20.3	42.1	—	0.5	0.1	63.0	769.4	8.2
	1983	6.9	51.4	—	0.5	2.8	61.6	724.5	8.5
Sri Lanka	1973	1.6	33.3	—	—	—	34.9	403.9	8.6
	1976	0.2	42.9	2.4	—	—	45.5	569.5	8.0
	1979	12.5	44.1	4.1	—	—	60.7	978.1	6.2
	1982	21.2	38.2	3.5	—	0.1	63.0	996.2	6.3
	1983	27.7	29.7	4.7	—	0.2	62.3	1053.8	5.9
Nepal	1973	14.5	—	2.6	—	—	17.1	26.80	63.8
	1976	35.1	0.5	—	—	—	35.6	51.3	69.4
	1979	17.3	2.8	7.9	0.1	—	28.1	68.1	41.3
	1982	15.4	0.7	0.5	—	—	16.6	49.2	33.7
	1983	16.9	0.4	—			20.9	60.2	—
Total	1973						311.9	4697.5	6.6
	1976						313.7	7203.7	4.4
	1979						573.5	11439.7	5.0
	1982						471.6	13538.5	3.5
	1983						458.4	14619.1	3.1

Source : IMF, *Direction of Trade* 1980, 1983, 1984.

TABLE 3

Intra-Regional Imports of South Asia

(*Value US $ Million*)

Destination/	*Year*	*India*	*Pakistan*	*Bangladesh*	*Sri Lanka*	*Nepal*	*Total*	*World*	*Percentage share of South Asia in total imports*
India	1973	—	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	4.1	9.8
	1976	—	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	5.1	7.8
	1979	—	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	6.1	6.6
	1982	—	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	6.1	6.6
	1983	—	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	6.1	6.6
Pakistan	1973	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	4.1	4.9
	1976	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	5.1	3.9
	1979	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
	1982	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
	1983	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
Bangladesh	1973	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	4.1	4.9
	1976	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	5.1	3.9
	1979	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
	1982	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
	1983	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
Sri Lanka	1973	0.1	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.3	4.1	7.3
	1976	0.1	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.3	5.1	5.9
	1979	0.1	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.3	6.1	4.9
	1982	0.1	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.3	6.1	4.9
	1983	0.1	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.3	6.1	4.9
Nepal	1973	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	4.1	4.9
	1976	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	5.1	3.9
	1979	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
	1982	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
	1983	0.1	—	—	0.1	—	0.2	6.1	3.3
Total	1973						1.3	4697.5	0.3
	1976						1.4	7203.7	0.2
	1979						1.4	11439.7	0.1
	1982						1.4	13538.5	0.1
	1983						1.4	14619.1	0.1

Source : IMF, *Direction of Trade* 1980, 1983, 1984.

	1982					471.6	13538.5	3.5
	1983					458.4	14619.1	3.1

Source : IMF, *Direction of Trade* 1980, 1983, 1984.

TABLE 3

Intra-Regional Imports of South Asia

(*Value US $ Million*)

Destination/ Origin	*Year*	*India*	*Pakistan*	*Bangladesh*	*Sri Lanka*	*Nepal*	*Total*	*World*	*Percentage of share of South Asia to total Imports*
India	1973	—	—	23.0	2.0	16.0	41.0	3234	1.3
	1976	—	5.0	10.0	—	39.0	54.0	5102	1.1
	1979	—	30.0	5.0	11.2	19.0	65.0	9899	0.7
	1982	—	56.0	22.0	23.0	17.0	118.0	18005	0.7
	1983	—	31.0	8.0	31.0	15.0	85.0	16887	0.5
Pakistan	1973	—	—	—	32.0	0.4	32.4	974.0	3.3
	1976	4.9	—	11.9	43.3	0.8	60.9	2132.7	2.9
	1979	26.5	—	36.2	48.7	3.2	114.6	4060.7	2.8
	1982	4.0	—	62.2	39.3	1.0	106.5	5459.6	2.0
	1983	7.0	—	64.3	33.3	0.6	105.2	5323.8	2.0
Bangladesh	1973	114.8	—	—	2.6	2.8	120.2	873.3	13.8
	1976	58.5	9.2	—	1.4	—	69.1	941	7.3
	1979	40.0	22.0	—	4.1	8.6	74.7	1908.4	3.9
	1982	43.3	25.5	—	3.0	0.5	72.3	2463.1	2.9
	1983	37.6	21.8	—	4.8	—	64.2	2308.1	2.8
Sri Lanka	1973	12.5	16.9	—	—	—	29.4	422.4	7.0
	1976	21.4	32.3	—	—	—	53.7	549.1	9.8
	1979	149.9	31.7	1.6	—	0.1	183.3	1449	12.7
	1982	72.9	17.6	0.2	—	—	90.7	1773.2	5.1
	1983	115.4	13.5	0.6	—	—	129.5	1787.2	7.2
Nepal	1973	41.2	—	—	—	—	41.2	64,9	6.3
	1976	62.6	0.10	0.10	—	—	62.8	93.7	6.7
	1979	84.7	0.20	0.10	—	—	85.0	163.5	52.0
	1982	85.2	—	0.10	—	—	85.3	253.7	33.6
	1983	76.7	0.20	3.0	—	—	79.9	247.8	32.2
Total	1973						264.2	5568.6	4.7
	1976						300.5	8818.5	3.4
	1979						522.6	17480.6	3.0
	1982						472.8	27954.6	1.7
	1983						463.8	26553.9	1.7

Source : IMF, *Direction of Trade*, 1980, 1983, 1984.

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TABLE 4

Intra-Regional Balance of Trade of South Asia

(*Value US $ millions*)

Origin/ Destination	*Year*	*India*	*Pakistan*	*Bangladesh*	*Sri Lanka*	*Nepal*	*Total*
India	1973	—	—	+ 151.0	+ 8.0	+ 21.0	+ 180.0
	1976	—	0.0	+ 49.0	+ 32.0	+ 18.0	+ 99.0
	1979	—	— 19.0	+ 93.0	+ 110.0	+ 58.0	+ 242.0
	1982	—	— 52.0	+ 17.0	+ 43.0	+ 61.0	+ 69.0
	1983	—	— 25.0	+ 28.0	+ 74.0	+ 70.0	+ 147.0
Pakistan	1973		—	—	— 18.7	— 0.4	— 19.0
	1976		—	— 1.0	+ 6.8	— 0.7	— 0.2
	1979		—	+ 12.1	— 7.4	— 3.1	+ 11.5
	1982		—	+ 13.0	— 23.1	— 0.9	+ 35.5
	1983		—	— 23.1	— 21.6	— 0.4	— 23.6
Bangladesh	1973			—	— 0.4	— 2.8	— 94.7
	1976			—	— 0.8	+ 0.1	— 50.6
	1979			—	— 2.1	— 8.6	— 23.1
	1982			—	— 2.5	— 0.4	— 9.3
	1983			—	— 4.3	+ 2.8	— 2.6
Sri Lanka	1973				—	—	+ 5.5
	1976				—	—	— 8.2
	1979				—	— 0.1	— 122.6
	1982				—	+ 0.1	— 27.7
	1983				—	+ 0.2	— 67.2
Nepal	1973					—	— 24.1
	1976					—	— 27.2
	1979					—	— 56.9
	1982					—	— 68.7
	1983					—	— 59.0

Source : Tables 2 and 3.

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FOOD SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

By B.M. BHATIA*

Agricultural and rural development and the eradication of hunger and malnutrition are among the chief aims of the international development strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade. In realising these aims the major focus has to be on achievement of national and collective self-sufficiency in food in developing countries. This international concern for agricultural and rural development in developing countries and securing adequate supplies of food for the peoples of these countries to eradicate hunger and endemic malnutrition among them, is of particular interest to South Asia which is the most populated and one of the poorest geographical regions of the world.

AN OVERVIEW

THE total population of the seven countries of South Asia, namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in mid-1982 was 932.1 millions. On the basis of the current demographic trends, this number would grow by the end of the present century to 1356 million, that is to 22.5 per cent of the world population, which is estimated to rise to 6 billion by that time. As against that, South Asia produces only 12 per cent of the world output of foodgrains. If present trends in agricultural production are allowed to continue in the countries of the region, its share of foodgrains production in the total world output may suffer a decline rather than show an improvement. This fear arises from the fact that in spite of the impact of the green revolution, the growth of foodgrains production in the countries of South Asia in the seventies has not been spectacular. For instance, in India the output of foodgrains registered an increase from 100 million tonnes at the beginning of the seventies to 133 million tonnes at the end of that decade. During the same period, production in Pakistan went up from 12 million to 18 million tonnes, and in Bangladesh from 17 to 21 million tonnes. In Nepal production remained static at around 4 million tonnes while in Sri Lanka the increase was from 1.5 million to 2 million tonnes. This all adds up to growth in the region of the order experienced by the rest of world so that since the end of the sixties the share of South Asia in world foodgrains production has remained constant at 12 per cent.

Source : Tables 2 and 3.

In terms of the World Bank's classification of countries in its Annual Development Report, all the seven countries in South Asia fall in the cate-

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gory of low-income economies defined as those having a per capita income of less than US $ 410. In 1983, the per capita income of Bhutan was US $ 80, Bangladesh $ 140. Nepal $ 150, India $ 260, Sri Lanka $ 300 and Pakistan $ 350. It may be of interest to note in this connection that China also falls in the category of low-income countries with a per capita income of $ 300 in 1983, which is exactly the same as that of Sri Lanka. Of the seven South Asian countries, three, viz., Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are classified as "least developed."

Out of the estimated total of around 420 million undernourished people in the world in 1974-76, 288 million, or 68.9 per cent of the total, lived in Asia ; the larger majority of these being in South Asia The undernourished in Asia formed 26 per cent of the total population of the continent. Taking South Asia separately, the proportion of the undernourished to the total population works out at 34 per cent.

In 1980, the daily calorie supply per capita to the population of the South Asian countries stood at 94 per cent of the average nutritional requirements worked out by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) on the basis of health standards. Even this figure does not adequately convey the extent of food deficiency in some of the countries of the region because of wide variations in conditions that exist from country to country in this regard. Thus in Bangladesh, the daily supply of calories per capita in 1980 was 84 per cent of the standard requirement ; in Bhutan 90 per cent ; in India 87 per cent ; and in Nepal 86 per cent. In the other countries of the region, Pakistan and Sri Lanka it was 106 and 102 per cent respectively.

The growth rates of cereal production in the countries of the region in the seventies were disappointingly low. With the triennium ending in 1971 as the base, the compound annual growth rates in Bangladesh were 2.3 per cent ; Bhutan 2.4 per cent ; India 2.2 per cent ; Nepal 0.1 per cent ; Pakistan 3.9 per cent ; and Sri Lanka 3.6 per cent. For the first three years of the current decade, the annual growth rates were : Bangladesh 0.5 per cent; Bhutan 1.6 per cent ; India (minus) 1.6 per cent ; Nepal (minus) 2.6 per cent ; Pakistan 2.2 per cent and Sri Lanka 0.2 per cent. In all the seven countries the growth rate of cereal production in the first three years of the current decade was lower than the population growth rates while in the last decade, in four countries it was lower than the growth of the population ; in one i.e. India, it was equal to the population growth rate, and in two countries, somewhat higher than population growth rates.

The region as a whole continues to be dependent on imports to meet a part of its food requirements though India and Pakistan are now nearing self-sufficiency in foodgrains production. Foodstuff, including foodgrains, imports in Bangladesh accounted for 25 per cent of the country's total import bill for the year 1980. For other countries of the region the

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corresponding figures were : Sri Lanka 20 per cent ; Pakistan 13 per cent ; India 9 per cent and Nepal 4 per cent.

Dependence on imports for a part of the food supply in these countries is compounded by their growing balance of payments difficulties. Deficit on current payment account of all non-oil exporting developing countries in 1981 was $ 107.7 billion ; of this six South Asian countries accounted for $ 6.1 billion. Deficit in the case of India was $ 4.04 billion ; Bangladesh $ 1.02 billion ; Pakistan $ 0.936 billion ; Nepal $ 0.019 billion and Sri Lanka $ 0.441 billion. The rising price of foodgrains in the world markets amidst falling prices of other agricultural produce in recent years has further added to the difficulties of food deficit countries. Thus for the countries of Asia and the Pacific region, or ESCAP as a whole, about US $ 9679 million worth of cereals were imported into the region in 1981 marking an increase of 11.8 per cent over the previous year. Despite this increase in expenditure on cereal imports, the quantity of cereals imported into the region was 11.1 per cent below the level of 1980. The reduction in the quantity imported was not simply a reflection of reduced requirements but was also the result of severe balance of payments constraints arising out of the terms of trade deterioration, which centred on price movements of major agricultural commodities imported into and exported out of the region. Thus according to the World Bank Annual Report 1982, while prices of most agricultural export commodities declined during 1981 ranging between 10 to 40 per cent, prices of major cereal imports increased by 3-11 per cent.

Still another factor affecting the economic fortunes of the countries of South Asia is the condition of annual rainfall. The economies of South Asia, with large agricultural sectors and dependence on exports linked with agricultural production, have shown a considerable degree of vulnerability to the vagaries of the weather. Bangladesh and India, two of the larger agricultural economies of South Asia, suffered large declines in their agricultural production and through it in their annual GDP growth rates due to drought in 1979-80 and 1981-82. As against the annual average of 5.8 per cent in 1975-80, the GDP growth rate in Bangladesh was 1.1 per cent in 1982 while growth rate of agriculture was minus 0.7 per cent compared to the average growth rate of 3.4 per cent during 1975-80. In the case of India, as against the average annual GDP growth rate of 4 per eent and that of agriculture 1.5 per cent during 1975-80, GDP growth rate in 1979-80 was minus 5.1 and agricultural growth rate minus 15.2 in 1979-80. The corresponding figures for 1982-83 for the country were 1.8 and a negative 4 per cent.

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IMPERATIVES FOR FOOD SECURITY SYSTEMS

Need for Agricultural Growth

Obviously the key to the solution of the problems of endemic poverty, hunger and malnutrition, as also to that of rapid economic growth in South Asian countries lies in a robust and steady growth of the agricultural sector in these countries. One would wish that this had been realised by the leaders and planners of the countries concerned at the very start of the developmental process after the independence of these countries from colonial rule. But the Western industrialisation model of development cast a spell which made them forget in the initial stages the peculiarities and imperatives of development in the special circumstances in which they were placed at the time. That it was a mistake to adopt the heavy industry model of development without first laying a sound base of agricultural development is now being realised. Agriculture is now being given increasing importance in the development plans of these countries. The characterisation of the Third United Nations Development Decade as the Agriculture and Rural Development Decade is thus fully in keeping with the needs and spirit of the times,

Agricultural output has been targeted to grow on an average at 4 per cent per annum in the developing economies during the current Development Decade. Instruments of policy aimed at achieving these objectives include price incentives, credit distribution, improvement of storage and transport facilities, reduction of post-harvest losses, agrarian reforms, wider access to water resources and other ingredients of improved technology, development of forests, fisheries and agro-industries, better integration of women in all stages of production processes and the establishment of agricultural cooperatives. These policy thrusts at the national level are proposed to be supplemented through the concerned international agencies by the international community by provision of increased financial and technical support to expand production, conclusion of a new international grain agreement as a part of building a new system of world food security, augmentation of the resources of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and of the World FoodProgra mme (WFP), implementation of the Food Security Assistance Scheme of the Food and Agricultural Organisation strengthening the Food Aid Convention and the International Emergency Food Reserve.

International Action for a Food Security System

Proposals for building a strong international food security system made in the wake of the international food crisis of 1972-74 and the world food crisis of 1974 have run into heavy water. A new International Grain Agreement that was seen to be the kingpin of the world food security system has

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eluded grasp till this day. Disappointed after efforts for five years to secure that agreement the Director General of FAO launched a Plan of Action in 1979 to secure at least some action towards fulfilment of the objectives of the World Food Security System envisaged in the undertaking.

The Action Plan was a five-point plan for international action towards building a global system of food security. These included : 1 adoption of foodgrain stocks policies on a global, regional and national basis ; 2 formulation of criteria for management of release of national stocks held in pursuance of the undertaking (adopted at World Food Conference) ; 3 calling on all donor countries to take special measures to assist low-income food deficit countries to meet current import requirements and emergency needs; 4 making special arrangements for food security assistance to most affected countries ; and 5 calling for collective self-reliance of developing countries. On this last point the Plan of Action required that :— (a) the international community should recognise the urgent need for fostering the collective self-reliance of developing countries in the vital sector of food security ; (b) to this end, developing countries should intensify their efforts to establish cooperative arrangements, including the setting up of regional reserves, to strengthen their food security and collective capacity to meet emergency food requirements ; (c) in particular, the governments concerned should consider joint action on reserve stocks held nationally or regionally, mutual action in times of shortfalls, special arrangements among developing food importing and food exporting countries, joint investment ventures in food production as well as exchange of technology ; and (d) concerned international financial and technical organisations and the developed and other potentially contributing countries should extend all necessary support to promote such efforts by developing countries to strengthen collective self-reliance.

Since then, FAO has been vigorously pursuing the aim of organising collective action on the part of developing countries on a regional basis. In the pursuit of that aim, a number of regional conferences have been organised periodically under the aegis of FAO in Africa, Latin America and Asia with the dual objective of promoting cooperative effort on the part of developing countries in each region in establishing a regional food security system and for taking stock of the progress made region-wise in the implementation of provisions of the FAO Plan of Action.

Call for Regional Systems

The Non-Aligned Movement has also expressed itself strongly in favour of the idea of collective action on the part of developing non-aligned countries, to organise regional food security systems. The Sixth Non-Aligned Summit at Havana in 1979 regretting "the almost total lack of implementation of the recommendations of the World Food Conference,

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particularly the target for food aid and its forward planning institutions of the system of international food security," called upon the member developing countries to "expeditiously set up a food security system of their own." For this purpose, experts of coordinating countries were asked to undertake a comprehensive study of the subject and draw up proposals for the establishment of food security systems for themselves. Four broad areas of cooperation suggested in this connection were mutual assistance, joint ventures, emergency arrangements and trade relations. More specifically, collective action was suggested to be taken for accelerating the growth rate of food production in the cooperating countries, helping to establish region-wise food security infrastructures, making trade and mutual assistance arrangements to meet food emergencies and entering into a region-wise food security pact, thereby signalling political commitment of member countries to the philosophy of the system of regional food security. The Seventh NAM Summit, held at New Delhi, reiterated the need for regional cooperation on the part of the non-aligned developing countries in the matter of building food security for them and endorsed in this connection, the report of experts of the coordinating countries drawn up in terms of the resolution of the Havana Summit. It must however be admitted that non-aligned countries have not been able to move beyond expressions of good intentions and desire for cooperation in the matter.

Some regional groupings for establishing food security have nevertheless taken place independently of the Non-Aligned Movement. The most outstanding example of regional grouping for the purpose is that of ASEAN countries which have set up a collective rice reserve of 50,000 tonnes to be used for helping a member country in the event of shortfall in its food production in any year due to climatic or other reasons. Contributions to the reserve and releases from it are managed collectively by a committee consisting of representatives of all the member ASEAN countries. In the Caribbean, a Disaster Relief Fund has been established by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to assist the least developed countries of the sub-region and further measures to promote food security are being taken by the Economic Committee of the Caribbean. The Arab Organisation for Agricultural Development has prepared a comprehensive study on food security programme for the Arab countries. The Ministerial Council of the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in Sahel (CILLS) has approved an FAO Feasibility Study for the setting up of a coordinating system of national and regional food reserves at a total estimated cost of US $ 217 million. The Southern African Heads of State decided some time back to call for a regional food security plan and the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) accordingly undertook to draw up a scheme for a comprehensive regional programme for food security. A high level meeting in Mexico was held under

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the auspices of *Sistema Economic Latino Americano* (SELA) in August 1981 to consider the steps to be taken to organise a food security system for the Latin American region. The secretariat of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific Region (ESCAP) has prepared a comprehensive study on food supply and distribution systems in the ESCAP region. This study has suggested setting up a food security reserve for South Asia on the lines of the reserve established by the ASEAN countries.

The key element in various proposals for establishing regional food security systems is the provision of buffer stocks of foodgrains, both at the national and regional levels, which would meet food emergencies arising out of temporary dislocation of supplies in a member country or countries. The purpose in view of all these proposals and schemes is crisis management. They do not go into the problem of endemic food deficit that most of the developing countries face. The remedy lies in collective action aimed at increase of food production and substantial shifting upwards of the normal food supply curve in these countries. This requires rapid growth of agricultural production in these countries. The focus of attention in the development plans of the non-oil producing third world countries for the next one or two decades has to be on agricultural development. The designation of the United Nations Third Development Decade as the Agricultural and Rural Development Decade is a recognition of this basic reality of the current international economic scene.

Policy Measures to Promote Rapid Agricultural Development

That agricultural development requires a massive investment thrust for the creation of infrastructures like irrigation, technological research, extension services, fertiliser plants and transport and communication services is well understood. What has not been adequately realised is that even massive investments cannot produce the desired results unless this is simultaneously supported by appropriate policy thrusts at the national level. Two policy directions are most important in this connection. These are : price intervention or price policy in respect of agricultural produce pursued by governments and extension of credit facilities to the farmer, particularly to the small and marginal farmer. Other requisites for starting the process of agricultural development in countries where it has not yet begun and accelerating the pace of the process in others are land reforms as well as restructuring the whole field of agrarian economy. But it has now come to be widely recognised among social scientists and policy makers that to wish for radical reform measures by the present ruling elites in most of the developing countries is to ask for the moon. The fact is that a considerable part of the ruling class in developing agricultural countries is formed by landed interests or the rural elite which will not allow a self denying ordinance to be passed through the country's legis-

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lature and let their holdings be divided and redistributed to the landless. Recognising this political reality, land reforms are either not mentioned or put in low key in the discussions in international forums on policy measures required to promote rapid development of agriculture in the Third World countries.

Governments' intervention in the market for agricultural commodities has now become a common feature of development policies of developing countries. The purposes behind such intervention are : to establish floor prices that are high enough to provide incentives to producers, especially immediately after the harvest when market prices tend to sag; to procure supplies to feed the public distribution system and to divert supplies to the domestic market from external markets. Governments also subsidise the prices of fertiliser and chemicals, water, credit research and extension services and transport in order to spread widely the new technology in agriculture and a more intensive cultivation of land ; lack of coordination in government policies of subsidisation of inputs on one side and offering incentive prices for farm produce on the other, has prevented full benefits of these liberal policies being reaped in promoting agricultural production. What has happened instead is that rich farmers have appropriated to themselves the larger part of the government largesse and have enriched themselves thereby defeating the principal purpose of general agricultural development that these policies had in view. This is illustrated by the experience of South Asian countries in the matter.

EXPERIENCE OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

In Bangladesh, as in India, the primary objective of the government intervention in the market for agricultural produce is procurement of rice and wheat to meet the needs of the subsidised public distribution system. Purchases at the minimum price also provide support to post-harvest prices, which may otherwise drop to unremunerative levels. Procurement prices in Bangladesh were raised by about 30 per cent in the fiscal year 1982-83 over that of 1979-80. The same has happened in India. Simultaneously the policy of subsidising the price of chemical fertiliser as well as irrigation water continues. At the beginning of fiscal year 1982-83, the level of subsidy on chemical fertiliser stood at 30 per cent of the actual cost in Bangladesh. In India, the cost of subsidy on fertiliser has risen from Rs. 648 crores in 1982-83 to Rs. 1048 crores in 1983-84 (revised estimates) and Rs. 1080 crores in 1984-85 (budget estimates). At the same time subsidy on foodgrains in India has come to Rs. 835 crores in 1983-84 (revised estimates) and is budgeted to cost the exchequer Rs. 850 crores in 1984-85.

Other South Asian countries show the same situation. Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have followed over the years similar policies combinning

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output-price-support and input-subsidisation at heavy cost to the exchequer but of doubtful benefit to the cause of overall agricultural growth. Pakistan has consistently tried to bring down the cost of subsidies since 1976 and has achieved considerable success in that direction. This has not hampered agricultural production in that country. On the contrary, the country has achieved compound annual growth rate of 3.9 per cent in cereal production between 1971 and 1981 compared to 2.3 per cent in Bangladesh, 2.2 per cent in India, 0.1 per cent in Nepal and 3.6 per cent in Sri Lanka. That raises the question of the soundness of the price and fiscal policies pursued by South Asian countries in the agricultural field.

Historically these policies have arisen out of two concerns of the governments of the countries of the region : a desire to control prices of foodgrains and essential wage-goods and to feed the urban non-food producing population at reasonable prices and providing a measure of relief to the "depressed" agricultural industry through grants and fiscal concessions. Conditions of production in agriculture have undergone basic changes in the last twenty years. Agriculture has, in many parts, come to be tried as a business like any other business by the farmer, at least in those parts of the region which have witnessed the Green Revolution. The farmer now carefully calculates the cost of inputs and the price he is paid for his produce in taking his decisions on his crop pattern and the amount of inputs he should use. A glaring example of this being a fact is provided by the sudden jump in foodgrains production in India this year. After four years of stagnation in production, foodgrains output in the country jumped from 128 million tonnes in 1982-83 to 149.8 million tonnes or around 150 million as the latest official estimates claim it to be, in 1983-84. Good weather has certainly contributed to this happy result. But one must not forget the 7.5 per cent cut in fertiliser price given by the government and the distribution of minikits of improved seeds and fertilisers by the Agriculture Ministry all over the country to lakhs of small and marginal farmers free of charge. The contribution of these measures to this year's record production is not to be minimised. In fact, last year's experience of India in the matter holds valuable lessons in price and fiscal policies towards agriculture not only for this country but also for other countries of the region.

Agriculture in South Asia has reached a stage of development where a dispassionate analysis of cost and benefit of the current official agricultural policies is urgently called for. The benefits of running a public distribution system with the object of ensuring a minimum necessary supply of foodgrains at much below the open market price even after payment of heavy subsidy from the exchequer are to be set against the disincentive to the farmer that this indirect price control method provides. It has been stipulated by some agricultural economists on the basis of farm data from India that technology rather than price incentive should be the engine of growth for

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agriculture in developing countries and that the cost of price incentives used as a means of growth would be prohibitive. These economists have stigmatised those advocating price incentives as "price fundamentalists." The fallacy involved in their argument is the implicit assumption that the "fundamentalists" advocate reliance on price incentives to the exclusion of use of modern technology for promoting agricultural growth. The actual position is otherwise. The "fundamentalists" feel that populist food control policies of governments in developing countries are preventing these countries from deriving the full benefits of modern technology and therefore, further spread of the Green Revolution in these countries. The benefits of subsidies on irrigation water, electricity and fertilisers are being wasted so far as overall agricultural growth is concerned because these are appropriated, on the one hand, by the rich and politically powerful farmers and on the other, they breed inefficiency in the use of previous resources like water and production of chemical fertiliser which has established itself in recent years as the catalyst of raising yield levels in agriculture of the developing countries. The whole question of agricultural price policy, thus, deserves far more dispassionate enquiry and discussion than what it has received so far.

Closely linked with the adoption of appropriate price and fiscal policies for promoting agricultural growth is the question of providing adequate quantities of credit to the farm sector for purchase of needed inputs by the farmer in time as also extending to him medium-term loans for land improvements, purchase of farm machinery and establishment of irrigation facilities. Some of the more perceptive enquiries in India in recent years into the imperatives of rural and agricultural development have revealed that the biggest need of the farmers in the countries undergoing agricultural transformation today is an adequate supply of commercial credit.

The available information clearly suggests that in most countries of South Asia, there have been significant increases in the disbursement of agricultural credit in recent years. Over the period 1976-82 Bangladesh, for example, recorded almost a nine-fold increase from Taka 902 million in 1976 to Taka 8,910 million in 1982 in agricultural advances. There is a growing involvement of commercial banks in the field of agricultural credit and it is this that has made possible the rapid expansion of credit to the agriculturists. Thus in India for example, the share of credit to the agricultural sector from the public sector banks' total credit increased from 5.4 per cent in 1969 to 13.7 per cent in 1979 and to 16.2 per cent in 1981. The Indian Government has laid down that a minimum of 40 per cent of the share of the nationalised banks' total advances should go to the priority sectors, which include agriculture, by March 1985. The share of agriculture alone has been fixed at 16 per cent. Pakistan is another South Asian country which has recorded remark-

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able growth of agricultural credit over the period ; agricultural advances in that country have grown from Rs. 1,458 million in 1976 to Rs. 5,102 million in 1982, while the share of agricultural credit in total bank advances has been stepped up from 28 per cent in 1972-73 to 48 per cent in 1981-82. The showings of Nepal and Sri Lanka in the matter are, however, poor to say the least. In Nepal total disbursed agricultural credit in 1979 was 250 million Nepalese Rupees ; it fell to 166 million Nepalese Rupees in 1981 but rose next year to 314 million Nepalese Rupees. In Sri Lanka, instead of growth there was a decline in the volume of agricultural credit from Rs. 115 million in 1976 to 82 million in 1980, which improved to 105 million in 1981.

While it is important to make efforts at improvement in the share of agriculture in the total disbursement of credit in Nepal and Sri Lanka, even in the three other countries which have shown impressive increases in agricultural credit in recent years, a number of issues have emerged in this connection that merit the urgent attention of policy makers. Most studies in the countries of South Asia, as in other Third World countries, point to the dominance of bigger farmers in access to institutional sources of finance while the poor and politically weaker sections of the agricultural population has to still depend largely on the traditional source of the village moneylender. This tends to exacerbate the gap between the well-off and the poor in the rural areas. The main problem here is to reconcile the need to provide adequate credit at reasonable prices to small farmers with the high cost of administering a large number of small loans. A number of expedients like cooperatives and establishment of regional rural banks have been tried but the results achieved so far have not proved too satisfactory. Relevant to this issue are subsidies, on agricultural credit disbursed through institutional channels. Though the exact magnitude of subsidy cannot be quantified most countries of the region provide varying levels of subsidy by charging on agricultural advances discriminately lower rates of interest than on non-agricultural credit. Because of limited access to these sources by the small farmers the benefits of the subsidy are appropriated by the larger farmer. Moreover there is evidence to suggest that the rate of default in repayment of loans is higher among the latter. Relatively large loans are given to keep the unit cost down. However, the higher rate of default among these borrowers does not contribute to the financial viability of credit institutions. A credit policy that more closely takes into account opportunity cost, may help to ease the problem somewhat. This may ensure the financial viability of credit institutions, while permitting better availability of credit to small farmers by easing out demand from bigger farmers for purposes with low rates of return.

Excepting in Sri Lanka, the proportion of resources allocated to agriculture in the total plan outlays in their respective development plans falls much below the share of agriculture in the GDPs of the countries of South

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Asia. As against 54 per cent share of agriculture in the country's GDP in 1981, the agriculture sector in Bangladesh in the 1980-85 Plan received 17.4 per cent of the plan outlay while irrigation was allotted another 14.9 per cent. The two together account for a little less than one third of the total plan outlay in the country. In India, the corresponding figures are 37 per cent, 11 per cent and 12.5 per cent. The allotment on agriculture and irrigation thus comes to less than one-fourth of the total plan outlay in the Sixth Plan compared to 37 per cent share of agriculture in the country's GDP in 1981. In Nepal, agriculture and irrigation together claim 27 per cent of the plan outlay for 1980-85 against around 60 per cent share of agriculture in the country's GDP. In its Sixth Plan covering 1983-88, Pakistan allots 4.8 per cent of the plan resources to agriculture and another 10.8 per cent to irrigation, with agriculture accounting for 30 per cent share in the country's GDP. The share of agriculture in the GDP of Sri Lanka was 28 per cent, but the resource allotment in the country's 1980-85 Plan to agriculture and irrigation stands at much higher proportion of 44.6 per cent. This, however, is because of the inclusion in the current plan of the expansive Mahaweli Irrigation Project which has disproportionately inflated the share of the agricultural sector in the total plan allocations in the current plan of the country.

While there is a case for investments in agriculture being further intensified in the countries of South Asia, two pertinent issues in this connection require close attention. First, as with other investments careful attention needs to be given to the cost benefit analysis of the investments in agriculture with full regard for externalities (especially likely for agricultural and rural development projects). Secondly, it is of great importance to determine who is likely to be benefited by investments funded from public resources. If the objective of agricultural development is not to be merely increased production but elimination of hunger and malnutrition as well and thus to provide a strong base for food security of the region, conscious integration of distributional aspects into project formulation deserve greater attention than usually given until now.

In the programme for regional cooperation adopted by the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) countries, food security directly does not find a place. But this only means that SARC has its eye on long-term cooperation among the member countries and is not yet prepared for coping with problems of immediate concern. However, by putting agriculture in the forefront of the areas selected for regional cooperation, SARC has taken a momentous step towards building a solid base for food security in the region. That the approach to regional cooperation in the SARC programme is cautious and confined largely to exchange of information on developments in the agricultural fields in the respective countries and of results of research, training of agricultural scientists and extension workers, is understandable considering the milieu of political relations in which

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the SARC Agreement had to be drawn up. In the given circumstances, the agreement is a great achievement. It is to be hoped that compulsions of the economic situation and urgency of solving the basic problems of hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity that are common to all the countries of the region will, in due course, lead to an accelerated pace of economic cooperation among the member countries of SARC.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

SOUTH ASIA'S QUEST FOR AN IDENTITY AND SARC

SCHOLARS of international politics in the post-war period have devoted conidcrable attention to identify a number of distinct geographical regions of the world for the purpose of undertaking an indepth analysis of their behaviour patterns in the global, inter-regional and intra-regional spheres. Many such studies have been pioneered by scholars like Louis J. Cantori, Steven L. Spiegal, Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch, Bruce Russet, Michael Brecher, etc. For instance, one comes across a large number of independent studies on areas like West Europe, East Europe, Latin America, West Asia, Africa, etc. These studies have highlighted the clearly discernible attributes of a specific region. At times, they have made an indepth analysis of their behaviour pattern both in global or regional forms. Besides several attempts have also been made to carve out a special identity for some of the above mentioned regions.

So far as South Asia is concerned, admittedly, it has not drawn such attention of scholars. Many Western scholars in course of their reflections on the Third World, have either minimised the importance of South Asia in the global area or have brought it together with the Southeast Asian region for the purpose of viable analysis of the so-called Southern Asian sub-system.

The purpose here is to critically examine some of the existing propositions on global regions and to see how far these can be relevant to study South Asia. While trying to understand the identification of a subordinate system (or a region) through indices like a core, periphery and the intrusive sector, an attempt would be made to examine their applicability to the South Asian region. Besides, it will be seen as to how far South Asia provides a case *sui generis* by not following the set pattern of other global regions. Here the various prerequisites of a distinct region as identified by Michael Brecher will be examined. Thereafter the rationale for the emergence of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) will be reviewed. In course of that one will see how far the quest of South Asia for a special identity in the comity of nations holds good.

In other words, the study will mainly respond to the following questions. First, does South Asia fit into the clear demacration of global regions? If so, what are its peculiarities? Second, can one identify the relationship between the core and periphery in a region in terms of cooperation and integration only, or alternatively, can it also be determined in terms of conflict and disharmony? Third, can one assume that the emergence of SARC is a major landmark for the South Asian sub-continent? Does it enhance its claim for a special identify in international politics? Finally, having initially overcome the preliminary obstacles for regional cooperation, are the ruling elites in South Asia really serious about intitutionaliz-

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ing major cooperative ventures after the forthcoming summit meeting in late 1985 ?

I
EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF REGION

Till the beginning of the present century, studies on foreign policies had nation states as their major focus. Even after the end of the First World War, the psychological reaction against balance of power politics led to an universalistic approach. However, with the failure of the League of Nations, the return of alliance theory, and the demands of security during the Second World War, the concept of the region came in vogue. Such a concept initially had an eurocentric thrust. In the late forties however, two significant phenomena occurred : (a) the emergence of the USSR and the USA as formidable super powers competing for domination and control on a global scale and (b) the emergence of a large number of recently decolonised "new" states. It was assumed that these states would be appendages in the polarised world in one form or another and that interactions would be mainly in the nature of reactions to the initiatives of powerful states—their former metropolis or the newly emergent super powers. As such, the super powers and the metropolis were perceived to be the most critical variable towards an understanding of international politics. The importance of certain regions or otherwise was viewed in relation to their position in the big power rivalry and competition.

Such an assumption was belied by : (a) the successful attempts at organisation on a regional basis in Europe as well as Latin America or even the Economic Commissions organised under the United Nations and (b) the change in the international environment. The movement of Cold War from *detente* and bipolarity to multipolarity has made it possible for the region to emerge as a significant force in the international arena.

The nature and tenor of such cooperation and collaboration has varied from issue to issue, state to state. And yet, there is no doubt that over the years, there has been an increasing effort on the part of the Third World states to find a niche for themselves at the regional, inter-regional and inter-continental planes. Organisations like the ASEAN or OAU, etc., underline such intra-inter-regional cooperational efforts in politico-economic spheres with a view to enhance their manoeuvrability and bargaining power *vis-a-vis* the dominant powers.

II
REGION DEFINED

To begin with, the term region can be defined as a cohesive and homogenous area, demarcated from other areas by the dictates of history and geography. Russet emphasizes on several indices like "homogeneity,

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interdependence, confrontation of ad hoc problems, acting as a *via-media* for effecting control and decentralisation of political power." According to him, the regions are "ordinary, common and practical geographical areas for which social and economic improvement programmes have been conceived, planned and undertaken."[1]

However, with the ascendancy of the system theorists, two other words "sub-system" and "subordinate system" have gained currency. If the whole international system is regarded as one unit for analytical purposes, then any of the demarcated geographical regions of the world may be treated as a sub-system. In other words, these (sub-systems) are viewed as devices for explaining the inter-dependence between local ties and concerns and the larger world which constrains them.[2]

Scholars like Michael Brecher, Leonard Binder, Louis J. Cantori, etc., are of the opinion that world politics is by and large influenced by the major global powers. These powers together constitute ths "dominant system." The less powerful states which maintain a geographical continuity, being very often influenced by the dominant system while shaping their foreign policy, constitute the "subordinate system" in world politics. According to Cantori and Spiegel thus, a subordinate system is one which "consists of one state or two or more geographically proximated and interacting states, which share in some degree common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bonds and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system."[3]

The proponents of the concepts of "sub-system" and "subordinate system" have made them more or less substitutive to the term region on the ground that the "region" had a static and descriptive connotation. Cantori and Spiegel, for instance, have used the terms "subordinate system" and "regional system" interchangeably.[4] Such an approach has neither highlighted the permutations and combinations of intra-regional power discrepancies nor the infrastructural linkages of the individual political systems when viewed in the overall contexts of modernisation and developmental processes of these states.

Geographers and developmental scholars, however, have refused such a notion by giving a more comprehensive orientation to the term region by taking note of its textural and structural charactristics. Besides, it has also been argued that the concepts of sub-system or subordinate system are value-loaded concepts implying in the process the dominance of one region over the other.

Such a controversy, however, has failed to be resolved among academics and neither of the terms has gained general acceptance. If at all, all the three terms have been, by and large, used synonymously and interchangeably. However, only a few of the authors have, as a mark of caution, made it explicit that their usage of these terms has been mainly as analytical categories bereft of the value bias which underlies them.

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III
SOUTH ASIA AS A DISTINCT REGIONAL SYSTEM

In the context of South Asia, mention needs to be made of the writings of authors like Michael Brecher who have argued that South Asia is a sub-system of the "subordinate" system of Southern Asia. Pejorative connotations of these two terms apart, Brecher's categorisation of the subordinate system aptly fits what he implies as the South Asian "subsystem." The six characteristics which he presents for delineating the subordinate system are as follows :

1 Its scope is limited with primary stress on a geographical region;
2 There are at least three actors;
3 Taken together they (the member states) are objectively recognised by other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region, or segment of the global system;
4 The members identify themselves as such;
5 The units of power are relatively inferior to units in the dominant system using a sliding scale of power in both; and
6 Changes in the deminant system have greater effect on the subordinate system than the reverse.[5]

Taking Brecher's characterisation of the Southern Asian subordinate system, one can argue equally well, if not better, that South Asia is a distinct regional system on the following grounds. At the outset, it is quite discernible that certain infrastructural linkages based on common history, race, religion, language and culture give a unique character to South Asia as different from the neighbouring West Asia and Southeast Asia.[6] Thus, the concept of the Southern Asian subordinate system, which presupposes the clubbing together of South and Southeast Asia, is both arbitrary and impractical. Besides, there is no doubt about the fact that the entire South Asian region represents an integrated geo-strategic unit.[7] Unless the regional actors, especially India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka ultimately plan and coordinate their defence policies, the entire region remains vulnerable to external pressure.

Separated from West Asia by the massive Karakoram Himalayan range that runs for over two thousand miles, the South Asian regional system, because of its northern border touching the southern flanks of both the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China, acquires an added significance in the global strategic planning. The location of South Asia places it almost as a midway junction between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Both these regions are broadly considered as sensitive and strategic regions of the world. South Asia thus provides, in this respect, a safe entry into the Persian Gulf, on the one hand, and to the Malaccan Straits on the other. The Indian Ocean which is in the close vicinity of the South Asian

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region (and of which the littoral states of the region are a part), has in recent times acquired a major significance in global strategic calculations particularly since the commissioning of a nuclear-powered US base in Diego Garcia.

Organizational channels like a region-wide legislative and executive body, security machinery, or a common judicial system, do help the states of a region to integrate amongst themselves. From such a perspective, in South Asia one does not come across any such organisations like the Council in the Middle East and the Inter-American Council of Jurists.[8] Why is it that such regional organisations have not emerged in the South Asian region ? What have been the imponderables in this respect ?

Before attempting to answer such questions, it is necessary to note that, more often than not, the South Asian region is treated to be synonymous with the sub-continent which comprises India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldivas and Sri Lanka. Some writers also include Afghanistan and Burma in the region. The area, however, possesses "geographical contiguity." if we include these two countries and "geographical compactness" if we leave them out.[9] For purposes of this article, Burma and Afghanistan in the east and west of the area are not included.

Further, in view of a yawning power disparity between the core and the periphery, the latter has at times projected postures varying from cordial to antagonistic towards the former. And yet, the peripheral sector is not completely alienated from the core because of a variety of infrastructural linkages. Such linkages like colonial legacies, emigrations, religion and language, operate almost simultaneously as "push" (i. e. those forces which ultimately draw the regional states togther) as well as the "pull" factors (i. e. those which alienate the regional actors from one another).

IV
SARC TAKES SOUTH ASIA TO THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

The late President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh formally introduced the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia in 1980. In the meantime, a number of meetings at the level of foreign secretaries of the seven South Asian countries have been held in various state capitals. As a result of open consultations and informal meetings among the officials, a number of misperceptions about the basic idea of cooperation have been removed. No doubt the initial reluctance of both India and Pakistan to go along with the smaller South Asian states (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives) specially cast a shadow over the future of SARC.[10] But slowly New Delhi and Islamabad took a positive stand, although they are not yet very enthusiastic about any institutional arrangement for regional cooperation in South Asia. The Foreign Secretaries, in the course of their several rounds of talks, have identified nine broad areas and have appointed working groups for indepth studies in each area. These groups

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broadly cover the areas of agriculture, social development, population control, meteorology, post and telegraph, telecommunication, science and technology, tourism, sports, arts and culture.

In order to give a major push to the movement, the Foreign Ministers of the South Asian states formally met in New Delhi during July 1983. A modest but practical scheme for cooperation was launched by them through the SARC Document released at the end of their deliberations. They approved the formation of a permanent Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries which would coordinate all the cooperative regional projects. Several technical committees were to be formed, whose main responsibilities would be to chalk out the details of the regional projects. They also took some tentative decisions about the financial modalities for all the regional projects. On the one hand there would be internal mobilisation by voluntary contributions of member states for the specific projects and external support from international agencies like the World Bank, IMH, EEC, etc, would be welcome.

Thereafter, the Foreign Ministers have met twice in Male and Thimpu and have endorsed the detailed reports submitted by several working groups. They have also prepared the first summit meeting of the South Asian states in Dhaka in order to further strengthen the SARC idea. The summit is likely to take place sometime during the last quarter of 1985 and before that another preparatory meeting at the level of foreign ministers will be held. Thus it is a foregone conclusion that the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia has reached a point of no return. Nevertheless, major queries occur in one's mind.

As the backdrop for SARC is entirely different from those of any other cooperative endeavours in the world at large, what concrete shape is it likely to take after the summit? Will the ruling elites of the region overcome their age-old misgivings among themselves? Is not the vicious circle of security a hindrance to the basic concept of regional cooperation in South Asia? Can the countries of the region, some of which are clubbed as one of the poorest in the world, afford to minimize their maximum dependence on the external powers, in order to expedite intra-regional cooperation? With several states following diverse development strategies for their economic growth and the volume of regional trade being as low as 8 per cent of the total external trade of the countries of the region, is it not wishful thinking to restore the complementarity in the economies of the concerned states?

It is rather difficult to think that the Dhaka Summit will find an easy solution to all these problems. There is going to be hard bargaining by all the statesmen of the region at the summit meeting. Ultimately, they may arrive at a sort of compromise, which would however remain fragile. The idea of consensus which has been mooted at the New Delhi meeting of Foreign Ministers is likely to reduce the SARC into at best a meeting

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point to air mutual problems. Very pragmatically it was also decided at the same meeting that all bilateral issues will be avoided at the SARC forum. Besides, more than a year and a half has passed since the SARC idea was formally adopted, but no sizeable contributions have been announced either by the concerned member states or by any external agencies. So funding of any major regional project is going to pose a problem. Last, but not the least, during last five years, because of the resumption of the new Cold War in our close vicinity and the suicidal Gulf War remaining in a state of stalemate, is the atmosphere really congenial for any worthwile cooperation in our region.

Even if the idea of SARC may not really institutionalize through major cooperative ventures within the sub-continent, there are several grounds to support it. A scholar from Bangladesh while analyzing the rationale for South Asian cooperation writes :

> These nations must realise that their individual efforts may not be adequate for accelerating the pace of socio-economic development for their burgeoning population. The best option, under the circumstances, is open to the underdeveloped small nations on a regional basis. Such a strategy of 'development regionalism' makes available to the nations the dynamic effects of integration such as eeonomics of scale, external economies, specialistion and increased economic efficiency through an enlarged market and so on and is likely to make an efficient use of the resources of the region.[11]

While citing another exploratory study in support of his "wishful thinking," he seems to believe that "all the countries of the region, big or small, would reap the advantages of market enlargement."[12] In his view, regional cooperation in the region would be useful in the two following ways. First, it would enhance their bargaining power with the industrialised North and would reduce their dependence on it. Second, the South Asian states "being more inward looking," can exploit the regional resources more efficiently in an environment of national trust and cooperation.[13]

However, as has been highlighted in the earlier part of our discussion, both these arguments advanced by Ahmed seem to be rather unfounded and unconvincing. As regards his first point, although South Asia's bargaining power *vis-a-vis* the developed North may be somewhat strengthened there is hardly any possibility to reduce its dependence on the latter. Second, neither are the South Asian states always inward looking, nor is their any possibility that an environment of mutual trust and cooperation can be an automatic offshoot of SARC.

Nevertheless, the argument advanced by a Sri Lankan scholar is rather more convincing; he suggests that the region of South Asia "is much more of a single ecosystem" in which India and other South Asian nations can profitably participate.[14] In fact there is every reason to support his proposition

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that the South Asian states have everything to gain if systematic efforts are made on a regional basis to harness the resources of the mighty Himalayas and the vast sea around the sub-continent. Of course, it all depends on a number of "ifs and buts." Such cooperation can only be feasible if the political elites of the region get rid of their mutual misgivings. Besides, there must be an atmosphere of give and take. Neither the large and comparatively advanced states like India and Pakistan should ventilate mutual grievances in the regional forums, nor should the smaller states be always haunted by the fear psychosis of being "hounded by a big brother." It is also an undeniable fact that till the extra-regional powers stop taking undue interest in the intra-regional affairs of South Asia, the idea of SARC cannot really get going.

But as has been highlighted earlier, the atmosphere at present is not really congenial. The security interests of the regional powers like India and Pakistan are quite divergent. There is no complementarity in the economies and developmental strategies of the South Asian states. Resource-wise the region seems to be one of the most backward in the world. Finally no worthwhile regional institution has been developed till now.

Inspite of all these psychological, political, material and institutional hurdles it is really a happy augury that the systematic movement of SARC during the last few years has brought the region into the limelight of international politics. A large number of projects have been undertaken by a few research institutions and scholars on the feasibility of cooperation in several areas. What is also crucial is that India is at present heading the non-aligned movement and has given a dynamic lead to the 101 nations. If the idea of SARC gets a major boost at the present moment, the imprint of South Asia in international affairs could be felt with greater intensity.

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Statements by Indian Representatives

INAUGURAL ADDRESS BY P. V. NARASIMHA RAO AT THE FIRST SESSION OF SARC STANDING COMMITTEE, NEW DELHI, 27 FEBRUARY 1984

WE are meeting at a time when our civilization faces a crisis which is unprecedented in history. The world is witnessing an intensification of political tensions, armed conflicts and the arms race. Over the past few decades, the goal of political freedom from colonial rule has been by and large attained. But the domination of the weak by the strong still continues and constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to peace and progress. The world economy continues to face its gravest crisis in the last half century. The crisis has served to focus attention once again on the iniquity of the existing world order.

The developing countries have been struggling for a fundamental restructuring of international economic relations and the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Greater cooperation among developing countries must constitute an integral part of this process. The current uncertainties in international economic relations and the continuing stalemate in the North-South Dialogue make it even more imperative for us to intensify cooperation among developing countries. Such cooperation would not only bring greater benefits to these countries but will also greatly improve the prospects for further cooperation with developed countries. The vast potential for South-South cooperation is only just beginning to be tapped. We must move forward rapidly towards the goal of collective self-reliance among developing countries. Our primary objective must be to strengthen our economic independence and to reduce the vulnerability of our economies to outside pressures. South-South cooperation is, of course, not a substitute for North-South cooperation, nor does it relieve the developed countries of their responsibility to support the development efforts of developing countries. It only means increasing reliance on our own resources and skills to promote self-reliant development of our economies. It must be seen as a key element in the role of developing countries in establishing a firmer, more equitable and enduring basis for global cooperation.

COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE

An important manifestation of our desire to realise the goal of collective self-reliance is the promotion of regional cooperation in South Asia. The countries of the region have realised that friendly political relations in the

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region must go hand in hand with cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields. Indeed the two are mutually reinforcing.

Our countries have common values and a common heritage. They are bound by age-old ties based on shared history, tradition and culture. They are engaged in a common struggle to improve the quality of life of their people and to establish a new world order in which all nations, big and small, can live together in peace and friendship. They are all committed to the principle of non-alignment. They are now engaged in adding a regional dimension to their cooperation in the greater interest of security, peace and development in this area.

There is often a tendency to question the possibilities of cooperation among countries which are at comparable levels of development and which seemingly lack complementarities in their economies. However, there are certain areas such as transport and telecommunications in which regional cooperation is not only desirable but is indeed unavoidable. Even in other areas, the countries of the region manifest complementarities in resource endowments, technical skills as well as other attributes conducive to increased cooperation to their mutual benefit. The South Asian countries also share common problems and common aspirations. Improved opportunities for coordinating their positions on global economic issues will, no doubt, help in focusing greater attention on their particular needs.

INFRASTRUCTURE

I am glad that the countries of this region have at last embarked upon a programme, howsoever modest at the moment, of regional cooperation. The programme covers important areas such as infrastructure and planning. Its implementation has already begun. The Technical Committees have held the first round of meetings and have initiated the necessary action in a time-bound framework. I wish to pay a warm tribute to the spirit of cooperation shown by all countries which has made this possible.

As we gain experience we would need to build upon the programmes already initiated and to enlarge the areas of cooperation. The potential in this regard is virtually unlimited. Among the most important areas which offer possibilities of fruitful cooperation are trade and industrial development. There is considerable scope for the expansion of mutual trade among the countries of the region. There are obvious advantages in increasing our purchases from neighbouring countries and to that extent reducing our dependence on countries outside the region for our essential requirements. Cooperation in the field of industrial development goes hand in hand with trade cooperation. There is considerable enthusiasm in the private sector for the promotion of trade and industrial cooperation in South Asia. This was evident from the encouraging response of the representatives of private trade and industry at the recent International

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Seminar on Trade and Economic Cooperation among South Asian Countries organised in Delhi by the Federation of Indian Export Organisations.

Another area which seems very promising is to develop non-conventional sources of energy. Countries of this region can profit a great deal by sharing their mutual experience in this regard. There is also a vast potential for regional cooperation in the area of tourism. The phenomenal growth of air transportation in recent times has made tourism the second largest export industry in the world. The countries of South Asia should get a greater share of the world market in tourist traffic.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Among the important guiding principles for the further development of the programmes of regional cooperation must be the full involvement of the countries of the region. It is also necessary to ensure the involvement in this process not only of governments but also the peoples of our countries, specially leaders of commerce and industry, scientists and intellectuals. A beginning in this direction has already been made. I referred earlier to the cooperation among the representatives of the trade and industry. Many academic and research institutions of the region are also cooperating in the framework of the Committee for Studies on Cooperation and Development. I would like to see such initiatives pursued further and grow in strength.

As we move forward on the path of regional cooperation we should not underestimate the enormity of the task that lies ahead and the problems that might arise. The prevailing international climate is a harsh one. The voice of the Third World continues to be ignored. Vested and narrow interests tend to obstruct cooperation. We must contend against these impediments, and forge ahead meaningfully.

Together we constitute one quarter of mankind. Although we still have a long way to go on the path of economic and social progress, we possess vast human and material resources waiting to be developed. Our cooperation will not only give us confidence in ourselves and contribute to our well-being but will also enable us to contribute effectively to peace and progress throughout the world. With this faith in our future, I inaugurate this Session and I wish you every success in your endeavours.

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STATEMENT BY ROMESH BHANDARI AT THIRD SESSION OF SARC STANDING COMMITTEE, MALE, 5 FEBRUARY 1985*

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Foreign Minister of Maldives for his inaugural address which has indeed set the tone for our deliberations. I am particularly grateful to him and my colleagues here for their warm references to the late Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi and her contribution to the attainment of SARC objectives.

The international environment in which we meet today is far from congenial. There is tension and conflict virtually in every part of the globe. The arms race continues unabated and poses a grave danger to world peace and security. The world economic crisis has affected all countries, rich and poor, big and small. There have been severe strains in the international monetary, financial and trading systems. All this has had inevitable repurcussions in our own regions. The malfunctioning of these systems and their inequitable nature has resulted in the transfer of an unfair share of the burden of adjustment to the developing countries with serious adverse implications for the pace of their development.

It is the firm belief of my government that to protect ourselves against the effects of the adverse global economic environment, and to reverse this trend, there is an imperative and urgent need to bring about more active and collective cooperation. This has to be done internationally, regionally, subregionally and bilaterally. Our new Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi has in fact placed cooperation between India and its neighbours as one of his highest priorities. As he said in his broadcast to the nation on 5 January 1985, and I quote :

> One aspect of our foreign policy needs special attention. We have deep historical and cultural links with our immediate neighbours in South Asia. We share the same memories of foreign rule and look forward to the same prospects of development and a better future for our peoples. I believe firmly that we can work together to realise these common aims. We do have some problems, but we are determined to resolve them on the basis of mutual respect, sovereign equality and friendship.

It is an unfortunate fact of life that in international relations adversities and negative developments become high profile drama whereas the laborious brick-by-brick building of the environment where international cooperation can thrive and flourish receives little public attention. And yet in the face of all too manifest divisions and differences which charac-

* The text of this speech, received as we go to the Press, has been included with an eye to its importance even though the Male Meeting was held in 1985 and hence outside the purview of this issue.

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terise international relations in the world today, what needs to be emphasised and highlighted is the community of interests and inter-dependence among the nations of the world. SARC is young, but we can congratulate ourselves that it is very much alive, active and growing to serve the people of the region.

Since we last met, our seven countries have continued their common struggle against poverty, hunger and disease. Through our mutual cooperation, we have been making progress towards our common goal of attaining sustained economic development. We have endeavoured to move from the philosophical plane into the realm of action in a somewhat longer term perspective in the areas in which our countries share common perceptions and outlooks. While we can justly be proud of the measures that we have been able to initiate jointly, we cannot under estimate the enormity of the task that still lies ahead.

Since our last meeting in July, considerable progress has been achieved in promoting cooperation in the region as is evident from the reports of the Technical Committees which are before us. The two Technical Committees of which India is Chairman, namely, the Technical Committee on Meteorology and the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture, have met in New Delhi and have done useful work. The programmes initiated by these committees are indeed wide-ranging and are fully reflected in their reports. I would only wish to refer briefly to some of the highlights. As you know, India has offered to hold the first South Asian Archaeological Congress in New Delhi in October 1985. The preparatory process has begun in right earnest and the specific themes for the proposed Congress and other suitable details are being worked out.

Another important initiative in the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture was India's offer to stage a Cultural Festival for South Asian countries in arts, crafts and traditional skills in New Delhi in November 1985 to coincide with the India International Trade Fair 1985. In view of the progress already achieved in programmes of cooperation among our seven countries this cultural festival, we feel, will be most timely and appropriate. Other important decisions of this committee included the holding of the South Asian History Conference in Bangladesh at the end of 1986, the holding of the Second South Asian Federation Games in Bangladesh in December 1985 and the conducting of many seminars, workshops, study tours, exhibitions and coaching camps. India has offered to hold a workshop for the study of ancient scripts which are essential for epigraphy and numismatics. The need for the pooling of resources in the field of preservation of monuments, murals and historic sites was recognised. To this end, I feel that it would be desirable for the countries of the region to emphasise the development of regional specialisation in specific disciplines.

In the field of meteorology, there is obvious need for an effective pro-

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gramme of cooperation since the inter-relationship of the meteorological phenomena in the entire region cannot be disputed. In order to give practical shape to our efforts in this area, a regional award consisting of a citation in English and a cash prize equivalent to US Dollars 500/- has been suggested. The response to this initiative has been encouraging. Action is also being taken for the creation of National Data Centres in the various countries to be computer-linked with each other to provide for ready and free flow of meteorological information among the seven countries. Training of personnel in this field is important and is being simultaneously undertaken. Seminars are being organised on climatic phenomena most commonly observed in the South Asian region. Importance must be given to the setting up of National Standards and of an international standard range of instruments in the field of climatology. Considerable progress has been made with regard to the proposal for the establishment of a Regional Meteorological Research Centre, There is happily a consensus in the Technical Committee about the importance of speedy implementation of this project and about the immense usefulness of such a centre to the countries of the region. Decisions would need to be taken soon on the location of the Centre and its funding. India has informed the Committee about infrastructural facilities which we can make available in case the Centre is established in India. These include the building for the Centre and the services of a computer which together will account for US Dollars 11.5 million out of the total estimated non-recurring cost of about US Dollars 11.6 million.

India has continued to play an active role in organising various activities in the SARC framework. Detailed information about these activities has been provided to the various Technical Committees.... I would only like to mention some of the more important activities organised by us. We arranged a number of training programmes for South Asian countries. These included the training programme on poverty focused rural development held at the National Institute of Rural Development, Hyderabad, a training course in leprosy for medical and para-medical staff at a number of institutions in Agra, Karigari (Tamilnadu) and Wardha; similar courses on TB at Bangalore and Cuttack and a course in instrument landing systems maintenance at Allahabad were organised. We had planned a joint workshop on post harvest technology and food processing at Mysore and a seminar on satellite communication at Ghaziabad, but these had to be postponed due to lack of response. In fact, one of the main problems which has been encountered in the process of implementation of SARC programmes has been the lack of adequate representation at the numerous meetings, seminars and workshops. Many governments have understandably found it difficult to cope with the rather hectic pace of activity. I understand that at our last meeting the distinguished Foreign Secretary of Pakistan had suggested that we draw up a calendar of meetings to enable

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Governments to plan their participation and undertake the necessary preparations. I hope we can draw up such a calendar at this meeting, if not for the whole of 1985, at least for the next six months or so.

It is apparent from the reports of the Technical Committees that the focus is gradually shifting from activities such as seminars and workshops to more tangible and concrete programmes of cooperation and work has been initiated in many cases for the formulation of regional projects. We would like to see this trend continued and efforts in this direction intensified. I would venture to suggest that we request the Chairman of each Technical Committee to give further thought to the possibilities of developing regional projects and to make specific suggestions in this regard in time for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Thimpu.

You will recall that at our last meeting we had agreed that consideration should be given to the convening of meetings at the level of Ministers with a view to giving an impetus to the programmes of cooperation in some areas. So far, there is no concrete proposal for a ministerial meeting. We would need to take a view on this matter at this Meeting. Among the areas in which we could envisage Ministerial Meetings are meteorology and agriculture. Some of you may have other ideas and it may be useful to have an informal exchange of views on this matter.

I turn now to what is perhaps the most important item on our agenda namely, preparations for the SARC Summit. We are grateful to the Government of Maldives for a very useful background paper on this subject. The main substantive change in the present institutional set-up which has been proposed in this paper is the establishment of a Council of Ministers as the highest policy-level body. We fully support this proposal. In fact, I would recall that we had ourselves put forward a proposal on these lines during the preparatory phase before the First Ministerial Meeting but we could not reach consensus on it at this time. However, now that we have agreed upon regular meetings at the ministerial level, we might as well institutionalise these meetings by making a suitable provision in the SARC Declaration. The background paper, however, leaves a number of questions unanswered. Will the proposed organisation have a Secretariat? Will it have a permanent Headquarters? We would need to address ourselves to these questions.

A related question is the future role of the Standing Committee in case we decide to establish a Council of Ministers as the supreme body. It would, of course, still need to prepare for Ministerial Meetings. In addition, it could play an important role in coordinating the work of the Technical Committees. To enable it to discharge this role effectively we could perhaps make its meetings somewhat more business-like. They could have shorter agendas and could be convened as and when needed, to deal with specific issues. If necessary, the representation at such meetings could even be at the level of envoys in the capital of the country which

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has the Chairmanship.

The Background Paper has suggested the adoption of a new Declaration or Charter at the SARC Summit. We would need to give careful thought to the drafting of such a document. We have noticed, for example, that a number of concepts to which we attach importance, such as the principle of unanimity and the need to keep out bilateral and contentious issues, find no place in the draft which is before us. There may be other amendments, changes or additions which some of you may feel should be incorporated. We would, therefore, venture to suggest that at this session we should concentrate our attention on the substance of the issues involved and leave the drafting for the Thimpu meeting. We also wonder whether, instead of drafting an entirely new Declaration, we might only consider the minimum amendments to the existing declaration which may be needed to incorporate any institutional or other changes.

As usual, we have on our agenda an item concerning the identification of new areas of cooperation. At our earlier meetings, we had put forward some ideas in this regard but so far the consensus has been that we should concentrate our efforts on the areas already identified; and we have gone along with this consensus. I am not sure whether there has been any change in this position. I shall be happy to have an informal exchange of views on this subject with my colleagues with a view to exploring the possibilities.

Finally, I come to the world economic situation which continues to be a cause for concern, specially for developing countries. The situation in many countries, particularly in a number of African countries south of Sahara, is extremely critical. The poorest countries in Asia and Latin America have also been gravely affected. The debt problem has reached crisis proportions. We are particularly concerned at the steady erosion of the spirit of multilateralism and the weakening of the institutions dealing with international economic cooperation. We must give serious thought to ways and means of reviving the spirit of multilateralism and giving an impetus to the North-South dialogue.

The need for initiating such a dialogue is particularly urgent in the area of monetary and financial reform. As you are probably aware, a Group of Experts was set up by the late Smt. Indira Gandhi in pursuance of the NAM call for an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development. The Group finished its work and submitted its Report in September 1984. The Report reviews the deficiencies of the present system and puts forward concrete proposals for reform. It is our hope that this Report will help to initiate a serious and meaningful dialogue between the North and the South on the reform of the international monetary and financial systems.

The countries of this region have a special stake in the improvement of the environment for international economic cooperation. They have many

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common problems and it is becoming increasingly necessary for them to coordinate their positions on world economic issues. All our countries have large pools of poverty and are engaged in the gigantic task of development. While we are determined to intensify our common efforts to utilise our varied resources, particularly human resources, to accelerate the pace of our development and to play our role in promoting the growth and development of the world economy, it is obvious that these efforts cannot succeed without adequate international support. In particular, countries of this region, which has the largest concentration of the world's poor, need adequate amounts of concessional financial flows for the development of their infrasturcture and for strengthening their capacity to meet the basic needs of their peoples. The plea which we made at our last meeting for an increase in IDA resources has so far fallen on deaf ears despite the praiseworthy efforts made by the Government of Maldives to bring our concerns to the attention of all concerned. We shall have to continue to strive in every available forum for early action to ensure supplementary financing for IDA VII so that IDA can play its proper role in supporting the development process.

There have been some disturbing developments recently in UNDP which would adversely affect the countries of this region. The Administrator has put forward proposals for certain changes in the criteria for the indicative planning figures for inter-country allocation of UNDP funds for the next four-year programming cycle. Our preliminary examination shows that the application of these criteria could work particularly to the disadvantage of South Asian countries. It would be desirable for our countries to remain in touch with one another with regard to this issue to safeguard our common interests.

May I conclude by expressing the hope that this Meeting will constitute yet another step forward in our efforts to promote greater cooperation, goodwill and understanding among our countries. We have important tasks ahead of us, which include not only the customary review of SARC activities but also the special task of preparing for the first-ever gathering of our Heads of Government. In my view, the most important requirement for a successful summit is to show some progress on the ground with regard to the implementation of the Integrated Programme. Our efforts should be concentrated on ensuring such progress over the next few months. On our part, I would like to reaffirm the whole-hearted support of the Government of India to the programmes which have been initiated for intensifying cooperation and fostering unity within our region.

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FIRST MEETING OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, COLOMBO – 21-23 APRIL 1981

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. At the invitation of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Foreign Secretaries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka met in Colombo from 21st to 23rd April 1981, in pursuance of the initiative taken by His Excellency President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh to consider the possibilities of establishing regional cooperation among the countries of South Asia.

2. The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, the Honourable A.C.S. Hameed, inaugurated the meeting with a keynote address emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation. He drew attention to the commitment of Sri Lanka to the ideal of an integrated regional approach to the common problems and common aspirations of the peoples of South Asia. The Foreign Minister welcomed the initiative of the President of Bangladesh which led to the convening of this meeting of Foreign Secretaries. Regional cooperation, he stressed, can enable countries to derive strength from each other, whether by way of enhanced trade, institutional linkage, sharing of technology, improved human resources or mutual investment. The objective of such cooperation was to develop collective self-reliance as a parallel strategy to global economic cooperation. He exhorted the Foreign Secretaries to work constructively for the establishment of a framework for regional cooperation in South Asia.

3. The Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Secretaries of South Asia, thanked the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka for his inspiring address.

4. The Foreign Secretaries elected by acclamation W. T. Jayasinghe, Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka, as the Chairman of the meeting.

5. The Foreign Secretaries noted that this was the first occasion on which they were meeting together in a South Asian regional context. They stressed the historic significance and importance of the meeting which was a manifestation of the will of the seven countries to cooperate regionally. It was agreed that regional cooperation in South Asia is beneficial, desirable and necessary. They noted the need to proceed step-by-step on the basis of careful and adequate preparation for early realization of such cooperation.

6. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the *Bangladesh Paper* provided a basis for their discussions.

7. They agreed that decisions should be taken on the basis of unanimity. They further agreed that bilateral and contentious issues

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should be excluded from their deliberations.

8. They agreed that regional cooperation should be based on and in turn contribute to mutual trust, understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the national aspirations of the countries of the region. Such cooperation should also be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit.

They further agreed that regional cooperation was not intended or expected to be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation but could complement both ; nor should it be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations.

9. The Foreign Secretaries noted that the South Asian countries are cooperating with one another and with other developing countries in various international forums. They agreed that efforts should be made to strengthen this cooperation, particularly on matters of common interest.

10. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that there were several areas in which mutually beneficial regional cooperation could take place and in this connection took note of the areas of cooperation mentioned in the *Bangladesh Paper*. As an initial step, they agreed that five Study Groups would be set up in the fields of—

1. Agriculture
2. Rural Development
3. Telecommunications
4. Meteorology
5. Health and Population Activities.

11. Each of these groups would have a coordinator country. It was agreed that the coordinator countries for the various Study Groups would be the following :

1. Agriculture —Bangladesh
2. Rural Development—Sri Lanka
3. Telecommunications —Pakistan
4. Meteorology —India
5. Health and Population Activities —Nepal

These groups would conduct in-depth studies and make concrete recommendations to the next meeting of Foreign Secretaries, which will be convened within six months.

12. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the terms of reference for these Study Groups would be as follows :

(1) Review existing cooperative arrangement pertaining to the region.

(2) Determine the potential and the scope of regional cooperation and the overall benefits and costs of such cooperation to the countries of the region.

(3) Draw up a work programme incorporating :

(a) Ways and means of establishing and strengthening regional cooperation ;

(b) Specific Projects/Programme in each area ;

(c) Arrangement for implementing and monitoring the work programme.

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(4) Make such other recommendations as may be appropriate.

13. The Foreign Secretaries also agreed to set up a Committee of the Whole comprising senior officials of the seven countries to identify and report on other areas of possible cooperation for consideration at their next meeting.

It was decided that Sri Lanka would be the coordinator country for the Committee of the Whole. It was further decided that all countries would nominate their representatives on this Committee and send information in this regard within three weeks to the Foreign Office of Sri Lanka. The first meeting of the Committee of the Whole would be convened not later than August 1981.

14. The Foreign Secretaries agreed to examine at their next meeting whether the stage had been reached to recommend to the Foreign Ministers the convening of a meeting at their level.

15. The Foreign Secretaries considered the institutional arrangements for regional cooperation set out in the *Bangladesh Paper* and agreed that this matter needed further examination.

16. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that Kathmandu, Nepal will be the venue for their next meeting.

17. At the conclusion of their meeting the visiting Foreign Secretaries expressed their sincere and warm appreciation to the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting and the generous hospitality accorded to all the delegates.

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, COLOMBO— 31 AUGUST-2 SEPTEMBER 1981

1. BACKGROUND

(i) The Foreign Secretaries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka met in Colombo in April 1981 ... to consider the possibilities of establishing regional cooperation among the countries of South Asia.

(ii) The Foreign Secretaries agreed that regional cooperation in South Asia is beneficial, desirable and necessary, and they noted the need to proceed step by step, on the basis of careful and adequate preparation, for early realisation of such cooperation.

(iii) The Foreign Secretaries also agreed that there were several areas in which mutually beneficial regional cooperation could take place and, in this connection, took note of the areas of cooperation mentioned in the Bangladesh Paper, which had provided a basis for their discussions. As an initial step, they agreed to establish five Study Groups in the fields of Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunications, Meteorology and Health and Population Activities, under coordination by assigned countries, which would conduct in-depth studies and make concrete recommendations to the next meeting of Foreign Secretaries in accordance with specified terms of reference.

(iv) The Foreign Secretaries also agreed to set up a Committee of The Whole comprising senior officials of the seven countries to identify and report on other areas of possible cooperation for consideration at their next meeting. It was decided that Sri Lanka would be the coordinator country for this Committee.

It was further decided that all countries would nominate their representatives on this Committee and send information in this regard within three weeks to the Foreign Office of Sri Lanka. The first meeting of the Committee of The Whole was to be convened not later than August 1981.

(v) In pursuance of these decisions, the Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka intimated to his colleagues his intention to convene a meeting of this group at a mutually convenient date within the time-span envisaged, and nominated his representative on the Committee. At the same time, he invited the other governments to intimate their nominations for membership of the Committee, and requested of them any views, suggestions or recommendations which would facilitate the Committee's work.

(vi) The Governments of Bangladesh and India submitted papers reiterating the views already expressed at the Foreign Secretaries' Meeting last April in respect of other areas of possible cooperation. Available views were then collated by Sri Lanka, as Coordinator, in a working paper designed to provide a basis for discussion at the Com-

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mittee's meeting, which was convened during August 31, September 1 and 2, 1981, in Colombo.

II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

(i) The terms of reference for the Committee of The Whole in the Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of the Foreign Secretaries' Meeting last April were "to identify and report on other areas of possible cooperation for consideration."

III. DISCUSSIONS

(i) The Committee, having dispensed with formal conference procedures and records, proceeded to a wide-ranging discussion on all aspects of the matter, using the Sri Lanka Working Paper as a basis for its discussion.

(ii) The Committee considered the original Working Paper, submitted by the Government of Bangladesh in November 1980, identifying eleven subject areas of possible regional cooperation. These were : Telecommunications, Meteorology, Transport, Shipping, Tourism, Agriculture/Rural Sector, Joint Ventures, Market Promotion in Selected Commodities, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, and Cultural Coperation and Health which was proposed by the Maldives.

(iii) In this connection, the Committee noted that the Foreign Secretaries in April 1981 had agreed as an initial step to set up Study Groups in the fields of Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunications, Meteorology and Health and Population Activities.

(iv) The Committee also had before it a Note submitted by the Government of India regarding further areas for regional cooperation.

(v) A view was expressed that the Committee of the Whole should concern itself with identifying areas other than those which had already been noted by the Foreign Secretaries at their meeting in April 1981. However, the other representatives were of the view that the Foreign Secretaries did not preclude the Committee's consideration of such areas.

(iv) From the deliberations of the Committee, the following areas of possible cooperation were identified :

(1) Education and Training.
(2) Cultural Exchanges.
(3) Scientific and Technological Cooperation including Cooperation in the field of New and Renewable Sources of Energy.
(4) Tourism.
(5) Transport.
(6) Shipping.
(7) Monetary Cooperation.
(8) Cooperation in International Economic Negotiations and Negotations with Multinational Corporations.
(9) Information and Mass Communication.
(10) Environment including Marine Pollution Control.
(11) Postal Services (as a part of Telecommunications).
(12) Coordination of Policies on Manpower Export.

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(13) Promotion of Cooperation Amongst Regional Planners, Non-governmental Organisations, Academic, Research and Other Institutions.

(vii) In identifying the above listed areas of possible cooperation, the Committee was mindful of the need to view regional cooperation as an evolutionary process to be seen in a long-term perspective, as well as its being a flexible process which would permit the elaboration of cooperative arrangements in as many fields as mutually agreed upon in these multi-dimensional areas of regional cooperation.

(viii) In connection with the areas identified, a view was expressed that the rule of unanimity adopted by Foreign Secretaries also applied to the conclusions of this Committee. Another view was that the Committee of The Whole was a consultative and not a deliberative body, and it was for the Foreign Secretaries to take decisions on the conclusions in accordance with the principles adopted by them.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

(i) Having considered the substantial economic and social benefits that the member countries can mutually derive from regional cooperation in various fields, and taking note of the views expressed by the representatives, the following areas of possible cooperation were identified for consideration by the Foreign Secretaries :

(1) Education and Training
(2) Cultural Exchanges
(3) Scientific and Technological Cooperation including Cooperation in the field of New and Renewable Sources of Energy.
(4) Tourism
(5) Transport
(6) Shipping
(7) Monetary Cooperation
(8) Cooperation in International Economic Negotiations and Negotiations with Multinational Corporations
(9) Information and Mass Communition
(10) Environment including Marine Pollution Control
(11) Postal Services (as a part of Telecommunications)
(12) Coordination of Policies on Manpower Export
(13) Promotion of Cooperation Amongst Regional Planners, Non-governmental Organisations, Academic, Research and Other Institutions.
(ii) One representative reserved his position in respect of Paragraph IV(i) above.

Note. The following are annexed :

'A' Extracts from the Bangladesh Working Paper of November 1980.
'B' An Indian Note regarding Areas of Cooperation.
'C' A Sri Lankan Working Paper collating these views.
'D' List of Participants.

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ANNEXURE 'A'

EXTRACTS FROM THE BANGLADESH WORKING PAPER OF NOVEMBER 1980

POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION

It has been stated earlier in the paper that cooperation in the economic sphere could be the starting point which could be expanded to include social and cultural cooperation. Science and technology also seem to offer great possibilities. Within these very broad parameters one can identify certain fields in which cooperation will not only be highly beneficial but also present a maximum convergence of common interest. In selecting these fields one will have to bear in mind the need to avoid duplication and overlapping functions and jurisdictions. After a careful analysis of the activities of the existing forums, both regional and international, it appears that a beginning can be made in South Asia in the following fields :

(*a*) *Telecommunications*

Telecommunications happens to be an integral part of the economic infrastructure in every society. Economic activities, dissemination of knowledge, vastly expanded social contacts of highly mobile individuals in contemporary societies, and last but not the least, trade and commerce depend upon an efficient telecommunication network. A telecommunication system in a country can attain its optimum level of efficiency and usefulness if it can be linked up with similar systems in neighbouring countries. As at present, it is a fact that in South Asia it is easier to communnicate with Europe and America than with next door neighbours.

(*b*) *Meteorology*

In the field of meteorology, cooperation could pay rich dividends to the member countries of the South Asia region. Facilities for scientific weather forecasting and introduction of the latest techniques of and methods for the study of climatic patterns could be organised on a regional basis. Since most of the countries of the region face permanent exposure to the hazards of cyclonic storms and other such natural disasters, active cooperation towards sharing the fund of knowledge, techniques, data, etc., gathered in this area will significantly benefit the member countries. These efforts would naturally be designed to strengthen the present international arrangements that may be operative in the region.

(*c*) *Transport*

In order to ensure an effective flow of movement of goods and also

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to facilitate intra-regional traffic, a well-integrated system of communications, especially in the form of road and rail links, would be invaluable for the economic development of the region. The national plans for building roads and for establishing railway lines could be harmonised at the frontiers to allow easy access across the national borders, without any substantial additional cost. Co-operation in this area would bring the countries closer through increased surface mobility.

(*d*) *Shipping*

The importance of shipping in the external trade of any country, whether coastal or land-locked, can hardly be over-emphasized. Its relative advantage over other means of transport as bulk carrier is also well recognised.

The world shipping market at present is overwhelmingly dominated by the developed countries. Thus, conditions imposed by these countries and the liner conference arrangements controlled by them militate against the natural desire of the developing countries to increase their tonnage capacity for a greater share in the transportation of sea cargo. The frequent escalation in the freight charges adversely affect the development needs and the balance of payments position of the developing countries. The countries in the South Asian region suffer from the consequent disadvantages in varying degrees. Thus, in order to bring about a degree of self-sufficiency in this field and to give an additional fillip to economic development of countries of this region, shipping is a natural area for cooperation on a regional basis.

(*e*) *Tourism*

Tourism is another area where there exists a vast potential for intra-regional cooperation. The revolutionary growth of air transportation in recent times has made tourism the second largest export industry in the world. It is essential that South Asia gets a greater share of the world market.

The potential of the region to attract tourism is virtually unlimited. The combined efforts of the countries of the region can be geared to develop this potential to their common benefit. This can be done by strengthening the infrastructure at home and by a vigorous marketing effort abroad. The rich and ancient heritage of the sub-continent and the varied scenic beauty of different parts of the region will provide the necessary attraction for foreign visitors. Intra-regional tourism can also be a major force in forging greater understanding between and among the countries and peoples of the region.

If the combined resources of South Asia can be tapped, better facilities can be provided to tourists which would doubtless increase their number. For instance, joint package tours with reduced group fares could be organised ; there could be cooperation among the various travel agencies operating in the region that could enable coordinated tour pro-

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grammes ; common tourist policies could be evolved after due consultations among the concerned governments.

(*f*) *Agricultural/Rural Sector*

South Asian countries, given their dependence on this sector, already have a large number of institutions engaged in research and development in a wide variety of fields. Regional cooperation would usefully augment the growing fund of knowledge and techniques in these fields. A coordinated arrangement for sharing information, experiences and results of experiments, etc., could effectively hasten the process of growth and productivity in this vital sector. Similarly, in view of the importance of developing the rural sector in particular, exchange of ideas and sharing of experience in the sphere of rural institution-building could result in significant advances as well as savings, both in resources and time.

(*g*) *Joint Ventures*

An economic cooperation group creates a wider market for commodities requiring large-scale production. It also provides scope for the utilisation of hitherto unexploited resources through more efficient organisation and optimum employment of existing resources. By increasing the range of production and ensuring higher returns on capital, it can create a self-sustained basis for further cooperation. Such multilateral economic groups not only can attract capital and technology from outside, but also obtain exemptions from GATT rules on non-discriminatory treatment on trade. Joint ventures provide the most potent field for reaping all these advantages for countries belonging to such a group. It is also one of the most tangible and productive forms of cooperation within the framework of ECDC.

The countries in the South Asian region possess a wide range of natural and mineral resources, technical know-how, trained manpower and a vast market. In spite of the fact that these countries are at varying stages of development, it is possible to identify potential areas for joint ventures, evolve appropriate institutional framework and policy instruments on the basis of equitable benefit accruing to these countries. Cooperative endeavours in the economic field can be undertaken to expand the production base through joint ventures that will lead to the creation of other favourable factors for further cooperation.

(*h*) *Market Promotion : Selected Commodities*

The countries of this region enjoy a significant share of the world market for a number of commodities, such as, tea, jute, and cotton. Most of these countries have separately undertaken marketing and promotional efforts for these commodities. It is well recognised that joint initiatives can reduce promotional cost and have greater impact in the export markets. Moreover, they also

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enable the countries of South Asia, particularly the less developed among them, to take full advantage of the liberal measures available under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in the markets of the developed countries. In the face of growing competition from substitutes as well as uncertainties due to price fluctuations, such joint initiatives will provide additional guarantee for further expansion of markets at remunerative prices.

(i) Scientific and Technological Cooperation

Countries of the South Asian region have a special need to develop effective use of science and technology for alleviating the widespread poverty that is a common characteristic of the area. It is recognised that the promotion of scientific education will not achieve the desired results unless science can be applied in practical terms for the development of agriculture, industry, energy and all other needs of society. There is indeed ample scope for further programmes in the field of applied science and technology to meet the basic requirements of the people of the region, particularly those in the rural areas. In many cases, the experience gained by these countries in this sphere can be shared with greater advantage than the technology borrowed from the industrialised countries of the developed world.

Cooperation in this field is particularly relevant in regard to both conventional and non-conventional sources of energy. Such cooperation could explore ways and means of reducing dependence on foreign sources by the development of local energy sources; improvement of efficient energy use through development of low-energy technology; conservation of non-renewable energy sources, etc.

Concerted research and action-oriented programmes for the eradication and elimination of such diseases as malaria, cholera, etc., afflicting the people of this region, could also be an effective and useful area of cooperation.

(j) Educational and Technical Co-operation

Cooperation at international and regional levels with regard to education has now been well established and institutionalised in many regions. In this region also, shared experiences of the countries could be usefully exchanged in matters pertaining to this subject.

A primary common concern among these countries is, for instance, how to provide cost-effective educational services which could reach out to millions of school-age children who crowd the cities and villages. The experiences of countries of the region, ranging from such areas as book production, manufacture of low-cost scientific equipment to matters connected with curriculum formation, examination procedures, teacher-training and in-service training, non-formal education, just to name a few, could be usefully shared.

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These countries having similar problems could benefit more from the expertise of personnel trained in the region than from that of foreign experts who obtain their training in an entirely different environment, and who, consequently, fail to develop the correct orientation in dealing with regional problems. Workshops, seminars, conferences and visits of technical experts organised on a regional basis could provide useful exchange of knowledge and experience.

(*k*) *Cultural Cooperation*

The South Asian countries are heirs to some of the richest cultural traditions of the world. The influence of the major religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam—on the different countries of the region in varying degrees, has contributed to the richness and diversity in the cultural heritages of these countries. This is, therefore, a field in which regional cooperation can be of considerable benefit in a better understanding of the cultural heritage of the countries in the region, and, as a result, in promoting mutual goodwill. As a matter of fact, cultural exchanges are already taking place between these countries on the basis of bilateral agreements. A regional approach would, however, introduce a new dimension in the cultural exchange programmes.

One can readily see numerous possibilities. There can be, for example, a South Asian Regional Film Festival in one of the capitals. Also, exhibitions of paintings can be organised on a regional basis. These can become a major source of encouragement for artistic activities within the region. Handicrafts of different countries of the region can also be enriched by holding exhibitions on a regional basis from time to time. Sports is another field which offers great possibilities. South Asian Games and Sports organised on an annual basis can become an integral part of the cultural life of the area. All these possibilities clearly indicate that the cultural field is an area that has a very wide scope for cooperation in the South Asian region.

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ANNEXURE 'B'

AN INDIAN NOTE REGARDING AREAS OF COOPERATION

The Indian views in regard to possible areas of regional cooperation were spelt out in the statement made by the Foreign Secretary, R. D. Sathe in the Colombo Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries held last April. He had then stated that the exercise of identifying areas "has to relate to functional cooperation in areas which are most relevant for the socio-economic development of our peoples." He had observed that the involvement of peoples in the region is of cardinal importance and the need to involve the academic community, and the non-governmental organisations, in this exercise is also very desirable. He had pointed out the advisability of the economic planners of the countries of the region to meet at regular intervals to discuss and exchange our experiences in the field of planning as also to consider long-term planning perspectives taking into account the possibilities of regional cooperation.

2. India feels that the scope of the work of the existing Study Group on Telecommunications should be widened so as to include cooperation in the sector of postal services. It is also suggested that the two existing Study Groups on Agriculture and Rural Development may be combined as one Study Group.

3. Apart from the above amendments, the possibility of setting up new study groups on the following possible areas of regional cooperation may be examined :

(1) *Cultural Field*—As already observed by India's Foreign Secretary in his statement at the Colombo Meeting, cultural cooperation can cover sports, education, films, theatre, production of text books, organisation of seminars and exhibitions, regional film festivals, etc.

(2) *Infra-structural Field*—This cooperation can extend to the following areas :

(i) Transport—In order to ensure an effective flow of movement of goods and also to facilitate inter-regional traffic, a well integrated system of communications, especially in the form of road and rail lines, would be invaluable for the economic development of the region. An increased surface mobility will go a long way to contribute to regional cooperation among the South Asian countries.

(ii) Shipping—In this area, too, we feel that the conditions imposed by the developed countries and the liner conference arrangements controlled by these militate against the national desire of the developing countries to increase, in the course of time, their tonnage capacity for a greater share in the transportation of sea cargo. Further, the frequent escalation in the freight charges adversely affects the development

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needs and the balance of payment position of the developing countries. In order to bring about a degree of self sufficiency in this field and to give an additional fillip to the economic development of the countries in this region, shipping seems to be a natural area for cooperation on a regional basis.

(iii) Tourism—This is another area where there exists a vast potential for intra-regional cooperation in South Asia. The revolutionary growth of air transportation in recent times has made tourism the second largest export industry in the world. South Asia should get a greater share of the world market in tourist traffic. The potential of the region to attract tourists is virtually unlimited and needs to be explored in depth.

(iv) Market Promotion—One of the richest areas for regional cooperation in our view is market promotion in selected commodities of common interest. Joint initiatives in the region can reduce costs and have greater impact in the export markets of a number of commodities. The countries of the region command a significant share of the world market for commodities, such as tea, jute and cotton. At present there are competitive promotional activities but these can be usefully and effectively combined to optimise results.

(3) *Cooperation Related to International Economic Negotiations*—This field for cooperation is being suggested with a view to present a common approach with respect to development aid, trade concessions, etc. It would mean adopting a common stand, to the extent possible, as a group at the North-South Dialogue, ECDC, in the UNCTAD, and ESCAP sessions and in the World Bank and other UN forums connected with aid to developing countries and other aspects of development cooperation. The common strategy will be directed towards the achievement of the objectives of NIEO, involving reforms in the international monetary system, stabilisation of prices of commodities of common interest, for their joint marketing and measures for facing competition from synthetics in the world market.

(4) *Scientific and Technological Cooperation*—Countries of South Asian region have a special need to develop effective use of science and technology for alleviating the widespread poverty that is a common characteristic of the area. Cooperation in this field is particularly significant in view of the fact that experience gained by the South Asian countries in this sphere can be shared with greater advantage than the technology borrowed from the industrialised countries of the developed world. This cooperation can be particularly beneficial in the field of conservation of energy, improvement of efficiency in use of the existing sources of energy through development of low-energy technology, and R & D aspects of new and renewable sources of energy.

4. India feels that the Committee of The Whole should also give

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attention to the following paths along which development of regional cooperation in South Asia can be promoted and thus are relevant for consideration by each of the Study Groups :

(a) Interchange of experience ;
(b) Cooperative development ; and
(c) Expanding economic relations.

5. South Asian countries can learn from one another in a great variety of ways, for instance, through exchange of teachers and students, through visiting delegations drawn from different walks of life, through collaboration among scholars and research institutions, and through various forms of cultural and scientific cooperation. Much progress can be made by encouraging lateral contacts between corresponding groups of institutions like professional associations in different fields, universities, academies of arts, literature and science, media organisations, and other appropriate bodies.

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ANNEXURE 'C'

SRI LANKA WORKING PAPER

1. Introduction

This brief working paper is designed to identify the terms of reference for this meeting and to provide a loose structure around which the discussions could proceed. It is without prejudice to any documentation to be tabled by participants upon the commencement of the discussions.

2. Background

Amongst the decisions taken by the Foreign Secretaries of the participating countries, when they met in Colombo last April, was the following :

> The Foreign Secretaries also agreed to set up a Committee of The Whole comprising senior officials of the seven countries to identify and report on other areas of possible cooperation for consideration at their next meeting.
>
> It was decided that Sri Lanka would be the coordinating country for the Committee of The Whole.

This decision of the Foreign Secretaries is to be read in conjunction with their earlier decision that, as an initial step towards identifying areas for mutually beneficial regional cooperation, five Study Groups covering Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunications, Meteorology and Health and Population Activities should be initiated and coordinated by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, India, and Nepal respectively, to conduct in-depth studies to make concrete recommendations for the next meeting of Foreign Secretaries.

3. Terms of Reference

Whereas the Study Groups in identified fields were required to conform to detailed terms of reference, the Committee of The Whole was only charged with identifying and reporting on other areas of possible cooperation. Hence, it would seem that the Committee is not required to undertake an in-depth study of any particular area, not to make detailed recommendations for action within such area.

4. Structure for Discussions

The Government of Bangladesh, in its original working paper submitted in November 1980, identified 11 areas of possible cooperation. These were—

> Telecommunication, Meteorology, Transport, Shipping, Tourism, Agriculture/Rural Sector, Joint Ventures, Market Promotion of Selected Commodities, Scientific and Technological Co-

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operation, Education and Technical Cooperation and Cultural Cooperation, To those eleven was added Health, as proposed by the Maldives.

Some of those subjects are covered under detailed studies now being undertaken. They are : Telecommunications, Meteorology, Agriculture, Rural Development and Health/Population Activities.

In respect of other areas, the Indian Government has suggested, both in the general statement that the Indian Foreign Secretary made at the last inaugural meeting, as well as in its Note submitted for the present discussion, that subject headings be grouped into broadly related combinations on a functional basis. India accordingly identified the broad area of cultural activity covering sports, education, films and theatres, production of text books, organization of seminars and exhibitions, film festivals, etc. Thereafter, India has identified an infrastructure group of subjects including transport, shipping, tourism and market promotion. The Indian paper then identifies two other broad groups of subjects : those relating to Cooperation at International Economic Negotiations, etc. and scientific and Technological Cooperation.

A convenient starting point of reference for the discussion might indeed be such a broad grouping, with additions and deletions flowing therefrom. Moreover, although no precise terms of reference were spelt out by the Foreign Secretaries for the deliberations of the Committee of the Whole, the Committee may find it useful to bear in mind the essential structure of the detailed terms of reference set for the particular Study Groups. The main elements of that structure were : a review of existing arrangments for any area, the usefulness of augmentative and supportive action in such areas and the prospects for an action programme being devised by further detailed studies.

It would seem that such an approach might better focus the Committee's attention upon an identifiable agreed range of subjects for recommendations to the Foreign Secretaries.

5. Concluding Report

As with the particular Study Groups separately established, it would seem to be the case that the Committee of The Whole too is not bound by any unanimity rule in respect of its recommendation, since the unanimity rule would only apply to binding decisions. Hence the report would attempt to identify the widest area of agreement regarding subjects which are recommended for further detailed study.

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SECOND MEETING OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, KATHMANDU—2-4 NOVEMBER 1981

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government of Nepal, the Foreign Secretaries of South Asian countries comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka met in Kathmandu from 2 to 4 November 1981 in accordance with the decision of their First Meeting held in Colombo in April 1981.

2. The Foreign Secretaries elected by acclamation Jagdish S. J. B. Rana, Foreign Secretary, His Majesty's Government of Nepal, as the Chairman of the Meeting. They also expressed their appreciation for the valuable work done by the Chairman of the First Meeting His Excellency W. T. Jayasinghe, the Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka.

3. The Rt. Hon'able Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Surya Bahadur Thapa, inaugurated the Meeting with a keynote address stressing the importance of regional cooperation to meet the growing challenges of peace and development facing the countries of South Asia. The Prime Minister pointed out that the concept of regional cooperation was a logical response to the pressing problems of development and the interdependent nature of the contemporary world and added that cooperation and a common approach were needed to fight the battle against wide-spread poverty in the countries of the region and to minimise the adverse impact of external factors on their development efforts. He observed that such programme of cooperation would revitalise the economies of the region and add incentive and strength to national development efforts which were being undertaken by each member country to improve the lot of their respective peoples. The Prime Minister urged the Foreign Secretaries to direct their efforts towards working constructively for the early realization of the common goal of regional cooperation.

4. The Foreign Secretary of India His Excellency R. D. Sathe, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Secretaries of South Asia, thanked the Rt. Hon'ble Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal for his inspiring address.

5. The Foreign Secretaries reiterated that regional cooperation in South Asia was beneficial, desirable and necessary and reaffirmed the determination of their respective countries to cooperate with each other in developing and accelerating the process of such cooperation.

6. The Foreign Secretaries paid warm tributes to the vision and statesmanship of the late President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh for initiating the proposal for South Asian regional cooperation.

7. The Foreign Secretaries considered and endorsed the recommendations of the Five Study

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Groups established in their Meeting in Colombo. They recognised that these recommendations fall into two broad categories of classification via those that were amenable to immediate implementation of cooperative activities on the one hand and those that were medium and long-term in nature requiring a longer gestation period on the other.

8. In this connection, the Foreign Secretaries agreed on the need for establishing appropriate modalities for implementation of the recommendations. They agreed to convert the existing Study Groups into Working Groups in each of the five areas of cooperation already identified. The Chairmanship of the Working Groups would be by rotation, the periodicity of which would be initially determined by each Group. The present coordinators of the five Study Groups would act as the first chairmen of the respective Working Groups. They further agreed that the Foreign Secretaries will meet from time to time to review recommendations, monitor progress and lay down guidelines for further action.

9. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that major task of each Working Group would be to draw up a comprehensive programme of action for cooperation in both the immediate and long term phases.

The immediate Action Programme would include such components as :

(a) Exchange of data and information
(b) Exchange of experts, training facilities, scholarships etc.
(c) Organization of Seminars, Workshops etc. on a regional basis.

The long-term Programme of Action would *inter-alia* include :—

(a) Assessment of needs and resources
(b) Preparation of specific projects of a regional nature
(c) Modalities for financing the projects.

10. The Working Groups would report progress both with regard to the implementation of the immediate action programmes as well as for the processing of the long-term programmes for the consideration of the Foreign Secretaries at their meetings to enable them to set out further course of action.

11. The Foreign Secretaries reviewed the conclusions of the Committee of the Whole and endorsed its report. They were mindful of the need to view regional cooperation as an evolutionary process to be seen in a long-term perspective, as well as a flexible process which would permit the elaboration of cooperative arrangements in as many fields as are mutually agreed upon. Recognising that they had already agreed upon the modalities and terms of reference at their meeting in Colombo in April 1981 they agreed for the present to institute studies in the following additional areas of cooperation :

	Coordinator Country
1. Transport	Maldives
2. Postal Services	Bhutan

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3. Scientific and Technological Cooperation — Pakistan

12. The Foreign Secretaries recognised that it would be beneficial to promote cooperation among the official national planning organisations of the countries of the region and agreed to initiate action with a view to discussing this matter in greater depth at their next meeting.

13. The Foreign Secretaries agreed to hold their next meeting within six to eight months to consider the implementation of their agreed decisions on regional cooperation. They also agreed to remain in consultation during this period with a view to recommending at the next meeting to their Ministers the convening of a Meeting at their level in 1982.

14. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the venue of their next meeting should be finalised by the current Chairman in consultation with other colleagues.

15. At the conclusion of their meeting the visiting Foreign Secretaries expressed their sincere and warm appreciation to His Majesty's Government of Nepal for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting and generous hospitality extended to all the delegates.

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THIRD MEETING OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, ISLAMABAD – 7-9 AUGUST 1981

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Third Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka was held in Islamabad from 7 to 9 August 1982. The first two meetings were held in Colombo in April 1981 and in Kathmandu in November 1981.

2. The Foreign Secretaries elected by acclamation Niaz A. Naik, Foreign Secretary Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as the Chairman of the meeting. They expressed their appreciation of the valuable work done by the Chairman of the Second Meeting Jagdish S. J.B. Rana, Foreign Secretary of His Majesty's Government of Nepal.

3. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, inaugurated the meeting. In a keynote address, he expressed satisfaction over the progress already made in identifying the scope of regional cooperation in various agreed areas. He underlined the equal stake of all the countries of the region in the preservation of peace and security and the promotion of mutual confidence and cooperation as a means for the realisation of the aspirations of their peoples for more rapid economic and social progress. He also stressed the need for ensuring an equitable distribution of the benefits of cooperation among all the countries of the region.

4. On behalf of the Foreign Secretaries, W. T. Jaysinghe, Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka thanked the Foreign Minister of Pakistan for his inspiring address.

5. The Foreign Secretaries decided that the address by the Foreign Minister should form part of the official record of their meeting.

6. The Foreign Secretaries reaffirmed the commitment of their countries to promote and strengthen cooperation among themselves. Noting that the process had acquired an irreversible momentum they expressed the determination of their governments to accelerate the pace of regional cooperation.

7. The meeting considered the reports of the Study Groups on Transport, Postal Services and Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The Foreign Secretaries noted with satisfaction that the Study Groups had completed the task of investigating the scope and feasibility of initiating regional cooperation in their respective areas, and unanimously endoresed the recommendations contained in these reports. They decided to convert the study Groups into Working Groups under the Chairmanship of the present coordinating countries.

8. The Foreign Secretaries consi-

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dered the reports of the Working Groups on Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunication, Meteorology and Health and Population Activities and endorsed their recommendations on programmes of cooperation.

9. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the implementation of the recommendations of the five Working Groups should be initiated as expeditiously as possible, where the expenditure for such programmes could be met from available financial resources. Action in this regard would be coordinated by the Chairman of the respective Working Groups.

10. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that the Chairmanship of the Working Groups would be for a period of two years and rotate in alphabetical order.

11. Recalling the agreement at Kathmandu regarding the promotion of cooperation among the official national planning organizations of the countries of the region, the Foreign Secretaries recommended the holding of a meeting of representatives of the respective national planning organizations of the seven countries at an appropriate level in New Delhi prior to the next meeting of the Foreign Secretaries.

12. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that regular consulations should be held by the representatives of the countries of the region, as deemed appropriate, on matters of common interest relating to international economic issues.

13. The Foreign Secretaries agreed to constitute a Study Group on Sports, Arts and Culture. It was agreed that the Committee of the Whole would nominate the coordinator for this Study Group.

14. The Foreign Secretaries reiterated the agreement of their governments on the importance and imperative necessity of holding a Ministerial Meeting at an early date. They agreed to recommend to their Foreign Ministers to convene a meeting at their level between May and September 1983, to be preceded by a preparatory meeting of the Foreign Secretaries. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan was requested to undertake consultations with his counterparts with a view to fixing the dates and venue of the Ministerial Meeting.

15. In order to ensure adequate preparations for the Ministerial Meeting the Foreign Secretaries agreed on the following programme :

(a) Meeting of the Working Groups on Transport, Postal Services and Scientific and Technological Cooperation in accordance with the terms of reference contained in paragraph 9 of the Joint Communique issued by the Kathmandu Meeting, and with a view to facilitate the task entrusted to the Committee of the Whole in para 17 below.

(b) Meetings of the Working Groups on Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunication, Meteorology and Health and Population Activities to elaborate where necessary, recommendations with a view to facilitate the task entrusted to the Committee of the Whole in paragraph 17 below.

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16. The Foreign Secretaries envisaged that the Working Groups would complete their tasks by the end of November 1982, and submit their reports to the Committee of the Whole.

17. The Foreign Secretaries decided to set up a Committee of the Whole under the Chairmanship of Sri Lanka to prepare, on the basis of the reports of the Working Groups, an integrated programme of action in the agreed areas of cooperation and to recommend modalities and mechanisms for implementation, coordination and monitoring of the agreed programme of action, and to the extent possible, provide indications of the financial implications of the short term component of the integrated programme of action, and recommend funding modalities and arrangements for its long term component.

18. The Committee of the Whole, comprising senior officials of the seven countries, would be assisted by the Chairmen of the eight Working Groups. It would meet not later than mid-January 1983.

19. The Foreign Secretaries accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to hold their next meeting at Dacca in February or March 1983. At that meeting they would examine the report of the Committee of the Whole and finalize preparations for the Ministerial-level meeting. The dates of the Foreign Secretaries meeting would be fixed after consultations to be undertaken by the current Chairman.

20. The visiting Foreign Secretaries expressed their appreciation to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the excellent arrgangements made for the meeting and the generous hospitality extended to their delegations.

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, COLOMBO—10-13 JANUARY 1983

INTRODUCTION

1. In pursuance of the mandate set out in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Joint Communique issued on August 9, 1982, at the conclusion of the Islamabad Meeting of the South Asia Foreign Secretaries, the Committee of The Whole comprising senior officials of the seven countries, assisted by the Chairmen of the eight Working Groups, met in Colombo, Sri Lanka, from January 10 to 13, 1983.

2. The meeting of the Committee Of The Whole, as well as the meetings of the eight Working Groups recently concluded in the various coordinator countries, arose out of the need to prepare adequately for a Ministerial level meeting to be held in 1983. This is to be preceded by preparatory meeting of South Asian Foreign Secretaries scheduled to be held in Dhaka in March, 1983.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

3. The Committee of The Whole, under the Chairmanship of Sri Lanka was required on the basis of the Reports of the Working Groups :

(i) to prepare an Integrated Programme of Action in the agreed areas of cooperation,
(ii) to recommend modalities and mechanisms for implementation of the coordination and monitoring of the agreed Programme of Action, and
(iii) to the extent possible, to provide indications of the financial implications of the short-term component of the Integrated Programme of Action, and to recommend funding modalities and arrangements for its long-term component.

4. Earlier, the Working Groups on (a) Agriculture (b) Rural Development (c) Telecommunications (d) Meteorology (e) Health and Population Activities (f) Transport (g) Postal Services and (h) Scientific and Technological Cooperation had met in the countries of the respective coordinators and submitted their recommendations. The Chairmen of the Working Groups assisted the Committee of The Whole in collating the sectoral programmes into an Integrated Programme of Action.

5. It was recalled that the mandate of the Committee followed the decision by the Foreign Secretaries to endorse recommendations of Working/Study Groups on programmes of cooperation formulated earlier. The Committee of The Whole was, therefore, faced with linking these recommended programmes into a composite framework. It was acknowledged that the Committee of The Whole would not duplicate or modify programmes already endorsed by the Foreign

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Secretaries. The Foreign Secretaries had agreed that the implementation of the recommendations of the Working Groups should be initiated as expeditiously as possible, where the expenditure for such programmes could be met from available financial resources, and that action in this regard would be coordinated by the Chairmen of the respective Groups.

INTEGRATED PROGRAMME OF ACTION

6. In approaching its task, the Committee of The Whole recalled the overall objective of South Asian regional cooperation, which was the promotion of the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and the improvement of the quality of life. They also kept in mind the reaffirmation of the commitment of their countries to promote and strengthen cooperation among themselves in the conviction that regional cooperation was beneficial, desirable and necessary.

7. The Committee noted that the cooperative activities identified by the Working Groups could be broadly divided into two categories :

(a) Activities amenable to long-term cooperation

These included, *inter alia* :

(i) Exchange of data.
(ii) Exchange of experts' services.
(iii) Training and research.
(iv) Holding of seminars/workshops in the countries of the South Asian Region.

(b) Activities amenable to long-term cooperation

These included, *inter alia* :

(i) Establishment of regional institutions for training and research.
(ii) Creation/strengthening of linkages among existing national institutions in the seven South Asian countries in the agreed areas of cooperation.
(iii) Strengthening of infra-structural support in such areas as postal services, telecommunications, railways, highways, shipping, meteorology, etc., which would require capital investment by the participating countries.

8. It was agreed that, whilst a measure of commonality was evident in the sectoral programmes envisaged by these Groups (as mentioned above), there were inevitable diversities arising from the nature and specificity of sectoral activity. The Committee, therefore, decided to annex to its Report a summary of the recommendations of each of the sectoral Working Groups. These recommendations would form an integral part of the Programme of Action.

MODALITIES AND MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTATION COORDINATION AND MONITORING

9. The Committee noted that there already exists a useful network for implementation and monitoring of the Programme of Action in

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various areas identified for regional cooperation.

(i) At the sectoral level, eight Working Groups have been established with coordinator countries acting as their Chairmen. It is intended that focal points be identified in various ministries / national institutions / apex organizations, where this has not already been done.

(ii) At the national level, focal points have already been established in the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the seven countries for overall coordination and monitoring.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. The Committee, after careful consideration, decided to recommend the following :

I Sector Level

(i) To redesignate the Working Groups as Technical Committees identified by subject title, e.g., Agriculture Committee, which would continue to be responsible for the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the programmes pertaining to its sector, and would submit periodic reports to a Standing Committee. The Chairmanship would rotate among the countries of the region in alphabetical order, every two years as already decided. The Technical Committees may, *inter-alia*, use the following mechanisms and modalities, if and when considered necessary :

(a) Meetings of heads of national technical agencies.

(b) Meetings of experts in specific fields.

(c) Contacts amongst recognised centres of excellence in the region. These centres may be reinforced and extended and considered feasible and desirable for the optimal use of the resources of the region for meeting the requirements of the cooperation programme.

(ii) The terms of reference for the Technical Committees would comprise the following :

(a) Determination of the potential and the scope of regional cooperation in agreed areas.

(b) Formulation of Programmes of Action and preparation of projects.

(c) Determination of financial implications of the sectoral Programmes of Action.

(d) Formulation of recommendations regarding the apportionment of costs.

(e) Implementation and coordination of sectoral Programmes of Action.

(f) Monitoring of progress of implementation.

II. Regional Level

(i) A Standing / Review Committee should be constituted with the following terms of reference :

(a) Approval of projects / programmes, including their modalities of financing.

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(b) Determination of inter-sectoral priorities and overall coordination of Programmes of Action.
(c) Mobilisation of regional and external resources.
(d) Review of progress of implementation of sectoral Programes of Action.
(e) Identification of new areas of cooperation based on appropriate studies.

11. In the case of projects involving more than two countries, but not all the countries of the region, action committees may be set up for their implementation with the prior approval of Foreign Secretaries. An action committee would consist of only those countries which are involved in a project.

12. The Foreign Secretaries may determine both the level of meetings of such Standing/Review Committee as well as their periodicity, at their next meeting.

13. There will be referral by this Standing/Review Committee, as and when necessary, to a ministerial level committee for decisions on policy guidelines, both in respect of the approval of projects/programmes as well as the authorization of modalities for financing. The Standing Committee would provide necessary support/services for meetings at the ministerial level.

Arrangements for Financing

14. In the light of the directive given by the Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in Islamabad, the Working Groups themselves sought to work out the financial implications of the short-term components of their recommended Programmes of Action. The Committee noted that in some cases the Working Groups were able to quantify the cost of short-term programmes as indicated in the programme summaries. In other cases, the Working Groups had delineated respective financial liabilities that were likely to be incurred as a guideline to determining costs.

15. In a number of cases, however, the Working Group could not estimate costs or delineate financial liabilities in the absence of prior determination of various parameters involved. The decisions of the governments were needed in such matters as the number of fellowships, expert services that could be available, the location of activities and their time phases, etc.

16. In the case of longer term components of various programmes, the problems of quantifying costs and recommending arrangements for financing appeared to be much more formidable as these activities involved political decisions on the size and the scale of projects, various technological options available, geography location, socio-economic considerations ond other factors.

17. The Committee agreed that the fundamental premise of financing arrangements should be the unfettered discretion of member countries to determine the level and manner of their financial allocations for regional activity. In that light, the following are some illustrative fiscal procedures which are suggested

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by the Committee for consideration by the Governments :

(a) Regular allocations for regional cooperation under sectoral ministries in the national budget.
(b) *Ad hoc* allocations.
(c) Assistance to one another through such mechanisms as scholarships, concessionary air-fares and accommodation, etc.

18. In this regard, the Committee took note of the asymmetry in levels of economic development among the seven South Asian countries as well as of the need to impart an identifiably South Asian context to the proposed regional actions and their funding.

19. The Committee noted that it was not feasible to lay down precise guidelines for the apportionment of the costs of implementing each and every type of activity proposed by the Technical Committee to make recommendations in this regard. However, the Committee recognised the need for some uniformity and, accordingly suggests the following guidelines :

(a) Except to the extent otherwise agreed, in the case of seminars, workshops and training programmes, the cost of travel and subsistence for participants would be met by their respective Governments and the cost of organising may be met by the host country, apportioned amongst participants in proportion to the facilities availed of or financed from external resources.
(b) Except to the extent otherwise agreed, in the case of experts' services, the cost of subsistence for an expert would be met by the receiving country, whilst the cost of travel and/or salary of an expert may be paid for by the sending country, shared amongst participating countries or externally funded.
(c) Other costs, such as, for the preparation of feasibility studies, etc., would be shared on a mutually agreed basis.
(d) In the case of long-term projects, the Technical Committee concerned would estimate the costs involved and would submit recommendations on modalities for meeting the costs as an essential element of the project document.

20. The Committee recognised that as the scope of regional collaboration broadens in the fulness of time, contributions may be made to a fund by the participating countries on the basis of agreed criteria. The Committee felt, however, that the time had not yet arrived to elaborate detailed recommendations in this regard since expenditures presently envisaged in respect of short and longer-term components of action programmes do not warrant the immediate creation of such a fund.

21. The Committee also accepted that where sufficient financial resources could not be mobilised within the region, recourse could be

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taken to external assistance from appropriate sources. This could apply not only to projects as such, but to any other aspect of regional programmes, such as, feasibility studies, technical assistance etc.

Other Issues

Study Group on Sports, Arts and Culture

22. The Committee had been mandated to identify a coordinator for the new proposed Study Group for Sports, Arts and Culture. In that connection, the Committee accepted with appreciation the offer of the Government of India to undertake that responsibility.

E.E.C and I.T.U. Offers of Assistance

23. The Committee took cognizance of the offers of financial assistance for South Asian Regional Cooperation already received from the E.E.C. and I.T.U. in regard to the farmer; it was decided to recommend that the current Chairman of the Group of Foreign Secretaries, His Excellency the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan should seek the concurrence of the E.E.C. towards utilising the assistance offered for any aspect of programme activity connected with South Asian Regional Cooperation, rather than in direct relation only to a specific project. Depending upon the outcome of such an approach, the Foreign Secretaries would be called upon to decide, at their next meeting, a procedure for the utilisation of the EEC offer.

24. In regard to the I.T.U. offer, the Committee decided to recommend to the Foreign Secretaries the acceptance of this offer and its utilisation as determined by the Telecommunications Working Group on the basis of their chosen priorities.

Timing of Fourth Foreign Secretaries' Meeting

25. The leader of the Bangladesh delegation indicated his Government's proposal of the dates—March 28, 29 and 30, 1983, as the timing for this meeting. The Committee agreed to alert their respective governments to these proposed dates, whilst the leader of the Pakistan delegation undertook to initiate through his Foreign Secretary the usual consultation on receipt of a communication from the Bangladesh Government.

Conclusion of the Meeting

26. The Chairman thanked the leaders and their delegations for the complete cooperation and assistance received from them in successfully fulfilling the mandate issued to the Committee.

27. At the conclusion of their meeting, the leaders of the delegations expressed their sincere and warm appreciation and gratitude to the Chairman of the Committee of The Whole and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the excellent arrangements that had been made for the meeting and the efficient services provided, which had enabled to expeditiously and successfully conclude their meeting.

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FOURTH MEETING OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES, DHAKA—28-30 MARCH 1983

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. At the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka was held in Dhaka from 28-30 March 1983. The earlier meetings of Foreign Secretaries were held in Colombo in April 1981, in Kathmadu in November 1981 and in Islamabad in August 1982.

2. The Foreign Secretaries elected by acclamation His Excellency A.H.S. Ataul Karim, Foreign Secretary, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh as the Chairman of the meeting. They expressed their appreciation of the valuable work done by the Chairman of the Third Meeting His Excellency Niaz A. Naik, Foreign Secretary, Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

3. The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, His Excellency A. R. Shams-ud Doha, inaugurated the meeting. In his keynote address he underlined the abiding ties of friendship of the seven countries of South Asia and their firm commitment to promote regional cooperation in the realisation of their fundamental goal to improve the quality of life of their people and to secure lasting peace and solidarity in the region. He recalled that the previous meetings of the Foreign Secretaries had laid a solid foundation for progressive development of cooperative programmes at the regional level from the conceptual stage through the feasibility phase and to the stage of consolidation. He stressed that the preparatory phase had adequately advanced so as to permit effective implementation of a comprehensive programme of action and the convening of a political level meeting that could accelerate the process of regional cooperation.

4. On behalf of the Foreign Secretaries, His Excellency Bishwa Pradhan, the Foreign Secretary of His Majesty's Government of Nepal thanked the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh for his inspiring address.

5. The Foreign Secretaries decided that the address of the Foreign Minister should form part of the official record of their meeting.

6. The Foreign Secretaries considered the report of the meeting of the Committee of the Whole, convened in pursuance of the directives laid down in paragraphs 15-18 of their Islamabad Joint Communique. The report recommends an Integrated Programme of Action comprising activities amenable to short-term as well as long-term cooperation, defines modalities for its implementation at the sectoral level by the technical committees and its coordination and monitoring at the regional level by a Standing Com-

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mittee as well as elaborate guidelines and arrangements for its financing. The Foreign Secretaries expressed their deep appreciation of the excellent work done by the Committee of the Whole as well as Sectoral Working Groups in fulfilling their mandate. The meeting fully endorsed the recommendations contained in the report of the Committee of the Whole and decided to recommend the adoption of the Integrated Programme of Action by their Foreign Ministers at their meeting which would formally launch its implementation.

7. The Foreign Secretaries agreed that all efforts should now be made for expeditious implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action. Considering that South Asian Regional Cooperation is an evolutionary process, they further agreed that studies be initiated in due course to identify additional areas of cooperation.

8. The Foreign Secretaries decided that the Committee proposed for coordinating and monitoring the Integrated Programme of Action at the regional level should be designated as the Standing Committee and be constituted at their level. They further agreed that the Standing Committee would meet at least once a year and as often as it deemed necessary. The Foreign Secretaries could also call for convening of expert level meetings whenever the discussion of technical issues might warrant.

9. Recognising the progress that had already been achieved in developing a framework for structured regional cooperation in South Asia, the Foreign Secretaries affirmed their belief that necessary preparatory work for a Ministerial level meeting had been successfully completed and that the stage for launching implementation of regional cooperative activities had now been reached. They recalled the earlier agreement of their governments on the importance and imperative necessity of holding a Ministerial meeting at an early date and accordingly agreed to recommend to their Foreign Ministers to convene a meeting at their level between the last week of July and the first week of August 1983 to launch the Integrated Programme of Action. The meeting of Foreign Ministers would be immediately preceded by a meeting of Foreign Secretaries.

10. It was agreed that the meeting of Foreign Ministers be held at New Delhi. The precise dates for this meeting are to be decided upon through consultations.

11. The Foreign Secretaries noted with satisfaction the report of the Meeting of the Representatives of National Planning Organizations of the seven countries, held in New Delhi from 24-25 January 1983 and agreed that it would be useful to hold such meetings periodically.

12. The Foreign Secretaries noted with appreciation that India as the coordinator country of the Study Group on Sports, Art and Culture would convene its first meeting at a very early date.

13. The Foreign Secretaries welcomed the offers of assistance received from the EEC and ITU for

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activities connected with regional cooperation in South Asia.

14. The visiting Foreign Secretaries expressed their appreciation to the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting and the generous hospitality extended to their delegations.

15. The visiting Foreign Secretaries expressed gratitude for the honour of having been received by the President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bangladesh His Excellency Lieutenant General H.M. Ershad.

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SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, NEW DELHI – 1-2 AUGUST 1983

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Secretaries held in Dhaka in March 1983, a Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka was held in New Delhi on August 1-2 1983, preceded by a Preparatory Meeting of Foreign Secretaries of these countries at the invitation of the Government of India.

2. The Meeting of Foreign Ministers was inaugurated by Smt. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India. In her inaugural address she described the Meeting of Foreign Ministers as an important step at a political level in the development of mutual relations in South Asia. She expressed the hope that cooperation among the seven countries would increase their capacity to withstand pressures, enable them to move ahead to a future of freedom, peace and prosperity and give a strong impetus to closer friendship and greater stability in the region.

3. On behalf of the Foreign Ministers, His Excellency A.R. Shams-ul-Doha, thanked Smt. Indira Gandhi for her inspiring address. It was decided that the text of the address should form part of the final records of the Meeting.

4. P. V. Narasimha Rao, Minister of External Affairs of India was elected as Chairman by acclamation.

5. The Meeting expressed its appreciation for the valuable contributions made by the Meetings of Foreign Secretaries held in Colombo (April 21-23, 1981). Kathmandu (November 2-4, 1981), Islamabad (August 7-9, 1982), Dhaka (March 28-30, 1983) and New Delhi (July 29-30, 1983).

6. At the conclusion of their Meeting, the Foreign Ministers signed the Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation setting out the objectives and principles of such cooperation and incorporating provisions regarding institutional and financial arrangements. They expressed their confidence that the adoption of this Declaration would promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia, improve their quality of life and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of the region.

7. The Foreign Ministers Meeting noted that considerable work had been done at the technical level to identify possible areas of cooperation and prepare specific programmes in agreed areas. It also noted that the Committee of the Whole at its meeting held at Colombo, and the Foreign Secretaries in their meetings held at Dhaka and New Delhi, had drawn up an Integrated Programme of Action based on the work done at

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the technical level. The Meeting considered the recommendations of the Foreign Secretaries and decided to launch the Integrated Programme of Action for South Asian Regional Cooperation, as recommended by them in the areas of Agriculture, Rural Development, Meteorology, Telecommunications, Scientific & Technological Cooperation, Health and Population Activities, Transport, Postal Services, and Sports, Art and Culture. The Meeting reaffirmed that it would be beneficial to continue co-operation among the National Planning Organisations and academic institutions of countries of the region.

8. The Foreign Ministers agreed to meet once a year to review the progress of South Asian Regional Cooperation. They also decided to recommend to their respective Heads of States/Government that they meet at their level and agreed that the date of the Summit would be finalised at the next meeting of Foreign Ministers.

9. The visiting Foreign Ministers expressed their deep appreciation to the Government of the Republic of India for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting and the cordial and generous hospitality extended to their delegations.

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SARC DECLARATION, 2 AUGUST 1983

The Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka,

Conscious of the common problems and aspirations of the peoples of South Asia and the need to accelerate their economic and social development through regional cooperation,

Convinced that regional cooperation in South Asia is beneficial, desirable and necessary, and that it will help promote the welfare and improve the quality of life of the peoples of the region,

Convinced further that increased cooperation, contacts and exchanges among the countries of the region will contribute to the promotion of friendship, amity and understanding among their peoples,

Recognising that each country of the region has an effective contribution to make to the promotion of collective self-reliance,

Noting that regional cooperation should be based on and in turn contribute to mutual trust, understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the national aspirations of the countries of the regions,

Mindful of the declaration on collective-self-reliance among non-aligned and other developing countries adopted at the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit held at New Delhi, which called upon all countries concerned to mobilise all necessary resources and deploy the requisite means in support of sub-regional, regional and inter-regional cooperation among non-aligned and other developing countries,

Affirming the determination of their respective governments to make joint efforts for promoting such cooperation,

Do hereby declare the collective resolve of their governments to pursue actively South Asian regional cooperation with the following objectives, prior arrangements and to launch an integrated programme of action, and to this end have agreed as follows :—

I. Objectives and Principles

1. a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life,

b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potential,

c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia,

d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems,

e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields,

f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries,

g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international

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forums on matters of common interest, and

h) to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

I. Principles

1. Such cooperation shall be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit.

2. Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation but shall complement them.

3. Such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations.

II. Institutional Arrangements

a) Technical Committees

4. A technical committee, open to participation of all countries of the region, shall be responsible for the implementation, coordination in each area of cooperation with the following terms of reference :

a) determination of the potential and the scope of regional cooperation in agreed area,

b) formulation of programmes of action and preparation of projects,

c) determination of financial implications of the sectoral programme of action,

d) formulation of recommendations regarding the apportionment of costs,

e) implementation and coordination of sectoral programmes of action, and

f) monitoring of progress of implementation.

5. The technical committee shall submit periodic reports to the standing committee.

6. The chairmanship of the technical committee shall rotate among the countries of the region in alphabetical order, every two years.

7. The technical committees may, *inter-alia*, use the following mechanisms and modalities, if and when considered necessary,

a) meetings of heads of national technical agencies,

b) meetings of experts in specific fields,

c) contacts amongst recognised centres of excellence in the region. These centres may be reinforced and extended as considered feasible and desirable for the optimal use of the resources of the region for meeting the requirements of the cooperation programme.

b) Action Committees

8. In the case of projects involving more than two countries, but not all the countries of the region, action committees comprising the countries concerned may be set up for their implementation, with the prior approval of the standing committee.

c) Standing Committees

9. A standing committee shall be established at the level of foreign secretaries for the coordination and

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monitoring of South Asian regional cooperation with the following terms of reference :

a) approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities of their financing,

b) determination of inter-sectoral priorities and overall coordination of programmes of action,

c) mobilisation of regional and external resources, and

d) identification of new areas of cooperation based on appropriate studies.

10. The standing committee shall meet as often as is deemed necessary but at least once a year.

11. The standing committee shall make a reference, as and when necessary, to the foreign ministers for decisions on policy guidelines, both in respect of the approval of projects programmes, as well as the authorisation of modalities for financing the standing committee and shall provide necessary support services for meetings of ministers.

d) General Provisions

12. Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.

13. Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations.

III. Financial Arrangements

14. The participation of each country in the financial costs of the programmes of cooperation shall be voluntary.

15. Each technical committee shall make recommendations for the apportionment of the costs for implementing the programmes proposed by it, taking into account *inter-alia* the following guidelines :

a) except to the extent otherwise agreed, the cost of travel and subsistence for participants in seminars, workshops and training and other programmes shall be met by their respective governments and the cost of organising seminars, workshops and training and other programmes may be met by the host country or apportioned among participants, in proportion to the facilities availed of or financed from external sources,

b) except to the extent otherwise agreed to, the cost of subsistence for experts, shall be met by the receiving countries and the cost of travel and or salary of the experts may be paid for by the sending countries, or shared among participating countries or financed from external sources,

c) other costs, including the costs of preparation of studies, shall be shared on a mutually agreed basis, and

d) in the case of long term projects, the technical committee concerned shall estimate the costs involved and shall submit recommendations to the standing committee on the modalities for meeting of costs.

16. In the case of projects and programmes for which sufficient financial resources cannot be mobilised within the region, recourse may be had to external assistance from appropriate sources, with the approval of the standing committee.

Done in New Delhi on the second day of August in the year Nineteen hundred and eighty-three.

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REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE : FIRST SESSION, NEW DELHI—27-29 FEBRUARY 1984

INTRODUCTION

The First Session of the Standing Committee was held in New Delhi on February 27-28, 1984 under the Chairmanship of M. Rasgotra, the Foreign Secretary of India.

2. The Session was inaugurated by H. E. P. V. Narasimba Rao, Minister of External Affairs of India. In his inaugural address he said that cooperation among the countries of the region "will not only give us confidence in ourselves and contribute to our well-being but will also enable us to contribute effectively to peace and progress throughout the world." He referred to the desire of the South Asian countries to realise the goal of collective self-reliance and said : "the countries of the region have realised that friendly political relations in the region must go hand in hand with cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields. Indeed the two are mutually reinforcing." He welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the programmes already agreed upon and underlined the need for building upon them and enlarging the areas of cooperation.

3. On behalf of the Standing Committee H.E. W.T. Jayasinghe, the Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka thanked Narasimha Rao for his inspiring address.

REPORTS OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEES

4. The Committee expressed its deep appreciation to the Technical Committees for the work accomplished by them and took note of the reports of the Technical Committees.... It expressed its warm gratitude to the Chairman of the Committees and to the countries concerned for organizing the meetings. It approved the recommendations contained in the reports.

5. The following decisions were taken on the specific issues referred to the Standing Committee by the Technical Committees :

(a) It was noted that the Technical Committee on Meterology proposes to make an indepth study of the report of the Panel of Experts on the proposed Regional Meterological Research Centre with a view to examining the feasibility of the project. It was agreed that the results of this study should be awaited before the matter is considered further by the Standing Committee.

(b) The Standing Committee accepted with appreciation the offer of the Government of India to host the South Asian Archaeological Congress. The Chairman of the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture was requested to take appropriate action to prepare for the Congress and to report to the Standing Committee at its next session.

(c) The Standing Committee requested the Chairman of the Techni-

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cal Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture to work out the details regarding the timing, venue, etc., of the South Asian History Conference.

(d) The Standing Committee requested the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture to take the necessary steps regarding the convening of a meeting of the appropriate agencies of the countries of the region to work out modalities and appropriate arrangements to ensure the protection and preservation of antiquities and art objects.

(e) It was agreed that for the purposes of the rotation of Chairmanship of the Technical Committees, the two year cycle will be deemed to have commenced from the date of which the SARC Declaration was signed, viz., August 2, 1983.

6. With regard to the future work of the Technical Committee it was agreed that :

(a) The proposed agenda for the meetings of Technical Committees and the documents setting out the issues to be considered should be circulated at least four weeks in advance of the meetings.

(b) The guidelines contained in Article 16 of the SARC Declaration for the apportionment of the costs of implementing the programmes of cooperation should not be applied with rigidity and exceptions may be made particularly in respect of countries which find it difficult to meet the cost of travel and subsistence for participants in seminars, workshops and training programmes, etc., at the request of the countries concerned.

(c) To enable the Technical Committees to make recommendations for the apportionment of the costs for implementing the programmes of cooperation, governments might consider allocating specified amounts to each sector out of the total pledges announced by them. This will enable the participants in the meetings of Technical Committees to reach expeditious decisions on the apportionment of costs.

(d) Each country should designate a sectoral focal point in each area of cooperation to enable the Technical Committees to monitor the progress in the implementation of the programmes of cooperation.

(e) The Chairman of each Technical Committee should remain in regular and frequent contact with the sectoral focal points with a view to monitoring the progress in the implementation of programmes and ensuring active involvement of all countries in the process.

(f) With a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the programmes of cooperation already agreed upon the Technical Committees should as far as possible identify countries responsible for implementation, agree on a time-frame and specify the modalities for implementation including the method of financing.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

(*a*) *Contributions by South Asian countries*

7. The Standing Committee took note with appreciation of the follow-

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ing contributions announced by the countries of the region for 1984-85 :

India	Indian Rs. 7.5 million
Pakistan	Pakistani Rs. 5 million, plus Rs. 500,000 for Scholarships
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Rs. 2.5 million.

8. Bangladesh and Nepal mentioned that their financial years begin in the month of July. They indicated that adequate allocations will be made for SARC activities in their budgets for 1984-85. Bhutan and Maldives indicated that they were actively considering making an appropriate contribution for SARC activities for the financial year 1984-85.

(*b*) *External Assistance*

9. The Committee noted that discussions were in progress with the EEC for the utilisation of its offers for 1983 and 1984 in the sectors of Transport and Scientific and Technological Cooperation respectively. The Committee also noted that the meeting of UNDP Aid Coordinators of developing countries which was scheduled to be held in Jakarta in Sep.-Oct. 1983 to consider the question of assistance from ITU had to be postponed and was now expected to be held in Bangkok in May 1984.

IDENTIFICATION OF NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION

10. The Committee recognised the potential for enlarging the areas of cooperation. However, it felt that for the time being efforts should be concentrated on the nine areas of cooperation already identified.

WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

11. The Standing Committee reviewed the world economic situation and expressed its grave concern at the continuing impasse in the North-South dialogue. It called for renewed efforts both for a viable and sustained recovery in the world economy aimed particularly at promoting the development of developing countries as well as for fundamental restructuring of the international economic order. In this regard the Committee urged that the proposals put forward by the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77 at various forums should be actively pursued, particularly the proposal of the Seventh Non-aligned Summit for the convening of an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development. It also emphasised the need for strengthening cooperation among developing countries.

12. The Committee underlined the crucial importance of concessional finance for the South Asian countries. In particular, it expressed its serious disappointment and concern at the recent decision regarding the level of replenishment for IDA VII. It urged all donor countries to provide additional resources to enable IDA not only to bring about an increase in real terms in the flow of resources to the existing borrowers over the level of IDA VI, but also meet the requirements of new borrowers.

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13. It was agreed that all South Asian countries would work together in the appropriate international forums to promote the foregoing objectives.

14. It was agreed that the next meeting of the Standing Committee will be held in Male on 7-8 July, 1984 to prepare for the meeting of Foreign Ministers on 10-11 July, 1984.

15. The visiting Foreign Secretaries expressed their deep appreciation to the Government of the Republic of India for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting and the cordial and generous hospitality extended to their delegations.

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SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTER, MALE—10-11 JULY 1984

1. INTEGRATED PROGRAMME OF ACTION—NOTE BY INDIA 18 JUNE 1984

INTRODUCTION

At the conclusion of their first meeting held in New Delhi in August 1983, the Foreign Ministers of South Asian countries signed a Declaration in which they affirmed "the collective resolve of their governments to pursue actively South Asian Regional Cooperation" and "to launch an Integrated Programme of Action." In their Final Communique, the Foreign Ministers noted that considerable work had been done at the technical level to identify possible areas of cooperation and to prepare specific programmes in agreed areas. They also noted that the Committee of the Whole, at its meeting held at Colombo, and the Foreign Secretaries, in their meetings held at Dhaka and New Delhi, had drawn up an Integrated Programme of Action based on the work done at the technical level. They considered the recommendations of the Foreign Secretaries and decided to launch an Integrated Programme of Action for South Asian Regional Cooperation, as recommended by them in the areas of Agriculture, Rural Development, Meteorology, Telecommunications, Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Health and Population Activities, Transport, Postal Services, and Sports Arts and Culture.

2. Technical Committees were set up in the nine agreed areas of cooperation charged with the responsibility for the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the programmes in the various areas. In pursuance of this provision, all the nine Technical Committees held their meetings during the period October 1983 to January 1984. A Standing Committee was also established for coordination and monitoring of the Programme with the following terms of reference :

(a) approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities of their financing;
(b) determination of inter-sectoral priorities and overall coordination of Programmes of Action;
(c) mobilization of regional and external resources and;
(d) identification of new areas of cooperation based on appropriate studies.

3. At its first session held in New Delhi on 27-28 February 1984, the Standing Committee considered the reports of the Technical Committees. The Background Note submitted to that session of the Standing Committee reviewed the

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progress in the implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action and put forward some suggestions on the specific issues referred to the Standing Committee as well as with regard to the future work.

4. The Standing Committee expressed its deep appreciation to the Technical Committees for the work accomplished by them and took note of the reports of the Technical Committees. It expressed its warm gratitude to the Chairmen of the Committees and to the countries concerned for organising the meetings and approved the recommendations contained in the reports. It also took decisions on the specific issues referred to it by the Technical Committees as well as with regard to the future work of the Technical Committees. These decisions are contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Report of the Standing Committee.

5. The purpose of this note is to update the information with regard to the progress in the implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action.

CHAPTER I

PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRATED PROGRAMME OF ACTION

A. Overall Assessment

6. With the completion of the first round of meetings of the Technical Committees and the consideration of their reports by the Standing Committee, the South Asian Regional Cooperation Programme has entered an active phase of implementation in a relatively short period of time. This has been due largely to the thorough preparatory work which was undertaken prior to the launching of the Programme. The work on some of these activities has already been completed since the first session of the Standing Committee, while the preparations on some others have reached a fairly advanced stage. Illustrations of some of these activities are contained in the following paragraphs.

B. Training

7. Work has continued on the organisation of special training courses for South Asian countries as well as the extension of the facilities of regular training programmes to trainees from other countries of the region. An Executive Development Programme in the transport sector was organised by India at the Railway Staff College, Baroda in March-April 1984. The response was rather poor as only trainees from Nepal and Sri Lanka attended the Programme. However, the participants found the Programme very useful. A Senior Supervisors' Development Programme, also in the transport sector, is being organised by Pakistan later this year. India is organising a training programme in telecommunications in the second half of this year. A training course was arranged by India in March

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1984 under the WMO/ESCAP Panel on Tropical Cyclones which was attended by eight trainees from South Asian countries.

C. Seminars/Workshops

8. Considerable progress has been made in the organisation of seminars and workshops in a number of sectors. Since the first session of the Standing Committee the following seminars/workshops have taken place :

(a) International Seminar on Road Maintenance, Materials and Construction Costs at *Islamabad*, March 25-29 1984;

(b) Regional Workshop on Hydrographic Surveys, Navigational Aids and River Crafts in Inland Waterways at Panaji, *Goa* April 24-27 1984.

(c) Workshop on Poverty-focused Rural Development Strategy at Hyderabad, March 23-28 1984 :

(d) Seminar on Postal Development in South Asia at *New Delhi* March 27-30 1984;

(e) Meeting of the Coordinators and Counterparts for Multilocation Trials for selected crops at *Dhaka*, April 15—17, 1984;

(f) Seminar on Materials and Costs of Road Construction in *Dhaka*, June 16—21 1984;

(g) Workshop on Problems and Prospects of Linkage of Training and Research in Rural Development to be held in Bogra, *Bangladesh* from June 25—28 1984.

D. Technical Studies

In a number of areas action has been initiated for the preparation of technical studies. These include, for example, a study of traffic flows and inter-modal distribution within the region. The study is proposed to be financed by the EEC and is being coordinated by Sri Lanka. A number of organisations in the region are expected to take part in the study including Rail India Technical and Economic Services and the Pakistan Railways. Preliminary estimates of the cost involved have been prepared and are being discussed with the EEC.

10. India has initiated action for a study on the optimisation of Operational Efficiency in the Railway Systems of the Region. Estimates of the expenditure involved have been prepared and the clearance of the participating countries, viz., Bangladesh Pakistan and Sri Lanka has been sought for the portion of the costs to be borne by them. A reply from Sri Lanka has been received while replies from Bangladesh and Pakistan are awaited.

11. India has prepared a study on Common Central Airworthiness Requirements which has been forwarded to the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Transport for circulation.

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E. Exchange of Information and Data

12. An important requirement for promoting cooperation in the region is the exchange of information and data. In a sense this process had been initiated even before the Technical Committees met, not only through the exchanges at the earlier round of meetings of the Study Groups/Working Groups, but also through the contacts which took place as a follow-up of these meetings. The process has now been put on a more organised basis following the decisions of some of the Technical Committees. Thus the Technical Committee on Agriculture has initiated action for the regular exchange of technical publications among agricultural insitutions of the region. To this end appropriate contact points have been identified in these institutions. The Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture has commenced work on the identification, listing and exchange of information about repositories of ancient manuscripts. The Technical Committees on Meteorology has set up a Panel of Experts on Climatology, Data Exchange and Agrometeorology to prepare recommendations on the regional needs of processed climatic information and to draw up guidelines on data processing and its utilisation for the preparation of regional climatic maps. The Technical Committee on Postal Services has asked the participants to supply available data and information, including operational manuals, tariff manuals, annual reports, etc., to the Postal Administration of Bangladesh which will act as a Coordinator.

F. Regional Directories

13. Some of the Technical Committees had decided to publish Regional Directories. The Technical Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation has already published such a directory. It is hoped that this will facilitate the identification of further programmes of cooperation in this area. The Technical Committees on Health and Population Activities has initiated action for the preparation of a Regional Directory on training programmes available in the region to enable the participating countries to identify their requirements. Participating countries have been requested to furnish the required information to the Chairman of the Technical Committee by June 30, 1984.

G. Exchange of Experts

14. The activities initiated in a number of sectors include the exchange of experts and scientists as well as of vaccines, insecticides, etc. The Technical Committee on Agriculture has decided to prepare a roster of consultants in each participating country specifying the areas of expertise, whose services could be utilised by other countries. The Technical Committee on Telecommunications has asked the participating countries which

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require the services of experts to intimate their requirements to the Chairman who would then contact countries which can make them available. In pursuance of a decision by the Technical Committee on Health and Population Activities, India has supplied 30 metric tonnes of DDT to Bhutan.

H. Regional Institutions

15. The question of establishing the Regional Meteorological Research Centre was discussed in the last Technical Committee Meeting on Meteorology. The decision taken by the Standing Committee and the follow-uplaction thereon are referred to in Section A of Chapter II (Para 18). India has prepared a study on the establishment of a South Asian Institute of Transport Management which is being circulated through the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Transport. The Technical Committee on Telecommnnications is considering the possibility of a detailed technical study on the establishment of a Regional Software Centre.

I. Other Activities

16. Action has been initiated for implementing a number of activities which, though not common to more than one sector, nevertheless constitute important elements of the Integrated Programme of Action. The Technical Committee on Telecommunications has reviewed progress made in the implementation of inter-country links on which work has already commenced. In some cases the work is nearing completion. The implementation of the decision to institute a Regional Award for the encouragment of research in Meteorology has reached an advanced stage. The first South Asian Federation Games are to be organised in Kathmandu during 1984. Bhutan will be organising a letter-writing competition for children in the sector of Postal Services.

CHAPTER II

SPECIFIC ISSUES REFERRED TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE

17. At its first session, the Standing Committee took number of decisions on the specific issues referred to it by Technical Committees...The present position with regard to these issues is indicated in the following paragraphs.

A. Regional Meteorological Research Centre

18. The Standing Committee noted that the Technical Committee on Meteorology proposes to make an indepth study of the report of the Panel of Experts on the proposed Regional Meteorological Research Centre with a view to examining the feasibility of the project. It was agreed that the results of this study should be awaited before the matter is considered further by the Standing Committee. The Chairman of the Technical Committee on Meteorology has

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requested participating countries to make an indepth study of the report of the Panel of Experts and to send their views. This matter will be taken up at the next session of the Technical Committee on Meteorology.

B South Asian Archaeological Congress

19. The Standing Committee accepted with appreciation the offer of the Government of India to host the South Asian Archaeological Congress. The Chairman of the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture was requested to take appropriate action to prepare for the Congress and to report to the Standing Committee at its next session.

20. Work has already started within the Government of India to prepare for the South Asian Archaeological Congress. An Organising Committee has been set up to work out the details. It is expected that the preparatoy work will be completed by early 1985 to enable the Congress to be held in the second half of 1985.

C. South Asian History Conference

21. The Standing Committee requested the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture to work out the details regarding the timing, venue, etc., of the South Asian History Conference.

22. The Government of India have written to all the other Governments of South Asian countries inquiring whether any of them would be interested in providing host facilities for the South Asian History Conference. Replies to these communications are awaited.

D. Protection and Preservation of antiquities and Art Objects

23. The Standing Committee requested the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Sports, Arts and Culture to take the necessary steps regarding the convening of a meeting of the appropriate agencies of the countries of the region to work out modalities and appropriate arrangements to ensure the protection and preservation of antiquities and art objects.

24. The Government of India have written to all the other governments of South Asian countries inquiring whether any of them would be interested in providing host facilities for the proposed meeting. Replies to these communications are awaited.

E. Rotation of Chairmanship

25. The Standing Committee decided that for the purpose of rotation of Chairmanship of the Technical Committees, the two year cycle will be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the SARC Declaration was signed viz. August 2,1983.

26. The purpose behind the above decision of Standing Committee was to ensure continuity in the work of the Technical Committees. For this, it is necessaty

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that the next sessions of the Technical Committees be held in the countries which currently hold the Chairmanship.

CHAPTER III

FUTURE WORK

27. At its first session, the Standing Committee took the following decisions with regard to the future work of the Technical Committees:

(a) The proposed Agenda for the meetings of Technical Committees and the documents setting out the issues to be considered should be circulated at least four weeks in advance of the meetings.

(b) The guidelines contained in Article 16 of the SARC Declaration for the apportionment of the costs for implementing the programmes of cooperation should not be applied with rigidity and exceptions may be made particularly in respect of countries which find it difficult to meet the costs of travel and subsistence for participants in seminars, workshops and training programmes, etc, at the request of the countries concerned.

(c) To enable the Technical Committees to make recommendations for the apportionment of the costs of implementing the programmes of cooperation, governments might consider allocating specified amounts to each sector out of the total pledges announced by them. This will enable the participants in the meetings of Technical Committees to reach expeditious decisions on the apportionment of costs.

(d) Each country should designate a sectoral focal point in each area of cooperation to enable the Technical Comomittee to monitor the progress in the implementation of the programmes of cooperation.

(e) The Chairman of each Technical Committee should remain in regular and frequent contact with the sectoral focal points with a view to monitoring the progress in the implementation of programmes and ensuring active involvement of all countries in the process.

(f) With a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the programmes of cooperation already agreed upon, the Technical Committees should as far as possible identify countries responsible for implementation, agree on a time-frame and specify the modalities for implementation, including the method of financing.

28. Governments may wish to indicate the steps taken by them in pursuance of the above decisions.

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2. REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE : SECOND SESSION, MALE—7-8 JULY 1984

INTRODUCTION

1. In pursuance of the decision taken at its First Session in New Delhi, 27-28 February 1984, the Standing Committee at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Maldives, held its Second Session in Male', 7-8 July, 1984 to prepare for the Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers of South Asian Countries, 10-11 July. Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, Senior Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Maldives was elected Chairman of the Meeting by acclamation,

INTEGRATED PROGRAMME OF ACTION

A. Report of the Technical Committees

2. The Committee reviewed Document SARC/MM/7 on the subject matter. It noted with satisfaction that the interim period between its First and Second Sessions marked an active phase in the actual implementation of the programme undertaken by the nine Technical Committees. Useful preparations, initiatives and follow-up actions had seen progress in a number of sectors including, *inter-alia*; the holding of several training courses, the completion of a large number of seminars and workshops with still others scheduled during the year; the initiation and in some cases submission of important technical studies; the exchange on a more organised basis of data and information; move to compile and publish regional directories; measures to facilitate the exchange of experts and scientists as well as vaccines, insecticides and germ plasms, etc. Other specific activities relevant to individual sectors have advanced to a stage of fruition. Longer-term measures relating to the study and feasibility of establishing regional projects and institutions had also been initiated.

3. The Standing Committee recalled its decisions as reflected in paragraph 5 of the report of its First Session and noted the following position in that regard :

(a) On the proposed Regional Meteorological Research Centre, the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Meteorology, has requested participating countries to make an in-depth study of the Report of the Panel of Experts and to send their views. The matter will be taken up at the next session of the Technical Committee and the outcome would be considered by the Standing Committee.

(b) With regard to the holding

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of a South Asian Archaeological Congress to be hosted by the Government of India, work has been started to prepare for the Congress. An Organising Committee has been set-up to work out the details. It is expected that preparatory work will be completed by early 1985 to enable the Congress to be held in the second half of 1985.

(c) On the question of the timing, venue, etc., of the proposed South Asian History Conference, the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Sports, Art and Culture charged with working out the details of the Conference, is awaiting replies to his communication to all other governments inquiring whether any of them would be interested in providing host facilities for the first Conference. The Committee also took note of the offer of Bangladesh to host the second South Asian History Conference sometime in 1986 or 1987.

(d) The Chairman of the Technical Committee on Sport, Art and Culture entrusted with the task of convening a meeting of the appropriate agencies of the region to work out modalities and appropriate arrangements to ensure the protection and preservation of antiquities and art objects is awaiting replies to communications addressed to all other South Asian countries inquiring whether any of them would be interested in hosting the meeting.

(e) The Standing Committee noted with satisfaction that the First South Asian Federation Games to be hosted by Nepal would be opened on the 17th of September, 1984 in Kathmandu.

4. The Standing Committee recalled the decisions taken at its First Session with regard to the future work of the Technical Committees as reflected in paragraph 6 of the Report of its First Session. The hope was expressed that the implementation of these decisions would make a significant contribution to further progress under the Integrated Programme of Action. In the light of experience in the implementation of activities under various programmes, the Committee decided the following :

(i) The time limit of four weeks for invitations to participate in programmes as well as for submission of the necessary background documentation may be increased to six/eight weeks.

(ii) A time limit of at least three weeks be set for inti-

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mating participation by member states to the organiser country.

(iii) The Standing Committee should draw up a calendar of activities on an annual basis. In this connection, it called on each of the Technical Committee to prepare as early as possible a calendar of its activities with maximum care to ensure effective participation. National Focal Points may forward the calendars of the Technical Committee to the Chairman of the Standing Committee.

(iv) The National Focal Points were asked to effect timely completion of procedures to ensure full participation.

(v) The Standing Committee urged all countries to strengthen follow-up actions in order to implement various activities according to the agreed schedules.

(vi) The Committee agreed that it would be useful to have regular informal meetings of representatives of South Asian countries in all capitals of SARC countries.

The Committee expressed the hope that as further progress is achieved in the implementation of the programmes, increasing emphasis will be placed on operational activities and to this end it invited the Technical Committee to draw specific projects of regional cooperation in their respective areas.

5. In pursuance of the Committee's decision at its First Session, several delegations informed that they had already communicated the sectoral focal points and others were in the progress of doing so. The Standing Committee requested the National Focal Points of member countries to communicate details of their respective sectoral focal points to the Chairman of the Standing Committee by 15th August, 1984.

B. Financial Arrangements

(a) Contributions by South Asian Countries

6. The Standing Committee took note with appreciation of the following contributions announced by the countries of the region for 1984-85 as an expression of their support for SARC activities.

Bangladesh—Bangladesh Taka 6.25 million

Bhutan —Bhutanese Nu. 1.00 million

India —Indian Rs. 7.5 million

Maldives —Maldivian Rf. 84,000

Nepal —Nepalese Rs. 2.5 million

Pakistan —Pakistani Rs. 5 million+Rs. 500,000 for scholarships.

Sri Lanka —Sri. Lankan Rs. 2.5 million

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(b) External Assistance

7. The Committee noted that discussions were in progress with the EEC for utilisation of its offers of assistance for 1983 and 1984 in the sectors of transport and scientific and technological co-operation. In the field of transport, the Government of Sri Lanka was coordinating a "Study of Traffic Flows and Intermodal Distributions Within the Region." Preliminary estimates of cost involved had been prepared and disbursement was currently being discussed with the EEC. In the field of scientific and technological cooperation, the Technical Committee has already identified projects relating to rural technology for utilisation of the EEC offer of assistance, which was conveyed to EEC in January 1984 through the Chairman of the Standing Committee. A detailed project for submission to the EEC will be prepared by the Chairman of the Technical Committee as soon as the requisite inputs from concerned member countries are received. In this regard it was noted that Bangladesh has submitted a project on "Bio-Mass Production" to the Chairman of the Technical Committee.

8. With regard to the ITU offer of assistance in the field of telecommunications, the Committee noted that the UNDP Aid Coordinators at their meeting held in Bangkok in May 1984 did not consider individual projects, confining their deliberations to broad policy issues. The UNDP meeting, however, strongly supported regional projects for sub-regional groupings like SARC to be funded by the UNDP Regional Programme. It was agreed that a representative of the ITU may be invited to the next meeting of the Technical Committee on Telecommunications in October 1984 to discuss the modalities of the offer of assistance with a view to an early finalisation of the same.

(c) Improvement in Telecommunications and Air-transport

9. The Committee reviewed the problems and potential for improving telecommunications and air-transport between South Asian countries. Conscious of the tremendous benefits that would accrue to the proples of the region, the Committee drew particular attention of the Foreign Ministers to the need for support and endorsement at the political level for measures designed to improve these services.

(i) Telecommunications

10. The Committee noted that some progress had been achieved in the improvement of telecommunication links among South Asian countries. Semi-automatic services have been introduced between India and Sri Lanka, a microwave link has been established between India and Bangladesh; an additional Open-Wire Carrier System has been commissoned between India and Pakistan and a microwave link between India and Bhutan

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is to be commissioned later this year. The Committee took note of the recommendations of the Technical Committee on Telecommunications and urged the governments to extend all practical assistance to the countries concerned for implementation of priority projects in this field. It was agreed that the Technical Committee on Telecommunications should give further consideration to the possibilities of improvement in the telecommunication links among the countries of the region.

(ii) Air Transportation

11. The Standing Committee emphasised the need for improvement in the field of air-transportation among South Asian countries and the necessity to link the regional capitals by airline connections. In this regard the Committee noted the following :

(a) The suggestion by Pakistan for the evolution of a regional mechanism to formulate and coordinate policies relating, *inter-alia* to the negotiation of traffic rights and tariffs, exchange of technical data, information and training facilities of air-traffic and radar control, aeronautical engineering, airport management and crash and rescue services, etc. It also endorsed with appreciation the offer made by Pakistan to convene a meeting of the civil aviation officials and airlines experts from the region to be hosted by its national airline.

(b) The proposal by India to establish an Institute of Air Transport Technology and Training for the South Asia Region.

(c) The paper submitted by the Government of India on "Common Central Airworthiness Requirements, Common Repair, Overhaul and Certification of Airworthiness for common types of aircraft" and the proposal that necessary steps be taken to have the paper examined in detail in a meeting of appropriate experts from countries of South Asia.

(d) The collection of necessary information on the types of aircraft operated by airlines of SARC countries and the infrastructure facilities available in each country for repair, overhaul and maintenance of aircrafts and components.

The Standing Committee called on the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Transport to examine these proposals in detail and to submit recommendations for further considerations by the Committee.

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IDENTIFICATION OF NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION

12. The Committee recognised the potential for enlarging the areas of cooperation. However, it continued to feel that for the time being efforts should be concentrated on the nine areas of cooperation already identified.

WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

13. The Standing Committee reviewed the world economic situation and expressed the view that the position had not changed for the developing countries since its last meeting despite the recovery in several industrialised countries. The developing countries had been facing a serious loss of development momentum due to excessive debt burden, protectionist measures and reduced flow of financial resources. It viewed with concern the decline in multilateral concessional resources for the poor countries, particularly the vastly reduced replenishment of IDA VII. It expressed its grave disappointment over the continuing impasse in the North-South dialogue and viewed with serious concern the significant erosion in multilateral cooperation. In this regard, it noted with deep regret that no appreciable progress was made in meeting the concerns of the developing countries at the London Summit Meeting of Industrialized Countries in early June 1984 despite approaches made by various leaders from the Non-Aligned and developing countries conveying these concerns.

14. The Committee urged that SARC countries actively pursue proposals put forward by the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit and the Group of 77 at various forums. It called for the early revival of the North-South dialogue leading ultimately to global negotia tions through the phased procedure of dealing urgently with the programme of immediate measures including the convening of an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development with universal participation. It also urged South Asian countries to instruct their representatives to such important meetings as UNIDO IV, the 39th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, etc, to closely coordinate their positions. The Committee also emphasized the need for greater South-South Cooperation.

The Committee regretted that despite strong pleas from developing countries it had not yet been possible to augment the resources available for IDA VII. It reiterated the call to all donor countries to provide additional resources to enable IDA not only to bring about an increase in real terms in the flow of resources to existing borrowers over the level of IDA VI but also to meet the requirements of new borrowers.

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NEXT MEETING OF STANDING COMMITTEE

15. In accordance with the decision taken by the Foreign Ministers that they would meet on an annual basis to review the progress of South Asian Regional Cooperation, the Committee decided to hold its next meeting by July 1985. The Chairman of the Committee was requested to carry out consultations with regard to the venue of the next meeting.

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3. JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. In pursuance of the decision taken at their first meeting held on August 1-2 1983, in New Delhi, the Ministers of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka held their Second Meeting in Male' on July 10-11 1984 at the invitation of the Government of Maldives.

2. The Ministerial Meeting was inaugurated by His Excellency Uz Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, President of the Republic of Maldives. His Excellency stated that our societies are quite diverse, but their hopes and expectations do not vary. Together, our peoples are sure of themselves, confident of their identities and confident too of their ability to control their own destinies. He added that the moving spirit and objective, the very principles which gave birth to this association, is that of working together which has as its basic foundation, a promotion of the interests of this region, an essential aspect of which is the maintenance and indeed the strengthening of our peoples' political, social and economic independence.

3. On behalf of the Foreign Ministers, His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan thanked His Excellency Uz Maumoon Abdul Gayoom for his wise and inspiring address. It was decided that the text of the address should form part of the final records of the meeting.

4. His Excellency Fathulla Jameel, Foreign Minister of Maldives was elected Chairman by acclamation.

5. The meeting noted with satisfaction the reports submitted by the Standing Committee following its first and second sessions in New Delhi from 27-29 February 1984, and in Male' from 7-8 July 1984, respectively. It considered and endorsed there commendations of the Standing Committee.

6. The meeting expressed its deep appreciation for the valuable work accomplished by the Standing Committee in fulfilling its mandate of coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action launched by the Foreign Ministers in their meeting in August 1983. It also expressed its appreciation to the Chairmen and members of all the Technical Committees for their dedication in carrying out their tasks and to the countries concerned for providing support and encouragement to various activities under the Integrated Programme of Action.

7. The Foreign Ministers felt that considerable progress had been achieved in implementing the Integrated Programme of Action in a relatively short time. They also took note of the decisions taken by the Standing Committee on specific issues referred to it by the Technical Committees as well as a number of important matters connected with the future work of the Technical Committees including preparation of

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medium to long-term projects of regional cooperation and improving implementation. They expressed the hope that the implementation of these decisions would make a significant contribution to the achievement of further progress under the Integrated Programme of Action. They stressed that as further progress is achieved increasing emphasis should be placed on operational activities and the formulation of specific projects. To this end, consideration should be given to the convening of meetings at the level of Ministers in some of the vital areas of cooperation already agreed upon.

8. The Ministers noted with appreciation the increased contributions announced by the participating countries for SARC activities in 1984-85. They called for necessary follow-up action to utilize the offers of external assistance that had been made.

9. The Ministers agreed that there was an urgent need for an improvement in telecommunications and air transport links specially between the capitals of all South Asian countries. To this end they endorsed the decision of the Standing Committee with regard to examination by the Technical Committees on Telecommunications and Transport of the various proposals submitted by the participating countries and submission of recommenadtions for consideration by the Standing Committee.

10. The Ministers reviewed the current world economic situation and expressed their concern over the deteriorating economic and social conditions in the developing countries. In the past three years, sharply falling commodity prices, deterioration in the terms of trade, intensification of protectionist measures, excessive debt burden and a decline in the flow of financial resources had caused unprecedented balance of payments problems and serious loss of development momentum in the developing countries. They agreed that without redoubling of efforts by the international community, including immediate measures, the goals and targets of the International Development Strategy under the Third UN Development Decade and the Substantial New Programme of Action for the least Developed Countries could not be attained. They expressed their deep disappointment at the lack of progress in putting into place international support measures and the continued stalemate in the negotiations on international cooperation. In this connection, they noted with deep regret that no appreciable progress was made in meeting the concerns of the developing countries at the London Summit Meeting of the Industrialized Countries in early June 1984 despite urgent actions suggested by various leaders from the Non-Aligned and developing countries.

11. The Ministers regretted that despite strong pleas from developing countries it had not yet been possible to augment the resources available for IDA VII. They reiterated the call to all donor countries to provide additional resources to enable IDA not only to bring about

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an increase in real terms in the flow of resources to existing borrowers over the level of IDA VI but also to meet the requirements of new borrowers. In view of the urgency of the matter the Ministers requested the Chairman to formally convey the concern of the South Asian countries to the leaders of the Industrialized Countries and in particular to the Prime Minister of Japan.

12. The Ministers urged that SARC countries actively pursue proposals put forward by the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit and the Group of 77 at various forums and re-affirmed their resolve to cooperate closely in all relevant forums in seeking appropriate solutions to the problems affecting the developing countries.

13. In pursuance of the decision taken by them at their first meeting in New Delhi in August 1983, the Ministers agreed to recommend to their Heads of State/Government, the convening of the First Summit meeting of South Asian Countries in Dhaka, in the last quarter of 1985. They expressed their deep appreciation to the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh for the offer to host the Summit Meeting. They emphasized the importance of thorough preparation for the Summit and decided to devote special attention to this matter at their next meeting.

14. The Ministers also agreed that the next meeting of Foreign Ministers would be held at Thimpu, in the first half of May 1985 and that it would serve as the preparatory meeting for the Summit. They expressed deep gratitude to the Royal Government of Bhutan for the offer to host the Third Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

15. The Ministers further agreed that the Chairman would consult closely with other countries with a view to finalising the date and drawing up the draft provisional agenda for the Summit Meeting. They also requested the Chairman after due consultation to finalise the exact date for the Third Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Thimpu.

16. The visiting Foreign Ministers expressed their deep appreciation to the Chairman His Excelleney Fathulla Jameel and through him to the Government of the Republic of Maldives for the cordial and generous hospitality extended to their delegations and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.

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REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE : THIRD SESSION, MALE—5-7 FEBRUARY 1985.*

INTRODUCTION

The Third Session of the Standing Committee was held in Male' from 5-7 February 1985, under the Chairmanship of Ibrahim Hussain Zaki, the Senior Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Maldives.

2. The Session was inaugurated by His Excellency Fathulla Jameel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Maldives. In his inaugural address he acknowledged that "the tremendous strides that South Asian regional cooperation has made within so short a time is testimony to the common awareness and belief of our peoples in the principles that it is only through cooperative efforts that we can move forward and promote a climate of harmony and confidence in the region and in the world as a whole. Such confidence, positive commitment and harmony is badly needed now, in order to alleviate the dangers and hardships of our lives." He stressed the need for the South Asian countries to be united and alert not to permit whatever shortcomings that may exist in our systems to be exploited by outside powers. Reiterating that the foremost goal of SARC must be to strengthen the economic and social status of the peoples of the region and referring to the dire shortages of production and employment, inadequate health conditions, malnourishment and rapid growth of population faced by the members of SARC, he emphasised the need for better planning, exchange of information and enhanced cooperation to combat these problems.

3. The Minister expressed his deep sorrow over the tragedy of the untimely demise of Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the late Prime Minister of India and stated that she had worked sincerely and endeavoured tirelessly to make SARC a reality and a positive force to reckon with.

4. On behalf of the Committee, His Excellency Bishwa Pradhan, the Foreign Secretary of Nepal, thanked His Excellency Fathulla Jameel for his inspiring address. It was decided that the text of the address should form part of the final records of the Committee.

5. The leaders of the delegations expressed deep sorrow at the tragic demise of Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the late Prime Minister of India and paid glowing tributes to her strong commitment to SARC and her contribution to the furtherance of its objective.

REPORTS OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEES

6. The Committee noted with appreciation the progress achieved in

*This document, received as we go to the Press, has been included with an eye to its usefulness, even though the Male Meetings were held in 1985 and hence are outside the purview of this issue.

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the implementation of the various programmes since its Second Session and endorsed the reports of the Technical Committees in the nine identified areas.

7. The Committee recalled that at their Second Meeting the Foreign Ministers had stressed that as further progress is achieved, increasing emphasis should be placed on operational activities and the formulation of specific projects. The Committee noted with satisfaction the progress already achieved in formulating such projects and requested the Chairman of the Technical Committees to report to the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee on the latest position in this regard.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

(a) Contributions by South Asian Countries—

8. The Standing Committee took note with appreciation of the further contributions announced by the countries of the region as an expression of their support for SARC activities.

9 The Pakistan representative indicated that a proposal for doubling his country's contribution to Pakistani Rupees 10 million for 1985-86 was under consideration. The final position would be communicated by July 1985. In addition, an amount of Pakistani Rupees 500,000/- would be earmarked for award of scholarships to students from South Asian countries.

10. The representatives of India, Sri Lanka and Maldives indicated their budgetary provisions at Indian Rupees 10 million for 1985-86, Sri Lankan Rupees 3 million for 1985 and Maldivian Rufiyas 84,000/- for 1985 respectively.

11. The Bangladesh representative indicated that a proposal was under consideration to increase significantly his country's contribution in the budget of 1985-86.

12 Other delegations indicated that consideration was being given to make appropriate budgetary contributions for SARC activities for 1985-86.

(b) External Assistance—

13. As regards the utilisation of the offer of assistance from EEC, the Sri Lankan delegation confirmed that the procedure for disbursement to the Sri Lankan Government of ECU 100,000 for the study in the field of transport has been completed, enabling the work to commence shortly.

14. In the field of Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the Standing Committee noted that the concerned Technical Committee had decided at its last meeting to convene three workshops in the fields of biomass, food technology and renewable energy. EEC, which was informed of the decision, had sought more details regarding the workshops. These were being obtained from the concerned countries and would be transmitted to the EEC.

15. As regards the ITU offer of assistance, the Committee noted that in accordance with its directions a representative of ITU had been invited to attend the meeting of the Technical Committee on Telecommunications held in Islamabad in November 1984 so that modalities

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of the offer might be discussed and finalised. However, as the representative could not attend the meeting, a programme of activities had been decided upon by the Committee and transmitted to ITU. Pakistan as the coordinator country was in touch with ITU for obtaining disbursement of assistance for this programme.

16. The Committee authorized the Chairman of the Technical Committee on Agriculture to pursue follow-up action with FAO with regard to its offer of assistance.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE FIRST SOUTH ASIAN SUMMIT MEETING

17. The Committee recalled that at their Second Meeting the Foreign Ministers had agreed to recommend to their Heads of State/Government the convening of the first Summit in Dhaka in the last quarter of 1985 and had decided to hold their next meeting in Thimphu in the first half of May 1985, as a preparatory meeting for the Summit.

18. The Committee noted that the Royal Government of Bhutan has scheduled this meeting for 13-14 May 1985 to be preceded by the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee from 10-11 May 1985. It was recognised that the most important task before the present session was the preparation for the Summit.

19. The Committee took note of the document SARC/SC/5 which contained, *inter-alia*, possible elements of a declaration/charter that the Summit might adopt and decided that the current Chairman would undertake further consultations and submit a revised draft for consideration of the Foreign Ministers at their next meeting in Thimphu.

20. The Committee noted with satisfaction that the Government of Bangladesh had initiated necessary preparations for holding the Summit Meeting and would undertake consultations regarding the exact date.

21. The Committee agreed to recommend that the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Thimphu might adopt the emblem of SARC.

EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN SARC ACTIVITIES

22. The Standing Committee noted that activities under various sectoral programmes had to be rescheduled or postponed due to lack of response from the participating countries and urged expeditious implementation of the decisions contained in paragraph 4 of the Report of its Second Session held in Male 7-8 July 1984. It further stressed that the national focal points should establish mechanisms for inter-ministerial review to monitor the progress of implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action periodically.

23. The Standing Committee decided to review the activities proposed by each Technical Committee and to draw up a consolidated calendar of activities at its next session in Thimphu in May 1985.

IDENTIFICATION OF NEW AREAS OF COOPERATION

24. The Committee recognised the potential for enlarging the areas

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of cooperation. However, it continued to feel that for the time being efforts should be concentrated on the nine areas of cooperation identified.

WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

25. The Committee reviewed the world economic situation and expressed its deep concern over the continuing economic crisis which has had particularly grave consequences for the developing countries. The Committee emphasised that the malfunctioning of the international monetary, financial and trading systems were significant factors that have sustained and deepened the continuing crisis.

26. The Committee expressed its grave disappointment over the continuing impasse in the North-South dialogue and viewed with serious concern the significant erosion in the spirit of multilateral cooperation. The Committee reiterated the non-aligned proposal for the convening of an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development. In this connection, it noted with appreciation the initiative taken by the late Prime Minister of India, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, in her capacity as the Chairperson of the Non-aligned Movement to establish a high level Group of Experts to examine the substantive and procedural aspects of the international conference. It welcomed the Group's Report which would make a useful contribution to the deliberations of developing countries on these crucial issues and help to bring about a dialogue with the industrialised countries.

27. The Committee re-emphasised the need for the countries of South Asia to receive an adequate amount of concessional flows to finance infrastructure development and to strengthen their capacity to meet the basic needs of their peoples. The Committee urged in this connection that multilateral financing agencies should be provided with adequate resources to meet the needs of their members particularly in the face of the continuing crisis of the world economy. It called attention to the urgent need to ensure supplementary financing for IDA VII so that IDA can play its proper role in supporting the development process.

28. The Committee expressed concern over the lack of progress in the implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action in the first half of the decade and urged that efforts should be made at the global mid-term review scheduled in September/October 1985 to ensure accelerated implementation of the Programme in the second half of the decade in order to enable the least developed countries to overcome their structural problems and provide basic minimum standards for their peoples.

29. The Committee reaffirmed the intention of the South Asian countries to closely coordinate their position in various meetings including UNDP Governing Council, Committee on the Review and Appraisal of IDS, Development Commitee and Interim Committee and,

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negotiations of MFA.

NEXT MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE

30. It was agreed that the next session of the Standing Committee will be held in Thimphu on 10-11 May 1985 preceding the next meeting of Foreign Ministers in Thimphu.

31. The visiting Foreign Secretaries expressed their deep appreciation to the Chairman of the Standing Committee, Ibrahim Hussain Zaki and through him to the government and people of Maldives for the warm and generous hospitality extended to their delegations and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.

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SOUTH ASIA—BASIC DATA

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh is bounded on the west, north and north west by India, east by India and Burma, south by the Bay of Bengal. Mostly an alluvial plain with a network of navigable rivers : the eastern arms of the Ganges, Jamuna and Meghna rivers. Their deltas, with many islands, form Bangladesh's coastline on the Bay of Bengal. Land area is 144.020 sq. kms. Population 88,513,000 (1980). Dacca (now spelt Dhaka) is the capital. The chief ports are Chittagong and Khulna. Rajshahi, Naranganj and Barisal are the other main towns.

A Republic. The Chief Martial Law Administrator, Lt. Gen. Hussain Muhammad Ershad is since 24 March 1982 the Head of Government. He is assisted by a Council of Ministers.

Agriculture is the main occupation of the people employing 80 per cent of the labour force and contributing about 55 per cent of the Gross National Product. 64 per cent of the total area is under cultivation; 80 per cent of which is under rice and 9 per cent under jute. Rice is the most important food crop and Bangladesh accounts for about half the world production of raw jute which is the main foreign exchange earner.

The main industries are jute manufactures, cotton textiles, silk, forestry, paper and board, cement, leather, chemicals and phamaceuticals, fertilisers, ship building and engineering works, steel mills, machine tools and handicrafts. Main exports to the tune of Taka 8,251 million (1979) are jute and jute products, tea, leather and fish.

Transport : Roads 11,076.8 kms, railways 4,186 kms., and inland waterways 8,050 kms.

BHUTAN

Bhutan (Druk Yul—Land of the Thunder Dragon) lies in the heart of the Himalayas. It is bordered on the east, west and south by India. Area is 46,600 sq. kms. Population estimated at a little over a million, is formed of three main ethnic groups—the Sharchops, the earliest inhabitants; the Ngalops, the descendants of Tibetan immigrants and the Nepalese. Thimpu is the capital city.

Bhutan is a Monarchy. The Head of State is King Jigme Singye Wangchuk, who is assisted by a National Assembly of 150 members called the Tshogdu; the Royal Advisory Council, called Lodoi Tsokde and the Council of Ministers.

The roots of Bhutan's economy remain in its natural resources, in the agriculture and animal husbandry that occupy over 90 per cent of the

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work force. The area under cultivation is about 5,500 sq. kms. The chief products are rice, millet, wheat, barley, maize, cardamom, potatoes, oranges, apples, handloom cloth, timber and yaks. Bhutan abounds in valuable forests. Tourism is the largest source of foreign exchange.

INDIA

The Indian Union, with a land area of 3.28 million sq. kms., is bounded by the great Himalayas in the north, the Indian Ocean in the south, the Bay of Bengal in the east and the Arabian Sea on the west. The mainland has four well-defined geographical regions—the great Himalayan range, the Indo-Gangetic plains, the Desert region and the Southern Peninsula. The neighbouring countries are, China in the north east, Burma in the east, Pakistan in the north west, Sri Lanka to the south east and Bangladesh in the north east. The country's total population is 683 millions (1981). The main languages are Hindi, Punjabi, Tamil, Gujarati, Urdu, Bengali, Telegu, Malayalam, etc. Capital : New Delhi. Other main towns are Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad, Bangalore, etc.

A Union of 22 federative states and 9 centrally administered territories, India has as the Head of the Union a President and the Governors are the Heads of States. The Central Parliament comprises the Council of People—Lok Sabha—with 524 elected members and the Council of States Rajya Sabha—with 250 members, 12 nominated by the President, the rest elected by state legislatures. The Head of State is President Giani Zail Singh and the Head of Government is the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The Indian economy is predominantly agricultural; 70 per cent of the people are dependent on land for their living and agriculture provides about 40 per cent of the national income. Agricultural commodities account for about 20 per cent by value of Indian exports (total Rs. 73,580 millions 1980 figures), while agricultural commodities, machinery and fertilisers account for about 25-30 per cent of imports. The country's total imports in 1980 were to the tune of Rs. 131,100 millions. Tea accounts for about 40 per cent of the agricultural exports. The main industries are textiles, cement, iron and steel and jute goods. Transport : Roads, 1,367,000 kms; railways, 60,700 kms. and 5,000 kms. of inland waterways. India has the third largest pool of scientific manpower and is among the seven countries in the world who have the technological capability to erect a complete nuclear power plant.

MALDIVES

An archipelago of some 1200 small coral islands (only 220 inhabited), grouped into 12 clearly defined clusters of atolls, Maldives lies in the Indian Ocean, approximately 600 kms. south of India and 675 kms. south

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west of Sri Lanka. Its area is 298 sq. kms., stretching 750 kms from north to south and 120 kms. from east to west. Male, also an island, is the capital of Maldives and has been the seat of government from the very beginning of the known history of the archipelago.

A Republic since 1968, it has a presidential form of government. The President, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom is the Head of State and Government. A Cabinet of Ministers assists the President in formulating government policy and advises him on major issues and decisions. A People's Council (Majlis) with 48 members (40 elected and 8 appointed by the President) is the country's legislative body. Maldives has universal adult franchise.

Population is 154,000 (1980 figures). Main language—Divehi; English is used as a second language. Main religion-Islam.

The Maldivian economy is based on the fishing industry. "Bonite" (dried Maldiva fish) is the main export commodity and Japan the main buyer. Fishing is the main traditional occupation of the peoples—employing about 45 per cent of the country's total labour force. The country's main imports are food (mainly rice), ships and boats, petroleum products and chemicals.

Tourism introduced in 1972 is, apart from fishing, shipping, coconut processing and agriculture, the country's developing industry. The number of tourists visiting Maldives increased from about 1500 in 1972 to nearly 75,000 in 1982. The country has no roads or railways; island to island transport by boat is the main means of communication.

NEPAL

The Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, situated on the southern slopes of the middle Himalayas, is bounded on the north by the Tibet region of China and on the east, west and south by India. The country can be divided into three main geographical regions : Himalayan region, Mountain region and the Terai region. Eighty-three per cent of land comprises high mountains and the hills, while the remaining 17 per cent form the plains known as the Terai.

The total area is 141,400 sq. kms. The estimated population—13.4 millions—is composed of diverse ethnic groups speaking different languages. Nepali is Nepal's national language; other languages spoken are Maithili, Bhojpuri, Tamang, Tharu, Newari, Avadhi, Magar, Rai, Gurung, Bhote, Sherpa, Rajbansi, Sunwar, Satar, Danuwar, Santhali, etc. Hindi is also spoken extensively in the Terai. The capital is Kathmandu.

Nepal is a kingdom. According to its Constitution, the sovereignty of the country is vested in the Crown, the symbol of national integrity. The Head of State is King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev. The administration revolves around the Panchayat system of government, characterised by

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partylessness, leadership of the Crown, class coordination and decentralization of power. Accordingly, the structure is three-tiered : the Village or Town Panchayats, the District Panchayats and the Rashtriya Panchayat. The latter, the apex of the Panchayat Pyramid, is a unicameral legislature consisting of 150 members, 112 of whom are elected on the principle of adult franchise. On the recommendation of the Rashtriya Panchayat, the King appoints one of its members as the Prime Minister.

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy; 94 per cent of the population are engaged on land producing about 60 per cent of the gross national product. (GNP) Rice, wheat, maize and millets are the main crops. The main industries are of jute goods, sugar, cigarettes, cotton textiles, cement, bricks and tiles, shoes, etc.

The country has valuable forests in the southern part; total forested area is approximately 40,831 kms. In the northern part, on the slopes of the Himalayas, large quantities of medicinal herbs are grown.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan, located north of the Tropic of Cancer, has on its east and south east India; on the north and north-west is Afghanistan; on the west Iran and in the south, the Arabian Sea. It is a landmass of diversified relief, with its vast fertile plains of the Indus Basin, rocky expanse of plateaus of the south west and snow clad mountains of the north. Total area is 796,095 sq. kms. and population (1981 figures) about 83.7 millions is mainly Muslim. The country's capital is Islamabad.

The government is headed by the President and Chief Martial Law Adminisirator—Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq. He is assisted by a Cabinet comprising Federal Ministers, Ministers of State and Advisers. The administration in the provinces is headed by the Governors who are also Martial Law Administrators. A Federal Council was set up in 1982 (the *Majlis-e-Shoora*) to associate the representatives of the people with public offices. The *Majlis*, a nominated body covers a wide spectrum of the society, including politicians, religious leaders, businessmen, women, journalists, labour leaders, etc. It helps in advising the government on executive and legislative matters.

Pakistan's economy has undergone significant improvement in recent years; it has registered a growth rate of over six per cent per year since 1977. At the same time industrial growth has averaged 9 per cent. Farm production has registered an annual increase of 4 per cent. As a result, Pakistan is now self-sufficient in basic foods and is able to export wheat and rice. The country's main industries are sugar, cooking oil, cigarettes, cotton yarn, cotton textiles, jute textiles, motor tyres, motor tubes, bicycle tyres, bicycle tubes, cement, fertilisers, steel, etc. The country's major exports are rice, cotton (raw cotton and fabrics), carpets, leather goods,

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petroleum products, etc. Its major imports are crude oil, heavy machinery; automobiles, machine tools and fertilisers.

SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka, a pear-shaped island, is a compact landmass lying off the southern tip of the Indian sub-continent, separated from it by the Indian Ocean but almost joined to it by the chain of islands called Adams Bridge. The relief features of the country comprise a mountainous area in the south central part surrounded by an upland belt, the coastal plain covering the rest of the island. Being centrally located in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka has for centuries served as a focal point on sea routes to East Asia and the West.

The country's total area is 65,610 sq.kms. with a population of 14,815,000 (1980), composed of different ethnic groups. The Sinhalese, practising Buddhism, form the predominant ethnic group. The Tamils form the next major ethnic group; eighty per cent of them are Hindus. There are Moors also, descendents of the early Arabs. Other smaller ethnic communities are the Burghers, Eurasians and Malays. Sinhala is the official language, while both Sinhala and Tamil are national languages. Main religions are : Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam.

The country's new Constitution, adopted in 1978, introduced the Presidential form of government. The President, J.R. Jayewardene is the Head of State, Head of Executive and of Government as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The legislative authority is vested in Parliament elected by universal franchise.

Sri Lanka is predominantly an agricultural country—about one third of the country's total area is under cultivation and more than half of the island's labour force work on the land. The main crops are paddy, rubber, tea, coffee and maize. Coconut is also grown in plenty. This sector accounts for about 28 per cent of the country's gross demostic product (GDP). The country's exports (totalling Sri Lanka Rupees 13,206 m. 1978) are tea, rubber, copra and coconut oil, gemstones and graphite. Its main imports (SLR's 14,662 m. 1978) are food and drinks, consumer goods and intermediate goods and fuel. The main industries are rubber processing, tea processing, light manufacturing, etc.

Transport : Roads, 26,805 kms. and Railways, 1,584 kms. Capital : Colombo. Main seaports—Colombo, Trincomalee and Galle.

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BOOK REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

General

RADHARAMAN CHAKRABARTI : The Theory and Practice of International Politics. Macmillan India, Ltd., New Delhi, 1982, xi, 249 p., Rs. 50.

THE book under review is divided into two parts, Concepts and Theories. Its basic purpose is to analyse and elucidate in a systematic and meaningful manner the dominant concepts and theories in contemporary literature in international politics. At the same time, the study purports to throw new light on some of the leading themes through a synthetic approach to the context and content of international politics. Schematically, the book is divided into ten well-conceived chapters. The first two chapters deal with the substance of the international system and actors in international politics. The third and fourth chapters successively discuss the resources of nations for action in terms of differing capability and the consequent inequality of states. Chapters five and six discuss the motivations of international politics as well as the patterns and instruments of interaction among nation states. The remaining four chapters are devoted to an examination of major theoretical approaches to international politics—the Realist Theory, Systems Approach, Decision-making Theory, Balance of Power Theory, Game Theory and the Communications model.

The author's discussion about the capability of nation states in terms of tangible and intangible components is quite good. However, in respect of the intangible variables like public morale, social system, administrative and diplomatic skill and leadership it is indeed very difficult to operationalise them. For instance, in the computation of a nation's capability it is almost impossible to indicate how and in what proportion public morale adds to the strength of the nation. In essence, when we talk of the capability of a nation, we have to conceive it in its relative connotation and not in its absolute sense.

On the nature of the theory in international politics, it may be stated that the endeavour has been to synthesise a vast amount of data into a meaningful whole while the emphasis is on the development of a conceptual framework and hypotheses in order to provide answers to complex questions in the international arena. In contemporary literature in international politics theory is conceived as a policy science (as a set of recipes) in its normative and empirical dimensions. However, the contingencies and irrationalities are more predominant than the uniformities and uniqueness of phenomena in international politics ; a fact which explains the limitations of theory in such a discipline.

The Realist Theory, as a general theory of international politics, is inadequate because it is a static model which assumes that power relations

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recur in a "timeless monotony." Moreover, the Realist Theory places the concept of power in a crucial position. Basing a theory on a variable like power, which is merely instrumental in the achievement of higher ends as determined by human purpose, is to ignore the fact that power is not an end in itself.

The Systems Theory is beset with the difficulty that the word "system" is used in its diverse meanings by scholars. Sometimes it is used as a method or technique and sometimes as an instrument for description, analysis and explanation. All this results in ambiguity. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure greater clarity in terms of assumptions or presuppositions governing this theory.

The theories of preferential behaviour like the decision-making approach and the game theory suffer from serious defects. They are at best partial theories with limited utility for policy-makers in governmental bureaucracy. The balance of power theory was the guiding concern of European nations in the 18th and 19th centuries, but in the age of nuclear weapons and advanced rocket technology it has lost its earlier persisting relevance. The Communication Model, like the preferential behaviour theories, uses quantitative techniques. While the reviewer is not against the use of quantitative apparatus, the fact is that it cannot be a substitute for qualitative judgement. Politics involves human purpose and systems involving such a purpose cannot be studied through alegebraic equations, mathematical formulas, tic tac toe computer, flow sheets, diagrams, etc. We should not mistake the various models developed by scholars as reality, though we do not deny the human tendency for reification.

On the whole, Radharaman Chakrabarti has succeeded in a considerable measure in clarifying certain concepts, issues and problems in international politics. The treatment is objective and informative since it draws extensively from the extant literature on the subject. In fact, the author has cast his net wide and has painstakingly studied the available material in books and learned journals. His balanced observations on different aspects of international politics testify to his ability for sound reasoning and critical discussion.

It would have been better if the author had updated his bibliography to include the recent publications in the subject.

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S. L. ROY: Diplomacy. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, vii, 196p., Rs. 75.

DIPLOMACY is more or less an enigmatic discipline not easily amenable to easy analysis or ready categorizations in terms of dynamics both above and below the surface. The international scene has enlarged and expanded itself in the recent decades to a very great extent. The texture of international relations is accordingly beset by stresses and strains of a tremendous magnitude. A host of international actors have appeared on the scene both transnational, e.g. the United Nations and its related agencies; sub-national actors, e.g. liberation movements viz.—PLO, ANC and others add to this configuration. Non-governmental organizations, multinationals, pressure groups, besides the traditional (bilateral and multilateral) accords, and one visualises a multihued kaleidoscope with horizontal, parallel, vertical and diagonal strains, constantly shifting, aligning and meeting in permutations and combinations. This in turn affects the nature of diplomacy and the task of the diplomat. A variety of tasks have to be handled by the diplomat in a way that would project a definite perspective and yet generate compromise and agreements. These concepts range from deliberations on nuclear war, disarmament, human rights, economic aid, a restructuring of international economic relations, women's rights, environment, populations, processes, energy, *et al.* The diplomat, and the art of diplomacy, needs to be skilled indeed, to handle these varied themes. Diplomacy today has shifted from bilateral negotiations to summit meetings in the accumulated glare provided by the mass media. It is increasingly becoming multilateral and shifting away from sole concern with classic concepts like military deterrence to a broader framework encompassing power, responsibilities and values. In an era of multilateralism and heightened public involvement, the function of the diplomat has been circumscribed and eroded, but nevertheless it is a vital part of establishing contacts between nations.

The changing nature of diplomacy is the subject of S.L. Roy's book on *Diplomacy*. It is a stark title yet conveys a series of dimensions which have been ably and efficiently dealt with by Roy in this book. It covers a large range of inter-nation contacts from the earliest times to the contemporary period. The material is extensively subtitled and this gives an indication of the range of topics covered—from "Cultural Activities and Diplomacy," "Evolution in Ancient India," "What is New in New Diplomacy," "Commercial Diplomacy," "Totalitarian Diplomacy," The Ideal Diplomat" to "Future of Diplomacy." A substantial part of the material shows a heavy dependence on other authors and elaboration of their views, e.g. Morgenthau. This leads the author into sometimes naive conclusions, e.g. "There is no doubt that if the above mentioned nine rules as enunciated by Morgenthau can be observed, diplomacy, in spite of the division of the world into opposing camps will thrive." (p. 183)

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The author arranges six scenarios for the future of diplomacy, ranging from complete and sudden annihilation of the human civilization to "the emergence of a world state." In both these cases international relations will cease to exist and international diplomacy will also disappear. Both these options seem a remote possibility—in between there are four scenarios : a) "gradual deterioration of the [sic] international relations marked by progressively greater inability to solve problems and meet challenges ;" a continuation of the present system with no great change ; slow and gradual improvement of the international system marked by progressively more effective solution of problems and rapid and radical transformation into a much better world order. The author concludes that Diplomacy will continue to play an important role in international politics particularly through the United Nations ; "diplomacy in the United Nations, be it 'quiet diplomacy,' or any other sort of diplomacy, will dominate the [sic] international relations to a great extent and exert considerable influence in shaping the future of diplomacy." (p. 185). The fact to my mind is that the United Nations as a "talking shop" has kept various problems simmering, and in many cases the strategy has been talking without negotiations. The atmosphere of holding crisis at bay by endeavouring to engage in summitry is a particular feature of diplomatic negotiation in the contemporary period.

With the television having brought multilateral summitry virtually into the living room, diplomacy has lost a considerable amount of glamour that originally surrounded it. Yet it remains fascinating to the average mind as an exercise in human relations. Whereas Roy's book is clearly meant as an introduction to the arena, serving as a text book, to anyone interested in the evolution of diplomacy, the book under review, provides valuable information, if not always insight or an indepth analysis of the subject.

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NEERA CHANDHOKE

HAROLD K. JACOBSEN and SUSAN SIDJANSKI : The Emerging International Economic Order : Dynamic Processes, Constraints and Opportunities. Saga Publications, New Delhi, 1982, 293 p., $ 25.

THIS book is the first of a series on *Advances in Political Science : An International Series* started by the International Political Science Association. (IPSA) The series seeks to reflect the aims and intellectual traditions of the Association, of rigorous political enquiry in a genuinely international perspective. As such this volume which is the product of the

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activities of the Research Committee of IPSA endeavours to present an objective analysis of the diverse strands of thinking on the varied aspects and problems of the international economic order that has been in the process of emerging in the post-war period, especially since the early seventies. The volume does succeed in giving a fairly impartial account of a highly controversial and difficult subject. This is reflected in the very scope of the international economic order that is brought under review. This includes at one end the general shape and evolving pattern of the global political economy with developed, developing and centrally planned economies, with a focus on the neo-liberal order of the dominant developed economies, and at the other end touches on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) which crystallises the hopes and aspirations of the large masses of people in the developing world.

The book begins with a narration by the co-editors—Harold K. Jacobsen of Ann Arbor, Michigan and Susan Sidjanski of the University of Geneva—of the continuing evolution of the global political economy. It refers to the unprecedented prosperity with uninterrupted growth of the world economy during the first post-war quarter-century through the early seventies, built around the international institutional framework and policies of the IMF, World Bank and GATT The stress of this international economic order was on comparative freedom of international trade coordinations of macroeconomic policies, convertibility of currencies and relative stability of currency values ; and the developing countries willy nilly participated in this neo-liberal international economic order through their economic links with the western states.

Reference is made to the dominant position of the United States in the world economy and in international economic institutions, the pre-eminence of the US doller as the basis of the world monetary system, the persistent and substantial deficits in American balance of payments, the fiscal discipline this imposed, quaintly enough, on *other* countries, and the enormous expansion of transnational corporations in the 1960s with their undue and over-weaning influence on the economies of less developed countries (LDCs).

Due note is taken of the shocks administered to a functioning international order from the mid-seventies onward by the dramatic hike in the price of oil, which brought into relief the endemic ills of artificially low prices of raw materials produced by developing countries and inordinate fluctuations in such prices and consequently in their export receipts. The exports of LDCs came under increasing pressure from a growing protectionist trend among the developed economies, alike against imports from other developed as well as developing economies, which found their industrialisation efforts stymied thereby—all in a background of a decisive slowdown, and widening recession in the world economy.

The steady relative decline in the United States economic strength both in relation to other developed economies, among them the burgeoning

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economies of Japan and West Germany, and against the growing industrialisation of the less developed countries, with strident increase in their population and their number, and enlarged voting power in the United Nations and United Nations agencies ; the growing trade and economic contacts of the centrally planned economies with the rest of the world, developed as well as developing ; the new phenomenon of the oil-exporting developing countries ; the plight of the least developed countries with continued relapse in their abysmally low living standards and stark prospects—are all graphically portrayed as features of a changing world economic scenario with its new challenges and opportunities.

Implicit in the scenarios are the sources of the demand for a New International Economic Order, formally so designated in successive resolutions of the UN General Assembly in its main constituent elements—sovereignty over the nature of economic systems and their operation (including command over natural resources), regulation of transnational corporations, better terms of trade for raw materials and commodities and stabilisation of their prices, access to markets of developed countries, technology transfers, participation in international decision-making processes, greater aid flows and investment and debt rescheduling, among others.

Being a compilation of contributions by different authors, the book necessarily lacks the cohesion of an individual work but it has the advantage of being able to present varied points of view as well as angles of observation of a complex subject-matter.

The forces for change in the global political economy are analysed early in the volume, from a provocative stance within the developed world presented by Robert W. Cox, which views the whole post-war development of the world economy as a dynamic process of internationalisation of production, having its core in highly developed and the periphery in less developed countries with its attendant international political-economic order, being a hegemony founded by the United States, which has its own ideology and whose dominance is rooted in broad general acceptance of the existing framework of power relationships. Such acceptance enlists in its sweep the interests and social affinities of the classes in developing countries brought up in the management schools and culture of the west, which rationalise the relegation of simpler forms of production, including raw materials to the Third World countries, reserving the more complex processes and sophisticated techniques to the "leading" economies. This order has been threatened with collapse by the crises of the 1970s. In a way, the Third World view emanates directly from opposition to the above view point of the international order. An historical account is given by Robert S. Jordan of the emergence of the demand for a NIEO incorporated in successive UN resolutions.

Not the least instructive part of the analysis of the book consists in the case studies (by Robert S. Walters and Lynn Krieger Mytelka) of the United

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States steel industry and the French textile industry which bring out the severe strains and tensions to which the relations *inter se* of the economies of the developed countries have been subjected of late, with the retreat from neo-liberalism and the rise of protectionism in a variety of forms, in a context of loss of competitiveness and growing unemployment (trends only intensified by the recent recession). It has fallen to the State to reinforce the influence of competition against the charges of unfair trade practices by industry, and to improve the scope for rationalisation and industrial adjustment and diversification against the demands for stereotyping employment in existing occupations and locations.

The most explosive development of the seventies impinging on the global political economy has been the oil price hike by OPEC. This was at once the most dramatic demonstration of commodity power (and as such supported and looked upto by the LDCs) and the most serious blow to the economies of oil-importing Third World countries, worsening their terms of trade and plunging them into irremediable debt. This forms the subject matter of the concluding part of the volume, which examines in a very innovative piece of analysis the varying lines of response, inward-and outward-oriented, of different countries to cope with this major threat, happily alleviated latterly by a softening of oil prices. In conclusion, the book turns its focus on the desperate plight of the sub-Saharan African countries—the most seriously affected segment of humanity—which calls for special remedial actions suited to their unique traits.

The book has a refreshing quality drawing as it does upon the vast intellectual resource of political scientists who are able to bring within their ken some of the wider politico-socio-economic forces that underly seemingly purely economic developments, and deserves to be widely read.

New Delhi. B. K. MADAN

Regional

M.S. VENKATARAMANI : The American Role in Pakistan. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1982, XII, 480 p., Rs. 175.

THE strong nexus between the United States and Pakistan which has resulted over the years in pumping a colossal amount of arms into that country has been a mystery which an ordinary member of the public has found difficult to understand. The motivation of Pakistan has, to us, been pretty clear ; it is to arm themselves to the maximum possible extent against India in order to meet with the possibility of Indian aggression (if one is inclined to a charitable explanation) or to make war on India motivated by revenge and for the glory of Islam.

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Venkataramani's book is a valuable contribution to the understanding of this mystery. It is based on hitherto secret records of the American Government which have been only recently made public.

The leadership of Pakistan seems apparently to have made up its mind even before the coming into existence of that state that Pakistan would be weak economically and militarily and that, therefore, it needed external support from wherever that support was available in order to meet what they imagined to be a threat from India, having convinced themselves that India had never accepted the reality of the partition and would, if given the opportunity, undo that partition by military means. There also, of course, was always the desire to convert what Jinnah had called the moth-eaten Pakistan, which he ultimately got, into the Pakistan of his original dreams through the accession of more territory, in particular of that of the Valley of Kashmir. As the strongest and richest power in the world, the Pakistanis naturally fixed on the United States as the source from which this external strength would be drawn.

It is amusing to see how, from the very beginning, Jinnah himself, along with the members of his government, at every level went after the American Embassy in Karachi persuading it of the necessity of American military aid to Pakistan and his impatience at the lack of response to his pleadings. The level at which this problem was approached indicated a complete lack of understanding of how the American system operated in the assumption that what was said to the Ambassador reached the President of the United States and that the President would therefore do whatever the Ambassador recommended. This ignorance of the American system was not confined to Pakistan ; we ourselves shared it ; for both of us had the assumption that Ambassadors were powerful agents of governmental action and that the Cabinet presided over by the President or the Prime Minister, as the case may be, took final decisions on the recommendations of the man on the spot.

The realisation came much later that the Amercians did not act that way, that the Ambassador was merely an agent of the State Department, that there were other equally and usually more powerful departments of the American Government which carried on war among themselves, that the executive government under the American Presidential system does not have the power that Prime Ministers do under a parliamentary system, that Congress has to be persuaded and cannot, unlike Parliament, be bludgeoned and that in order to get successful action from the United States, an immense and many-sided effort has to be put in to convince the various centres of power the resultant of whose forces ultimately leads to action in that country. It should be said to the credit of Pakistan that when they did understand the American system, their effort broadened out into all the agencies of the American Government and the single-mindedness of the effort was reflected in the countinued and unremitting pursuit

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of its goal to its ultimate success.

Venkataramani traces the history of this effort in a clear, lucid and connected narrative along with comments enlivened throughout by amusing pieces of satire. One of the prime powers, in the matter of military aid from the United States is of course the Pentagon, and over the years, Pakistan has taken particular care to cultivate that part of the American Government through continuous contact with its own military establishment and the careful cultivation by all sections of that establishment of their American counterparts.

The success of Pakistani diplomacy is the story of one great confidence trick. American interests lay, during the period covered by Venkataramani's book, in fighting what they regarded as the threat from Communism which till the *volte face* engineered by Professor Kissinger in 1971, was regarded by that country as an unmitigated evil which had to be resisted irrespective of its designs on the United States. In view of the world situation, the United States needed allies; Pakistan never made a secret of its desire to become one. The effect that American action in pursuance of its global interests had on relations between its allies and the other powers in the region was, and indeed is, of little concern to America. The fact that dumping arms into Pakistan would worsen the relationship between that country and India, that it would cause scarce Indian resources to be spent on armaments to meet the threat from Pakistan, that it would lead to a slowing down of its economic development and that it would therefore endanger the maintenance of democracy, was of little concern to American policy-makers.

In underrating or indeed neglecting completely the effect on India of this military aid they were encouraged by the refusal of India to join their anti-Communist alliances and its pursuit of the policy of non-alignment which Secretary of State Foster Dulles went so far as to say was immoral. If immoral people were caused trouble it surely served them right. Dulles's bias against India was based on morality. President Nixon, on the other hand, had developed a gut-hatred towards India which was only to a limited extent based on his alleged anti-Communism—which he conveniently forgot when he pursued the opening to China—but more largely as the reaction of a small man to fancied personal insults. Whatever the reasons, whether before 1958 or thereafter, the fact is that American military aid to Pakistan has been based on a colossal confidence trick for the success of which one must pay tribute to Pakistani diplomacy.

The Americans were and indeed are convinced that Pakistan needs all these arms for the purpose of fighting the enemies of the United States. The fact that these arms have twice been used against India, that they have never been used against a Communist power, that while professing anti-Communism, Pakistan has entered into the closest relationship with the second greatest Communist power in the world, seems to have

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had no effect on the American mind.

The book is of considerable personal interest to the present reviewer as he has had the advantage of knowing personally almost every actor on the scene mentioned in this work, both Pakistani and American, some of whom have been his intimate friends. One incident of considerable interest which illustrates the real situation was on an occasion when, just before the signatures on the 1954 Military Agreement, he was playing bridge in Washington with the Pakistani Ambassador. The news on the radio had just said that China had lodged a strong protest against this agreement. The comment of the Ambassador of Pakistan was, "Why on earth are they protesting ; what has it got to do with them ?" To my response that as he was entering into an anti-Communist alliance, obviously the matter concerned China very directly, his answer wast "But we don't want the arms against China, we want them against you."

Gandhinagar B. K. NEHRU

RASHMI JAIN : US-Pak Relations, 1947-1983. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1983, viii, 182 p., Rs. 90.

FOR a few years after Pakistan came into existence that country's foreign policy was influenced by the British strategic doctrine. Pakistan's rulers did not have a framework of foreign policy except vague declarations of seeking friendship with all and intent to work for world Islamic solidarity. Pakistani policy-makers had carried over to the new country the prejudices of the long years of conflict and controversies between the All India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress. These, when transferred to state to state relations became the basic determinants of Pakistan foreign policy. Pakistani rulers perceived India as the main threat to its security and territorial integrity. Since Pakistan could not confront India, given its size and population, its rulers sought exernal assistance. This assistance was readily available as the United States was on the look out for allies who could provide it with bases around the Soviet Union. The US-Pak Security alliance of 1950s has never been broken, though at times it appeared to have come under strain.

Recently, US perception of Pakistan's importance to its interests has increased enormously. This is because of radical changes in the political and strategic map of the entire region. The United States policy in South-West Asia had rested on Israel, Sadaat of Egypt, Shah of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Sadaat and the Shah of Iran have disappeared from the scene. The Saudi Kingdom is also very fragile as was shown by the Mecca Mosque incident in 1979. Pakistan under late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was not a reliable ally. After the coming into power of Gen. Ziaul Haq Pakistan has

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become once again the most "allied ally" of the United States.

Rashmi Jain has traced the origins of the US-Pak alliance from the early fifties and then goes on to analyse the low ebb in the alliance during the mid-sixties. This was the period of Sino-Indian War and the 1965 India-Pak War where the US failed in the eyes of the Pakistani ruling class. This led to Pakistan's disenchantment with the US-Pak alliance. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had by now assumed the direction of Pakistan's foreign policy, was attempting to end Pakistan's exclusive dependence on the United States.

Pakistan found China as an alternative source of moral and material support ; however, this new ally could not substitute fully for the United States. Pakistan's dependence on US continued and the 1959 US-Pak Executive Defence Agreement remained in force.

After 1969 the United States, under Richard Nixon, ushered in a new era in US-Pak relations. This was the period when Pakistan was undergoing domestic turmoil in the wake of the fall of Ayub Khan and India-Pakistan confrontation over the freedom movement in Bangladesh. US came closer to Pakistan, and Gen. Yahya helped in bringing US and China together, followed by President Nixon's now infamous "tilt" towards Pakistan during the 1971 India-Pak War.

Pak-US relations appeared to deteriorate during the mid-seventies over the decision by the Bhutto government to acquire the French nuclear reprocessing plant. The discord arose mainly because the United States did not fully rely on the loyalty of Bhutto since he was not dependent on their support for survival. Pakistan's nuclear programme under Gen. Zia has not met with any US disapproval. On the contrary, Pakistan has been exempted from the restriction under the Symington Amendment, which bars countries which are working on nuclear weapons from receiving US military aid.

The revolution in Afghanistan in 1978 and Soviet intervention in December 1979 led US policy-makers to "rediscover" the strategic importance of Pakistan. Pakistan became a frontline state and an essential line of defence and an indispensable element of any strategy that sought to punish the Soviets for their action. From this point began Pakistan's revival of its American connection.

The United States was planning to resume supplies of weapons to Pakistan long before the Soviets decided to help the threatened Kabul regime in December 1979. With the assumption of office of US President by Ronald Reagan, Pakistan was offered a package of $ 3.2 billion economic and military aid. In addition to this huge sum the United States also sought to assist Pakistan through multilateral forums.

The *quid pro quo* for this generous dole is no longer a secret. Pakistan is a conduit for US arms to Afghan rebels and is also providing sanctuary to them on its territory. Pakistan may provide bases to the US Rapid Deployment Force and may play a more active role in the Persian Gulf.

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Rashmi Jain in her conclusions has correctly analysed the main determinants of US-Pak security relations. However, she appears to under-estimate the India factor in US-Pak relations. From the earliest days after independence the US policy-makers have not concealed their hostility to the Indian policy of non-alignment and self-reliance. US policy-makers are well aware of the consequences of the massive supply of arms to Pakistan on Indo-Pak relations. Three India-Pak wars are ample evidence of this. This has not received adequate attention from Rashmi Jain.

The study on the whole however, is a valuable contribution to the subject.

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ASGHAR H. BILGRAMI : An Essay on the Genesis of West European Integration, P.C. Dwadash Shreni & Co., Aligarh, 1977, v, 183 p., Rs. 45.

THE book under review is a study in which post-war movements (and rationales) towards integration in Western Europe are sought to be studied in the Cold War context. Although some remarks *are* offered relating to changes then in the offing (e.g. the metamarphosis of the OEEC into the larger OECD) yet in the wider context the impending issues of decolonization and the economic rise of Western Europe — plus Japan — are left aside. This accords well with what the author has said relating to the ambit of his subject matter at the outset of the monograph.

The immediate sequence of events following 1947 are succintly chronicled and the very proximate role played by Americans in promoting West European economic recovery (and viability) is identified. Various intergovernmental, and other institutions, which had been then set up, are indicated. The predilections of major West European politicians, together with those of their trans-Atlantic counterparts, are identified. The Soviet Union had also its assigned role in this integrative *scenario*, we are reminded, since the Cold War made Western national togetherness on the European mainland more desirable — a perspective well-encouraged by the United States. The structural foundations of integration were, however, entirely indigenuous to the Europeans ; the Cold War merely accelerated the pace of integrative endeavour. France-US connivance in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is highlighted, as is the inferior-partner status which France, in particular, sought to endow on West Germany within the ECSC framework.

It is also precisely within this mode of functional integration that the gradual political assimilation, *inter pares*, of West Germany into West

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Europe took place, starting in 1955. This culminated in the entry of West Germany into the European Economic Community in 1957 ; it was soon to lead further to a very thoroughgoing France-German *rapprochement* through the Treaty of Cooperation (1965). Tensions were, later, to arise on the basis of a superior German economic performance, the comparatively greater strength of the Deutschmark and the rather greater understanding the Germans came to have (compared with the French) with the United States. But these were very much in the future, in the fifties — hardly causes for concern.

Bilgrami concentrates, therefore, on the dynamics of the steady understanding which was built up amongst the West Europeans over this early period. The reasons for British abstinence from the EEC are also briefly put forward. Another major economic force, apart from the EEC, the EFTA, which has been built up in Western Europe and which — in the area of negatively integrative economics—is of the first importances has also been very perfunctorily dealt with. The European Defence Community which although mooted, never came into being, is also analysed in the context of events. Britain in the Cold War context also finds place in an appendix to the main text which is situated after the bibliography.

Overall thus, this is a scholarly monograph dealing with the myriad questions facing West Europeans in the fifties. These related to defence, an internecine *modus vivendi*, empire and finally, economy. Given that, Marshall Aid and autochthonous entrepreneurship were looking after the lattermost, the prime questions of the day related mainly to the first two of the above. This mongraph deals mainly with these. The subject matter is therefore, somewhat dated although it carries exegetical significance.

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SOUMYA K. MITRA

KALYANI BANDYOPADHYAYA : Burma and Indonesia : Comparative Political Economy and Foreign Policy. South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1983, VII, 250 p., Rs. 95.

THE book under review is a welcome addition to the study of contemporary Burma and Indonesia, the two important countries of South East Asia which have undergone the political experience of being ruled under a parliamentary democratic form of government since their independence in the late forties and have witnessed the emergence of military rule since the sixties. Since the overthrow of the civilian rule the military has played a major and dominant role in the political, economic, and social life of both the countries. The political economy (i.e. interdependence of

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politics and economics) and foreign policies of both these countries were conditioned to a great extent by the attitude, political behaviour and perception of the ruling civilian elite before the army took over power from them. The same considerations apply to the period of military rule in the case of the political economy and foreign policy of Burma and Indonesia, though in Burma's case the foreign policy of the country since the military take-over of March 1962 has been a continuation of the policy of neutralism or non-alignment although it has ceased to play an active role in regional and world politics since then.

There is a great deal of similarity between the political economies and foreign policies of Burma and Indonesia. Ms. Bandyopadhyaya gives a detailed account of economic performance of Burma and Indonesia since independence and shows as to how politics and economics in both these countries have been interdependent and how the political economy and the foreign policy have affected each other in Burma and Indonesia.

The Indonesian archipelago with a population of about 160 million and land area of 1,904, 569 sq. kms., very rich in natural resources, is the largest, most populous and potentially the most important country in South East Asia. The territory of Burma (676, 577 sq. kms) is smaller than Indonesia, yet it is the second largest country of the region with a population of about 35 million. Although rich in natural resources and at one time one of the largest exporters of rice, Burma is an underdeveloped country and its mineral, timber and other resources are yet to be fully tapped. It has been continually plagued by multifold insurgencies since independence. It was generally expected in both the countries that political independence would lead not only to the political development but modernization and nation-building. The politico-economic and foreign policies of both these countries were expected to promote the growth of nation-building and modernization. But even after nearly three and half decades of independence these countries remained economically backward and underdeveloped and their political development has been considerably retarded.

A striking fact at the outset is, that the book under review is entitled "Burma and Indonesia" by which one naturally expects it to deal with bilateral relations between the two countries. The theme of the book is, however, concerned with a comparative study of the political economy and foreign policy of Burma and Indonesia. The political economy and foreign policy of the two countries has been closely interdependent right from the time of their independence in the late forties and especially since the military came to power in 1962 in Burma and in 1965 in Indonesia.

The book has been divided into two parts, each consisting of four chapters. In the first part of the book the author has presented a comparative analysis of the problem of economic development faced by Burma and Indonesia in the context of the failure of parliamentary democracy and emergence of the military regimes. The author has taken great pains to

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highlight the significant aspect of mutual interdependence of politics and economics in each of these two countries.

The first chapter is a background chapter wherein the author discusses the impact of British and Dutch colonial rule on Burma and Indonesia respectively and growth of nationalism in both the countries which paved the way for their emergence as independent states on 4 January 1948 and 27 December 1949 respectively. The policy and practice of the economic ideology of syncretic socialism followed under the parliamentary democratic system of government of Burma during 1948-1962 and under the liberal democratic system of government in Indonesia during 1949-1957 forms the subject matter of chapter two. The hard core of the ideology of syncretic socialism was economic nationalism as expressed through the politics of Burmanisation and Indonesianisation although the ideology also contained the elements of Marxism and religion in both the countries. In fact the author's treatment of Burmese and Indonesian economic ideology during the period mentioned above and subsequent economic orientation towards ideology and practice of socialisation of the economy by General Ne Win's military government in Burma from 1962 to 1969 and by President Sukarno's government during guided democracy period, and still another orientation in the political economy of both the countries in the form of economic liberalism pursued since 1970 in Burma and since 1966 in Indonesia under General Suharto's "New Order" government, form the backbone of the present study. Bandyopadhyaya's treatment of the above aspects of the political economy of Burma and Indonesia is particularly strong. The author has taken pains to explain the factors reponsible for these changes and has also outlined the changes involved in the economy of both the countries. Perhaps, the greatest factor necessitating this change from the policy of "Socialisation" to "Economic Liberalism" in the political economy of Burma and Indonesia was the failure of the policy of socialisation and nationalisation and consequent economic decline suffered by both the countries in the years before 1970 and 1966 respectively.

Part two of the book is primarily concerned with a comparative study of the foreign policy of Burma and Indonesia as related to their political economies. In the beginning of the part, the author has dealt with the imperatives of Burmese and Indonesian foreign policy as determined by the compulsions generated by their political economies. Here, the author assiduously tries to compare the policy of non-alignment as followed by Burma with that of Indonesia during the phase of parliamentary democracy. In the subsequent two chapters (chapters six and seven) an attempt is made to compare Burma's foreign policy under Ne Win with Indonesia's foreign policy under Sukarno's Guided Democracy and Suharto's New Order in relation to the domestic political economies of both the countries. The author has given a detailed account of the foreign policy of Burma and Indonesia and has all through emphasized the fact that the foreign policies

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of the two countries were an important determinant of their political economies and vice versa. The author, however, could have done well if she could have also discussed other factors, that is, security, political ideology of the civilian and military elites in both the countries and the international situation obtaining in the South-east Asian region in determining the course of foreign relations of Burma and Indonesia. Although economic factors were predominant in leading to a perceptible change in Indonesia's foreign relations under Suharto and Burma's foreign relations under Ne Win since 1971, other factors mentioned above should also have been taken into account.

In the final chapter, the author has made an attempt to make a comparative assessment of the political economies and foreign policies of Burma and Indonesia. Here, the author has also made observations regarding the degree and extent of the interdependence of political economies and foreign policies of both the countries.

The importance of the book lies not only in presenting a comparative study of the political economy and foreign policy of Burma and Indonesia, but what it reveals is pertinent to the other less developed countries in a comparable position which face the problems of political and economic stagnation. Ms. Bandyopadhyaya has drawn upon almost all the relevant sources for presenting a detailed account of the comparative political economy and foreign policy of Burma and Indonesia. She is to be congratulated for creating greater awareness of the politico-economic experience of Burma and Indonesia since their independence and for highlighting the interdependence of political economies and foreign policies of these two South East Asian countries.

There are a few factual errors and spelling mistakes in the book. For instance on pages 38 and 39, U Nu has been described as President and Prime Minister which is wrong. Sao Shwe Thaik was the President and U Nu was the Prime Minister of independent Burma. Similarly on p. 139, it has been mentioned that the first Asian Socialist Conference was held at Rangoon in January 1948 which is incorrect. This Conference was held in January 1953 in Rangoon under the auspices of the Socialist Parties of Burma, Indonesia and India in which representatives from socialist parties from other countries also participated. Again on p. 168, Brigadier Aung Gyi has been mentioned as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (RC) which is incorrect as General Ne Win was the Chairman of the R.C. On pages 224 and 296, BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party) has been mispelt as BWSPP (p. 224) and WSPP (p. 225).

Nevertheless, the book is very useful for students of Burmese and Indonesian politics, economy and foreign policy. In short, it is essential to any library on contemporary South East Asian history.

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UMA SHANKAR SINGH

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MADAN M. SAULDIE : Ethiopia : Dawn of the Red Star. Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1982, vii, p., 241, Rs. 165.

ETHIOPIA enjoyed a good deal of uniqueness among the Sub-Saharan African states. While the majority of the African states passed through a colonial phase, Ethiopia formally lost its independence only during the short span of Italian conquest in the late thirties. It also enjoyed the distinction of defeating a major European power like Italy in the Battle of Adowa of 1898. Under Haile Selassie, for more than three decades, Ethiopia enjoyed political stability in a continent where political instability and recurrent military dictatorships have set the tone of political systems. The existence of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church for centuries and its active role in politics have further added to the complexities of the Ethiopian polity. The foreign policy of Ethiopia has also been characterized by uniqueness. For example, when the pan-African sentiments were stirred throughout the black continent, it was Haile Selassie who took the lead in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. As a result Addis Ababa became OAU's headquarters. As an elder statesman Haile Selassie played an important role in the OAU for almost a decade.

During 1974, the decadent feudal rule of Haile Selassie was overthrown by the military. The military leaders, notably Maj. Mariam Mengistu Haile, were "Progressive-Left" and aimed at establishing a socialist society. This inevitably prompted the socialist states like the USSR and Cuba to support Ethiopia in socialist reconstruction of a hitherto feudal society. In addition to these internal convulsions, factors like strategic, location, Eritrean secessionist movement and Ethio-Somalian border dispute virtually transformed the entire Horn of Africa into a potential battleground for the East and the West.

Developments in Ethiopia have arrested the attention of all curious Africa watchers. Forexam ple Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux have come out with a first-hand account of these developments in a book called *Ethiopian Revolution*. They have attempted to dissect the nature of revolution in a comparative perspective by drawing parallels from other socialist countries.

The work under review has neither conceptualized revolution nor does it suffer from any sort of academic pretensions. It is a vivid and straight forward analysis of most of the major developments in Ethiopia since Haile Selassie's times. That is why, probably, it makes very enjoyable reading. The author has focused his attention on two central themes, i.e. ; a) the nature of Haile Selassie's rule, its potentials and maladies that led to its decay ; b) the rise of military rule and internal and external hindrances to socialist transition.

The first theme has been built on the basis of a reasonably substantial historical background. The author demonstrates, convincingly, how the grasp of political personalities, regional politics and immense manipulative

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abilities allowed Haile Selassie to rise to the pinnacle of glory. Alliance with the Church, landlords and military significantly contributed to the staying power of his monarchical rule. For, "Neither the church property nor the incomes of the clergy, were ever taxed." (p. 53) "The army pockets were so well-lined that during the 1960's soldiers got salary raises of almost 500 per cent." (p. 77) Moreover, "the Imperial family owned about 15 per cent of the country's total arable land, the government about 25 per cent and the former aristocracy and church 20 per cent each. The rest of the 20 per cent was owned by small and medium-sized farmers." (p. 166) The author has highlighted some of the redeeming features of the regime such as opening up of educational institutions, promotion of health and welfare schemes, setting the pace of industrialization in a predominantly agrarian country, integration of Eritrea within the federal structure and Haile Selassie's leadership of the Pan-African movement. However, any feudal order has a tendency to put personality over principles. Subsequently, loyalty to personality, rather than principles, delivers dividends. Haile Selassie had built a coterie of admirers around himself. There are some perceptive comments on the nature of Ethiopian people who upheld such a rule—e.g.—"Haile Selassie's autocratic rule was characterized by his personal qualities and strengths and partly by the weakness of his opponents as well as blind faith reposed in him by the rural masses." (p. 32)

The deteriorating economic conditions in Ethiopia considerably weakened Haile Selassie's regime. Age old problems of developing societies, such as poverty, unemployment, famine, hunger, etc., had plagued Ethiopia. Furthermore, "Poverty reflected itself no less in the preponderance of paupers, prostitutes and priests in Ethiopia. Paupers could not be counted, but the prostitutes were estimated to number more than 100,000. Priests outnumbered them all totalling 200,000." (p. 52) In other words only the higher ups of the Church appeared to be direct beneficieries of the regime. The contrasts between the life styles of the rich and the poor was glaring. In the midst of such grave problems, Haile Selassie had no qualms about celebrating the 10th anniversary of the OAU with pomp.

Students rose in rebellion against Haile Selassie during the early seventies. Paradoxically, it was the latter who was responsible for building the educational institutions—an eventual anti-thesis of his own regime! The general discontent in Ethiopia prior to the *coup* is well portrayed in the book. However, the analysis is a bit ambivalent on some important issues, e.g., How could the military assume power after the overthrow of Haile Selassie? Was it the only organized group? Could the students, workers, landless peasants and other discontended sections not channelise their dissent by establishing a broad viable democratic front? In what manner the rank and file of the Army was influenced by the civilian discontent? How far was the Army politicized? Did the deprived priests oppose the church authorities in particular and the regime in general? Deeper analysis of

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some of these questions could have added more substance to the first theme.

While analysing the second theme, the author has provided a lucid account of the character of the new rule. He states : "In a key policy statement over Radio Addis Ababa, the Military Council said it would 'reconstruct the country in line with its motto, *Ethiopian tikdem*.' '*Ethiopian tikdem*,' it added, 'means socialism, socialism means equality, the right to guide one's own destiny, the right to earn and work.' " (p. 165) Once the one party Socialist State was established the programme of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia was published. "It analysed in Marxist terms the class structure and alliances of contemporary Ethiopia and announced such basic aims as the abolition of feudalism and capitalism, achievement of the transition to socialism and establishment of 'peoples democratic republic.' " (p. 189) Col. Mengistu ruthlessly suppressed the opposition and went ahead by nationalising key industrial sectors and implementing land reform schemes. He also took note of the major hurdles that stood in the path of development, i.e. weak industrial base, shortfalls in agriculture, rising cost of living, inadequate trained manpower and backward technology. Once again, the author has made some perceptive comments on Mengistu's revolutionary regime. He observes, "while the Chinese experience was essentially of a grass-roots nature, the Ethiopian revolution was being imposed from the 'top downwards.' " (p. 214) The regime also suffered from a sense of misplaced priorities. For example, to mark the first birth anniversary of the revolution a huge parade ground was constructed at Addis Abba which cost US $2 million. Was it not a heavy drain on the slender resources of a poor country ? Apart from instances of misplaced priorities, Mengistu's capacity to lauch political purges against the enemies of revolution injected a fear psychosis in the people. Under the circumstances, it was difficult to gauge whether the policies were serving the socialist cause or aggrendizing the personnel power of the military rulers. The author seems to have faced the same dilemma while commenting on this transitional phase.

The discussion of Eritrean secessionist movement is rather sketchy. It could have been more meaningful had the author attempted to place the Eritrean Question in the context of secessionist movements in Africa. The secessionist movements, in the past, have threatened to disintegrate major African states such as Congo/Zaire (Katanga — 1960-65/Shaba province 1977-78) and Nigeria (secession of Biafra 1966-70). How far is the Eritrean struggle different from them ? What are the compulsions that keep Eritrea under Ethiopian control ? What has been the role of external powers in adding to the potentials of the struggle ? Some of these questions remain unanswered. The analysis regarding the role of Soviet Union in Ethiopia also could have been more extensive. Some of the intriguing questions such as — Why did the Soviets withdraw their support to

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Somalia ? Did the Soviets bank on the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia to consolidate their power in the Horn of Africa ? Was it possible for the Soviets to maintain cordial ties with both the countries ? Furthermore, Russia's relations with small-sized socialist countries has a wide spectrum. One end of this spectrum is represented by Yugoslavia, which maintained its independence in external affairs, while the other end has been represented by Cuba which has been Russia's major ally. Placing Ethiopia in this spectrum could have been a worthwhile exercise.

The book, on the whole is a welcome addition to the literature on African studies. Some of the pertinent questions which it has raised can stimulate the academic community to do further research in this area.

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RAJEN HARSHE

D. P. SINGHAL : India and Afghanistan : A Study in Diplomatic Relations 1876—1907. South Asia Publishers, New Delhi, 1982, xiv, 216 p., Rs. 75.

THE book under review is a study of the shaping of Britain's Afghanistan policy and its stable imperial frontiers in northwest India during a period when the Russians were expanding their empire in Central Asia. What was achieved by 1907 was the result of protracted diplomacy and intermittent warfare, both influenced by complex forces and considerations at play, such as, the fear of a "likely" Russian invasion. So far as the British side of the story is concerned, the broad outline of external policy was determined in London, but the responsibility of its execution lay with Calcutta, through which channel alone Anglo-Afghan diplomacy was conducted. Often forward policy of the men on the spot did precipitate action in an unauthorized direction—many such instances are given by D. P. Singhal—but this could happen only because the metropolitan authorities were permissive in every such case. The Turkish Mission that met its failure in Afghanistan in 1877 is a pointer in this respect.

The author concludes that the major decisions affecting Afghanistan during the period "were unexpectedly reached and have surprisingly survived." (p. 188) One such surprise was the support given to Abdur Rahman after his enthronement. Yet another was the delimitation of the Indo-Afghan frontier along the faulty Durand Line and its durability. Even the 1907 accord between Britain and Russia, according to the author, was the result of a sudden turn in the international situation following the emergence of Germany as a formidable power. It was in 1879 that Afghanistan was deprived by treaty "for the first time of its traditional character of a

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'buffer state' and its Amir became virtually a feudatory of the British Crown." (p. 45) However, while Afghanistan's protectorate status under the Treaty of Gundamak continued to persist even beyond 1907, neither its buffer function nor its internal autonomy was ever lost during the reigns of Abdur Rahman and his son Habibulla. By the Kabul Treaty of 1905, Amir Habibulla "was accorded the designation of 'His Majesty' by the most powerful nation of the time." (p. 178) The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 upheld this status-quo. The Russians on their part affirmed that the Afghan ruler's territories were outside their sphere of influence, and that Britain was to control Afghanistan's relations with other foreign Powers. However, under the terms of the Convention, Russians could deal directly with the Royal Government of Afghanistan on local issues.

Primary source materials, which the book is based upon, relate almost exclusively to the British side of the story. That materials revealing the Afghan side are 'practically non-existent,' as mentioned in the Introduction, only partially explains this shortcoming. What about Russian sources? "The available materials on the subject are so abundant and complicated that it has been necessary," says the author, "to limit the subject to India's diplomatic relations with Afghanistan between 1876 and 1907, the most formative period in the history of Indo-Afghan relations." In the context of this defined scope of the study, source materials used are indeed varied, rich and adequate for the purpose. Afghanistan is by now a well-researched area, and several studies based on wider sources and written during the period between 1963, when the first edition of the book under review came out, and its reprinting in 1982 are available in any case. Of these, Suhash Chakravarty's, *From Khyber to Oxus : A Study in Imperial Expansion* (New Delhi, 1976) and Ludwing W. Adamec's *Afghanistan 1900-1923 : A Diplomatic History* (Berkeley, 1967) deserve a special mention.

It is a pity that the original edition of Singhal's book is reprinted unaltered. His judgement that no "new or substantial evidence has come to light demanding alteration or change" in the main text may be valid. But his failure to update the bibliography or to write a more substantial introduction than he has done for the Indian reprint, brought out eighteen years after the first publication date, is not justified thereby. In any case, the book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on colonial diplomacy at work in and around India.

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INDIA

Foreign Policy

SURENDRA CHOPRA (*Ed.*) : Studies in India's Foreign Policy. Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1980, ix, 586 p., Rs. 50.

THE book under review is a compilation of papers presented in two seminars, the first on "Indian Foreign Policy,. New Challenges and Opportunities" (8-10 March 1979) and the second on "India and Her Neighbours : Foreign Policy Perspectives and Cooperation for Development" (27-29 March 1980), held at the Guru Nanak Dev University. Amritsar and at the ICSSR Regional Centre, Chandigarh.

The participants included such distinguished and internationally known experts as Dr. K. P. Karunakaran (Delhi University) ; Dr. Shanti Swaru (Punjab University); Dr. Surendra Chopra (Guru Nanak Dev University), Dr. K. P. Misra (JNU) , V. S. Budhraj (Kurukshetra) ; Mohit Sen (New Delhi) and Dr. Ramakant (Jaipur). There are 30 papers in all, including the inaugural address by Dr. K.S. Gill, Vice Chancellor of the host University, and excluding the bibliographical survey. The topics covered are —Foreign Policy; in the Indira Gandhi Era; Janata Government's Foreign Policy and Nuclear Policy; the New International Economic Order; the Law of the Sea; India's Relations with Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh; India's relation with USA, USSR and China ; India's policy towards Afghanistan, West Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean. In addition, there is an interesting paper by Prof. Satish Kumar on the Structure and Working of the Foreign Office, perhaps the first full-scale study on the subject which, often veiled in secrecy, deserves a deeper probe if only to make it more efficient and purposeful. As is common with such compilations, the papers vary in quality and some of them tend to become too descriptive at the cost of analysis or projection.

It is interesting to note that the one seminar was held at the fag end of the Janata period and the other, after the restoration of Indira Gandhi to power. They cover two sides of a historic divide. It is not surprising that there is a marked difference of tone in the two sets of papers. The academics are also prone to sway with the prevailing wind but what is reassuring is that on the two sides of the divide there is an overall continuity of foreign policy. This proves that foreign policy has its basis in permanent national interests and therefore it is founded on a national consensus. The difference of approach is not too glaring. The contours enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru have stood the test of time ; the shading may vary with the artist.

India's relations with the Super Powers have been generally smooth but intensity and mutual appreciation vary according to the international en-

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vironment, our relative dependence on one or the other for development assistance, technology or defence supplies and our proximity to the current theatre of their preoccupation. Two views have been presented in this book—the first that the Janata Government had a built-in limitation in initiating a new policy; the other, that the Janata Government made an effort to improve relations with the United States without neglecting relations with the USSR. The crux of the matter is that the Janata Government had no desire, nor any particular reason, to initiate a "new" foreign policy nor is it possible for any country to make a break with the past. The purpose of the Janata Government was limited—to eliminate distortions in the application of the principle of non-alignment and to focus attention firstly on South Asia and secondly on the regions on our right and to our left—namely South East Asia and West Asia. A dialogue had already been initiated with China and this was to develop in its normal course, without undue haste. In this limited purpose the Janata Government succeeded. Our ties with all countries in South Asia did acquire a note of friendliness and the foundation was laid for economic and technical cooperation in the years to come. Indeed even Indira Gandhi's restoration and her imperious approach have not been able to throttle this trend. The crux of the South Asian situation is Indo-Pakistan relations and to this theme, Surendra Chopra's paper makes a valuable contribution. In the long run, satteliitisation of Afghanistan and consequent strategic convergence is bound to push the South Asian countries into reconciliation, though the main bone of contention is still the Indo-Pakistan divergence on whether the subcontinent can defend itself without injection of foreign arms into the region which give rise to the arms race and aggravate mutual fears and create new tensions. Unfortunately, no paper touches the question of how India should get about reassuring its much smaller neighbours of its good intentions. Whatever the difference in approach, pragmatic or moralistic, even the nuclear policy survived the Janata era in tact, as the Desai Government refused to bow to US pressure.

K. P. Misra's paper on the Indian Ocean also shows that India, as the major littoral state, has failed to end the super power rivalry or expanding naval presence in this region. Even though in theory, practically all the littoral states have demanded an end to this rivalry, the fact is that this protest is toothless and even the proposed UN Conference on the Indian Ocean has not yet been held. The fact is that manyl ittoral and island states, small as they are, or because of smallness itself, have been sucked into the rivalry and have become enmeshed in the strategy of one super power or the other. The fragmentation of the Third World through the emergence of mini-and micro-states, notwithstanding juridical equality, paves the way for penetration by external powers which may in course of time assume neo-colonialist dimensions.

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Satish Kumar has examined the organisation and working of the Ministry of External Affairs. Perhaps he has been somewhat generous. Anyone, who knows it from within must find its information storage and retrieval system deficient and therefore much of its decision-making on casual or immediate problems (fire-fighting operations) somewhat out of context and unrelated to long-term policy planning. Indeed in the rush of frequent change of personnel and diplomatic movements, long-term policy projections end up as academic exercises, fit only to gather dust!

A very valuable addition is the survey of source material on India's foreign policy and international relations which identifies gaps which need to be plugged jointly by diplomats, academicians and media analysts. As seminar papers turned into a symposium are not easy to edit or to read, when transformed into a book, they suffer from gaps as well as overlaps. But, on the whole, this is a useful survey of the status of our foreign relations at the beginning of the '80s.

India emerged as a regional power in the '70's and in the '80's ; its objective is to match its world standing with military and economic capability. Whether it shall add to or detract from its moral authority remains to be seen and on that depends the final balance sheet of nations as of men.

New Delhi. SYED SHAHABUDDIN

ASHA HANS : Indian Diplomacy : The Suez Crisis. Amar Prakashan, Delhi, 1983, vi, 202 p., Rs. 75.

AMONG the numerous difficulties in researching and writing about Indian foreign policy are the problems of access to relevant documents, of extensive interviews with the leading participants, and of the necessary expertise to absorb the data into an easily explainable but nonetheless comprehensive theoretical framework. Asha Hans does not seem to have overcome these "obstacles". And yet she has brought a new book on Indian diplomacy during the Suez Crisis of 1956. She has assembled her facts with care to project a coordinated thesis, although the tyranny of facts stalls success. Nevertheless the effort is laudable. The author does not remain a mere spectator of phenomena but tries to interpret them and give her own opinions on the various events. The value of the book lies particularly in its presentation of a horizontal picture of the Suez Crisis rather than a sketchy survey.

According to Ms Hans, the specific factors lying behind India's role during the Suez Crisis were mostly domestic, particularly the Muslim mino-

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rity in India. She is of the opinion that late Maulana Azad played an important role in shaping India's West Asian policy. Again, she observes that the issues of Muslims and impending general elections of 1957 played a major role in policy formulation during the Suez Crisis. She does not stop at this and goes one step further and adds : "The success of Korea and Indo-China would be nullified in the eyes of the Indian electorate if India did not succeed at the Suez." (pp. 15-18)

Then she includes the impending Second Five Year Plan which was also a vital domestic factor. One feels that this aspect of motivation has been somewhat overemphasised. India would have played the vital role which it did, even if these so-called pressures were not at work. One has to see Nehru's total personality as a crusader against colonialism and imperialism rather than a mere nationalist politician. Ms Hans does enumerate the other factors—"the principles of the sovereign equality of nations, of non-interference in the internal affairs of one country by another, of the right of the new nations to remain non-aligned in the Cold War as well as the need to resist the return of colonialism and the peaceful resolution of international problems."—but she seems to give more importance to the compulsions of internal politics.

Hans holds the view that though India recognized Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal, it did not approve of the method adopted by Nasser while nationalizing the Canal. In the "Indian view" such precipitate actions would have a harmful effect on the developing nations whose economy depend upon the aid received from the developed states. But, then, why was Nehru opposed to bringing in the UN. He wrote to Nasser that he did not think it wise for Nasser "to suggest that the present problems should be considered by the United Nations."

So far so good. But when Ms Hans comes to her conclusions, a person like me, will have to accept some of her remarks with a spoon-full of salt rather than a pinch. She writes, "During the Suez Crisis it was seen that the Indian Foreign Policy premise was based on a false perception of the world order. Neither gunboat diplomacy nor colonialism were an order of the past." (p. 144) To my knowledge of the Indian Foreign Office, no one claimed otherwise. Nehru, and Menon both realised that the struggle against western colonialism and neo-colonialism was a long drawn one. I wish Ms. Hans had interviewed P.N. Haksar and T.N. Kaul who know much more about Nehru's mind than those mandarians she has interviewed during the course of her study. Ms Hans is unnecessarily sore about the fate of the Commonwealth after the Suez Crisis when she writes: "Though the Commonwealth remained an organized body due to the efforts of persons like Pearson and Nehru, it lost its earlier character of being a close-knit family of nations." To my mind it was never a close-knit family of nations, it was and is only a ceremonial body. India would not loose its prestige if this organization had become ineffective, rather

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it proved more beneficial with the emergence of the non-aligned movement which was a direct outcome of Nasser's triumph after the Suez Crisis.

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SURENDRA BHUTANI

History

D. DEVAHUTI : Harsha : A Political Study. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1983, xxvii, 362 p., Rs. 180.

THE book under review has 389 pages (362 in the body and XXVII used for preface etc.). It has 7 Chapters, 4 appendices, 14 plates and 1 map. The book is the result of very hard work. Some new materials have been gathered by the author. The Chinese materials of the last Chapter and of Appendix IV are very useful and thus the book provides materials for further study of Harsha, particularly for Harsha's diplomatic and religious policies. Further Buddhist study is also possible on the basis of these new materials.

In spite of the above mentioned qualities of the book, the book leaves something to be desired. According to Devahuti, epigraphical sources are the most important sources for the political study of the period (p. 1), but she has utilized mostly Hieuntsang and Bana for Harsha. In the Chapter on sources she has not even named her inscriptions, although some times they have been used in the body.

Devahuti's comprehensive knowledge of the political situations of the pre-Harsha period is well attested by the description of her II Chapter (called—From Regional Kingdoms Towards An Empire). The related dynasties must receive attention of the author. But the author is sometimes found preoccupied with details which have nothing to do with her subject. The topic must put certain limitations on the author. Devahuti has frequently crossed the limitations of her topic (Harsha—A Political Study) and the scope of the Chapter.

Her III Chapter (called the Vardhanas) includes many subjects and the points about the rise of Harsha are badly mixed up with many other points.

Harsha's extent of empire (IV Chapter) has been a knotty problem. Even after this book the problem of the identification of "Five Indias" mentioned by Hieuntsang remains unsolved. Devahuti is inclined to take "Five Indias" as "Five Gaudas" (pp. 97-99) and gives five names for them—

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Sarasvata, Kanyakubja, Gauda, Mithila and Utkala. But Harsha conquered Utkala at the end of his reign period. The author has tried to put her point by finding a lack of historical precision on the part of Hieuntsang and says that the pilgrim's prime concern was Buddhism. (p. 99) But in the same paragraph she says that Hieuntsang's claim for Harsha is not false, but early by good many years. At many places (pp. 5, 8, 96) Devahuti has praised Hieuntsang and has regarded him authentic and trustworthy. The Chinese text which has the variant "Five Gaudas" for "Five Indias" and on the basis of which the author has built the palace of her arguments, has not been located by her. The author has clearly explained her presumption that places visited by Hieuntsang in his journey from Kanauj to Bengal were conquered by Harsha during his eastern campaign. Similarly Hieuntsang's descriptions of the kingdoms, lying to the west of Kanauj, have been well explained and justified by the author. Her points that Harsha had no control over Nepal are very clear.

The author feels that this age is not the age of creative writings, rather the age of commentators (V Chapter—Principles of Polity, p. 129). But very few commentators of the age have been named and referred to. I would not appreciate her view that the works ranging between A.D. 400—and 800 are close enough to Harsha's reign to give some idea of the political and administrative trends of the time. She has utilized the works of Gupta period, Manu, of Mauryan period and even Vedanta, Upanishadas and Mahabharata. It is going too far back for principles of polity and for their references. Harsha's administration should have been described fully and then the principles of polity should have been observed and established.

In the Chapter on Harsha's administration (VI Chapter) many other things have been described—economic activities, Harsha's literary and artistic achievements, etc., etc. But many vital aspects of Harsha's administration (like Council of Ministers, espionage) have not been discussed. Some other important administrative points have been rarely touched. Materials of the Sino-Indian mission (Chapter VII) are certainly welcome addition to the existing literature on the subject and to some extent Harsha's diplomatic policies have been framed on the basis of these materials.

T'ai-tsung favoured Christianity, received and honoured the Buddhist pilgrim Hieantsang, approved of Taoism, favoured the Confucians and permitted Zoroastrianism (C.P. Fitzgerald, China—A Short Cultural History, p. 337).

T'ai tsung was in this respect typical of his age and nation. The mellowness of the Catholic religious beliefs of Harsha should have been compared by the author. The religious personality of Harsha is not explained.

The last and concluding statement of Devahuti Chapter—Conclusion) shows that the book suffers from serious contradictions. She says—"Harsha cannot be classed among India's greatest monarchs. He may, however, be

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regarded as one of the lesser among her great kings." (p. 268) Thus she gives third rank to Harsha—neither one among the greatest, nor equal among the great, lesser among India's great kings.

Against this view we may see her following remarks :

"Pulkesin styles Harsha as the 'master of the whole of Uttarapatha' in his record ; " (pp. 98-99) "apparently the overlord of the Uttarapatha or the Dakshinapatha—was a sort of partial Chakravarti"; " (p. 98) "his (Harsha's) political efforts prove that Harsha was inspired by the concept of Pan-Indian kingship, his accomplishments show that he succeeded in becoming Sakalotterapathanatha ; " (p. 266) "from the rank of a king of Thanesvara, Harsha rose to the status of Sakalotterapathanatha. This title is justifiable by reason of the fact that Harsha gradually bestowed political and administrative unity, upon this vast area, through his long and unbroken career that lasted for more than four decades." (p. 129) "The use of Paramabhattaraka—Maharajadhiraja for Harsha himself, is, however, quite justified from the record of his conquests and the extent of his empire. The epithet Sakalottarapatha-esvara further strengthens the authenticity of his claim ;" (p. 183) "Kings subordinate to Harsha are variously referred to by Bana as raja, bhupala, parthiva, kumara, kshitipala, nripati, narapati, etc." (p. 184) "It is clear Harsha had the tributary kings belonging to different categories ; " (p. 185) "Hieuntsang's statements regarding Harsha's early conquests are in line with those of Bana and the Manju-srimula-kalpa." (p. 96)

"Proceeding eastwards he invaded the states which had refused allegiance and waged incessant warfare until in six years he had subjugated (or repulsed) the 'Five Indias.' " (p. 96)

"Harsha gathered troops from the 'Five-India's.' " (p. 97)

"Harsha, we presume, led a march of inspection and consolidation through the districts mentioned by the Chinese pilgrim, the names of many of which survive to this day." (p. 103) "Harsha's personality as portrayed in contemporary and later sources, is indeed arresting and the 7th Century A.D. in which he flourished is a significant epoch in Indian history. It is the last outstanding instance in the Hindu Buddhist era, of centrally maintained political equilibrium in a large empire." (p. IX)

"Siladitya Maharaja has conquered the nations from east to west and carried his aims to remote districts, but the people of this country (Chalukyas of Vatapi) alone have not submitted to him." (p. 9)

Thus Devahuti has not done justice to Harsha by giving contradictory statements. Her description about the Harsha era (Appendix I) and the coins of Harsha (Appendix II) are very good, although about the dates on the silver coins I am not satisfied. The letters of Prajnadeva, Jnanaprabha and Hieuntsang (App. IV A) are to be analysed for the Buddhist study of the Harsha period. The Uighurs (a Turkish folk) (App. IV B) were prominent in China's west (Sinkiang) during the Tang period. They belie-

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ved in Manichaeanism. The author should have explained the link between Buddhism and Manichaeanism in Western China.

There should be some more chapters like—Religious Policies (or beliefs) of Harsha, Economic (or welfare) Activities of Harsha, and Harsha's Diplomacy. The described materials (with some additions) should be redistributed and rearranged in the chapters.

Most of the chapters suffer from "out of place descriptions." The book is weak in arranging materials. II and V Chapters have some unnecessary descriptions. The author gives many serious and subtle ideas and theories, but she leaves them entirely unexplained. The first sentence of the source chapter, the first paragraph of the principles of polity and many paragraphs (including the last one) of her conclusion may be checked for examples. Some wrongly written Sanskrit words (like—Sthanvisvara, Kumar-amatya, Vigrahadhikrit, Maharaj-adhiraja-Varn-asrama, Nagananda sail-odbhava, etc.) create difficulties. The illustration of the gold coin is not clear.

A map of Hieuntsang's travels in India should be given. The Roman or Nagari versions of all the inscriptions of Harsha (including in the forms of coin-legends) and of Aihole inscriptions should be given in an appendix. Harsha's silver coins should also be illustrated.

In her exhaustive bibliography, two books of Prof. A.B.L. Avasthi—"History from the Puranas" and the "Study of Skanda-Purana's,' "(for Vardhanas and Sasanka) are not mentioned. In her detailed Index sometimes alphabetic order is ignored. Printing is nice. Getup is attractive. Price—(Rs. 180) is high.

Magadha University, PRAFULLA CHANDRA ROY
Bodhgaya.

RAFIUDDIN AHMAD : The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906 : A Quest For Identity. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, 271 p., Rs. 125.

THIS is undoubtedly one of the most authoritative accounts of the Muslim society in Bengal in the post-1871 period. Based on an Oxford D. Phil thesis and now published in the Oxford University South Asian Studies Series, this book breaks much fresh ground in analysing many complex historical processes. With the aid of the vast *puthi* (religious tracts) literature, many interesting insights are offered to enrich our understanding of the Bengal countryside in the later half of the nineteenth century.

Sections dealing with the *Faraisi* and *Tariqa-i-Nuhamadiya* movements reveal Rafiuddin Ahmad's depth of scholarship. Though these religio-

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reform movements merit a far more detailed and sympathetic analysis, Rafiuddin is one of the few historians to delineate their ideological content, analyse their socio-economic programme, and identify the social composition of their followers. There is no denying the religious content of the reformist propaganda (p. 46), but there is equal recognition of the fact that the socio-economic programme of the reform movements had priority over much of their religious work, and the organisers ignored their avowed primary purpose, namely, the purification of religious life, and continually emphasised militant activities. It is shown that the *jihad* they preached was meant to drive "the English Government out of India and supplant it by Mussalman Government," that they openly called for the expropriation of the landlords without compensation, and proclaimed the interesting idea that "no man has a right to levy taxes on God's earth." (p. 45)

Rafiuddin subtly rejects conventional explanations for the rise of communal antagonism—the divide and rule policy of the Government, the historical conflict between Islam and Hinduism, and the central role of constitutional initiatives. Instead, he looks at the process of communalization in the Bengal countryside by examining the role of new educational and welfare institutions and the *waz mahfils* which became a regular feature of Muslim social life. Also analysed in the role of the *ulama* who successfully manipulated certain common symbols and slogans and helped transform Bengali Muslims into a community, marked by a certain consciousness of solidarity. (p. 72) We are also told how reformers, particularly their later efforts at Islamization, evoked much ready response, and how they were able to achieve a horizontal solidarity within the lower strata of the Muslim community. (p. 104) This was a notable change, for similar efforts by the religious preachers at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not rouse the apathetic Muslim peasantry in Bengal.

The impact of Islamization and the social and cultural trends connected with this phenomenon is the theme of chapter four. Reference is made to the "Crisis of Identity : Muslims or Bengalis"? the attempts to purge all that was Bengali in the life of a Muslim, the efforts to emphasise the distinctive ethos of Islam, and the selection of language and culture as symbols of Muslim identity. These trends are explained with a fair degree of sensitivity, but what remains somewhat vague is the background against which the process of Islamization, in particular, came to acquire a fair measure of support amongst the Muslim masses. Among the factors hinted at are : the rising tide of ill-feeling between the Hindus and Muslims, (p. 132) and the economic grievance of the Muslim peasantry against the Hindu Zamindars. (p. 162) But these factors have been inadequately discussed, and, more importantly, their far-reaching implications on the attitudes and trends in Bengali Muslim society are scarcely noticed. Proceeding on the highly dubious assumption that the *ulama* and the educated Muslim leaders successfully "manipulated' the Muslim masses to play the

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communal game and to dance to the tune of pan-Islamic solidarity, Rafiuddin arrives at certain conclusions which are hardly convincing. Moreover, he is unable to offer a satisfactory explanation to many of the questions which arise from his own narrative. These are : Why did the Muslim peasantry in Bengal rally round the symbols of Islam ? What particular symbols appealed to them and why? How was the supposed "unity" and "solidarity" of the Muslim community built in Bengal ? What were the problems and difficulties involved in overcoming the problems of social integration which faced the Muslim community, particularly its leaders and religious preachers ? Some of these questions acquire relevance in the light of Rafiuddin's own illuminating chapter on "The Bengal Muslims : Problems in Social Integration."

I have no disagreement with Rafiuddin's broad conclusion, but merely feel that his reference to "Muslim solidarity" resting on "the narrow aspirations of the vested interests which relied heavily on the manipulation of symbols assiduously popularized by the religious preachers" is far to simplistic. The notion of "Muslim solidarity," however unreal and absurd it may appear to a modern historian, reflected an objective reality from the late nineteenth century onwards and we will do well to reckon with it in our analytical framework. Notice that even after the break-up of Pakistan and the reassertion of regional identity in Bangladesh, the idea of "Muslim solidarity" is not totally abandoned.

Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, MUSHIRUL HASAN
New Delhi.

DAVID HARDIMAN : Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat : Kheda District 1917-1934. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, x, 309 p., Rs. 110.

DR HARDIMAN has in this book focused our attention mainly on the Kheda District in the years 1917-1934. Even the title "Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat" appears to be modest. The book has something of the quality of the Indian banian tree. There is the strong and vivid stem with many branches. This book covers a much wider field than the Kheda District or even Gujarat. We have a chapter on "The Politics of Non-Cooperation 1919-1924." This of course means the whole of India and Mahatma Gandhi's leadership of the Indian National Congress. This again means a broad-based study of Indian politics portraying many events and leaders. It is thus a valuable handbook on the origins of Civil Disobedience and on how a Civil Disobedience Movement creates many political reactions among the peasants. We realise as we go through the

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different chapters that leadership in civil disobedience is not an easy task, specially because such disobedience affects manifold interests of the peasantry. These interests often clash and without a strong and single minded leadership civil disobedience can break up when it appears to be reaching high promise. The author has given us the picture of how Sardar Patel himself came into sharp disagreement with Gandhiji. The redoubtable character of Sardar Patel as a leader of the peasants of Gujarat is brought out vividly. The period of the Kheda Satyagraha was right within the period of the Empire. This Empire had its almost unbreakable unity in Delhi and roots of this unity spread into the provinces and districts. But the anomaly of a disjointed centre and trackless branches is also discernible in the working of the Empire. For we are told how even when Delhi agreed to some settlement, local officials would not have it easily.

There are some high flashes of the courage and sacrifice of the peasants interspersed in the story. Here is one such flash :

> Vallabhbhai's arrest sent a wave of indignation through Kheda District. Merchants closed their shops, meetings were held throughout the district and a rousing speech which Vallabhbhai had made a fortnight before was printed and circulated around the villages. The Patidars of Ras, insulted by the arrest in their village, resolved to refuse their land revenue. The Gandhian leader of Ras, Ashabhai Patel, went to Borsad to inform the Congress leaders of their decision. The Congress leaders tried to dissuade him, arguing that Congress had not sanctioned land revenue refusal and only Gandhi could give permission for such a campaign. Ashabhai therefore waited for Gandhi to come through Borsad Taluka on the salt march, and in the meantime visited several other villages of the taluka to persuade them to join Ras. During the next ten days, he received promises from the Patidars of fourteen villages that they would refuse their revenue. Vallabhbhai's arrest thus triggered off the no-revenue campaign in Borsad Taluka.

We might add a line or two at this point. If Kheda Satyagraha led to that in Borsad, it was Borsad that led to Bardoli. And Bardoli was ofcourse the last word in the victory of Satyagraha at the time. After Bardoli, India has never looked back in the struggle for independence. However long the waiting period was, and however hard the disciplines were of the constructive programme and of the experiments in the Legislatures, India never once stepped back. Students of contemporary ideas and events of the period 1917-1934 will find valuable data in this book about the economic and political conditions of the Indian peasants. There is a revealing paragraph in the chapter entitled "Conclusion."

"The Patidars of Kheda, for instance, had no ideological commitment to the principle of non-violence, for they often murdered each other in

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land disputes and used violence on a wide scale to coerce the lower castes into submission. Non-violence was, rather, a tactic which they preferred for two reasons. First, there was less risk involved in non-violent protest, for the authorities were unlikely to suppress such agitations with the full coercive forces available to them. Thus, as long as non-violent protest achieved results, such as the humiliation of officials and cancellation of land revenue demands, the landowning peasants saw no utility in more violent forms of protest."

This is not altogether a fair analysis. But it shows the pragmatic values of non-violence in the minds of the common peasants. Let no one belittle this valuation. Non-violence is not only for saints but for the common people facing worldly problems and seeking to solve them. In this is perhaps the historic significance of non-violence for any people.

Mahatma Gandhi Vidya Peedom,
Neyyattinkara.

G. RAMACHANDRAN



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